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# CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS CHANGES: FROM DESECULARIZATION TO POSTSECULARIZATION

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**From Desecularization to Postsecularization**

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## FOREWORD

Religious life and the connections between individuals and social groups with religions and their institutions are subject to constant changes and different social influences. And the past of the Balkans undoubtedly bears witness to the degree to which extra-religious and extra-institutional circumstances (concentrated around the salvation of the believers) contribute to changes in religious and institutional life of individuals and social groups. The aforementioned changes are so strong and obvious that it would be very hard to give a complete account of them without underlining as essential for their explanation the social and even international political factors, even if we face the risk of falling into a kind of sociologism. However, between the claim that the entirety of religious life (both personal and institutional) is wholly dependent on a constellation of ambient social circumstances and the claim that the circumstances in question influence religious life realistically to a high or low degree, a clear distinction exists. And probably social sciences are the most invited among the sciences to analyze and explain the way and the degree to which the social events of the 1970's in Europe and around the world influenced the changes in the relationships between people and social groups, for both long-standing religions that have existed for centuries and more recent ones, including brand new religious ideas, expressions and practices. Of course, the social changes in question also had an influence on the social position of religions and religious institutions. In that regard the ambient influence of society on religion and religious institutions is not unidirectional, because the changed state of the religion subsequently influences social actors, culture, politics, morals and general social values.

An approach to religious changes such as this bears certain markings of methodological reductionism as religion, unlike in a theological approach, has an auxiliary rather than a main role in this approach, as religious events are used not to explain religion itself but the behavior of individuals and the interactions between social groups as carriers of certain confessional self-consciousness. The historical circumstances of the Balkans, for example, strongly imply that the relationships between individuals and peoples cannot be understood without religious factors. Because this factor is so intertwined with the social and the public sphere even today the current Balkan societies and their relationships cannot be understood without their religious/confessional weft. And with that comes all the more reason for caution – although social factors are important for the explanation of religious phenolmena, this phenomenon is not only a social product – there are gnosiological, anthropological and psychological factors to religion and religiosity.

The deterministic framework of religious changes is complex and is dependent on a set of several important social changes widely accepted as paradigmatic confirmation of the influence society had on the position of religion and religious institutions in society. On one hand at play is the process through which religious traditions acquire political importance, and on the other, the process through which those very traditions, announcing their return, deprivatize adopted, syncretic beliefs and behavior, which are important elements in the process of the desecularization of religious life. The events in question are those which showed that religion has not lost, or rather, regained its potential to inspire large, collective efforts of individuals for changes concerning the very core of their political and religious life. To be more concrete, the events in question are the following:

1. the strengthening of fundamentalism in Islamic countries at the end of the 1970's, first in the figure of the Iranian Islamic revolution, later in a series of Islamic political movements in other countries and today in the figure of Al Qaida, or, the so-called Islamic State;

2. the changing of the religious state of affairs in a series of western countries with events like, for example, the rise of Christian conservatism in the USA or the strengthening of radical Christianity in Latin America as well as the changing of the Catholic Church's strategies in Europe, from a strategy of adapting to the modern world to a strategy of reevangelizing that same world, especially with incentives that should be coming from the Catholic Church in the east, mostly from Polish Catholicism as the most effective role-model;

3. the active or at least supportive role of religions and their institutions in the destruction of the communist order in middle and eastern Europe at the end of the 1980's and, based on that, a religious state-of-affairs that can be described by the term of radical deatheization of these societies in the process of returning or bringing for decades suppressed or stigmatized religion back to the wider circles of the population.

4. the forceful rise of public, or more precisely, political (mis)use of religion with no regards to confession, in the territories of ex-socialist Yugoslavia and current Serbia in the 1980's and especially in 1990's during the Yugoslav war, and also the religious stabilization of the first decade of the 21st century after identiterian wanderings occurring throughout the aforementioned period of crisis that even today cannot be described as mere distant memory;

5. the recent rise in public importance of the orthodox church in Eastern Ukraine and Russia as an identifier, homogenizer and method of cultural defense during a period of crisis.

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Of course, while the aforementioned social and religious changes are indisputable, conclusions of theoretical and empirical studies regarding the extent of influence of social changes on religion (and its institutions) are not. How to name the processes of religious change, what is the extent of those changes, how serious and provable are the tendencies of these changes in the context of (de)secularization, post secularization, revitalization, the vitality of religion and what are the limits of these changes in the religious life of individuals – are questions to which neither final answers nor wider consensus exists. We are of the opinion that these are important questions that should individually analyzed and that answers to them should be given in interdisciplinary and international conferences especially in the context of newer research conducted in the region and Europe.

The conference proceedings before you contain reviewed papers from the "Processes, trends, extents and limits of religious changes in the contemporary world: de(secularization), post secularization, revitalization of religion – theoretical underpinnings and empirical proof" international conference held in Srebrno jezero on the 5th and 6th of April 2019, organized by the Forum for religious questions of the Center for Sociological and anthropological research of the Belgrade Institute for Social Sciences, the Yugoslavian society for scientific research of religion (JUNIR) from Niš and the Committee of Education and Culture of the Požarevac-Braničevo diocese.

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# RELIGIONS AND NATIONS AS FACTORS OF DIVISIONS AND DESINTEGRATION IN THE BALKANS

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**Summary**

Differences in the approach of theologians and sociologists to religion. Why is there no critical approach to religion in today's sociology? About overestimating an integrative role of religion in society. Does the disintegrative role of religion and nation replace this role in the global, networked, informational society? Such national and confessionally complex societies are also in the area of ex. Yugoslavia. The Bal-kans as the "limit of curse" amongst religions and confessions. Do we overlook the role of religion as a ca-pital for social changes? Religious and national situation in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina according to the 2013 census. The data show that religion and nations act integratively (homogenisingly) within a national-confessional group, but also disintegratively (distancing) towards members of other na-tional confessional groups. Has multiconfessional and multinational Bosnia and Herzegovina become a past?

Societies in which religion is not a force of peace and stability, but a source of tension and conflicts. Religion as a factor of conflict and separation (from others). Religion can also divide the members of the same national community. Different interpretation of the past, especially war events, as a source of divisions. Divisions within the same religion. Does a sociologist need to deal with them?

Nationalism as a source of divisions. The role of intellectuals in the emergence and leader-ship of nationalism. The Balkan market of nationalisms. Croatian, Bosniak and Serbian nationalism. The nation and religion can serve as a source of violence. Violence expressed in "ethnic cleansing". Violence over cultural goods. When religious and national divisions lead to a crime. What is the relationship of religious communities to victims, crimes and criminals? Today's situation.

**Key words**: religion, nation, divisions, Bosnia and Herzegovina, crime, integrative and disintegrative role.

*All great ideas should be followed by an exclamation mark – a warning signal similar to the skull and crossbones drawn on high-voltage transformers.*
Emil Cioran

Even today, in theological literature, one still finds the attitude that only theologians have the right to write about religion. If we were to accept such a po-sition, sociology of religion would be significantly impoverished if not rendered impossible altogether. And along with that idea comes the notion that sociologists who adhere to no particular religion can neither understand it nor objectively write about it. Following this logic implies that, in order to treat mentally ill patients, the psychiatrist should be mentally ill as well, while an oncologist treating cancer pati-ents should have cancer him/herself etc. Luckily, such views are not accepted within the sociology of religion which gives sociologists the opportunity to discuss and write about religion.

Certainly, there are differences between the sociologists and theologians in their approach to religion. The theologian describes the religion not as it is, but as it should be (according to “holy scriptures“). The sociologist does not assess what in a given religion is in accord with religious teachings but assess the degree to which religion influences social life and vice-versa, the degree to which society influences religious interpretation and understanding of the world. Therefore, a sociologist does not assess what a religion should be but what religion is in a concrete society. Exactly around issue of what religion and its role in society is, do the opinions of sociologists diverge.

Let's remind ourselves of the fact that the French sociologists were drawn to religion serving as a factor of solidarity and integration in a society (Durkheim), while the German sociologists to the role of religion in political (class) struggle (Marx) and its role as a compensator (Feuerbach, Freud,...). In both cases, religion's position and role in society is critically analyzed.

In sociological discussions concerning religion that took place in the territories of ex-Yugoslavia one could also very often find a critical attitude to religion, its institutions and its role in society (Vrcan, Supek, Pavićević, Roter, Kerševan, Mardešić, etc.). Why is that absent (or present to a very small degree) in contemporary sociology? Has critical theory of religion gone to the very fringes of sociology? Religious communities have, by conquering the public space during the 1990's, reacted strongly to each critique by interpreting it as an attack on religion and its attached institutions. Has this “scared“ sociologists into retreating from “slippery“ terrain due to the fact that they might be understood as those who “attack“ or “persecute“ religion?

Since the collapse of socialism and the dissolution of Yugoslavia it seems as if the sociological critique of religion, its position and role in public space has itself collapsed. More critique of religion and its role in public life (particularly in political life and nationalism) can be found in the works theologians than in the works of sociologists (Let's remind ourselves of at least some of their names: M. Volf, P. Kuzmić, R. Bigović, D. Bojić, M. Babić, I. Šarčević, M. Oršolić, R. Hafizović, E. Karić ...). Maybe some will say that this is not *novum*. Did Moses not criticize the adoration of the golden calf; Jesus the turning of the temple into a marketplace; Luther the state of the Catholic Church, Hans Küng the same in the last century? It is as if the sociologists have grown afraid of the power religion wields in public space. If they write about religion at all they do it to indicate its moral (!) role, its role as an integrating element and element of national identity. But is all so perfect with religions and their attached institutions in the territories of former Yugoslavia?

The invitation letter underlines with every right the fact that historical circumstances in the Balkans clearly show how relations between individuals and nations cannot be understood without a religious factor. We have already mentioned that French sociologists, especially Durkheim, were drawn to religion as a factor of solidarity and integration in society. That idea was later followed to the point of overestimation by many sociologists. If religion has such a strong integrative role as claimed, why did it not bring together Punjabis, Bengalis, Boludžije, and Pashtuns in Pakistan (all of them being Muslim)? The Bengali broke away and formed their own independent state of Bangladesh while ethnic conflicts in Pakistan are still occurring to this day. Or, alternatively, why has religion not brought together Serbs, Macedonians and Montenegrins (all of them being orthodox and living in a relatively small geographic area)?

In written religious sources (we in the Balkans are mostly interested in the Qur'an and the Bible given that the vast majority of the population is comprised of

Muslims and Christians) we can find support for both the integrative and the disintegrative role of religion. However, a sociologist does not judge a religion by its written sources (at least not primarily) but by its role in society. Religions used to have, when societies were comprised more or less of individuals belonging to the same religion, an integrative role (the same role nations had in monoethnic societies). However, societies have changed. Today, societies whose members belong to only a single religion (or ethnicity) are the exception to the rule. Can religion and nation, in the era of globalization, informational revolution and the networked society, when societies become (also aided by migration) multiconfessional, still play an integrative role? Or has its role changed – from an integrative into a disintegrative one. Therefore, the global, networked society, encouraged by migration, is neither monoethnic nor monoconfessional that religion could play an integrative role in it. On the contrary, the role of religion has become disintegrative.

We are following in the footsteps of those sociologists who drew attention to the fact that religions could lead to the disintegration of social members. Such a position on religion is found in Knoblauch's *Sociology of Religion* (2004) and the works of Italian sociologists Acquaviva and Pace (1966), with both of them being of the opinion that in complex societies religion no longer has an integrative role. And societies located in the territories of former Yugoslavia are of this kind (complex with regards both to ethnicity and religion).

Krleža wrote in 1939 about the "curse of the borderlands". It is precisely in the Balkans that the border between Christianity is Islam is located, along with the interior border of Christianity – between Orthodoxy and Catholicism[1]. This border was the source of bloody conflicts and wartime suffering. "Suffering passes, but the fact of having suffered never passes" (L. Bloy). One life is lead before experiencing war-time suffering, another after experiencing it. One kind of life was led by the members of various ethnicities and religions up to the beginning of the 1990's, and a different one altogether after the ensuring conflicts.

The invitation letter highlights that religion has not lost, or rather, that it has regained its potential to stimulate large, collective efforts by people directed towards changing the very essence of their political and religious life. Are we not overestimating the role of religion as capital for social changes? Specifically, it seems that we are overestimating the role religion played in the collapse of socialism in Europe during the end of the last century. Namely, a large number of authors (a fact that can also be gleaned from the invitation letter) consider that religion (especially the Vatican) had either an active or at least a supportive role in the destruction of the social-list order in Middle and Eastern Europe during the end of the 1980's. The fact that religious institutions did not accept socialism and that they were a kind of silent opposition to it is indisputable. However, the search for the real reasons behind the collapse of socialism should be conducted elsewhere, which is beyond the scope of this paper.

Let's return to "democratic states" and the role that religion and ethnicity plays in them. Sadly, "the possibility of identity problems to cause conflict and instability in and between democratic states is real and unpleasant. "[2] This can best be seen on the example of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the last couple of decades.

[1] "That is the border between Eastern and Western Christianity. I doubt that there ever will be a border strewn with more bitterness than this one" (Stoddart, 2009: 42).

[2] Francis Fukuyama, Voting with one's feet and the end of history. NIN, Beograd, 12. 7. 2018: 44.

*The religious and national circumstances in B&H according to the 2013 population census*: "The most interesting religion in the making is the religion of data" (Harari, 2018: 451). And I myself have not managed to resist it, so I am reporting some data that might be interesting in the context of the topic I am writing about. This data clearly shows that religion and ethnicity can be factors not of rapprochement but of distancing (of homogenization of its adherents) between individuals of different religious and national/ethnic identities.

The population of Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided for centuries by confessional and, starting from 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, national identities. However, rarely did those identities divide them as much as they did during the end of the last and the beginning of this century.

I return to statistical data in order to illustrate how much ethnically and religiously more homogeneous and further apart we are after each war. According to the 1991 population census, 30.0952 % of the population declared itself as Orthodox, 42.7666 % as Muslim and 16,9651 % as Catholic. After that no census was conducted until 2013. Back then the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina was 3.531.159. The majority was made up of Bosnians (50.11%), Serbs (30.77%) and Croats (15.42%). The Serbs were mostly concentrated in the Republic of Srpska (81.51%), while Bosnians (70.40%) and Croats (22.44%) were mostly concentrated in the Federation. In the Republic of Srpska the Croats made up 2.4%[3] of the total population while Serbs in the Federation made up 2.55 %.

To what ethnic and religious violence committed during the 1991-1995 war can lead is best illustrated by the following figures: In municipalities of The Republic of Srpska in which Serbs were the majority of the population in 2013, 312.560 Bosnians were absent when compared to 1991. In places where the Croats (in the Federation) were the majority the number of Bosnians decreased by 22.589 when compared to 1991. 79.79% of all Bosnians lived in nationally homogeneous municipalities (where 50% of the population is comprised of members belonging to the same ethnic group) in 2013. In 1991 that percentage was 65.54%. Only 16.5% of all Bosnians lived in municipalities where they were not the majority in 2013. When compared to 1991, the number of Bosnian residents has decreased in 64 municipalities by a number of: Zvornik – 28.247; Doboj – 25.842; Banja Luka - 20.907 (equaling 73.21% of the pre-war population); Prijedor – 20.317 (equaling 41.17% of the pre-war population); Bosanska Krupa – 19.526; Foča – 19.520 (equaling 93.89% of the pre-war population) etc.

When compared to 1991 the number of Croatian residents has decreased in 85 municipalities, out of which the following municipalities take the lead in the number of absent residents: Banja Luka – a reduction of 23.922 (equaling 82.42% of the pre-war population); Derventa – 19.383 (equaling 88.29% of the pre-war population); Zenica – 14.231 (equaling 63.22% of the pre-war population); Kakanj – 13.583 (equaling 82.04% of the pre-war population); Travnik – 11.419 (equaling 42.18% of the pre-war population); Brod – 10.706 (equaling 76.51% of the pre-war population) etc. In municipalities in which the Serbs were the majority population in 2013, the

[3] The data in question is the best answer to Aleksandar Vučić's question regarding the degree to which Republic of Srpska was multiethnic. Namely, Vučić stated the following on BN TV: "Is the Republic of Srpska multiethnic today? Well it is. The Serbs live as a majority but in it also live Bosnians and Croats. Where and in which number depends from city to city" („*Oslobođenje*", Sarajevo, 28. 1. 2019: 9).

number of Croat residents has decreased by 116.872 when compared 1991 and by 135.980 in municipalities where the majority population was Bosnian.

The number of Serbian residents has increased in municipalities located in The Republic of Srpska when compared to 1991. However, 89 municipalities experienced a decrease in the number of Serbian residents when compared to 1991 - mostly municipalities located in the Federation: Novi Grad Sarajevo – a reduction of 33.244 (equaling 88.38% of the pre-war population); Novo Sarajevo – 29.407 (equaling 89.98% of the pre-war population); Sanski Most – 23.526 (equaling 92.75% of the pre-war population); Ilidža – 23.429 (equaling 93,61% of the pre-war population); Zenica – 20.024 (equaling 89.26% of the pre-war population), etc. In the municipallities where Bosnians were the majority in 2013, 411.840 Serbs were missing and in municipalities with a Croat majority, 23.392 Serbian residents were missing. 91.38% of the total Serb population lived in ethnically homogenous municipalities (in 1991 this figure was 44.44%).

In total, in 2013, 96.16% of the total population declared itself as religious, with the population declaring itself as Muslim 50.7% (1991 – 42.76%); Orthodox 30.75% (1991 – 29.39%); and Catholic 15.99% (1991 – 16.87%), respectively. Here Knoblauch's claim that in confessionally-mixed societies "alienation" from religious institutions is higher does not hold. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the situation is different.

According to data from the 2013 population census, The Republic of Srpska is ethnically and confessionally more homogenous than the Federation. Only 6 municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina have remained multiconfessional (with no single group holding more than a 50% share in the total population): Mostar, Distrikt, Brčko, Jajce, Busovača, Vukosavlje i Glamoč. Not one of these is located within The Republic of Srpska. Has the multiethnic and multiconfessional Bosnia and Herzegovina become a thing of the past? Has it been replaced by a tri-partite, ethnically-confessional homogenization?

If the fact of living in nationally homogenous municipalities is taken as criteria, then Serbs have homogenized the most – 91.38% of them live in ethnically homogenous municipalities. The criterion of "we won't (live) with them" has led to the formation of municipalities in The Republic of Srpska that have no more than 300 residents (Kupres RS); 257 (Mostar Istok) and even to the formation of the Drvar Istok municipality with only 79 residents. The population of many villages in Serbia is greater than that of the aforementioned municipalities. Right behind the Serbs in the degree of homogenization are the Bosnians with 79.79% of them living in ethnically homogenous municipalities. The Croats are the least homogenized – with 57.04% of them living in ethnically homogenous municipalities.[4] It should be kept in mind, however, that in Neum, Čitluk, Široki Brijeg, Posušje and Grude municipalities Croats in constituted more than 90% of the total population before the 1991-1995 war. Therefore, the wartime events of 1991-1995 homogenized them less than the Serbs and the Bosnians.

The aforementioned data shows that religious and ethnic identity can have a dual role in multiethnic and multiconfessional society: an integrative role within a single religious/ethnic community and a disintegrative one with regards to interconfessional and interethnic relations (which resulted in religious/ethnic homogenization and mutual distancing). That's how it usually is in the "nationally, ethnically di-

[4] More information regarding this in: Ivan Cvitković, National and confessional state of affairs in B&H, *Demographic and ethnic changes in B&H*. ANU BiH, Sarajevo, 2017.

vided Balkans, a terrain which for the long time represented for Europe a threatening other...“ (Eaglton, 2011: 160). In a terrain like that one finds an entire mosaic of linguistic/confessional/national divisions. Nation and language are the causes of division within the same religion (confession) – Slovenians and Croats are Catholic but language was the crucial factor in the formation of two distinct nations; Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians are Orthodox and yet they are divided into different nations; Bosnians and Albanians are of the same religion[5], Islam, and yet they belong to different nations (for Albanians language was an important factor of national self-consciousness).

There are societies in which religion is not a force of peace and stability but *a source of tension and conflict.* [6] It would seem that the same is the case with the role of religion in the territories of former Yugoslavia. As M. Krleža said: in the entire world God brings people together, but in the Balkans, He divides them. We are not disputing that religious and cultural differences can be a source of wealth; however, they can also be a source of bloody conflicts. Acquaviva and Pace wrote about religion as a source of conflict in their *Sociology of religion* (1996). Hamilton seems to agree with them when pointing out that “religion can be a cause of conflict as much as it can be an integrative force“ (Hamilton 2003: 42). Religions create *separation* from others that are not “ours“ (Muslims, Catholics, Orthodox ...). But, religion (confession) can also divide members of the same ethnic community: Germans (Catholic and Protestant); Irish (Catholic and Protestant); Albanians (Muslim, Catholic and Orthodox), Holland and Flanders (Protestant and Catholic), Swiss (Catholic and Protestant). [7]

Conflicts are often preceded by a spreading of fear regarding the Other, or „them“. In the same vein, during the end of the 1980's, the spreading of fear regarding forceful conversions to Catholicism, Orthodoxy or Islam served as a prelude to the bloody conflicts of the 1990's. Along with the return of national myths during the 1990's, church bells, religious holidays and God(s) also came back. That's how, contrary to the whole world, we were divided by God(s), Miroslav Krleža would say. People behaved as if there was no other proof of ethnic identity other than religion and confession.[8] The connection between religious communities and nations leads to the connection between religion and nationalism. [9]

Rarely did the adherents of the three religions in Bosnia and Herzegovina have the same interpretations of past events. This is especially true with regards to wartime events. It was so in the past, and so it is now. As they once led to division, so

[5] There are some Orthodox and Catholic Albanians, however.

[6] “Religious differences are often sources of tension and conflict which does not support the functionalist explanation of religion as a fundamentally unifying force” (Hamilton, 2003: 197).

[7] Serbian nationalists would here mention Serbs of Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim faith (similarly to how Tuđman in the 1990’s talked about Catholic and Muslims Croats.) I’m not completely disregarding the possibility for certain individuals to identify themselves as such, but, that story belongs more to the stuff of jokes than to the social reality of the 21st century.

[8] Since the fall of the Berlin wall we are located in a world where belongings are overemphasized, especially those which stem from religion; in which coexistence of different human communities, in turn, becomes harder every single day, a world in which democracy is constantly at the mercy of identitarian competition” (Maluf, 2009: 23).

[9] “Through contact with the Church nationalism has become some kind of religion, while the Church has fallen into ethnophillistinism and clericalism, and, in the end, it became the most important ‘institution of the Serbian people’”, writes Basara (2018: 75).

do they does now (for example, the interpretation of wartime events from 1991-1995; of the formation of The Republic of Serbia and so on). Differing memories of a mutual past warn us that disputes may happen again, as Vladimir Tabašević points out in his novel *Zabluda svetog Sebastijana* (2018).

Is a return to religion the only way to reach salvation and moral stability after the bloody 20th century and the "defeat of God" that happened in it? The problem at the beginning of the 21st century lies not with the "conflict" between religions but with a "void" (J. Kristeva) that exists between the adherents of different religions, and/or between them and those that "do not belong". Such a "void" does not lead to moral stability.

We also bear witness to *intrareligious division*: Hinduism divides its adherents into classes (Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, Shudras). In Islam we find the division into Sunni, Shia and Salafi; In Christianity we find the Catholics, the Protestants and the Orthodox; in Buddhism we find the division between the Hinayana and Mahayana Buddhists. During the last couple of years "nothing has remained simple even in the Orthodox world, wherever you turn, discord, wherever you look, schism", as Svetislav Basara writes in his novel *Andrićeva lestvica užasa* (2016: 96).

In Bosnia and Herzegovina we are observing disputes between Bosnian Muslims and the Wahhabis[10] (What is the proper form of prayer: the one used by Muslims in Bosnia for centuries or the one practiced by the Wahhabis). Additionally, Wahhabism rules out "any vision which brings together tolerance and openness towards different religious understanding", as Khosrokhavar Farhad writes in his book *Radicalization* (2017: 151). Let's also mention the disputes between the Franciscans and the bishops regarding the administration of the counties in Bosnia and Herzegovina, etc. Should a sociologist concern him/herself with division within religious communities, given that these divisions are "their internal concern"? All of aforementioned disputes would not be the objects of sociological discussion if they did not also concern interpersonal relationships, specifically, relationships within a local community (physical confrontations regarding houses of worship; divisions between adherents that are "for" and those that are "against", which lead to situations where brothers and sisters stop communicating altogether), and, if there were no requests from religious communities for the government to decide on those very disputes (because the communities are themselves incapable of solving them).

What are the factors that have led and may yet still lead to mutual distancing (between the Catholics, the Orthodox and the Muslims) in the territories of former Yugoslavia?

Nationalism as a source of division: The word nationalism by itself is not a negative word. However, "words get soiled in such a way that they can never be washed clean" (Jergović, 2015: 30). Nationalism is one such word. Nationalism "is an ideology that successfully brings together that which is usually socially divided: classes, layers and groups – which then accept all other differences" (Šušnjić, 2014: 115).

Many authors in their analysis of nationalism (J. H. Kautski, Ernst Gellner, Anthony Smith, Benedict Anderson, etc.) point out the large influence of intellecttuals on the creation and the management of nationalism. In order to "differentiate" themselves from other Balkan nations, they (ethno-intellectuals) are even capable of proclaiming one people "divine". No kind of nationalism is absent from the Balkan

[10] "Islam is a religion of peace while Wahhabism is an ideology of murder and war" (Rešid Hafizović, professor at the Islamic studies faculty, interview "Emancipation", Sarajevo, 5. 11. 2011: 33).

market: ethnic, chauvinist, "western", "eastern", linguistic, "progressive", "reactionnary", religious, moderate, aggressive, authoritarian, democratic, "populist", cultural, political, secular. Here you go, folks! Choose the one that suits you. The nationnalism market is still dominated by a competition between Croat, Bosnian and Serbian nationalism in proving which nation had it worst in "Tito's time" – which nation "suffered" the most. "National past" serves the needs of current national leaders and elites. "National past" and the "obsession" with one's own innocence are most commonly used by the nationalists to further their own goals. They are mostly interested in the suffering and the plight of their own people (in the past and recent wars that happened in former Yugoslavia) while also ignoring the suffering and the plights of others. '"Remember!" and "Never Forget!"... The remembering of past misdeeds acquired the strength of an almost pseudo-religious duty (Wolf 2012: 306). The nationalists in their striving to glorify their own people, very often, in actuality, do the opposite and humiliate it with their attitudes and actions.

*Croat nationalists* are linking up with right-wing political groups and are propagating Neo-fascist ideas (let's remind ourselves of the problems Croatian football had with FIFA because of the presence of Neo-fascist groups among the football supports: creating a swastika with their bodies; the waving of the Ustaša flag; using the Nazi salute; the singing of songs glorifying Ustaša war-criminals, etc.) "That which has died should be buried, while positive values which were bequeathed to us by former generations should be resurrected and set up as examples for those who are yet to come", wrote Krleža (1983: 157). It is certain that Krleža would never count Ustaša ideology, the destruction of antifascist monuments, intolerance towards the Other and being a "Great Croat", etc., among those values. Besides, it takes no knowledge for one to be a "Great Croat". It is enough for one to have a dose of anti-Serbian and anti-Bosnian sentiment, wave the flag, be against the Cyrillic script and he or she would be quite close to Greater Croatia ideology. Croat nationalists in Bosnia and Herzegovina see clearly and highlight the difficult position of Croats in municipalities where they are the statistical minority; however, they do not see that the position of the members of the two other ethnicities is exactly the same in Croat majority municipalities.

Does Cardinal Bozanić's speech given on the 24th of January 2019, marking the International Holocaust Remembrance Day, herald new "currents" in the Catholic Church? Namely, cardinal Bozanić has, among other things, highlighted that: "We should place special importance on the events that happened in our environment, in Croatia, and highlight without any reprieve the truth about the horrors of Jasenovac and other death camps, the killing fields of innocents".[11] Such a message, mentioning both Jasenovac and marking the International Holocaust Remembrance Day, was not sent by a single member of the government or a representative of the Croatian Parliament.[12]

Besides Croatian, *Bosnian nationalism* is also flourishing. For a long time now Bosnians have been trying to "appropriate" a part of the medieval past of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the center of that effort is the Bogomil myth, held so dear by the Bosnian nationalists. Individuals from the Islamic community also see the dangers of that myth: "Our consciousness of our indigenousness has created in us a dislike for

[11] Source: Jutarnji list, Zagreb, 26. 1. 2019: 6.

[12] Sadly, hope is lost due to the fact that Bozanić, in that specific speech, did not mention either the NDH or the Ustašas who were the orchestrators behind Jasenovac and many other camps.

any ethnicity other than Bosnian", says dervish Senad Mičijević. [13] To what national animosity leads to is also illustrated by the fact that "in February 2010 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Bosnian National Pride movement was formed based on the Handžar division and defined its enemies as the following: 'Jews, Roma, chetniks, Croatian separatists, Tito, communists, homosexuals and churches'"[14] Will the Bosnians pay for their creation of a victim myth (stating this I do not want to diminish their suffering, especially in the 1991-1995 war); will that awareness create a destructive force in young people?

Bosnian nationalists highlight that in "Tito's Yugoslavia", Bosnians faced inequality. And yet it is in this exact "unjust" Yugoslavia that their status as a national community was recognized. Džemal Bijedić, the president of SIV, was a Bosnian and so was the Raif Dizdarević, a president of the Yugoslavian presidium. Or are they not considered Bosnian by the nationalists?

I would not say that *Serbian nationalism* lags behind Croatian and Bosnian nationalism in any way. Among the Serbian nationalists the obsession with "Serbian lands" can still be observed (S. Basara). Was not the carrying of reliquaries through "Serbian lands" (during the end of the 1980's) put to that purpose? In interview for "Politika" (27. 1. 2019), the Serbian Patriarch Irinej also spoke about "The Serbian states". Statements like that are still associated with territorial pretensions aimed against them by the neighboring peoples and states. The patriarch also spoke about the "earthly and heavenly Serbia". [15]

The Serbian Orthodox church spread myths resting on the assumption that Serbs suffered just because they were Serbs. The eternal fear of the Vatican, the West, Europe and an orientation towards their Orthodox brothers in Russia (who often did not behave even as cousins, much less as brothers.) This "pagan and zoological nationalism Orthodoxy transforms either into a national ideology or a natural, "market" religion. For a long time has this nationalism "been eroding the very foundations of the unity of the Orthodox church", wrote Radovan Bigović, professor of the Orthodox seminary.[16] The transformation of a universal religion such as Christianity into a nationalized religion ("svetosavlje") has led to a disregard for the Christian principle of universality (similar to how some "transform" the Catholic Church in Croatia into The Church of Stepinac).

Now, at the very beginning of this century, Serbian politicians like to point out that Serbia is a leader in the region (leader in what!). I can in no way accept the notion that "Yugoslavia fell apart mostly due to the policy of Serbian nationalism. Because of that I think that others cannot be blamed for their weakness. The dissolution of Yugoslavia I consider a tragedy of all people that lived in it, but it wasn't caused from the outside", points out Hobsbaum. [17]

*Nation and religion can serve as a source of violence:* In the Book of Genesis we read about how the serpent persuaded Adam and Eve to freely enjoy the fruit from the Tree of the Knowledge because then they would, as gods, know of good and evil, or, in other words, they would become able to do both. In the New Testament we can find passages that point to a deeper antagonism towards family. Today we would call

[13] Senad Mičijević, dervish in the interview "Emancipation", 21. 10. 2006: 11.
[14] *Neonaci ex-Ju*., v. Helsinška povelja, Beograd, broj 149-150, 2011: 34.
[15] „Najveća nacionalistička laž je da smo mi posebni. Nismo" (Džamić, 2015: 98).
[16] Radovan Bigović, Pravoslavana Crkva na kraju drugog milenijuma. „*Politika*", Beograd, 6. 1. 1996: 20.
[17] Radovan Bigović, Pravoslavana Crkva na kraju drugog milenijuma. „*Politika*", Beograd, 6. 1. 1996: 20.

that antagonism domestic violence. One of the 10 commandments reads: Honor thy father and thy mother. How do, for example, children with divorced parents or parents guilty of domestic abuse deal with this commandment? Can parents represent for them authority that should be respected? Jesus' own attitude towards family is "for the most part brutally indifferent" (Eagleton, 2011: 286).

But, let's leave that ancient history to the historians of religion. Let's try to show, through a few examples, how religion can be a source, or a supporter, of violence in the modern era as well. Was it not Pope Pius XI (1922-1939) who ordered the Catholics of Germany to be friendly towards Hitler in 1932, and also supported Mussolini's attack on Ethiopia (Nigel, 2008: 288). At the beginning of the 21st century wars (local, civil...) were being waged in 84 countries while 50 of them had religious markings. It would seem that "religions behave extraordinarily aggressively, while at the same wanting to be treated with kid gloves", wrote Salman Rushdie (2005).

Of course, the extent to which the feelings of humiliation (religious, national, racial, linguistic...) and suffering play a role in the motives behind violence should always be investigated. "That feeling that suffering makes us special and that need to keep our suffering safe from any comparison – for myself I have named the vanity of suffering", points out literary author and academic Dževad Karahasan. [18]

The violence manifested in "ethnic cleansing" (what is cleansed are dirty objects, and ethnicities certainly are not that – cruelty of the term notwithstanding, it still has made itself at home in local writing) in the conflicts of the 1990's was not aimed at bringing people together but at mutual distancing of members of different nationalities and ethnicities (Croats, Serbs, Bosnians, Albanians) and confessions (Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim). This is also evident in the Bosnia & Herzegovina census data which was cited above. And any idea of creating a "clean" national territory (which was one of the leading ideas of the conflicts of the 1990s) is by itself genocidal.

Let us also mention examples of violence committed on cultural goods. When socialism collapsed and the national parties won, "unsuitable" books[19] were burned in the 1990's (especially in the conflicts happening then). [20] More than 85% of library material contained in the National and University library located in the Sarajevo City Hall were destroyed in a fire on the 25th/26th of August, 1992. The material destroyed was comprised out of around 3 million books. (The fire was caused by incendiary grenades fired by Mladić's warriors from the nearby hills). And "when books are being burned, by rule, human bones also always break!" (Krleža, 2009: 154). And so it was during the ensuring conflicts. [21]

Much literature has been written about *the times when religious and ethnic divisions lead to crimes*. How nice it was in the golden age of Pericles. He considered

[18] Dževad Karahasan, in "Likovne novine" in Prague 17. 6. 1993.

[19] During Stalin's purges 24 million books were also burned. It is interesting to think about whether there are any similarities between book burnings happening under Stalin and those happening under Hitler, writes Aleida Assmann (Asman, 2018: 91).

[20] Examples of book burning we find almost everywhere. Let us mention on more: in January 2011 the Iranian government confiscated and burned around 300 Bibles. Almost no one in the world protested, but when a single eccentric in the US burned a Qur'an (January 2011), global condemnation ensured. (Source: Marko Karamatić, Christians in Islamic countries. In "Svjetlo riječi", Sarajevo, November 2014: 40).

[21] "All of us were not bested by either the Serbs or the Croats, but simply by human scum, criminals, murderers, pickpockets, thimble riggers, psychopats, cowards, ruffians, thiefs, bandits and good-for-nothings, found on all sides. What bested us was the lack of our will to stand up to them", writes Dubravka Ugrešić in her novel *Lisica* (2017: 157).

best and greatest in his life the fact that no living Athenian put on black because of him. But in the Balkans "evil is that which should always be hoped for" (Krleža, 1976: 262). Everyone feels like a victim of evil, but not a participant in it (Aleksievič, 2013: 11). The need to have the status of the victim is dominant.[22] "As a crime we acknowledge only those inflicted upon us, whining is as a hymn to us and pits are our places of sleep. Sometimes and somewhere, I get the impressions that I also sang similarly, with them" (Drašković, 2013: 40).[23] Did everything that started as a competition in martyrology (and religious communities also competed in that – I. C) end in martyrological imperialism? "Wars in Yugoslavia during the 1990's started because, among other things, the Serbs believed that the number of their compatriots killed during the Second World War was much higher than it really was", writes Snyder (2018: 473).

Of course, "it is much easier to remember the pain caused on us by others than to confess to what we did to them." And reconciliation and mutual respect can only be renewed through a confrontation with the past and an admission of guilt and compliance (Ipgrave, 2011: 210).

"The victims are, by the nature of things, dead and they cannot defend themselves from the misuse of their death by others", writes Snyder (2018: 465). And what's the relationship of religious communities towards the victims, the crimes and the perpetrators? "Christ has always been with us, the Orthodox Serbs" says Patriarch Irinej in an interview for "Politika" (27. 1. 2019). Was he also with them in Srebrenica, 1995? He was as much with them as he was with Catholic Croats in Ahmići and the Muslim Bosnians in Grabovica (serious crimes were committed in both places, not as serious as the crime of genocide in Srebrenica, but a crime nonetheless, as determined by the ICC in Hague. No one is going to humiliate the Croats for Ahmići, the Bosnians for Grabovica or the Serbs for Srebrenica, they were all humiliated by the members of their own nations which committed the crimes there. They were humiliated by the members of their own religious communities which welcomed convicted war criminals as nation heroes, promoting their books and organizing public debated for them on religious property. "How much death and tragedy is needed for us to come to our senses? How many victims should fall before we turn on our sensitivity? There is a saying that the death of an individual is a tragedy, but that the death of millions nothing else but a statistic", writes Donskis (Bauman and Donskis, 2017: 25).

And today: "War! War! War! is being heard more loudly than in 1991… all things that were left unfinished during the last war should be put right, something that was started then and left unfinished should be brought to an end… there are great protectors, brothers in blood, faith and country: Erdogan, the protector of Islam and the sovereign Turkish right to Bosnia; Putin, the great Russian Emperor, the benefactor of Slavs and Christians; Donald Trump, the promoter of traditional values, who is going to draw the line between the West and the East. Why do we need national sovereignty if not to go to war over it? War! War! War! – chant the leaders

[22] "In the 21st century a second wave of aggressive wars occurred, which began with the representation of the aggressor as the victim while the leaders openly invoked mass killings on the 20th century. Humankind's ability to perceive itself as the victim is obviously without bounds, and individuals who convince themselves that they are victims are easily motivated into horrific violence (Snyder, 2018: 465)".

[23] "According to nationalist and "Jacobin" patriotism, the fatherland can never commit a crime and nothing that is done in the name of the fatherland can be considered a crime; or, alternatively, even if the fatherland was in the wrong, it is a crime to remind it of the crime".

of forevermore discordant tribes, peoples and states...There is only one reason why this war, however, will not happen. Nothing truly important remains here, blessed are the irrelevant. [24]

This retrospective look the disintegrative role of religion and nations in multireligious and multiethnic societies should not be understood as some sort of wish for a society without religions or nations. I am aware that this would be a utopia. But, the fact that we would be all better off in the Balkans if we were to sometimes and somehow forget about religion and nation, seems obvious to me. Nothing better ever comes later, goes a German proverb. After every conflict the religious/-confessional divisions in the Balkans become ever deeper. We are becoming more distanced from each other. This is why each subsequent war is bloodier than the one before. Comfort yourselves; the worst is yet to come! (Graffiti)

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[24] Miljenko Jergović, War! War! War! Or why the war will not happen, in "Jutarnji list", Zagreb, 24. Janury 2017: 25.

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# (DE)SECULARIZATION IN THE XXI CENTURY: EMPIRICAL VERIFICATION OF THE REVITALISATION OF RELIGIOSITY IN SERBIA

**Summary**

The purpos of this paper is a clarification of the terms and proceses of desecularization and modernity, wich are inevitable when one regards religious changes in modern postindustrial societies, as well as in postsocialist ones. Empirical reasrches confirm that even the most secular Western Europe does not have a homogenus religious society. In the second part of the paper the autores will use key empirical research in an attempt to show revitalisation of religion in Serbia as well. The nineteen-nineties brought war, crisis and transition, but they also brought a functional change for the Serbian Ortodox Church. This paper will address some of these changes: 1) religion is not just a personal thing any more, it assumes a certain place in the public sphere; 2) a new law of religious freedom (2006) changed the legal status of religious communities; 3) religious centers and temples are being rebuilt and built; 4) religions have gained their place in the media (public and private), and religious radio and tv stations are also created; 5) religious communities are reciving financial suport, as well as tax brakes from the state, and they are gradually taking control over their property which was previously nationalised. There is also an reemergence of Religious education in Primary and Secondary Schools, religious service in the military and in the hospitals, so it is necessary to monitor these processes in future.

**Key words**: (de)secularization, empirical reasrches, Serbian Ortodox Church, Europe, Serbia.

## INTRODUCTION

The challenge of modernization and secularization of religion today is being met by the religization of modernity (Vukomanović, 2009: 10). Religion, as an integral part of the globalization process, interact with different ideological, political, cultural and economic systems. On the other hand it become a safe haven for “cultural defence”, both nationally and locally. The term *Return of the Sacred*, which is being brodly used in debates about the dominant tendencies of religius situations in (post)modern societies, was introduced to the sociology of religion by Daniel Bell in his memorial lecture dedicated to Hobhaouse in 1977.

In order to define secularization we need to reexamine the concepts of religion, modernity and secularization. The way we perceive secularization will determin the way we understand religious revitalisation. Depending on what we imply by the term of secularization we can explain religious revitalization, whether secularization means the differentiation between secular sphere and religious institutions, a decline of religious beliefs and practices or the withdrawal of religion in to the private sphere. If we are to talk about secularization, religious revitalization and sacralization we need to keep in mind the fact that religion has once again emerged in those parts of the world where secularization occurred. *Theoreticians* all agree on one thing, Europe is a place of empirical verification for the theory of secularization. Non the less, when people report on the results of the *European Values Study*, they use the term "church-free spirituality" instead of the term secularization because Europeans *did not lose their* "religious" needs.[1]

We consider that secularization, same as it's opposite process of desecularization, is a reversible process (Radisavljević Ćiparizović, 2006). According to some authors, like Yinger (Yinger, 1970) the process of desecularization is a part of the "eternal cycle of religion", which is immanent to human nature, so the only question that makes sense is "in which way is someone religious?", and not "is he religious at all?" Desecularization is an inevitable term when one regards religious changes in modern industrial and postindustrial societies, as well as in postsocialist and transitional societies. In her book *Sociology of religion* Grace Davie writes that after the predomination of the established theory of secularization, todays religious revitalization sparks a sociological debate in an attempt to theoretically clarify what is empirically evidente - the presence of religion in different forms which manifests itself in the individual and social plane. That leads to new religious forms, besides old ones, which influences individuals, and the society itself. Luckman writes that religion in modern society is in no way invisible, while Davie says that secularization seams to be extrinsic to modernity, so you can be entirely "modern" and entirely religious. There are different opinions by those authors who claim that modernization inevitably leads to secularization. For example K. Dobblaere and B. Wilson remain fervent supporters of the secularization theory stating that it stil has some explanatory value concerning modern social processes (Radisavljević Ćiparizović, 2016: 74). On the other hand Peter Berger, a former supporter of the secularization paradigm, feels that desecularization has become a permanent phenomenon (Berger, 2008:12).

The most aperent way to disprove secularization is by use of empirical evidence based on experience because since the mid '70s, or the late '80s for postcommunist societies there is an increas of religious revitalization in diferent spheres of religious and social life. Comparative empirical data regarding religious situations in modern societies show with out a doubt that not only religion did not disappear, but it never retrited to the private sphere, and in some contemporary societies, traditionnal and modern, it impose itself as the main creator of public life.

There isn't a unique stance concerning which model is the dominant one: "believing without belonging" (Davie 1994), or "belonging without believing" (Davie 2005), or "neither believing nor belonging" (Voas; Crocket, 2005). The hub of British sociology of religion is composed of *noninstitutionalized* forms of religion, new religious movements and New Age, religious minorities and religious organisation and its role in modern life (Davie, 1994). At the center of French sociology of religion lies an interest in new structures of religious communities, social consequence of religious pluralism, especially the urgent question of Islam, and the separation of religious faith from religious-institutionalized dogmas (Hervieu-Léger, 2000). We agree with the German sociologist Knoblauch when he states that the religious situation in Europe is so diverse and uneven that it can not be judged by the same standards (Knoblauch, 2004: xi).

[1] https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/about-evs/research-topics/religion/.

Besides the distinctions between modernity and postmodernity (Davie, 2008: 90) theoreticians also indicate that there are differences and distinctions between different concepts of modernity. According to *Eisenstadt* concept of “multiple modernities” indicates that we cannot identify modernity with the transference of western models to other parts of the world (Gavrilović, 2008: 53-59).

Theoreticians of secularization thought that the only way religious organizations can remain a part of society is if they adjust to the secularised world. Berger came to a different conclusion: “The fact is not only did religious communities survive, but they are flourishing in that extent in which they refused to adjust to some supposed demands of the secularised world” (Berger, 2008: 14).

The results of a research done by the *Pew Research Center* show that people in West Europe believe in a Christian God the least, unlike people in Central and East Europe. The research involved 1400 citizens from each of these European countries, and religiousness was measured thru questions involving participation in religious ceremonies, daily prayer, belief in God, and total belief in the importance of religion for the individual (*Politika,* 17.2.2019)[2]. Armenia was at the top of the list with 79% of believers, Georgia was second with 73%, followed by Moldavia, Romania, Bosnia, Grece and Serbia in seventh place, while Croatia was in eight place (B92, 20. 2. 2019).[3]

One of the types of desecularization is an emergence of fundamentalism occurring as a reaction to the change brought on by modernisation. As a form of such deprivatization, Casanova recognizes protestant fundamentalism and Catholic reactions to abortion. Also, alongside the questions of contraception and genetical engineering, religion can emerge as an authority in environmental protection in modern societies.

## DESECULARIZATION IN SERBIA

During the nineties people from former socialist countries started to turn towards religion, because of the collapse of socialism which left an ideological vacuum. The collapse of communism led to significant religious changes, and also led to changes in religious situations in almost every East European, and Middle European country. And while one social, cultural and symbolic system was nearing its end, another which was marginalised for a long time has been given a chance for (re)affirmation. Desecularization at first spread among the Catholic population during the ’70s, but later during the end of the ’80s and early ’90s, it spread to the homogeneous Orthodox population, a population which was a full decade behind in desecularization, as they were more prone to secularization.

Complex causes of mass conversion to atheism of the traditional Orthodox population, and the complete marginalization of the Serbian Orthodox Church (referred below as SOC) had a deeper historical background. According to historian Radmila Radić, SOC was unable to conduct an inner reform during the XIX and XX century and become an initiator of modernization processes in Serbia, due to internal and external circumstances. Namely, SOC emerged from World War 2 as depleted,

[2] “Belief in God“ http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/422931/Vera-sa-sumnjom-u-Boga
[3] “West filed with non-believers: Serbs in 7. Place just above their neighbours.” https://www.b92.net/zivot/vesti.php?yyyy=2019&mm=02&dd=20&nav_id=1507663.

robed, with its priesthood decimated, and without any material bases, or real income due to the agrarian reform, so it was depended on the government aid. “Modus Vivendi between the church and the state was to be achieved through peaceful means, according to state authorities, meaning that the church had to abandon its mission willingly, and withdraw from the public sphere... Total control over the organization of the SOC was achieved in a little less than five years after the war” (Radić, 1994: 352). The so called "inner weakness of orthodoxy" was considered the main reason of opposition towards secularization, especially compared to Catholicism an Isalm, and they entailed the following: 1) traditional roles of SOC in the definition of the Serbian national subject and its symbolic connections to the state, 2) decentralized nature of institutionalized orthodoxy, and the lack of a sole administrative center, which would give it support in the fight against social marginalization, do with the new and unfavorable situation. For example, Vatikan always provided strong support for the Catholic church in Croatia and Slovenia, 3) Fideism as reliance on faith rather than reason in pursuit of religious truth, and the neglect of social problems. 4) a long time schism in the Church, while it was in emigration.[4] The results of such forced secularization are best demonstrated by Đorđevic's empirical research of the district of Niš, done in 1984 where the percentage of religious practices, celebrations and dogmatic beliefs have reached its all time minimum, ranging from 0,16% to 10,32% of cases (cited according to Radisavljević Ćiparizović, 2006: 35-36).

Religious revitalization in this part is certainly part of a large-scale social process which is implemented in the entire world, and especially in central and southeast Europe, but it is also an autonomous process which has its special characteristics. The results obtained in our study “*Religiosity and Tradition*” confirm the basic hypothesis of a revival of attachment to religion and the church in Serbia in late 1990s, manifested in decade's continuity of high traditional religiosity, but above all through the growth – not spectacular, but evident – of the so-called current religiosity. Beyond any doubt, the image of the so-called typical believer at the end of the last decade of the 20th century is completely changed in comparison with the mode of believers of the 1980s. Thanks to an increase in religiosity of, primarly, urban population, men, highly educated, and the young, previous differences in attachment to religion and thechurch by place of residence, gender, education and profession have been leveled significantly. In changed social circumstances the credibility of SOC, as the most influential church in Serbian society, has grown (Radisavljević Ćiparizović, 2006: 165-166).

The Serbian Orthodox Church has emerged from a half century of exile into the public sphere, and became once again a significant factor in the reshaping of religious and national identity. After the regime change during the 5 October 2000 SOC not only retained its social position, as the largest church in Serbia, but strengthened it significantly. What was abolished through political actions, and through imposing communist ideology, emerged in a similar, but less violent way. In the July of 2001 in Primary and Secondary Schools was introduset Religious Education as a type of confesional class (Radisavljević Ćiparizović, 2006: 95-105).

[4] After twenty nine years, during the celebration of Candlemas (on the February 15. 1992) the schism in the Serbian Orthodox Church was ended when His Holiness, the Serbian Patriarch Paul led a procession in St. Michael's Cathedral alongside Metropolitan Bishop Irinej (https://www.saborna-crkva.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=395&Itemid=301).

Then Faculty of Orthodox Theology was reintroduced to the Belgrade University, and priests were reintroduced to the military. After six different versions the law that defines the position of religious communities was finally passed. Nationalised church property is either retrund or reimbursed, and temples are either being built or rebuilt. Media presence of priests at public manifestations, or political elites at religious events has been noticed.

Here are some examples from the local press and internet:

*Building and rebilding of churches and monesteries*

"Since the nineties Serbian Orthodox Church has rebuilt about 500 of its churches and monasteries. Despite the economic crisis church construction in the last decades is going thru an renaissance in every country where SOC has its diocese - Montenegro, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia, Germany, America. In Serbia alone in the last fifteen years there have been over 200 new temples built, and builders are finishing about a hundred more" (*Novosti,* 2011).[5]

*Priests in hospitals*

"Within an emerging number of hospitals in Belgrade special chapels have bean opened in which patients can pray, confess, take communion and get baptized. First such chapel was opened in Special hospital for cerebrovascular diseases "Saint Sava" two decades ago, and in other medical institutions after that. Today there's barely a hospital without a place for worship. Priest receive lists with patients names and mentions them in daily prayer" (*Danas*, 28.4.2008.)[6]

*Military priest reintroduced to the service*

"After more then seven decades Serbian military will be assigned military priests – eight ortodox ones, and one imam, and one Chatolic chaplain. Ceremony was atended by Metropolitan bishop Porfirije, and Archbishop Stanislav Hočevar... Military priests-officers don't carry any weapons, nor will they be able to comand" (*Novosti*, 31. 7. 2013.)[7]

*Liturgy in District Prison*

*"On the second day of the Christmas, on the feast-day of the Assembly of the Most Holy Mother of God, with the service of the Holy Liturgy in the chapel of the Resurrection of Christ in the District Prison in Belgrade.* There were present at the service: prisoners of that prison, commanders and employees of the facility, parishioners of the Vozdovac church of Holy Emperor Constantine and Helen, members of the Charity section of the Archbishopric of Belgrade-Karlovci, deacon Branislav Jocic and prison chaplain Revd. Gligorije Markovic" (January 2019. Website of SOC).[8]

[5] „Prayer among scaffolding“
http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/aktuelno.290.html:352108-Molitvamedju-skelama

[6] „Prair in hospitals“ https://www.danas.rs/beograd/molitva-u-bolnicama/

[7] „Serbian military: military priests in service again“
http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/drustvo/aktuelno.290.html:446764-Vojska-Srbije-Vojni-svestenici-ponovo-u-sluzbi.

[8] "Christmas in the Central prison in Belgrade“
http://spc.rs/sr/bozhitsh_u_centralnom_zatvoru_u_beogradu.

## REVITALIZATION OF RELIGIOUSNES IN SERBIA: ARGUMENTS OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

There are two theorical frameworks when it comes to interpreting religious revitalization in Serbia. First adreses religion as a public institution, while the second entitles individual needs of belivers for religion and spirituality. While the first framework is unquestioned, the second one brings about different, often colliding opinions, and different interpretations of the same empirical evidences made by the leading Serbian sociologists of religion. Dragoljub B. Đorđević takes in to acount indicators of traditional relations towards religion and the church which show that this type of relations is the most widespread (Đorđević, 2009: 57-64). On the other hand, Mirko Blagojević takes in to acount recent religious behaviour, and uses this recent behaviour to prove the changes made in the initialization of religiousness of the population. Being that the case of Serbia isn't the sole case in Europe, we should take into acount different religious situations in different countries. More then half of the people interviewed go to church at least once a month in catholic countries, up to one quarter in confessional mixed countries, in protestant countries a small number of people practice this religious obligation, and the same goes for modern Orthodox Russia. Religious practices and belief in God in Serbia are closer to Catholic countries (Italy and Portugal), and is significally higher not only compared to protestant (Denmark and Sweden) and confessional mixed countries (Great Britain and Holland), but also higher compared to Orthodox Russia. However, when it comes to regular participation in religious ceremonies of the interviewed believers, then the difference between catholic, protestant, confessionaly mixed and orthodox countries is being clearly noticed. Situation in Serbia is then closer to confessionaly mixed countries. The structure of believers which was formed during the nineties in Serbia remained intact, it has even grown stronger regarding religious consciousness, and advanced by "crabs walk" in the ritual dimension (Blagojević, 2008: 255).

### Religiousness in Serbia in the XXI Century: Results of a Sociological Study

In order to detect any change in religiousness of Serbian citizens in the 21st century we compared results from two sociological studies which refer to: a) confessional and religious self identification of believers, b) traditional and c) current religiousness. On the one hand, considering the fact that both researches were done on a representative sample increases their comparisons, but on the other we are aware of certain limitation in the comparison because the 1999 research was done on a dozen selected indicators. According to the 2010 Research, 93% of the interviewed people declared that they belong to a confession, which is identical to the 1999 research – 93,5%. 77% of these were orthodox, catholics 8,6, evangelists or some other protestant church 0,8, Muslims 6,2, buddhists 0,2 while those who don't belong to a religious community are at 6,6 (Radisavljević Ćiparizović, 2011: 25-42).

Religious selfidentification is also a part of the so called low indicators of religiousness, but they are the most frequently used ones. in the 1999 research 60% were religious, a fifth was undecided (21%) and nonreligious les then a fifth (19%). Our expectations were that the undecided, who are usually a group influenced by different socio-cultural relations, as well as personal dispositions and socialisation (learning of religious behavior) will align themselves across the believer-nonbeliever halfs. And that's exactly what happened, because according to the 2010 research the number of religious people jumped to 78%, but the number of undecided dropped by five times (4%) compared to 1999 while the number of nonreligious dropped insignificantly to 14%.

Table 1. What is your relation towards religion? Are you personally religious?(in %)

| Modality | 1. 1999 | 2. 2010 |
|---|---|---|
| Religious | 59 | 78 |
| Undecided and indifferent | 21 | 4 |
| Not religious | 19 | 14 |

1. Religion and tradition (Belgrade, Novi Sad and Niš) 1999. (Radisavljević-Ćiparizović, 2006);
2. Religiousness in Serbia 2010. (HKC, 2011).

### *Traditional Attachment to Church and Religion*

We monitor traditional religiousness thru these indicators: baptism of children, the celebration of religious holidays and church burials. Besides confessional religiousness, the traditional religiousness not only remained on the same level, but we observed a slight increase.

Table2. Traditional links with the church and religion in %

| Indicators | 1. 1999 | 2. 2010 |
|---|---|---|
| Baptism of children | 84 | 87 |
| Celebration of religious holidays | 87 | 92 |
| Church burials | 86 | 87 |

1. Religion and tradition (Belgrade, Novi Sad and Niš) 1999. (Radisavljević-Ćiparizović, 2006);
2. Religiousness in Serbia 2010. (HKC, 2011).

### Current Attachment to Church and Religion

Indicators that show current attachment to church are: participation in the Liturgy, going to Church and temple, regular prayer, fast, confession, holly communion. There are about 10% of religious church goers. These percentages are expectedly smaller, but there is a significant rise in every indicator (regular particpation in Liturgy almost 10%, 4,1% go to church more than once a week, while 8,7% go to church more than once a week- which means that 13% of people interviewed go to their temples once a week. Every day prayer and regular fasting are almost doubled).

Table 3. Elements of religious behaviour and the congregation

| Indicators | 1. 1999 | 2. 2010 |
|---|---|---|
| Liturgy-almost every time | 2,1 | 9,8 |
| Going to church at least once a week | - | 12,8 |
| Everyday prayer | 15,9 | 27,4 |
| Regular fasting | 16,8 | 27,4 |

1. Religion and tradition (Belgrade, Novi Sad and Niš) 1999. (Radisavljević-Ćiparizović, 2006);
2. Religiousness in Serbia 2010. (HKC, 2011).

Based on these data, we can say that the religious revitalization, and the image of believers has changed the most in the period between the ‘80s and the end of the ‘90s. The decade that we observed (1999-2010) only verifies those trends.

Results of Pew Research Center: As much as 87% of people in Serbia believe in God, that is to say 58% is certain in his existence, and 29% aren’t. Only 10% of the nation are atheists. Countries in which the majority doesn't believe in God include Czech republic (66%), Sweden (60%), Belgium (54%) and Holand with 53% of non-believers (B92, 20.2.2019).

Table 4. Religious profile of the region (number of people interviewed in procentages)

| | Romania | Grece | BIH | Croatia | Serbia |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Religion is very important in their lives | 50 | 55 | 54 | 42 | 34 |
| Attend religious services at least once a month | 50 | 38 | 35 | 40 | 19 |
| Pray every day | 44 | 29 | 32 | 40 | 27 |
| Believe in God with certainty | 64 | 59 | 66 | 57 | 58 |

Source: Pew Research Center

## CONCLUSION

(De)secularization is an inevitable term when one regards religious changes in modern industrial and postindustrial societies, as well as in postsocialist and transitional societies. Comparative empirical data regarding religious situations in modern societies show without a doubt that not only religion did not disappear, but it never retired to the private sphere, and in some contemporary societies, traditional and modern, it impose itself as the main creator of public life.

Europe is a place of empirical verification for the theory of secularization, but things aren't in unison as they seem. This is why we cannot generalize because there are differences between catholic, protestant and orthodox population, between Great Britain and northern European countries. In (post)modern societies secular ideas and values exist side by side with religious values which points to a certain value relativism, that is to say existence at the same time of value orientations which seem to be at different theoretical positions (Radisavljević Ćiparizović, 2006).

Religious revitalization in the XXI century has been just a continuation of a trend that started during the time of crisis, wars and transition in the nineteen nineties. At that time desecularization occurred which lead to the change in the role of religious communities in Serbia. At this time SOC started to provide a new ideological framework for different state institutions, such as military or schools, filling the ideological vacuum left by the fall of communism, showing initiative in doing so, but also with the help of the government. After 2000 this trend was confirmed. This paper already addressed some of these changes: 1) religion is not just a personal thing any more, it assumes a certain place in the public sphere; 2) a new law of religious freedom (2006) changed the legal status of religious communities; 3) religious centers and temples are being rebuilt and built; 4) religions have gained their place in the media (public and private), and religious radio and tv stations are also created; 5) religious communities are reciving financial suport, as well as tax reliefs from the state, and they are gradually taking control over their property which was previously nationalised; 6) an reemergence of Religious education in Primary and Secondary Schools, religious service in the military and in the hospitals. Even though there are different interpretations of the same empirical evidence, we feel that the result of empirical studies (both domestic and foreign) speaks for the process of desecularization in Serbia.

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## RELIGIOUS CHANGE AND THE INTERNET: DIALECTICS OF THE CONFLICT OVER NEW MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES

**Summary**

Although religion in some form has always had to be mediated, the emergence of the Internet leads to new dynamics and possible changes in the field of religion. The Internet brings new communication opportunities through its non-hierarchical communication patterns, multimodality, interactivity and hypertextuality, as opposed to the hiearchical stance of the „old media". Therefore, it can be hypothesized that the new media logic should bear important consequences on the contemporary religious changes. Based on the two case studies presented in the paper and theoretical considerations, the paper proposes an idea that the Internet indeed brings new possibilities for the religious change towards „the new religiosity" (religious individualism, ecclecticism, etc.). However, it is also emphasized that new possibilities of control on the side of traditional religious authorities arise as well, i.e. that the changes that follow the mediatization of religion should not be overstated since there is a great overlap between offline and online religious worlds. It is also concluded that the topic of mediatization of religion should be an inherent part of the discussions over secularization and desecularization in the contemporary world.

**Key words**: religious transformation, Internet, new media, mediatization, socio-cultural changes.

## INTRODUCTION – MEDIATIZATION OF RELIGION

The concept of mediatization is gradually becoming ubiquitous in contemporary social sciences. Hepp, Hjarvard and Lundby (2015) put forward an idea that mediatization is a concept paramount to the concepts such as individualization and globalization, i.e. it is a meta-concept that covers many social and cultural fields with the main assumption that media and communication transformations interrelate with social and cultural transformations. In other words, the influences are not linear and one-sided, coming from the media as a sole causal factor, i.e. social and cultural processes can find their expression and reinforcement in the media and communication transformations. Thus, mediatization can be conceived as a process wherein the media logic changes the logic of social and cultural institutions (Hjarvard, 2008; Pavić, 2016a). In this sense, the concept can be thought of as a continuation of the so-called Medium Theory that contends that the nature of culture and society can be inferred from the dominant communication medium that structures social relations and interactions (Hepp, 2013: 10-15). As Hjarvard (2013: 1-3) pointed out, the concept has wide-ranging implications going beyond simple effect research, audience research and uses-and-gratifications approaches, which attempt to elaborate on the effects of the media on people, and uses of the media by the people. In other words, mediatization surpasses simple *mediation*, i.e. it implies structural transformations though which institutions change as the media are becoming integral part of their functioning. As Hjarvard also noted, the concept of mediatization is not tied to specific communicative situations and therefore involves creating middle-range theories about the long-term interrelation of the media and specific institutions, religion being one of them.

Mediatization of religion might be seen as an independent causal factor that cannot be simply incorporated into existing theories in sociology of religion, such has classical secularization theory (Berger, 1967; Wilson, 1966), sectoral secularization (Casanova, 1994; Dobbelaere, 2002), socio-historical approach to secularization (Martin, 1978), theory of religious economies (Stark and Bainbridge, 1987; Stark and Iannacone, 1994; Stark and Finke, 2000), new spiritualities theory (Heelas and Woodhead, 2005; Heelas, 2006; Roof, 1999), „believing without belonging“ (Davie, 1994), etc. As noted by Stolow (2010), the media and religion are often wrongly considered as two completely distinct areas wherein their connection can be subsequently studied. However, it is a trivial assumption that all religious symbols, ideas and practises have to be mediated somehow, even the most abstract ideas have to be materialized in some way. Consequently, recent changes in media and communication technologies bring about an unprecedented mix of media and religion most often denoted as *mediatization of religion*. Even though, as Stolow warns us, the invention of printing caused significant religious dynamics that led to Reformation and changed notions of religious authority, recent situation is different in many ways. New media technologies might lead to deterritorialization of religious communities, penetrate more deeply the inner-dynamics of various religions and bring about new visibility of religious phenomena. With the last point in mind, we can also reflect on the aforementioned visibility and its influence on our ideas about secularization and desecularization of the contemporary world. The increasing visibility and dramatic potential of some phenomena (e.g., Islamic radicalism), in our view, can lead to a haste conclusion about the „death of secularization“ (Stark, 1999). Such deceptive visibility can create the impression of enhanced social and cultural influence of religion, which does not have to correspond to the actual situation. However, the increased visibility can have reciprocal effects on the importance of religion and desecularization processes. For instance, Chetty (2014) shows how the Internet opened up a forum for Hindu political and religious activism that had been closed in times when mass media were dominated by the liberal and secular discourses. Nonetheless, even in this case the Hindu fundamentalism as a phenomenon was not created *per se* in the cyberspace. The cyberspace acted as a mediator and an enhancer of the existing political views that arose from a fear of Islamic fundamentalism.

Mediatization of religion thus has many contradictory consequences. On the one hand, established religious institutions can use the media to broaden the scope of their activities, to reach for wider audiences and to proselytize. At least, the media can be purposely employed to strengthen already existing religious communities and to confirm validity of the faith. Conversely, the media can offer a space for development of religious markets, can brought about new religious offer and new dynamics. Joined by the process of individualization present in the postmodern (late-modern) societies, the media can strongly impact already observable religious transformations. Precisely such consequence of mediatization gives credit to those who claim that secularization results from failed activities of the religious institutions, first and foremost for diluting religious messages in order to fit them into increasingly liberal worldviews of the Western population (for a further elaboration, see Warner, 2010). Hjarvard's (2013, 2016) idea of *banal religion* covers similar conceptual space. Namely, banal religion includes religious imaginary, such as crosses, biblical quotations, witches, ghosts, vampires, etc. This imaginary provides a raw material for everyday religious thoughts and emotions that are silent and largely independent of official religious institutions. Even so, it might be noted that such „re-enchantment" of the social and private worlds might be inconsequenttial. In other words, even though private lives can be filled with religious representations, they do not inform everyday decisions, but only form a scenery within which everyday rational decisions are being made.

It can be posited that the widespread use of the Internet contributes to the further mediatization of the contemporary religious phenomena. In this paper, we provide a short theoretical overview of the Internet and religion interrelation, especially with regard to the issue of the changes in religious authority that might be following from the development of the Internet. In continuation, we shall sum-up two short case studies of the conflict over the use of the Internet technology (Haredi Jews and the issue of 3G mobile phones) and new possibilities for dissenting voices inside of the established religious communities (the topic of the so-called protestantization of the Catholic Church in Croatia) in order to illustrate the dialectics of the Internet in the sphere of religion. We bring the paper to a close with a short appraisal of the importance of including new media realities into the study of religious transformation.

## INTERNET AND RELIGIOUS TRANSFORMATIONS

The relation between the Internet and religion is a matter of paramount importance for at least two reasons. First, the question of specificity of this medium and its technology can be raised with regard to the consequences of those specificities on certain structural components of religion – beliefs, rituals, experiences, authority, etc. On the other hand, it is interesting to ask the question as to the role of the Internet in religious transformations of the postmodern society. In other words, questions can be raised as to will the internet contribute to reviving religions, to secularization, or to transformation in the direction of greater religious individualization and eclecticism.

According to Campbell and Vitullo (2016), the Internet and religion research has undergone through four distinct stages. In the begginning stage, researchers were interested in classification of emerging online religious phenomena, such as virtual religions and virtual religious communities in general. In stage two, researchers attempted to discern whether online religious communities are authentic communities, i.e. whether they can be described as such. In the third stage, research had been undertaken related to investigation of the Internet use among offline religious institutions and their harnessing of the technology in order to enhance their mission. In stage four, researchers are involved in determining intersections between offline and online communities, since it can be shown that they influence and reinforce each other. In other words, religious persons tend to shift their religious practices between the two spaces, not seeing any contradictions between them. Additionally, in their review of recent scholarship on the topic of interrelation of the Internet and religion, Heidi Campbell and Mia Lövheim (2011) outlined three distinct themes that emerge from the acknowledgement that the interrelation is complex and mutual. Firstly, an important theme of religious authority should be considered bearing in mind that digital worlds can both weaken and strengthen existing religious authority figures. Secondly, relations between online and offline religious spaces and forms of belonging also happen to be multidimensional. Online and offline spaces can be more and less important for different believers in different life-phases, and they can be used for different purposes. And thirdly, values and norms of online and offline worlds can be both mutually opposing and reaffirming. On one side, it can be hypothesized that online worlds are commercial and ephemeral, which contradicts religious seriousness. On the other hand, online presence can help to reach wider audience and to validate the existing religous value and norms.

For instance, on an example of the Salafiyya Muslims Becker (2011) illustrated three different scenarios considering interrelation between offline and online rituals. Different elements of rituals (sound, sight, movement, etc.) can be either enabled or disabled when ritual moves into online spaces, while the movement can be deemed as successful or unsuccessful depending on whether it can preserve the sacred-profane border, reproduce core values of the community and thus involve significant number of believers. For example, Becker shows that religious conversions through the out-loud speaking out of the Islamic statement of faith (*shahada*) before at least one Moslem witness can be easily achieved in online space (e.g., chat rooms), notwithstanding the difficulties that might arise (especially issues of sincerity). With regard to the gender separation on the Internet, a more ambiguous ritual transfer takes place since offline prescriptions are not relevant in online space (for instance, regulations relating to body covering), while some new problems arise in online spaces (for instance, private conversations between men and women in chat rooms, which are usually seen as controversial). And finally, Becker also mentions several cases of blocked transfer, such as obligatory prayer ritual (*salat*) that can only be performed in offline spaces since it includes obligatory physical movements and contact between the community of believers. The same applies for virtual Hajj that can be performed on Second Life[1] for spiritual and preparational purposes, but cannot serve as a replacement for offline Hajj. In a similar vein, Catholic mass cannot be fully reproduced in mass media or on the Internet since it involves the transubstantiation of the bread and wine and thus implies physical presence of believers during the Eucharist in order to partake in the ritual.

A distinct strand of research is dedicated to the changes in the concepts of religious authority that are supposedly taking place with the development of the Internet. For instance, Lundy (2013) noted that the Internet brings new communication potentials through its non-hierarchical communication patterns, multimodality, interactivity and hypertextuality, as opposed to the hierarchical stance of the „old media". It can be posited that the Internet brings the notion of translocality to the new, unprecedented level. Global electronic culture implies simultaneity that leads to personal involvement and a sense of connection between communication agents who had previously never met and are miles away (Meyrowitz, 1995). Instantaneous action and response that is characteristic of the Internet communication can lead to even higher feeling of involvement and space transcendence. Cheong (2013) points out two parallel lines of theoretical thinking in this sense. The first one highlights the plurality of the Internet, which entails the possibility of challenging the existing religious authorities because of the greater availability of information that enables the emergence of informal leaders, i.e. alternative religious ideas and rituals within existing traditions and even the emergence of entirely new online religions. On the

[1] It is provided by IslamOnline.net, a news webportal specialized for Islamic content.

other hand, other theoretical considerations point to the possibility of appropriating of the new media by the existing religious organizations and leaders and their orientation in the desired directions, emphasizing the logic of continuity and complementarity of online and offline religious phenomena. In other words, the new media technology in this case, as it has happened before, with television and radio, adjusts for its own purposes rather than with open disclaimers. Religious organizations and leaders thus have the potential to identify early in unacceptable ideas and practices and try to control and censor them. Cheong et al. (2011) point out a paradox on which the greater familiarity of believers with religious information, and even the multitude of somewhat contradictory information provided by the Internet, can contribute to the empowerment of formal religious authorities and leaders who position themselves as authentic interpreters who possess the superior theological knowledge that enables them to bring competent court and transfer it to believers (the so-called strategic arbitration). In this sense, the inherent plurality of the Internet can even act in a way that is contrary to initial theoretical expectations.

One of the first theoretical takes on the issue of the impact of the Internet on religious authority is Helland's (2000) heuristic distinction between *religion online* and *online religion*. The distinction is based on the level of religious participation which is, in turn, a consequence of the intentions of religious providers/religious institutions. If online religious communication is limited to one-way directive flow of information, then we are presented with a case of religion online, i.e. a mere transfer of offline communities into the online world. In contrast, if religious communications is of a one-to-many type, then we have a case of online religion, which represents a *novum* that doesn't closely mirror offline communities. Starting from a definition of religion as an outcome of processes of mediation and belonging, Lundy (2011) posits that changes in mediation brought about by the Internet can have significant impacts on the processes of religious belonging. On the one hand, *religious community* as a social grouping implies more permanent interaction and a sense of belonging that results with the identification with the groups and its values and shared meanings. On the contrary, *religious social network* represents a looser social grouping with less identification and emotional attachment. According to Lundby, it is an open empirical question whether changes in mediation have as their consequence changes in belonging. For example, online and offline spaces can be both used to strengthen belonging, i.e. to reaffirm the existing religious communities. Campbell (2007) frames the question of authority in a multilayered way, with hierarchy, structure, ideology, texts as the main components/layers. Hierarchy refers to the hierarchy roles that can be affirmed or challenged in the online world. For instance, new religious leaders might emerge who contradict the official ones. As for the structure and authority channels, Campbell (2007: 1059) poses the following questions: „What connection do these channels make to traditional structures or organizations? Do religious organizations attempt to monitor or influence online religious groups in any way? How and why? Note needs to be taken of offline religious groups that issue official policy statements related to religious practice online. What concerns do they highlight? How are these policies viewed by religious Internet users?“ Important research questions emerge from the component of religious ideology. For instance, global ideologies might be challenged by their local variants or, conversely, common beliefs and solidarity in global forum might contradict local ideological variants. When it comes to religious texts, Cambell (2007: 1059) continues with the following questions: „Do religious texts continue to serve as a premier source of authority? Are they more often affirmed or criticized online? Does the role which official religious texts play online differ across religious traditions? What roles does the Internet play in 'canonizing' or validating religious texts?“.

On the other hand, as Douglas Cowan points out, each movement is provoking its counter-movements, so the Internet can serve as a tool for regulating competing religious movements, especially in the new context of religious pluralism, within which other, more rigid modes of regulation (bans or other forms of labor hardening) are no longer possible (Cowan, 2004). Cowan illustrates this idea on the example of the Christian „counter-attack“ on the Church of Scientology. Namely, in contrast to earlier methods, which generally involved dissemination of written materials and „deprogramming“ members of cults in cooperation with their families, the Internet provides opportunities for exponential, consistent and simplified replication of original materials, sometimes with minor modifications. In this way a multitude of hyperlinks are linked to the same material, creating the illusion of a multitude of independent sources and materials, repeating essentially the same arguments as allegations of law violations, abuse of members, Ronn Hubbard's controversial career, the price of scientific services, etc. (Cowan, 2004, pp. 261-263). Furthermore, Cowan points out that the Internet provides opportunities for esoteric religious texts that individual religious communities do not want to publish for their internal reasons. When the Scientology Church is concerned, the esoteric texts serve to achieve a higher level of consciousness (the so-called Operating Thetan) and should only be available to those who are potential candidates for the achievement. The Internet has allowed some of these texts to be published, arguing for freedom of speech and the need for potential members to know what the religious organization actually offers, precisely because of the difficulties in securing cyber space rights (Cowan, 2004: 264-266). Thus, counter-actions on the Internet, make it possible for an opponent in the virtual space to be transformed into a „scarecrow“ attacking numerous repetitions of simplistic arguments often concealing assumptions which in themselves require additional evidence.

## CASE STUDY 1 – HAREDY JEWS AND THE USE OF 3G MOBILE PHONES

The dialectics of the relationship between the new media technologies and religion can be illustrated on the case of the regulation of Internet usage within Haredi (ultra-orthodox) Jews. One of the battles included the campaign against 3G mobile phones that ran from the beginning of 2005 (Rosenberg and Rashi, 2015). Namely, the rabbis and the entire Haredi community mobilized around the demands directed to Israeli telecommunications companies, requiring that only phones without Internet access („kosher“ phones)[2] can be sold to Haredi communities. Namely, mobile telephones are estimated to be particularly dangerous because they allow easy access to inadmissible content on the Internet, and also because its use can lead to a large amount of time consumed that can instead be used to study the Torah. As

[2] This demand was followed by a strong media campaign and a refusal to publish advertising messages by rabbi-controlled Haredi newspapers, which caused some tangible financial damage to telecommunications companies.

Tsuriel Rashi (2013) points out, this example shows that a religious community can use the new media to re-assert existing authorities, to delineate the boundaries for those belonging to the community and to banish those who do not respect norms and thus strengthen solidarity within the community. On the other hand, as Rashi points out, full control was not possible because a significant number of believers did not listen to the imperative of purchasing exclusively the Kosher telephones, as seen from the mobile phone markets statistics.

Later development confirmed the second Rashi's remark, given that a complete Internet ban was not possible. Today, among the Haredi population a common choice is to block certain contents, primarily pornography and explicit depictions of human body, as well as lists of secular pages that give less favorable accounts on religion. When it comes to mobile phones, there are versions of kosher phones that do not allow surfing the Internet, but allow using applications and send email messages.[3] For example, a 2016 poll showed that 49% Haredi Jews use the Internet, while 21% have Internet-based mobile phones[4], notwithstanding the fact that recreational use of the Internet is still strictly forbidden amongst many rabbis and Haredi communities. Generally speaking, among the Haredi communities it is apparent that media technologies are accepted to the extent that they can be controlled and rejected in cases where the control is not effective. This can be inferred from the free use of radio and newspapers, the suspicion of television resulting from the official ban on television by Haredi rabbis (Cohen, 2017)[5] and attempts to limit the use of the Internet or, at best, to censor it. Because of the many secular and theologically unacceptable content that it offers, the Internet is undoubtedly considered as dangerous as television, but it nevertheless offers the possibility of active filtering and content censorship, or real-time control of content that the television does not offer. An important element in relation to the Internet is its necessity in professional situations, thus some Haredi movements, such as Hasidic Jews, consider it more acceptable if it is needed for work and is equipped with the appropriate filters and forbidden at home. Because of this, it can be noted that Haredi Jews' Internet and television prohibitions are respected in considerably varying degrees – the ban on television is widely accepted, and the ban on the Internet not so much. However, Cohen (2017) showed that new media technologies, particularly in the case of independent radio stations and internet portals that are not supervised by rabbi authorities and do not consult them when they give opinions and attitudes, have contributed to the pluralization of authority within the Haredi community, i.e. to contestation of the official leaders. For example, these media report on disagreements within in the various streams of Haredi Judaism, as well as on cases of abuse and corruption within the same communities, which can be clearly theologically interpreted as a violation of the prohibition of spread of gossips that is part of the Jewish religious law (the so-called Halakah).

[3] For example, a Kosher phone offered by Rami Levy Communications.

[4] http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/222190

[5] Cohen states that only about 5% of Haredi households have a television set.

## CASE STUDY 2 – CATHOLIC CHURCH IN CROATIA AND THE INTERNET

In contrast to the Haredi communities presented above, the Catholic Church does not have such a problematic history of the relationship with the media. Theologically, media communication is widely regarded as a useful form of religious communication that can promote the evangelical mission. However, there are some exemptions. For instance, when it comes to media transmission of the Holy Mass and its theological meaning, neither the Canon Law nor the Catechism of the Catholic Church deals with this specific issue. it is usually interpreted within the 2183 Catechism statement dictating that „if there are not enough dedicated officers or for another important reason it is impossible to participate in the Eucharistic celebration, it is highly recommended that believers participate in the Word service if, according to the diocesan bishop's regulations, it is celebrated in the parish church or at another holy place, or to spend the time in prayer in person or in the family or, occasionally, in groups of families.“ Thus, it is a common opinion that Mass as a communal event celebrated as a memorial to the Last Supper can not be replaced through mediation, that is, that for its full theological meaning it is necessary to have a personally active participation and physical presence.

The importance of the media for the Catholic Church can be seen from Pope Francis's decision that in 2015 the existing Vatican media and related media services will be merged into a unique departmental secretariat for communications. This service includes the following organizations: the Pontifical Council for Social Communications, the Holy See Press Office, the Vatican Internet Service, the Vatican Radio, the Vatican Television Center, the L'Osservatore Romano, the Vatican Press, the Vatican Photo Service and the Vatican Publishing House. However, if we look at the Youtube channel called Vatican News, which currently (21 February 2019) has 221.076 subscribers[6], it is apparent that it is a contentwise and formally strictly controlled channel. By virtue of its content, the channel is almost entirely dedicated to the promotion of Pope Francis activity, that is, the videos are mainly related to press conferences, images, the Angelus and other prayers, audiences reports, etc. Formally, it is immediately apparent that the basic mechanism of interactivity, user comments, is not enabled for none of the videos. Furthermore, the so-called community tab, i.e. the tab that provides additional interactivity and multimodal communication (text commentary, GIFs, etc.), is not enabled even though the channel has enough subscribers that would allow for such activation (a minimum of 10,000 subscribers is required).

Such ambivalent official standpoint towards the Internet use is visible in its use by the Catholic parishes and believer's association. Starting from the theoretical framework of the so-called networked religion (Campbell, 2012) that encompasses networked community, storied identity, shifting authority, convergent practice and multisite reality, Pavić, Kurbanović and Levak (2018) set out to establish whether the contemporary Croatian Catholicism had changed in any meaningful way as a response to the new media environments. In a nutshell, their content analysis of the

[6] Interestingly, out of that number, 81,696 subscribers pertain to the channel in Spanish, and 49,302 to subscribers in the Portuguese language. On the other hand, the German version has only 7,460 and the English 14,622 subscribers.

Catholic webpages and Facebook pages indicated that some sort of networked Internet communities do emerge, but only when it comes to non-affiliated communities (i.e., communities that emerge outside of the official church), while parochial webpages and Facebook pages represent a mere extension of the existing offline community. However, the religious online communication „hardly brings about more eclectic religious ideas or at least more ecumenical considerations", while it „rarely contested the existing religious authorities" (Pavić, Kurbanović and Levak, 2018: 262). The authors concluded that „semi-affiliated and non-affiliated Internet sites more often resemble networked communities, showing higher levels of convergent practices and new forms of religious expression, as well as lower levels of interconnection between online and offline worlds" (Pavić, Kurbanović and Levak, 2018: 264). In other words, in case of the Croatian Catholicism new forms of religious expression on the Internet do appear, but at the same time religion on the Internet does not challenge authorities and bring about significant theological innovations and eclecticism. Essentially, the study conclusions replicated the results from Cantoni and Zyga (2007) whose research of monastic institutes and convents of the Catholic Church showed that the Internet is manly used for official announcements and internal communication, whereas interactive services such as chats and forums, that are outwards directed, are very rarely present.

However, the Internet also opens up spaces for dissenting voices and controversies among members of the Catholic Church in Croatia. The case of the accusations of the so-called „protestantization of the Catholic Church" is a great illustration of such possibilities. Namely, a number of articles appeared on the religious portal of Catholic theologians „Faith and Deeds" in which some charismatic religious groups, as well as the Rhema religious foundation[7] founded by several Catholic entrepreneurs, were being accused of theological deprivation. it should be noted that here is the Rhema Foundation, established and funded by several entrepreneurs and intellectuals, has financed many Catholic organizations and Catholic media in the past few years, such as Bitno.net, Laudato.hr and Laudato TV; Kristofori, SKAC Palma, Grozd, Vigilare, etc. These articles states that certain groups (e.g., the Kristofori community) promote the elements of Pentecostalism or put undue emphasis on the Holy Spirit as the third divine person. Contrary to the Catholic dogmatics, this argumenttation says, „Protestantism" is manifested in the dominance of ecstasy and experience that neglects deeper theological truths. Let us quote here a longer passage from the portal, written by Snježana Majdančić-Gladić[8]:

„First of all, it is about simplified psychological and spiritual techniques that are reduced to questionable recipes for achievement of happiness, that is, those in which there is no serious encumbrance in theology and anthropology, especially in Catholic theology. Therefore, it is quite understandable that they offer some kind of schools of prayer, life-long prayer classes, and similar services of „mastering spiritual experience", to organize „meetings" consisting of the trinity: „celebrating-teaching-prayer", as conceived in Protestant communities; while the Eucharist takes the

[7] According to this critic, the very word of „rhema" can be interpreted as „logos", i.e. as God's creational word, but also as a special manifestation of the Holly Spirit. More can be read in: Rhema foundation and protestantization of the Catholic Church, *Belief and Deeds* portal, https://www.vjeraidjela.com/zaklada-rhema-i-protestantizacija-katolicke-crkve/ (accessed on the 3 January 2019)

[8] https://www.vjeraidjela.com/zaklada-rhema-i-protestantizacija-katolicke-crkve/, (accessed on 8 January 2019)

place of the most exalted form of worship of God only if it is accompanied by the ecstatic pouring of the Word of God - the power of the Holy Spirit (Rhema)."

The author puts the activities of the aforementioned Catholic communities in Croatia in the context of the protestantization of the Catholic Church, which allegedly takes place primarily through the spread of charismatic movements within the Church itself, but also by the proselytizing by the Protestant communities. Similarly, Polish philosopher Andrzej Kobyliński believes that the rapid spread of Charismatic and Pentecostal Christianity is a result of the rejection of the rational and dogmatic side of faith and the re-awakening of folk devotion, which this time manifests itself in spreading of the primacy of religious experience itself (Kobyliński, 2016). In other words, it may be inferred that earlier manifestations of folk devotion focused on the magical humiliation of the deity and the rejection of „high theology" are now transformed into an ecstatic individualized experience of God. This form of contemporary folk devotion is compatible with the new, postmodern social context characterized by strong individualization and the crisis of meaning induced by the plurality of social roles and the sense of fragmentation of the person. In other words, in religious experiences an individual recaptures the lost feeling of self that is fragmented in the many, often incompatible social roles (Pavić, 2016b). This form of devotion is undoubtedly linked to new forms of Internet communication, especially by using multimedia content that can stimulate the state of ecstasy and trance or mystical experience of God.

In any case, the mentioned problematization of the „protestantization" of the Catholic Church in Croatia implies new possibilities in the religious field. It is apparent from it that the Internet can provide a suitable forum for different theological visions and opposing views. The case points to the fact that the Internet is indeed a perfect ground for religious flows that even can go against the ruling orthodoxy. Bearing in mind, of course, the constant transformation that in the theological sense all religious communities pass through.

## CONCLUSION

In his review on the 1990's scholarship on the relationship between the rise of the Internet and religious changes Lorne Dawson posed the following questions: „Will the Internet change the nature and functioning of religion? Will the changes be significant? Will they be incremental, and in line with trends already in place?" (2000: 26). From the contemporary standpoint it seems that answers might be affirmative in a modest sense. Internet does bring about significant changes in religion, probably more significant than those brought about by broadcast media such as television and radio. The reason behind such development is a radical communication paradigm shift that the Internet implies. On the other hand, the changes are incremental indeed. Neither are worldwide religions fundamentally changed and challenged by the advent of the Internet, nor any significant new online-based religions have appeared. However, the Internet has changed religious practices throughout the world, and has enabled new forms of religious expression. Nevertheless, its utopian and radical consequences with regard to religion are yet to happen.

Hitherto scholarship on the issue of religion and the internet teaches us that the topic needs to be theoretically contextualized. First of all, the issue has to be linked to the study of the new media and the socio-cultural consequences they imply. Furthermore, theoretical contributions need to be placed in the context of sociology of religion, that is with contributions that deal with the transformations of religion and religiosity in contemporary societies. Our example from Croatia shows that the Internet does not have to increase the tendencies of religious individualization and pluralization, but can even challenge them by fighting for religious orthodoxy. Our examples also indicate that it is also important to take into account the local religious and socio-cultural contexts that affect the dynamics of religion-technology relations.

Nevertheless, a word of caution is warranted here. The Internet can indeed engender a world of networked individualism in the field of religion as well. The crucial question is where do we find these worlds and how visible they are. Namely, religious individualism can probably be find in numerous discussion between individuals, more or less known to one another in offline world, on social media, Internet forums and causal comments on online portals. In other words, such spaces are not only to be found in obvious choices, such as Second Life and other virtual spaces, but also in these less visible and identifiable interactions that have some impact on religious identity of individuals that partake in them. Every day probably millions of identity-seekers take part in deeper or more superficial interactions that are however meaningful to them and represent quest for identity that doesn't evolve into any kind of deeper and permanent community. These interactions are „lost" in the online world and less visible to researchers but they are consequential and have real impacts. Therefore, we should not place insufficient emphasis the religious changes brought about by the Internet only because offline and online worlds proved to be not so detached after all.

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# THE AMISH IN REALITY SHOWS

**Summary**

The paper analyzes the content of the reality television series Breaking Amish and Return to Amish, broadcasted on TLC television, as well as the analysis of the documentary Out of Order, broadcasted on National Geography, all dedicated to the life of Amish, a conservative Christian group from North America. A total of 26 hours of material, broadcasted between 2012-2014, was analysed. The aim of the research is to determine the image of Amish as created in the reality and documentary programs. Content analysis was preceded by an overview of the existing knowledge about the way of life, beliefs and customs of this Protestant denomination on the basis of comprensive foreign literature. A separate chapter in this paper covers an exclusive interview with Christopher Petrović, the only Amish in Serbia, who currently lives in Niska Banja.

A comparison of information derived from the scientific literature, television material and the answers obtained from the interview, points to a conclusion that the presentation of such programs creates a distorted image of Amish and their lives, which significantly affects their relationship with other people and religions in real life.

**Key words**: TLC, National Geographic, Breaking Amish, Return to Amish, Out of Order.

## INTRODUCTION

The Amish community is one of the specific communities that exist in the 21st century. Due to its specific religion, culture and tradition, it is easily recognizable by almost anyone who has ever contacted them, whether in person or through audio-video content. In part, this is why they are the subject of numerous books, films, series, documentaries, reality shows, and even episodes of very popular TV series that portray the Amish as characters and presenttheir stories in one or more episodes.

This is the way many people get acquainted with this community for the first time because they are unable to meet them directly (except in the Amish territory). We have chosen this topic motivated to discover at least part of the impact of such content. It is the lack of this religious context that has made us want to discover more about them, their beliefs and their way of life.

We want to show all the complexity and multilayeredness of their community because we refuse to believe in something that is taken out of context. On the other hand, Christopher Petrović, an Amish from Niška Banja has left a strong impression on us. We had the opportunity to meet him in Niška Banja a few years ago, while he was roller skating. At first, we thought that he was masked or an actor, and when we found out that he actually looked and lived that way, we were even more curious. We asked ourselves the questions:"Who is he? Why is he dressed like that? Does he really live without electricity? Are there other people like him? Is it possible that we know almost nothing about them?"All those questions made us want to find out more about them, their lifestyle, customs and religion.

## ROOTS

The spiritual roots of the Amish date back to the time of Christ and the early Christian church. However, the specific movement which this group secedes from started on 21st January 1525 in Zurich, Switzerland. At the time when the Protestant Reformation was shattering the 16th century religious world. At the same time, a reformer named Ulrich or Huldrych Zwingli (1484-1531) appeared in Zurich. They both advocated a new Christian order, preached the Bible in the language of ordinary people and proclaimed that God's grace and forgiveness of sins were freely available to all only by faith and not with money (Snyder, 1995: 62-64).

Due to this religious and social upheaval, a group called Brethren formed a community. They were called Anabaptists, or baptized again. They were severely persecuted both by the Roman Church and the Reformers. They believed that the church should be a community of free people, baptized voluntarily in the name of faith, and like the early Christian church, separated from the world and the state. They wanted a pure church without state control, which was a new and radical idea at the time (Snyder, 1995: 62-64).

Perhaps the most famous Anabaptist leader was Menno Simons (1496-1561), a Catholic priest from the Netherlands, who joined the movement in 1536. His moderate leadership and prolific writings did much to unite the scattered Anabaptists. They were soon called "The Mennons". In 1693, a young Swiss Mennonite elder realized that the church was losing its purity, so he disbanded his fraternity and formed a new Christian community. His name was Jacob Amman (1656-1730) and his followers were called the Amish. (Kraybill, 2011: 7-8)

## BASIC BELIEFS

All Amish groups are committed to the Christian faith and life. Their principles and beliefs are fundamentally in line with the principles of Christians. Many leaders throughout history have fought every religion that has had a tendency to replace the Bible. However, what separates them from Christians are distinctive doctrines and customs. Because of this, the Amish are often thought to be "sectarians", while most contemporary historians classify them as Protestant denominations. One of the basic beliefs of the Amish, which is close to Christianity, is that all people are sinners, and that they need reconciliation through the Lord Jesus Christ. However, they also believe that humanity is free to choose or reject salvation. While Christians believe that we are all born in sin, according to the Amish, children are already in the kingdom of the Lord, until they are old enough to choose their own path. The one and only God, the eternal existence, reveals Himself as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. God is the creator of everything, while the Bible is the word of God, and the New Testament is the fulfillment of the Old Testament. For the Amish, the church is a visual form of people who commit themselves to a life of piety and love of their own free will. According to their belief, Jesus Christ will return to judge the world, raise the dead, and establish the kingdom of God (Good and Good, 2001: 16-17). For the Amish, formally, the church as a building is not of great importance. They can meet in different homes to do weekly service. The place of the service changes, depending on the arrangement itself, and the service is held every other week (Israel, 1994: 43).

They believe that a member of the church community is an adult person who is willing to voluntarily surrender himself to the leadershipof the church and accept the responsibilities that the church imposes. They believe that a person can be baptized only when he or she confesses his/her faith. The church must be free and separate from the state (Hostetler, 1967: 6).

The Amish communities are divided into church districts and each of them contains 75 baptized members. (Israel, 1994: 44)

## LIFESTYLE

The Amish lifestyle is determined by the Ordnung (German word for order), which varies from community to community and, within the community, from district to district. What is acceptable in one community may not be acceptable in another. Ordnung does not have a proper translation. It is sometimes understood as "regulation" or "discipline". Gingerich defines it as a code of conduct maintained by the church through tradition rather than a systematic and explicit rule (Gingerich, 1986: 181).

The Ordnung defines private, public and ceremonial life. It is not a written rule; in their opinion, it is an "understandable" code of conduct which the Amish are expected to live by. In the community, decisions are made by the elders, before the annual assembly. This is how they set out the rules about the dress code, using technology and contact with outsiders. The elders are mostly men (Kraybill and Donald, 2001: 95).

Everyone in the district follows the same rules of conduct, so, as a result, there is a great deal of uniformity in the group. It gives them a strong sense of identity, and clearly distinguishes them from the rest of the world. This one-of-a-kind identity is very important to the Amish because they believe the Bible requires them to remain separate from the world and because they think that the lifestyle of others is sinful (Wagner, 2001: 13).

## DRESSING AS AN EXPRESSION OF FAITH

The Amish do not intend to look strange with their dressing style. The way they dress is a highly distinctive outward symbol of membership in the group, but through its plainness and simplicity rather than through any eccentricities. The idea is that a person's clothes should reflect humility and avoid individual distinctiveness. In the early years of the Anabaptist movement, this principle did not result in the standardized and distinctive dressing style as it is today, but reflected in consistent plain and simple dressing. However, the identity of these groups began to disappear with increased contact with the rest of the world. Then the leaders, who saw what was going on, began to think of ways to strengthen the identity of their groups. For many of them, dressing didn't matter much. But many Swiss-German groups knew that it was important to specify a particular style for their people, in order to stay humble and unusual andkeep them away from the world. (M. Good, F. Good, 2001: 27).

## HEALTH AND CARE

Many Amish will initially refuse hospital treatment because they believe that God gives and takes health away. This does not mean that they reject modern medicine; on the contrary, they often donate blood. When a research is in progress or some medical issues need to be dealt withregarding a disease that affects a large number of people, they usually sign up voluntarily. However, although they cooperate with doctors, they are not vaccination supporters because vaccines are linked to autism (Clark and Mindy, 2013: 72-75). Before seeking medical help, Old Order Amish prefer to go to non-medical clinics around the world, or visit places recommended by family members or friends who have been and got help there. A large number of them also trust chiropractors (Good and Good, 2001: 75-79).

## FORMAL AND INFORMAL EDUCATION

Few, mostly Old Order Amish, wonder whether high schools and colleges provide the necessary knowledge and lead to Christian obedience. The Old Order is not basically against education and learning. What they are concerned about are learning methods offered by many public high schools in America (Israel, 1994: 76-77). The Amish teenager, unlike the average American teenager, knows less about art, science and technology, but more about land, animals, and plants. Therefore, parents of the Old Order want their children to learn the basics of reading, writing and calculus. Many Amish children only go to school until 8thgrade, because they believe that an eighth-grade educationis sufficient for their lifestyle. Legally, this tradition was recognized by the Supreme Court in 1972. In Ohio and Northern Indiana regions, the majority of children go to public school and few are homeschooled, which is not a common practice.[1]

The Amish have built their own schools, too. Teachers who work there are focused on developing basic skills and discipline. There is primary and vocational school. Primary schoolincludes eight grades, while the vocational one combines training and farm work for students who have finished primary schoolbut are not old enough to have work permit. They build schoolsby themselves, and they are governed by the parents of that church district. The function of school is to teach children basic values, discipline, and how to get along with others (Hostetler, 1993: 171-178).

## THE INTERVIEW

Christopher Petrović, aged 35, a former Amish and dedicated believer, has been interviewed for the purpose of this analysis. Christopher came from Virginia to Niš, in search of his Serbian roots. His grandfather Denča Petrović went to America in 1912. Christopher inheritedsome land from his ancestors in Donja Studena, which is also one of the reasons for his return to Serbia.

He is not Amish by birth, but he did a thorough research on this community and joined them at the age of 23. Before that, he had been a student at Baptist University and didn't like the direction his former religious community was heading at that time. Due to his unusual appearance, he was immediately noticed in Serbia. As the only Amish in this region, he aroused curiosity and journalists wanted to know more about his life. He always gladly gave interviews, as evidenced by numerous ar-

[1]Information taken from: http://amishamerica.com/do-amish-children-go-to-school (visited on June 25, 2018, 10 p.m.)

ticles on various newspapers websites: Blic,[2] Telegraf,[3] Kurir,[4] Informer,[5] Hronograf,[6] and many more.

We met Kristofer in Niška Banja during his walk. He agreed to talk to us without questions or hesitation. Together with his wife Jovana, he spent two and a half hours answering our every question at length. He spoke freely and without restraint about himself. He said that he had heard about the reality shows Breaking Amish and Return to Amish. He tried to explain that, probably, there were young people in the Amish community who could resemble those represented in the reality shows, but in his opinion, the events shown there had been exaggerated.

These are questions and answers relevant to the purpose of this paper:

**What community are you from?**

I am from an Amish community, located in Virginia. (...) I wasn't raised as an Amish. My parents sent me to public school and later, I went to Baptist University. My mother's father was a Baptist deacon, so I went to a religious school for my university education. After four years, while I was in my first year of master's degree, I realized they were too liberal, so I joined the Amish.

**How many people left the community during your life there?**

I would say about 50% of people return if they have been excommunicated before. A very high percentage of people come back. In most cases, 90% of people return, but sometimes the whole group leaves the Amish Church. That's why I said a small portion of people. For example, in Indiana, there were 40-50 families who said they didn't want to have young people running around (they didn't want Rumspringa), and they all said: "We don't want to be a part of this!" and so the Amish split.

Most of these people would come back. No one is perfect, everyone makes mistakes. People are not saying everything to their congregation. But some things are considered a great insult (offense) and a disgrace. Everyone gets three chances to correct their behavior over a six-month period, because people don't change overnight – it takes a while. After this period, those who will not correct their behavior are excommunicated from the church. But no one is expelled for life. There is no such thing. You can always redeem yourself, and, even 50 years later, say: "Hey, what I did was wrong. I'm sorry. Can you forgive me? ", And we will say," Yes, of course! ".

**What do you think of the Rumspringa period of adolescence?**

This came about as communities grew larger. This is what happens when you have 30 Amish churches, side by side. Young people started going to one singing group, then another singing group and the parents no longer knew who all these other people their children were hanging out with were. Then young people started coming

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[2] Information taken from: https://www.blic.rs/kristofer-petrovic (visited on September 28, 2018, at 8 p.m.)
[3] Information taken from: http://www.telegraf.rs/teme/kristofer-petrovic (visited on September 28, 2018, at 8 p.m.)
[4] Information taken from: https://www.kurir.rs/tag/344787/kristofer-petrovic (visited on September 28, 2018, at 8 p.m.)
[5] Information taken from: http://informer.rs/tags/32117/kristofer-petrovic?page=1 (visited on September 28, 2018, at 8 p.m.)
[6] Information taken from: http://hronograf.net/2017/11/05/kristofer-petrovic-srpski-amis-iz-niske-banje (visited on September 20, 2018, 8 p.m.)

and behaving badly. That got out of control. The Amish do not speak about Rumspringa; it is actually a word that non-Amish invented to describe what was happening. None of the Amish are planning this. For example, when a son buys a car and parks it behind the barn, his parents turn a blind eye on it and say: "He'll grow up in two years!" All this is very informal; no one in the Amish community says that Rumspringa exists or that young people have to go through it.

**Why did you leave the community?**

The community in which I lived in Virginia had a lot of problems; people were coming from all communities. Different Amish people have different traditions. Most of my friends moved away and I asked myself: Why should I stay?" I like living in Virginia, it's nice, it's warm in the south - I don't have to freeze during the winter. However, I had problems finding a farm in America, because land is very expensive. I had no experience as a farmer, I had no father who would give me land, I did not have farm equipment, but I wanted to have land. And so I prayed to God – “God, please, I really wish I had some land. God, if you could just help me! It would mean a lot to me if youcould give me a small farm” – but I forgot to tell him where! So, he said “Here you are Christopher; here it is, in Serbia!”. I inherited 2 acres of land here in Donja Studena.

**Do you use technology more now when you are no longer a member of the Amish community?**

Put yourself in my shoes – you came from the Amish community to Serbia. What are you doing here? If you were me, what would you do? (...)

Take, for example, the Amish in America and their lifestyle – if they don't have electricity, how can they run a business, a shop? They use diesel generators to power machines and many other devices and appliances; they use a line shaft attached to a number of belts which drive various pieces of equipment and appliances. Gasoline here costs three times as much as in America, so I would have to pay three times as much if I wanted to use gas to power equipment and devices for my business. And salaries in Serbia are 1/6 of what I would earn in America. When all these things are taken into account, how do you make money here? Well, you can't. If I want to have a good community here, it can’t be the same as in America.

**If you decided to return, would the community accept you, without any hesitation or punishment?**

Yes, of course. The last time I was in America, I was in the Iowa Amish community. It's a small community, there are only 10-12 families, but most of themlived in Virginia, where I used to live. I was in church, and they didn't have enough deacons. Since typical church service is 3 hours long, various deacons participate,but they had no one to read the Bible. One chapter is read at each church service, so they asked me to do it, and then they asked me to start a hymn. It shows that I was well accepted. If I went to Indiana tomorrow, they would ask me to start a hymn, they would put me at a table and they would want to know about everything that was going on, and all the women would talk to Jovana. It would be completely normal.

**What are the advantages and disadvantages of being an Amish?**

The advantages are: life in a community, better food than outside the community as well as the practice of church discipline. In many modern churches, everyone does what they want and they come to church, say a few words, dress properly, look good, shake hands, go home and that's it. But in the Amish community, if you tell a lie, you are required to go before the church because of it. If you cheat in business, people in the community will not ignore it; they will talk to you and try to solve the problem. There is a very strong sense of justice among the Amish. When people work together, there are problems, of course. It's complicated to live with the Amish; it's a hard and strict life, at least to me.

What is nice here in Serbia is the fact that everyone thinks I work hard because I felt really bad in the Amish community. We all went to work together to build a barn or a new house and Iwas the worst worker there. No one said anything bad about me, no one criticized me, no one said: “Christopher doesn’t work hard!" No one would do such a thing. But they all knew that Christopher couldn't carry planks and cement blocks. I could carry half of what they did. It was frustrating, and I didn't feel good about it. But here, they think I'm a great worker, so I like it here. I feel better in Serbia.

## ANALYSIS

Reality shows *Breaking Amish* (2012) and *Return to Amish* (2014) display prearranged, melodramatic and rebellious behavior. Breaking Amish follows the lives of five young Anabaptists, who go to New York in order to experience a different kind of life. In the end, they have to decide whether they are going to continue their lives without their families, or go back to their community and face potential ostracism. The reality show Return to Amish begins with now ex-members of the Amish community, Breaking Amish participants.

From the first to the last episode, in both reality shows, alcohol is mentioned or referred to as a newly found source of fun for the young Amish. Topics such as religion, customs, historical or cultural heritage are rarely mentioned. The events described in those programs are related to personal challenges, problems, disagreements and decisions. Apart from the fact that they demonstrate typically Amish clothes, this program offers no informative or educational elements related to this protestant denomination. The Amish are represented as an introvert and scary group of people, focused on bans and punishments. The only information about their communities that we get from the participants is related to the things they were not allowed to have, do or say. The topics never include spiritual aspects or reasons for the specific way of life of the Amish, and they almost always come down to the lack of material things, isolation and difference from the rest of the world. Even though they are determined to leave their communities, reject their way of life and clothes, the participants still continue to give their statements wearing the Amish clothes. We assume that this represents the production’s efforts to connect the viewers to the Amish, using visual elements. The rest of the world might not learn about the Amish beliefs or way of life, but no one is ever going to forget what they are wearing.

The behavior of individuals is projected onto the entire group, the genuine life of the Amish is generalized and banalized. Furthermore, private conversations are made public, revealing the details of the participants’ lives. The focus is always on secrets, conflicts and gossip. The show is full of inappropriate activities, swearing, fights and misdeeds. In addition to visual elements, the production uses audio effects. There is music announcing tension or potential event-changing activities.

In contrast, besides the existance of these types of programmes with such aims, there are also other types of programmes, educational programmes and documentaries. They represent the way for certain Amish communities to create their own image of their people, without the influence of the powerfull media. One such example is National Geographic's *Out of Order* that describes the Amish as a complex community of good and bad people. Its creators tend to approach the topic in an objective and neutral way, following their lives in everyday situations, without idealizing or satanizing their lives. There are both positive and negative stories in the episodes. No one is privileged. The participants are Amish, ex-Amish and non-Amish who want to become Amish.

There is almost no tension, no conflicts or drama in this program. The aim was to depict every day activities of the Amish. In every episode some kind of a spiritual aspect of the lives of the Amish is mentioned, for example, their belief in the afterlife, going to paradise or to hell. What is particularly emphasized is their belief in God's will and destiny. Out of order deals with religious topics, which is not the case with the reality shows.

Mostly, the older members of the community do not want to be filmed. Nevertheless, the production shows both the more introvertial and conservative groups and the ones that are more liberal, trying to adjust in the modern world, as a way to keep the community together. Unlike the aims of both of the reality shows, the focus of the documentary is on the behavior of the community members. There is not a single episode dealing with drinking alcohol or inappropriate behavior of the younger members. This type of program offers a rich variety of information and personal problems and desires. This leads us to conclude that it is not an easy job to define or demonstrate any group of people in its entirety and mark it as exclusively good or bad.

## CONCLUSION

The announcements released on TLC guarantee interesting and unexpected situations. It all comes down to sensations that contribute to misinterpretation and generalization by those people who never before had the opportunity to meet the Amish. The importance of this program in the process of creating the Amish image is increasing the ratings, bearing in mind that TLC is broadcasted internacionaly.

There are many theories that deal with the influence of the mass media onto the process of creating prejudices, stereotypes and attitudes. One of them is Josef Clapper's social and cultural model of the process of convincing in mass communication. Namely, Clapper claims that mass media, he refers to as "faceless techniques of communication", and mass media contents promote empowering, not changing the existing attitudes. The key word is 'existing'. He believes that mass media's influence onto the viewers is mostly felt at those moments when a public opinion on certain matters is being created. So the influence is the greatest if the individual and group attitudes have not been formed before (Radojković and Stojković, 2004: 30-32). After we take into consideration international broadcasting of the reality shows and the countries where the Amish live (the highest population is in America), the chances for the rest of the world to learn about the Amish in any other way, other than via

TV, are slim. Breaking Amish reached the top ten list in money making for TLC, which advocates the high ratings of the reality show.[7]

It is inappropriate and completely unjustified to associate a complex Amish community with a few individuals. This is what making general conclusions means. According to Ivan Vidanović "generalization is a logical process that starts by observing a limited number of members of a group, and ends with making general statements or conclusions applied to all the members of the group" (Vidanović, 2006). Maybe generalization was not the aim of the production, but high ratings and easy money definitely were. The issue now is whether damage was done to the Amish all over the world and to what extent.

Kristofer Petrović insists on the fact that Roomspring, as an official and obligatory period in the life of every adolescent, does not exist. It is more a phrase used by non-Amish people. He is still a dedicated believer, even though officially he is not an Amish because he does not live in their community. What is curious is that he had to change his Amish habits and beliefs due to the conditions of life in Serbia. The essence of the Amish way of life is the family, community and religion. Without them you are nothing but someone who does not use electricity, rides horses, wears hats or skirts. Does that entail that the Amish themselves have to adjust to changes (especially in the world of communication), as one way of fighting against this kind of generalization? Or that they should consider the mass media as an efficient means of promoting their missionary way of life?

It should constantly and clearly be emphasized that what is seen in the reality show does not necessarily relate to all the Amish. It should be made clear to everyone watching the show, that the participants are ex-Amish, who had contacts with the rest of the world before the filming, and that certain relationships had previously been arranged.

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# ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS WORLDVIEWS IN THE PUBLIC DISCOURSE OF ST. PETERSBURG

**Summary**

The article actualizes the specific role of St. Petersburg as a significant center of Russian traditional religions, and as a center for the development of art, culture and science; analyzes current trends in both intra-religious and inter-religious contexts; examines the process of the modern religious and secular discourses relationship. In this study the authors address to the methods of content analysis and discourse analysis, supported by a descriptive method. The peculiarity of St. Petersburg in this perspective has a generic specificity of the whole religious and confessional situation in Russia; in many ways, the religious field of modern Russia naturally derives from its historical past, in which there were no large-scale religious conflicts (such as European), also, this past was based on multi-ethnic and multi-confessional composition of the population.

**Key words**: secular, religious, discourse, St. Petersburg, Russia.

## INTRODUCTION

The term "secular" from the Latin word "Saeculum" (century) in the Middle Ages meant secular life as opposed to the Church, spiritual objects (Vehi.net, 2018). With the word "secularization" canon law began to mean the transition of a person or thing from a spiritual state to a secular one, unless deprivation of spiritual rank was a punishment (degradation). The secularization of a thing consisted in its church properties loss and its transfer to secular hands" (Vehi.net, 2018).

## THE ORIGIN AND INTERPRETATION OF THE CATEGORIES AND PROCESSES OF "SECULARIZATION" AND "RELIGIOUS WORLDVIEW"

This term dates back to the dichotomy of Aurelius Augustine, namely, to the division into “worldly”, utilitarian – non-church and “religious”, high church (Mayorov, 1979: 123-124). At the same time, this category cannot be isolated from the religious space, since it is the antipode of religion. Religion itself (Hebrew dät, Greek θρησκεία, lat. Religio, obviously, from religare – to connect) is defined as “a system of beliefs, emotions and actions relating to a particular sacred reality, that is, to that which is opposed to the reality of everyday (profane, secular) and is considered as fundamentally incomprehensible and not at the disposal of a person, as such a reality on which his/her whole life depends and which sets the meaning of his/her existence” (Encyclopedia, 2011: 128).

Some scholars tend to reduce the concept of secularization to the era of the New Time, when, within the framework of the liberal paradigm, the ideas of republican forms of government, a free market and separation of religion from the state, and the proclamation of the principle of freedom of conscience were approved (Shvechikov, 2009: 20-21).

Other scholars believe that the process of secularization has been characteristic of European civilization throughout its existence, being its characteristic feature; “Without it, it is difficult to imagine both the formation of civilizational foundations in antiquity (philosophy, science, law), and the creation of experimental science in the longer term, the rapid growth of industry, and striking social dynamics” (Gora, 2012: 106).

At the same time, the religious context is extremely important, since at the stage of formation of modern European society, it served as the basis for its further development. B. Lewis notes that in the European legal field the presence of the possibility of inheritance and transfer of capital by inheritance played a special role in the development of the region, especially in contrast to the region of the modern Middle East, where the Muslim, according to Sharia law, could not dispose of his/her property and transfer it by inheritance (Lewis, 2003). The influence of canonical church law itself on the development of modern institutions is significant. This topic was actively developed by U. D. Ashley, the author of Introduction to English Economic History and Theory. Ashley recognizes the influence of scholastic teachings on the cultivation of the rules of business relations, medieval society and the formation of economic theory (Ashley, 1893).

At the beginning of the 20th century, social science was dominated by the paradigm of extrapolating European secular experience to other regions and countries. Modern processes of politicization of religion and a surge of religious extremism and radicalism clearly show that the process of secularization is not linear and is not associated with the development of technological progress. For example, the strengthening of the positions of religious organizations is observed in the most modernized country in the world – the United States, and in the Middle East, Islam still continues to play a system-forming role, in Africa there is a strong surge of both Christian and Islamic religiosity. All these factors indicate that “the relative secularity of Europe is no longer a model for substantiating the relevance of the thesis of secularization, it is only a concrete example typical of the European part of the world” (Kargina, 2014: 110). The stage of coexistence in one society of both a developed secular worldview and a religious one, their constant interaction, was called "post-secularism" (Habermas, 2008).

In the modern public discourse of big cities, both secular and religious trends are manifested. The question of the religious and secular relationship in such a multinational, multi-religious and culturally significant city like St. Petersburg is very important. The specificity of St. Petersburg in this perspective has the generic specificity of the entire religious and confessional situation in Russia. As noted by the domestic scientist A.V. Sitnikov “The religious space of modern Russia is the result of its historical development as a multinational and multiconfessional state. Russia escaped religious wars, large-scale interfaith clashes, such as those that took place in Europe in the New Age” (Sitnikov, 2012: 57).

This factor is relevant in view of the fact that the processes of secularization in Europe took place in the context of large-scale conflicts, beginning with medieval heresies and ending with the eras of religious wars, whose heritage can be seen in modern conflicts (the Croatian-Yugoslav conflict). Important for the establishment of secular thinking in Europe was the fact of a review and rethinking of philosophy.

Among the first to begin the process of secularization were European philosophers (B. Spinoza and R. Descartes started this process, continued by I. Kant and F. Nietzsche).

In the Russian Empire in the XIX century, philosophy was banned (Kamnev, Kamneva, 2016), therefore, as noted by A. V. Malinov and S. A. Troitsky, Russia did not have its own philosophical school, capable of rooting the traditions of secularism (Malinov and Troitsky, 2013). Russian social thought was embodied in a literary form, which was in a certain way connected with the religious worldview (Dostoevsky, Tolstoy). Even the philosophy of the 20th century was directly permeated by Orthodox eschatology (Ilyin, Berdyaev).

In connection with the peculiarity of urbanization and cultural traditions, some scholars determine the current state of Russian urban society through the process of “archaization”. But this approach is more relevant for Russian society at the macro level, since a return to the “conservative modernization” model makes the archaization problem significant at the regional and local level, in view of the removal of the role of cities as significant centers of human activity to the sideline (Malinov and Troitsky, 2013: 10).

Russian philosopher A. G. Dugin, introducing the concept of “archaeomodern” into philosophical discourse, states: “The Russian society of the last three centuries belongs to the same type of archaeomodern, when, during the modernization of Peter the Great and some time before him, rulers began to introduce structures of a social logo, traced from European countries and societies, and people became isolated in their ancient dreams” (Dugin, 2011: 49).

The issue of the development of modern communities in a city is a very complex topic in the social science. In modern conditions, big cities faster and stronger submit to the influence of meta-processes such as globalization, migration, dynamization, the introduction of the latest achievements of scientific and technological progress. On the other hand, large cities, due to high standard of living, become the main centers of both internal and external migration, through which elements of religion and culture brought in by migrants get involved directly into the city culture.

Religiosity originally exists in the space of St. Petersburg, at least in architecture, temples and cathedrals are an integral part of the Northern capital, both culturally and historically. Petersburg was created as the economic, cultural, political and religious center of Russia. In modern St. Petersburg, all-Russian religious and secular tendencies are manifested, but the level of religiosity of the population remains high.

High religiosity of the Russian population is confirmed by the results of the ACSPO (All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion) survey on Great Fast, namely, a quarter of the respondents (25%) adhere to Orthodox religious beliefs, observe fasts with one or another frequency (14% observe only the Great Fast, 9% observe the majority of fasting, but not all, and 2% strictly observe all fasts) (Wciom.ru, 2019).

Regarding the experience of St. Petersburg, state studies on the religiosity of the population or the distribution of the population among religious groups in St. Petersburg were not conducted during 2017 and 2018. However, according to a telephone survey given in an article by a sociologist E.V. Rodionova “Conflict potential of religious attitudes of megalopolis residents: according to the research in St. Petersburg” only 22.8% of respondents identified themselves as atheists, the rest of the respondents classified themselves not only as religion or denomination believers, but 15.1% attributed themselves to a cluster "I believe in God, but I don't profess any religion" (Rodionova, 2018). Despite this, the majority of respondents identified themselves as believers or religious people.

## PUBLIC DISCOURSE ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS WORLDVIEWS ON THE EXAMPLE OF ST. PETERSBURG

In public discourse this correlates with the activities of various associations. In St. Petersburg, there are a number of different kinds of not only religious, but also public organizations that identify themselves with a particular religion or denomination. For example, the Council of Orthodox public associations of the St. Petersburg diocese, established on December 14, 2015, which purpose is to coordinate the interaction of the St. Petersburg diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church with Orthodox public associations and organizations in St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region, is actively working (Ethnorelig.ru, 2018). In the framework of the Council's activities, forums, film screenings, and public discussions aimed at strengthening relations between Orthodox associations are held. It should be noted that in the public field in the form of cooperation and coordination among the Orthodox there are forums of the Orthodox community and Orthodox fairs, during which photo exhibitions take place, including those that help strengthen international relations in the format of cooperation with representatives of other countries (Mitropolia.spb.ru, 2018). In St. Petersburg there are unions of Orthodox writers, a union of Orthodox entrepreneurs, and brotherhoods. At the same time, the citywide procession – the Day of the Translation of the Faithful Saint Prince Alexander Nevsky's Relics in 2018, gathered about 110,000 people on Nevsky Prospekt (Kommersant.ru., 2019).

In the field of Islam there is the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of St. Petersburg and the North-West of Russia in the city, which manifests itself mainly in the perspective of education in the political and social field. So, under the Spiritual Administration, the "Eastern Academy" was opened, where conferences and round tables are held.

Also in St. Petersburg there is a cultural and educational center "Dagestan", which is engaged in educational activities as well. At the same time, representatives of religions coordinate their own relations at a number of conferences, such as "Islam in the harmonization of interethnic relations" (Lenobl.ru, 2018); Orthodox, Muslim and Buddhist representatives participate in the conference "Traditional religions – for a strong Russia", the conference "Traditional religions in the context of national unity" (Spbdn.ru, 2018) and the conference "Christianity and Islam: fidelity to tradetion, fidelity to Russia "(Gov.spb.ru, 2018). In St. Petersburg, as in any developed city, secular positions are strong. A vivid example of socially significant events and trends in the field of secularism is the annual anti-clericalism rally in the city. Participants of the left-wing social and political movements took part in this rally, for example, the following phrases and calls were heard at the rally: "Now someone is surprised: Oh, they appropriate St. Isaac cathedral! Ah, they build churches in our squares! Of course they are building! This is their right, because it is their power, the power of the clergy. This power is not based on workers who have realized their class interests. In order to rely on the people, it (the power) must deceive. And the best experts in deceiving the people are priests. For centuries, they have learned this! For centuries they have learned how to explain to a person from whom bread, work and house are taken away – be patient! Be patient, you will be rewarded in your next life. Everything will be wonderful!” (YouTube.com, 2018, a). Such a statement shows not only the speaker’s complete ignorance of the foundations of Christian doctrine, but also a lack of understanding of the political situation in the country.

It is important to note that actively the ideas of maximizing the separation of the church from society (and not from the state, although the Church is part of society) are upheld by deputies of the Legislative Assembly of St. Petersburg Boris Vishnevsky and Maxim Reznik. For example, in connection with the Anti-Clericalism rally, Boris Vishnevsky declared: “I consider aggressive and ignorant obscurantism, the growing interference of the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church in secular life, attempts to establish prohibitions and restrictions for society based on religious dogmas – completely unacceptable and unconstitutional, by the way, violating the principle secular state” (Nevnov.ru, 2018). Maxim Reznik actively made statements on the transfer of St. Isaac's Cathedral and was an active initiator of the verification of the legality of the transfer of Sampson Cathedral to the Russian Orthodox Church by the state.

An example of secular discourse in public discourse is the regional St. Petersburg media, for example, based on a content analysis of the most popular information resource in the city, Fontantka.ru, it is noted that religious contradictions between population groups alone do not lead to conflict situations. The religious situation undergoes conflictogenesis as a result of the work of the media, which extremely simplistically transfer religious issues to the plane of economics and politics. Thus, an analysis of the publications of Fontanka.ru from August 30, 2017 to January 15, 2018 showed that all 60 news about the Church are in no way connected with the charitable, social, religious activities of the Russian Orthodox Church and most of the publications are related to politics and economics (Rodionova, 2018).

Also, in St. Petersburg, film director A. N. Sokurov, who at a meeting with teachers, undergraduates and students of the Higher School of Economics, said: “We have a powerful Muslim world. He may also claim his great rights. And in religious wars there is no compromise. I am against merging the Orthodox Church with the state, against granting the Russian Orthodox Church party status. This can destroy a state like Russia. And these are not some threats from the category: “NATO threatens us.” Flirting with the Orthodox Church is a mistake. And the Orthodox Church has always sought to become a party in the state” (Rosbalt.ru, 2018).

This state of affairs demonstrates not only a misunderstanding of the Russian model of State-church relations, which has its own problems and shortcomings, but also there are absolutely no tendencies toward turning the Russian Orthodox Church into a party. Also, the so-called respected director, the Muslim world actively manifests itself at the highest level of power to the same extent as the Russian Orthodox Church. In public discourse A.G. Nevzorov, who became the opinion leader in St. Petersburg in 2017 (Sobaka.ru, 2018) is quite famous. So, Nevzorov constantly opposes not only religion, but also the Russian Orthodox Church, quite often demonstrating ignorance not only of religion, religious studies, but also a manifest and clear sophistry. For example, an article in the Snob publication Church Hype dated November 20, 2017 states: “The Russian Orthodox Church called the public discussion of the problem of sexual harassment and rape propaganda of sin”. This was reported by Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokolamsk on the air of the Russia 24 television channel. He also proposed to ban abortion by law. "Snob" phoned Alexander Nevzorov and asked what, in his opinion, this statement meant.

The following is a statement by A.G. Nevzorov: "This is pure hype, nothing more. Physiologists always care about priests of any color; they always strive to stick their nose into their underpants. (…) There are beliefs that require compulsory circulation, that is, circumcision of a piece of the penis. These are Jewish things: they decided that this particular organ is the antenna of faith…" (Snob.ru, 2018).

Not only does this passage vividly demonstrate the sophisticated principle of the substitution of concepts (the argument for the thesis "priests," that is, Orthodox priests, is built on examples from other religions), but Nevzorov's absolute ignorance and misunderstanding of those historical, climatic, hygienic and sacred meanings that these or other rituals (for example, circumcision) can carry under them or this is a deliberate distortion of the information transmitted to them by the magazine.

However, a serious analysis of the texts and statements of Nevzorov shows us complete ignorance or intentional distortion of the religious system and the meanings of certain words. So, in one of the excerpts from the video clip of Nevzorov on YouTube's video hosting, he states: "Everything that concerns the Christian cult itself is through, completely, one hundred percent Jewish history, with full respect for the Jews and respect for their mythology and sympathy for their mythology "(YouTube.com, 2018, b). Here we see an emphasized respect for Judaism and an emphasized disregard for Christianity.

Note that, firstly, the declaration of the sacred religious system as "mythology" is extremely incorrect, however, later in the same passage Nevzorov gives an ex-ample from the Gospel that Jesus was called a rabbi in the scripture by his disciples. Nevzorov interprets this fact in the modern Jewish-religious sense. However, it must be understood that the word rabbi (from Aramaic רבין rabbin) in the era of the acts of Jesus meant "great" or "teacher", therefore, the appeal to Jesus with the word "rabbi" is quite organic.

In addition, Nevzorov accuses priests and hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church of homosexuality and pedophilia (YouTube.com, 2018, c), but does not cite any data that compromises the videos and correspondence. He also predicts the Church will soon decay (Fontanka.ru, 2018), and at the beginning of 2018, media reported that holy water was taken from the toilet in St. Isaac's Cathedral (Mk.ru, 2019).

The above examples of statements by A.G. Nevzorov contrasted sharply with the activities and statements of other proponents of secularization in St. Petersburg with their emphasized negativity. So, if the deputy Reznik is engaged in his direct duties, checking the legality of the transfer of property (even if this property is the temple), and the deputy Vishnevsky argues his secular position, to which he has full right, then in the case of Nevzorov you can see obvious media outrage and constant maintenance of a certain image designed for "branding" of the name "Nevzorov".

## CONCLUSION

Summing up, we must say that St. Petersburg is a city with widely represented both religious associations and secular ones. Despite the great mediation of secular and atheistic discourses, the majority of the population in one way or another classifies themselves as believers. At the same time, secular discourse crystallizes into a form of ideology that does not accept any religious component (singling out the ROC as its main adversary), framing any manifestation of religiosity as negative (which is confirmed by the mentioned discourse of the Fontanka.ru Internet portal). Religious organizations themselves have representation in the public sphere and are constantly in a dialogue format, building trust and diplomatic relations not only with state and municipal authorities or public associations, but also with each other. It can also be postulated that there is practically no constructive dialogue or interaction between representatives of the religious worldview and the secular, despite the willingness on the part of the religious community. The authors of the article are inclined to believe (starting from the communicative premise of Yu. Habermas) that it is precisely in the dialogue, mutual respect, a clear definition of interests and constant interaction that the two worldviews can productively exist in St. Petersburg in the era of post-secularism.

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# БОГАТСТВО БЕДНОСТИ, ИЛИ МОЖЕТ ЛИ РЕЛИГИЯ БЫТЬ БЕДНОЙ? (СО-РАЗМЫШЛЕНИЯ С М. ЭПШТЕЙНОМ)

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**Аннотация**

В статье раскрывается и анализируется концепция „минимальной (бедной) религии" М. Эпштейна, выросшей из пустоты и опустошенности атеизмом. „Минимальная религия" – феномен пост-атеистической религиозности. Эта религиозность называется „бедной", ибо почти ничего не имеет в этом мире: ни храмов, ни ритуалов, ни доктрин. Всё, что она имеет – это общение с Богом здесь и сейчас. Это не религия „говорения *о* Боге", а религия „разговора *с* Богом", „Божьего слуха". Здесь на место традиционной теологии „Слова о Боге" приходит теология „Слова Бога о Самом Себе" – теология космопоэзиса; теология „смерти Бога" трансформируется в „теологию воскресения", т.е. новой жизни Бога за пределами его церковно-исторического тела. „Минимальная религия" – это непосредственная связь, соединение с Богом без посредников в лице Церкви, которая в облике клерикализма выполняет часто роль Антихриста, подменяющего собою Бога. „Бедную религию", по мнению Эпштейна, можно сопоставить с „бедным искусством" – авангардизмом. Как в авангардизме главное – не *что*, а *кто*, не что создано, а кто создает и *вера* в то, что этот кто – гениален, а, значит, и произведение, созданное этим кто гениально, так и в „бедной религии": главное – не что мы видим в мире, а Кто это создает, не что с нами и миром происходит, а Кто руководит этим происходящим. Здесь возникают проблемы непостижимости замыслов Бога, Его внеморальности, ибо Бог стоит по ту сторону человеческих, эгоистических представлений о добре и зле. Лишь вступая в со-творчество с Богом путем разрушения скорлупы своего „Эго", ощущая себя бедным и нищим перед лицом Бога, человек обретает всё – величайшее богатство – встречу с Богом в своем сердце, способность к видению и слышанию Бога через Его творения. Такова очень богатая – „бедная религия".

**Ключевые слова**: „минимальная (бедная) религия", теология воскресения, атеизм, Церковь, Антихрист, теология космопоэзиса.

С древности и до сегодняшнего дня в самые тяжелые и безысходные моменты жизни человек взывает к Богу (богам, идолам) о помощи. И конец XX – начало XXI века не является исключением. Хотя появляются новые (или забытые древние?) нюансы в характере обращения человека к Высшим Силам, Богу. Размышления над этими новыми нюансами привели М.Н. Эпштейна к идее о возникновении особого вида религиозности – „бедной религии" или „минимальной религии" (в английском варианте – „minimal religion"), основные признаки которой он сформулировал в 1982 г. в „Манифесте бедной религии". В 90-х годах эта идея начала оформляться им в концепцию в статьях „Пост-атеизм, или Бедная религия", „Minimal Religion", „Post-atheism: From Apophatic Theology to "Minimal Religion"„ (Эпштейн, 2013: 26–31; Эпштейн, 1995; Epstein, 1999a; Epstein, 1999b). В течение 30 лет концепция „бедной религии" вынашивалась и осмысливалась и, наконец, в 2013 г. воплотилась в серьезное научное исследование „Религия после атеизма. Новые возможности теологии" (Эпштейн, 2013), в котором она анализируется в самых различных (иногда необычных) ракурсах.

Первый вопрос, возникающий сразу и практически у всех, кто знакомится с этой концепцией: „Почему *бедная* религия?“. Разве может быть религия, как *связь* с Богом, бедной? Разве не делает человека *такая* связь сверхбогатым? Для ответа на эти правомерные вопросы необходимо обратиться к истокам самого понятия „религия“ и феноменальному развертыванию его в мире, обществе и истории.

Слово религия связано с двумя латинскими словами: religio – культ, святыня и religare – связь, соединение. В соответствии с этими *двумя* интерпретациями в мире существуют, но, увы, часто не со-существуют, два проявления религии: 1) религия как духовно-социальный институт, где главное – культ, поклон-ение, пре-клонение и связанные с этим ритуалы (жертвы, обряды, богослужения, св. праздники, посты и т.д.), порождающие необходимость в существовании служителей культа (жрецов, священников), Св. Книг и „дома для Бога“ – храма; 2) религия как *непосредственная* связь с Богом.

„Бедная религия“ – это *непосредственную* связь с Богом, когда человек встречается с „безо́бразным“ Богом (в смысле освобождения Бога от всех, человеком придуманных образов и представлений) не в „доме Бога“ – каком-то помещении, храме, а в своем сердце. Встреча сердца человека и Сердца Бога. Прекрасно об этой встрече пишет суфийский поэт Джалал-ад-дин Руми:

> „Я долго искал Бога у христиан, но его не было на кресте.
> Я побывал в индуистском храме
> И древнем буддийском монастыре,
> Но и там не нашел я даже следов его.
> Я дошел до Герата и Кандагара и искал его повсюду,
> Но его не было ни внизу, ни вверху.
> Решившись, я дошел до горы Каф, но и там я нашел
> Только птицу Анка, а не Бога.
> Я отправился к Каабе, но Бога не было и там.
> Я спросил о нем Ибн Сину,
> Но он был выше суждений философов…
> Тогда я заглянул в свое сердце.
> И только там я узрел Бога,
> Которого не было больше нигде…“ (Торчинов, 1998: 9).

Такая религия не нуждается в сложных определениях и носит сугубо экзистенциальный характер. „Бедная религия – это религия без дальнейших определений, столь же прямо и цельно предстоящая Иному, как неделимо Оно Само“ (Эпштейн, 2003: 30). Именно *такой* религии посвящена книга М. Эпштейна „Религия после атеизма. Новые возможности теологии“, в которой развивается концепция новой, постатеистической теологии.

Новая постатеистическая теология – это уже не традиционная теология жизни Бога (в исторической Церкви), не радикальная теология смерти Бога (в атеистическом мире), а *теология воскресения*, т.е. новой жизни Бога за пределом Его церковно-исторического тела. „Бог уже умер – и теперь воскресает, причем именно в той стране, которая первой в Новое время распяла его“, – пишет М. Эпштейн о современной России (Эпштейн, 2013: 27). Более того, теология воскресения, концепция, рождённая путём осмысления феномена

„бедной религии“, является, по мысли Эпштейна, ничем иным, как *новым циклом религиозной истории* (там же). Этот „новый цикл“ базируется на всё большем осознании людьми невозможности постичь Бога, представить его каким-либо образом или именем, ибо Он больше всех определений, и в то же время неискоренимой тоске о реальном Его присутствии, жажде встретиться с *живым Богом*. Осмысление подобного феномена требует обращения к традиции апофатического или негативного богословия, основанного на осознании непостижимости Бога, ибо „Бог постигается “во мраке незнания”, через отрицание всех своих возможных определений“ (Эпштейн, 2013: 22). „Интересно и парадоксально, что во всех религиях постижение Непостижимого осуществляется путем отказа от Его постижения, „познания неведением“ (Дионисий Ареопагит). С этой целью в психотехниках религий различными способами очищается сознание от знаний и логических умо-заключений (кенозис в исихазме, у-вей в даосизме, коаны и мондо – в дзен-буддизме). Прекрасно это выражено Христом в Его Нагорной проповеди: “Блаженны нищие духом” (Мф. 5: 3). Ибо, лишь очистив сосуд своего, человеческого духа от ego, став нищим духом, “пустым”, можно наполниться Высшей Полнотой Единого и достичь таким образом блаженства в христианстве, или нирваны в буддизме, или мокши в индуизме, или космической, инь-янской гармонии в даосизме“ (Сергеев и Шелковая, 2017: 75).

Однако на каком основании Эпштейн делает вывод, что феномен „бедной религии“ – явление, прежде всего, российской действительности? Дело в том, что тот вид воинствующего атеизма, который имел место в СССР, в некотором смысле уникален и незнаком другим странам. Почему? Ведь в странах социалистического содружества тоже существовал атеизм (он существовал всегда и, вероятно, не скоро исчезнет с Земли)? Однако только в СССР появился уникальный феномен „святой земли атеизма“. Как отмечает А. Дударев, „по аналогии с библейским народом Божьим карикатурно появился “народ-безбожник” – советский народ, имеющий свою “святую землю” – страну победившего социализма, и просуществовавший три-четыре поколения. Именно в СССР атеизм явил некую полноту и завершенность“ (Дударев, 2012). Кроме того, следует учитывать особенность русской души – эту уникальную „боголюбивую душу“. Она (эта русская душа) всеми фибрами тянется к живому Богу и любые Его суррогаты лишь обостряют тоску по Нем. „Опыт пребывания в пустыне, – пишет М. Эпштейн о периоде воинствующего атеизма в СССР, – не может пройти без следа, и этот “след” пустоты обнаружится в стремлении к полноте духа, преодолевающей границы исторических деноминаций. Для тех, кто обрел Бога в пустыне, слишком тесны стены существующих храмов, их нужно раздвинуть“ (Эпштейн, 2013: 402).

В начале своей книги „Религия после атеизма“ М. Эпштейн сообщает данные последнего крупномасштабного социологического опроса, охватившего 56900 человек в 79 субъектах Российской Федерации, проведенного в декабре 2012 г. службой „Среда“, согласно которому 25% россиян верят в Бога, но не относят себя ни к одной определенной конфессии (Эпштейн, 2013: 32). С одной стороны, четверть населения великой России – внеконфессионально верующие – это много. Но в свете вышеизложенной исторической ситуации России, „перепахавашей“ души россиян так, что в них вырастает тяга к живому Богу сильнее, чем прежде, эта цифра должна быть гораздо больше 25%. В чем же дело?

Мой более, чем 20-летний опыт преподавания религиоведения в ВУЗе и общения с атеистами и верующими разных религий показывает, что часто для тех, кто относит себя к определенной религии и даже выполняет определенные предписания той или иной религии, главное состоит не в „одеждах" религии а в *непосредственном* общении с Богом, но... (и вновь, и вновь эти смыслоемкие „но" человеческого бытийствования!) вырваться из традиций, отказаться от „помощи извне" в виде различных религиозных ритуалов поддержки человека у многих не хватает силы духа. Быть наедине с Богом, лицом-к-лицу, сердце-в-Сердце – удел сильных духом. Но сильных мало, слабых – большинство. А слабым нужен Утешитель. И в этом были правы и З. Фрейд, и Ф. Достоевский (см. его „Легенду о Великом Инквизиторе"). „Православная церковь нужна умирающим больше, чем живущим, больным больше, чем здоровым, страдающим больше, чем счастливым, несведущим больше, чем знающим", – отмечает М. Эпштейн (Эпштейн, 2013: 215).

Те же, сильные духом люди, которые считают себя атеистами и не ищут в Церкви утешения и помощи, желая лишь всегда, во всех жизненных обстоятельствах сохранять свое лицо, свою чело-вечность, помогать другим, не „говорить о высоких материях", а что-то делать реальное для конкретных людей, своего общества, своей страны, своей Родины и, наконец, для человечества и Земли, по сути, являются со-творцами Бога, сами не подозревая об этом. И часто *такие* атеисты ближе к Богу, чем некоторые традиционно верующие. Такой „атеист" может быть и святым, сам того не подозревая, жить по законам Божьим, но думать, что он живет просто по человеческим законам человеколюбия. Об этом пишет Эпштейн, анализируя повесть М. де Унамуно „Святой Мануэль Добрый, мученик": „За безбожием Дона Мануэля, скрывается подлинная святость и готовность к мученичеству во имя ближних, а значит, и во имя Бога. Так происходит двойное развенчание иллюзий сознания: дон Мануэль разоблачает для себя иллюзию веры, с ужасом постигая свое неверие, и одновременно писатель разоблачает эту иллюзию неверия, открывая за ней неосознанную реальность веры" (Эпштейн, 2013: 381). Осмысление этого феномена приводит Эпштейна к мысли о том, что европейская религиозность „все более утрачивает свое господство в сознании, чтобы заново обрести его в глубине подсознательного" (там же).

Таким образом, причина того, что 25%, а не 50% и более являются представителями „бедной религии" не в несовершенстве этой религии (встреча с Богом не может быть несовершенной!), а в том, что стать „бедным верующим" трудно по вышеперечисленным причинам для большого количества людей слабых духом (к тому же эту „слабость духа" усиленно культивирует государство в своих интересах: слабыми легче управлять), а люди „сильные духом", видя в религии только культ и „социальные игры" отворачиваются часто от нее („игры" надоедают) и идут по жизни, руководствуясь зовом сердца, не подозревая, что этим сердцем мудро и с любовью руководит сам Бог. „Истина одна. Бог один. Но путей к Нему неисчислимое множество. И у каждого – *свой П*уть к Богу. Критерием встречи человека с Богом, Истиной является рождение в его сердце любви ко всему сущему" (Шелковая, 2016: 136).

Все религии в той или иной форме проповедуют любовь и милосердие к людям, но при этом часто Церковь, как социальный институт, в своей деятельности сама отходит от этого, преследуя ино-верцев и тех, кто отходит не от

Бога, а от *предписаний Церкви*. Религиозна ли в таких ситуациях сама Церковь? Не отрицает ли при этом Церковь суть религии как поклонение *Богу* и связь *с Ним*? Не является ли абсолютизация „помощи" Богу в лице Церкви подменой сакрального владычества мирской властью и проявлением недоверия Богу, неверия в то, что Он сам способен править эти миром? Чему и кому поклоняется Церковь, возводя храмы, один роскошнее и богаче другого? Нужны ли Богу *такие* храмы? К кому приходят верующие в *такие* храмы? Являются ли *такие* храмы местом встречи с Богом, местом раскрытия духовности? Эпштейн ставит очень остро вопрос об существовании атеизма внутри теократии. Отвечает ли сущности религии существование и всё большее распространение „религархии" (М. Эпштейн), сращивающей церковную высшую иерархию с государственной? Не являются ли теократия и атеизм двумя сторонами одной медали, „атеократией" (М. Эпштейн)?

Осмысление этих вопросов подводит философа к необычному и очень интересному, на мой взгляд, подходу к проблеме бунта в религии на примере нашумевшей в 2012 г. акции трёх участниц панк-группы „Pussy Riot" в храме Христа Спасителя (Москва, Россия). Как рассматривать беснование этих девушек в храме Христа Спасителя: как богохульство или как бунт против искажения смысла учения Христа? Ведь хорошо известно, что Сам Христос „бунтовал" в храме иудейском, опрокидывая лавки менял, меняющих Богово на кесарево. Что это было, вопрошает Эпштейн, – „богохульство или вызов фарисейству?" (Эпштейн, 2013: 12). А не богохульство ли возведение богатейшего храма в полу-нищей стране, храму Тому, кто говорил: „удобнее верблюду пройти сквозь игольные уши, нежели богатому войти в Царство Божие" (Мт. 19: 24)? Не богохульство ли постоянно нарушать заповеди Христа, устами Которого говорил Бог, например о любви ко всем и молитве за врагов (Мт. 5: 44), о тайной молитве (Мт. 6: 5–7) и Царствии Божьем внутри нас (Лк. 17: 21)? Любят ли Христа те, кто смотрит без содрогания на распятого Христа (представьте себе постоянное созерцание тела искалеченного любимого Вами человека), забывая о том, что Его НЕТ распятого, Он ВОСКРЕС еще в 33 году?

Пишу это и думаю: „Как относится Церковь к бунтарям?" Ответ знаком всем. Знакомо и то, что выдающихся мистиков и глубоко верующих мыслителей Церковь часто отлучала и уничтожала, жестоко уничтожала. Почему? Или она видела в Боге конкурента и, соответственно, в тех, кто был непосредственно, т.е. без посредства Церкви, связан в Ним?

И здесь, на мой взгляд, очень важно понимание сущности понятий „еретик", „антихрист" и „антихристиванин". Еретик – это отступник от Слова Церкви, ее предписаний и запретов. А вот „антихристианин"? Отступник от христианства, как учения Христа, или от Церкви христианской, часто искажающей это учение с точностью „до наоборот"? Означает ли выступление против христианской Церкви протест против учения Христа? В этом контексте нельзя не вспомнить Ф. Ницше, учение которого анализирует в своей книге Эпштейн. Кем был Ницше – противником Христа, Бога, „богоубийцей" или противником христианской Церкви, человеком, душа которого безмерно страдала от непрекращающегося в течение почти 2000 лет „распинания" Христа, „убиения" Бога? „"Бог умер", – говорит Ницше, но означает ли это, что он умер для Ницше, а может, это фиксация его смерти для масс? Сам же Ницше признается, что он "еще ребенком узрел Бога во всем блеске"„ (Шелковая, 2015: 82).

А „антихрист“? Это противник Христа, борец против Него или тот, кто всуе фарисейски преклоняется перед Христом, а, по сути, заменяет собою Его? Не является ли нам часто именно в таком контексте Церковь христианская? Об этом вопрошает и рассуждает Эпштейн в своей книге „Религия после атеизма“, анализируя „Легенду о Великом инквизиторе“ Ф. Достоевского, „Повесть об Антихристе“ Вл. Соловьева, концепцию интеррелигии Д. Андреева в его „Розе мира“ и современный процесс всё большей клерикализации российского общества. Нельзя не согласиться с глубокой мыслью в этом контексте Эпштейна о том, что „главное в Антихристе – не бунт, а подмена. Этим он отличается от своего отца Сатаны, в начале времен взбунтовавшегося против Бога... Новая стратегия Сатаны <...> привести под жезл одного наставника “превозносящегося выше всего, называемого Богом или святынею, так что в храме Божьем сядет он, как Бог, выдавая себя за Бога” (2 Фес. 2: 4)“ (Эпштейн, 2013: 117).

Если атеизм – это *открытое* богоборчество, то клерикализм, церковно-государственное христианство – фарисейское, „лживое благочестие и богопочитание“ (Эпштейн, 2013: 118). Именно против такого „благочестия“ выступал и бунтовал (опрокидывая лавки менял в иудейском храме) Иисус Христос. Сопоставление трех стадий развития отхода от Бога, изображенных Достоевским в „Братьях Карамазовых“ и Вл. Соловьевым в „Повести об Антихристе“: от лжелюбви – амбициозной любви к Богу, через несогласие с Богом во имя любви к человечеству, к всепобеждающей любви к самому себе и подмене собою Христа, приводит Эпштейна к выводу, что это путь разворачивания религиозности в России и за ее пределами: „настоящая эпоха Антихриста <...> еще вовсе не пришла с советской властью, а только через нее готовилась. Ибо Антихрист не будет прямо враждовать со Христом, как это делали Ленин – Сталин, а будет именно говорить от имени Христа“ (Эпштейн, 2013: 157). Да, и это самое страшное. И это мы видим воочию сегодня. Но сегодняшних людей труднее обмануть, чем людей первых десятилетий XX века. И ложь Церкви отторгает от нее и ведет к „бедной религии“, процесс распространения которой становится, исходя из вышеизложенного, закономерным не только для России, но и в целом для современного этапа развития человечества.

При этом трудно не заметить сходства одного из кругов ада, описанного Д. Андреевым в его „Розе мира“ с современным обществом, его культурой и мироотношением. Антропоцентризм, царящий в современном западном обществе, является ничем иным как „эпохой Антихриста“, в которой человек возомнил себя Богом, „убил Бога“ и поставил себя вместо Него. И корни, пропитанные „убийством“ Бога, прорастают в „дерево убийства и самоубийства“: насилие над природой и варварское ее уничтожение; насилие и уничтожение в человеке истинной духовности и культуры, заменяя ее лже-духовностью и лже-культурой; уничтожение личностного, творческого, уникального начала приводят не только к умиранию самого человека как богоподобного существа, но и к физическому его вымиранию как части природы. Убиение в себе Бого-подобия приводит к тому, что Антихристо-подобный человек, уничтожает сам себя.

Почему уничтожает? Может, это тоже замысел Бога? Убивает, чтобы затем воскресить. Ибо *воскресает то, что умерло*. Но воскресает не то, что было *до* смерти, а „преображенное тело“. Эта мысль постоянно живет во мне и на нее обращает особое внимание Эпштейн. Какова миссия Мессии, для чего

Христос пришел в этот мир? Может, для того, чтобы явить людям путь от умирания к воскресению? Попробуем рассмотреть и проанализировать как отвечает на этот вопрос Библия и христианская Церковь.

Из анализа текста Библии следует, что Христос пришел в этот мир, чтобы Своей мученической смертью искупить грехи человеческие, и прежде всего первородный грех Адама и Евы. Но в чем заключается суть первородного греха, который должен был искупить Христос? В эгоизме. А что такое эгоизм? Это когда человек думает только о себе. Он не умеет любить даже себя, ибо „*думать о любви и любить – это не одно и то же*. Думает – голова, любит – сердце. То есть Христос пришел, чтобы избавить нас от эгоизма – научить нас любить. Он пришел *не как Жертва, а как Духовный учитель*. Отсюда культ воскресения, ибо любовь побеждает смерть, *культ жизни, культ радости*, ибо воскресение, как победа над смертью – это огромная радость. Здесь главное для верующих – *научиться любить и радоваться жизни во всех его проявлениях*... Это – религия *“воскресшегоХриста”„*, религия людей сильных духом“ (Шелковая, 2015: 82).

Точка зрения христианской Церкви относительно причины прихода в мир Христа аналогична: Христос пришел в этот мир, чтобы Своей мученической смертью искупить грехи человеческие, и прежде всего первородный грех Адама и Евы. То есть, Он пришел, чтобы умереть в муках ради людей. И именно на этом делается акцент, на этом останавливается христианская Церковь. „Христос распят... Он мученически умер, принесенный на алтарь Бога, как жертва. Отсюда культ креста и крестиков с изображением распятого Христа, культ страданий и великомучеников за веру Христову, видение в аскетизме проявления духовности, культ распятия, то есть культ страданийисмерти. Здесь Христос выступает как жертва Богу за грехи человеческие. И главное для верующих – каяться в грехах и терпеть страдания, как терпел их Христос. Это – религия “распятогоХриста”, религия людей слабых духом“ (Шелковая, 2015: 81).

Таким образом, видение миссии Христа и, соответственно характер христианства, кардинально отличаются в зависимости от ответа на вопрос о миссии Мессии. Одни, христианская Церковь, делают акцент на распятии Христа, другие видят миссию Христа, прежде всего, в воскресении как победе над всеми испытаниями жизни. Человек в течение своей жизни подвергается множество раз „распятиям“ и вера в Христа дает ему силы каждый раз воскресать. Вновь и вновь, вновь и вновь... Это же относится к „распятиям“ религии, „убиениям“ Бога на протяжении всплесков атеизма в истории человечества. При этом важно осознание того, что „каждую “очередную” смерть Бога можно воспринимать как пролог к последующему воскресению“ (Эпштейн, 2013: 9). Не только к воскресению, но и к преображению. Ибо „каждая атеистическая волна, – как отмечает Эпштейн, – ... приносит за собой и новое понимание Бога и духовной реальности“ (Там же).

Не могу, в связи с этим, не рассказать о своем собственном духовном опыте. В Киевской духовной академии и семинарии проходила конференция, участником которой была я. Академия находится на территории Киево-Печорской лавры, и я жила там. Вечером, когда уже смеркалось, монах, проводивший экскурсию, ввел нас в Успенский собор, который из-за позднего времени был закрыт для верующих и в нем не было ни души. Тихонько, во мраке, я и еще несколько священников вошли в храм Божий. Свет едва мерцал и струился через окна около купола. Во мраке еле виднелась позолота алтаря и иконы. Тишина. Благость неимоверная. Меня охватил священный трепет. Я замерла... В это время служитель церкви зажег для нас свет. Всё озарилось светом, и красота неизреченная богатого убранства храма засияла всеми красками. Я ахнула тихо. Но... Соблазн для глаз убил тот благоговейный трепет души, который мерцал у меня до этого и увел меня из того, Горнего мира, в котором пребывала я, в этот, Дольний мир. И тогда я почувствовала и поняла, что такое „*соблазн очей*“.

Соблазн очей, уводящий от мира Горнего в мир Дольний. Именно об этом соблазне пишет Эпштейн, анализируя искусство авангарда, называя его, по аналогией с „бедной религией“ – религией без риз и прикрас – „бедным искусством“. „Разве не вернее предположить, – вопрошает он, – что именно реальность, пышущая здоровьем, чувственно округлая, полнотелая, скорее могла бы послужить демоническому искушению человечества, совратить его на земные пути и уклонить от небесных?“ (Эпштейн, 2013: 79), рассуждая о религиозной сути реалистического и авангардного искусства. Да, авангардное искусство дразнит зрителя, искушает его своей непонятностью и отсутствием в нем того, что принято считать неотъемлемым свойством искусства – эстетическим наслаждением. В этом контексте, отмечает Эпштейн, оно адекватно этимологии слова „искусства“ как искуса, искушения (Эпштейн, 2013: 70). Но оно же, подобно юродивому, сбрасывает ложные покровы с мира, инициирует процесс перехода человека от сомнения к вере, от абсурда к Истине, ведет, как дзенский коан, к трансформации сознания и постижению алогичности, непонятности жизни в силу невозможности постичь замысла Творца и в то же время вере в то, что мир создан наилучшим образом, ибо создан Богом. Авангардное искусство низвергает культ человеческого разума и понятности, культ человека, возомнившего себя всемогущим и всепонимающим творцом. И в этом-то, по мнению Эпштейна, состоит религиозная миссия авангарда. Всматриваясь и вдумываясь в „Мусорный роман“ И. Кабакова, состоящий из приклеенных к массивному деревянному стенду частиц повседневного хлама: пушинок, ниточек, осколков, очинков, философ приходит к выводу, что это и есть наша жизнь. „Разве не из таких вот пылинок она состоит?“ – спрашивает он нас, и продолжает: „И вдруг от этого мусора в сердце пропечатывается библейское: “Прах ты и в прах вернешься”„ (Эпштейн, 2013: 88). В этом-то и состоит катарсис авангарда – очищение от эгоизма, высокомерия и гордыни человеческой, более того, осмысление бренности земного, материального бытия и обращения взора человека к Небу, Богу, духовным ценностям. „Тема мусора, приобретает у Кабакова глубоко эсхатологический смысл – как прощание с пыльной материальностью мира“ (Эпштейн, 2013: 89).

Проводя параллель между „бедной религией“ и „бедным искусством“ – авангардизмом, Эпштейн выявляет их глубинное сходство. Как в „бедном искусстве“ – авангардизме главное – не *что*, а *кто*, не что создано, а кто создает и *вера* в то, что этот кто – гениален, а, значит, и произведение, созданное этим кто гениально, так и в „бедной религии“: главное – не что мы видим в мире, а Кто это создает, не что с нами и миром происходит, а Кто руководит этим происходящим. При этом человек – не игрушка в руках Бога, он, как подобие Бога, – тоже творец и очень важно осознавать, на что обращает особое внимание Эпштейн, что человек нужен Богу так же, как Бог нужен человеку, и всё происходящее в мире и с человеком – результат со-творчества Бога и человека (Эпштейн, 2013: 372).

В то же время, как мне видится, отрицание Эпштейном духовной миссии реалистического искусства, основываясь на библейской заповеди „не делай себе кумира и никакого изображения того, что на небе вверху, и на земле внизу“ (Ис. 20: 4), неправомерно. Ибо истинное произведение искусства – не фотография, не магнитофон, воспроизводящие действительность, а символ, в котором отображается душа художника, его переживания, его страдания, более того, истинным художником всегда руководит Бог в акте вдохновения.

Не совсем понятна также мысль Эпштейна о том, что формы предметности – заскорузлые и заслоняют истинный Свет (Эпштейн, 2013: 86) и что авангардизм, уходящий всё дальше и дальше от красоты сего мира и его гармонии демонстрирует „растущую власть трансценденции“ (Там же). Трансценденции от чего – от живого, чувственного, божественного, Богом созданного мира, трансценденция от себя истинного и погружение в свои ум-ствования? Или в свое без-умие? Свое без-умие не Бога-умие. Приближает ли *такая* трансценденция к Трансцендентальному или отдаляет от Него? Разве в каждом творении не вы-свечи-вается образ Творца? Разве дети заслоняют образ родителей и для того, чтобы увидеть родителей надо уничтожить детей?..

Да, идея красоты как соблазна для очей очень интересна и глубока. Наша жизнь – суета сует, собрание лоскутков и часто, увы, всякого хлама. Да. Но и нет. В жизни есть звездные мгновенья и красота мира про-свет-ляет, гармонизирует человека, вы-свет-ляет в нем всё лучшее. Разве Божественное не прекрасно? Разве хлам „божественнее“ прекрасной женщины? Поэтому не могу согласиться с тем, что лишь „бедное искусство“ приводит к Творцу. Да, „бедное искусство“ может привести к видению „праховости“ всего материального, но разве мало шедевров реалистического искусства приводит к тому же видению? Вспомним хотя бы „Апофеоз войны“ В.В. Верещагина. Более того, истинные шедевры искусства *всегда* приводят к встрече с Вечностью, с вечным и Богом во временном и материальном, и ценности именно *этого* вечного.

Следует отметить, что в дальнейшем изложении своей концепции Эпштейн переосмысливает свои идеи, высказанные в связи с анализом „бедного искусства“ – искусства авангарда. Так, он цитирует слова старца Зосимы, выделяя даже жирным шрифтом слова, отражающие мысль о том, что через творения можно увидеть Творца – Бога, Его лик и постичь (вернее, прикоснуться) к Его тайне (Эпштейн, 2013: 255. „Бог не во всем, но в каждом, в *каждости* всех вещей“, – говорит философ (Эпштейн, 2013: 403). Бог „божествует“ (С. Франк) во всем. „Дерево, озеро, облака, радуга – все они могут божествовать, т.е. передавать потоки божественной энергии, *если мы способны их воспринимать* (курсив мой – Н.Ш.)“ (Эпштейн, 2013: 370). Вот эта способность воспринимать потоки божественной энергии во всем и есть, на мой взгляд, и тут я полностью согласна с Эпштейном, один из главных признаков *встречи* человека с Богом. Встречи с Богом-Творцом через Его творения.

Анализируя книгу Иова, Эпштейн отмечает, что „Иов – это Адам, которого Бог заклинает совершить обратный путь от Древа познания добра и зла к Древу жизни“ (Эпштейн, 2013: 256) и выделяет это жирным шрифтом, как очень важную мысль. То есть надо наслаждаться жизнью, которую дает и так красиво живописует Бог в разговоре с Иовом. Живописует, наслаждаясь созерцанием Своего творения. И Эпштейн делает на этом акцент. В своем анализе „Екклесиаста“ он подчеркивает, что несмотря на то, что „всё суета сует“, надо не скорбеть, а уметь радоваться тому, что дает нам Бог, „*благопреки*: и вопреки отсутствию смысла, и благодаря ему“ (Эпштейн, 2013: 265). Более того, в своем письме Томасу Альтицеру Эпштейн развивает концепцию виталистического подхода к богословию – *теовитализм* как учение о возрождении, воскресении, начале новой жизни, приходе „вновь-бытия“ из небытия, „избыток бытия после его истощения и восстановления“ (Эпштейн, 2013: 395).

Да, жизнь наша часто кажется нам бессмысленной, суетой сует, „но ведь *человеку не дано постигнуть этот смысл*, – глубокомысленно отмечает Эпштейн, – а значит то, что считается суетой вменяется ему в обязанность, как смирение перед лицом непостижимого Промысла. <...> Все сужденное человеку само по себе бессмысленно, но раз это дано Господом, то делай, трудись, пользуйся, веселись, наслаждайся во всю полноту своих дней (курсив мой – Н.Ш.)“ (Эпштейн, 2013: 265).

Всё, что нам послано судьбой – послано Богом. Он – главный Творец нашей судьбы. Но не единственный. Мы творим свою судьбу *вместе* с Богом, как со-творцы (вспомнился феномен „обо́жения“ в исихазме: человек готовит себя к встрече с Богом путем „умного делания“, „теозиса“, но состоится ли встреча – это решает *только* сам Бог. Хотя... в неприготовленную для встречи душу Бог просто „не сможет“ прийти, будучи всегда рядом...). И здесь раскрывается глубокая сущность, естество феномена „веры“: вера в мудрость Божью, Его любовь к нам порождает веру в то, что *всё*, что происходит с нами – наилучшее для нас здесь и сейчас. Но это „самое лучшее“ может восприниматься нами, видеться нами (т.е. восприниматься через призму нашего, эгоистического видения) как „самое худшее“. И мудрость человека, его истинное Бого-любие заключается в осознании того, что и „рай на земле“, и „ад кромешный“ в своей жизни человек творит в со-творчестве с Богом и бо́льшую долю „ада“ творит сам человек. Бог лишь любя направляет свое любимое детище туда, куда разумное или неразумное „дитя“ свободно, *по свей воле* выбирает идти (вспомним символическое изображение отхода-по-своей-воле от Бога Евы и Адама в Библии). О мудрости Логоса, знающего лучше человека, *что* есть истина, и *что* должно происходить с нами, и стоящего помимо *человеческих* представлений о добре и зле, писали еще древние стоики.

Бог – вне человеческих представлений о добре и зле и в этом плане Он – вне-морален. Но... вне-морален не означает а-морален. И Эпштейн обращает особое внимание на это и анализирует феномен „внеморальности Бога“. Естественно, в этой связи сразу „всплывает“ теория Ф. Ницше о морали сверх-человека, стоящего *по ту сторону* добра и зла. „Ницше обвиняют в жестокости, имморализме. Но это не так. Ницше – не жестокий, а мужественный человек, открыто смотрящий в реальный, а не человеком, философами-идеалистами придуманный мир. Не Ницше жесток, а то общество, в котором он жил, и которое, увы-увы, не стало добрее и гуманнее сегодня. А жизнь? Она вне человеком придуманной морали, *по ту сторону* добра и зла“ (Шелковая, 2015: 80).

Но имморализм падшего человека, т.е. человека, со-вершившего от-ход от Бога, тем более, „убившего“ Бога, не есть вне-морализм Бога. Бог – вне проблемы морального выбора добра и зла, проблемы падшего человека, вкусившего от Древа познания добра и зла. Бог – выше этой *дихотомии* отношений, выше раздвоения, „разрезания“ мира скальпелем человеческого разума на две половинки – добрую и злую, выше половинчатости в отношениях – добром или злом. Бог – Творец Древа жизни, Творец *целостного мироотношения* (об этом, кстати, говорил еще Гераклит, отмечая единство добра и зла в мире, видение чего достигается путем постижения Логоса). Бог – над-морален, как надморальна и в то же время прекрасна и гармонична окружающая нас природа и всё мироздание в целом, Творцом которых Он и является.

Дихотомия, противопоставление, борьба добра и зла – человеческая проблема, „человека-Древа-познания-добра-и-зла“, падшего, от-павшего от Бога и, тем самым, от Древа жизни. Человек, встретившийся с Богом, становится вне морали, ее запретов и предписаний, вне человеком созданной дихотомии мира. И, став таким образом целостным, Бого-подобным человеком, вернувшись к себе первозданному, он может делать всё, что захочет. Именно в этом контексте звучат слова Бл. Августина: „Верь в Бога и делай, что хочешь“. Ибо это „что хочешь“ будет всегда божественно прекрасно, так как человек, ставший истинным со-творцом с Богом, уже просто *не может* сотворить то, что против Бога, против Древа жизни, он становится „человеком-Древа-жизни“. О необходимости и зарождении в лице „бедной религии“ такого поворота в человеке и судьбе человеческой, как возврат от Древа познания добра и зла к Древу жизни, и говорит в своей книге Эпштейн. „Спасение, – пишет он, – в Древе жизни, а не в добре, которое противостоит злу, подобно всем искривленным ветвям на одном губительном дереве“ (Эпштейн, 2013: 258).

Очень важно обращение Эпштейном особого внимания на характер „разговора с Богом“ в „бедной религии“: не „о Боге“, а „с Богом“. „Бедная религия не имеет никаких слов, кроме житейских, человеческих, но зато ей внятно присутствие *Божьего слуха*. Перед лицом этого слуха нельзя говорить о Боге, но только Богу (курсив мой. – Н.Ш.)“ (Эпштейн, 1996: 163). Разговор „о“ – это разговор о ком-то постороннем (Он), разговор „с“ – это разговор с близким нам существом, интимный и за-душевный разговор (Ты). Не Он, но Ты. Не Властелин, но Владыка. Не Господин, но Отец. Не много-говорящие о Боге, но молчащие о Боге. „Бог там, где про Него молчат“ (Н. Виноградова). Интимный разговор с женщиной, с мужчиной, с Богом… Христос учил: „И когда молишься, не будь как лицемеры, которые любят в синагогах и на углах улицы, останавливаясь молиться, чтобы показаться перед людьми. Истинно говорю вам, что они уже получают награду свою (в виде общественного мнения об их религиозности. – Н. Ш.). Ты же, когда молишься, войди в комнату твою и, затворив дверь твою, помолись Отцу твоему, Который втайне; и Отец твой, видящий тайное, воздаст тебе явно“ (Мт. 6: 5–6). Это очень важно. Церковь же настаивает на прилюдности молитвы. Личное становится публичным. Сокровенное, тайное выставляется напоказ, нивелируя тем самым себя.

Неожиданной и очень глубокой является трактовка Эпштейном понятия „теология“ – Бого-Словие как „Слово Бога о самом себе“ (Эпштейн, 2013: 253). Каждой капелькой и травинкой Бог рассказывает человеку о Себе, говорит человеку что-то очень для него важное. Но что? И здесь встает проблема знания и понимания „языка Бога“. „Может быть, – размышляет Эпштейн, – Он давно уже вещает нам, но говорит на языке камней и трав, дождей и радуг <…> мы ждем речи **о** себе – но Бог беседует **с** нами обо всем на свете“ (Эпштейн, 2013: 254). И здесь имеет место уже не догматическая теология как рассуждение **о** Боге, не экзистенциальная теология как разговор **с** Богом, а *теология космопоэзиса* – не слово о Боге, но Слово Самого Бога. Это, по выражению Эпштейна, „эксцентрическая“ теология, обращенная не к Центру – Творцу, а к периферии – Его творению. Это теология, желающая понять „язык Бога“, чтобы „иметь возможность слышать Его голос“ (там же), обрести способность не только смотреть и слушать то, что происходит в мире, но и видеть и слышать, а, значит, и понимать сказанное человеку Богом.

Вот в этом, на мой взгляд, главное – *увидеть за творениями Творца*: в искусстве – за картиной, музыкальным произведением, стихотворением, книгой увидеть и почувствовать душу и состояние художника, композитора, поэта, писателя; в жизни – в явлениях природы, деревьях, цветах, птицах и т.д. увидеть и почувствовать Бога; в людях – увидеть и почувствовать замысел Бога (*не понять*, ибо понять Бога невозможно, а *увидеть и почувствовать*, открыв широко свои глаза и свою душу навстречу миру и всем творениям Божьим). Как у У. Блейка:

„В одном мгновенье видеть вечность,
Огромный мир – в зерне песка,
В единой горсти – бесконечность,
И небо – в чашечке цветка“ (Блейк, 1982: 542).

Вечное – во временном, бесконечное – в конечном…

Вспоминается Волошинское „…высвобождаясь от власти малого, беспамятного „я“, увидишь ты, что все явленья – знаки, по которым ты вспоминаешь самого себя“ (Волошин, 2009: 102). Высвобождаясь от власти малого, беспамятного „я“… Да, лишь, проклюнувшись из скорлупы „эго“, своего Я-изма, и открыв себя миру, очистив свою душу от „накипи“ различных негаций к миру, человек тем самым возвращается к себе первозданному и становится способным видеть Бога во всем, слышать Его язык и понимать его. Сбросив с себя „богатство“ своего малого „я“, n-ное число „чего-то“, ощутив себя бедным и нищим, „пустым“ перед лицом Бога, открыв себя Богу и миру, человек обретает „всё“ – вмещая в себя „полноту Бога“ – величайшее богатство – встречу с Богом в своем сердце. Такова очень богатая – „бедная религия“.

Таким образом, „бедная религия“ – это не просто „продукт“ массового атеизма, а „росток“, выросший из Пустоты и опустошенности души человеческой воинствующим атеизмом и беспределом клерикализма. Как из ничто рождается всё (ex nihilo), как из вакуума рождаются виртуальные частицы и „неустойчивый вакуум (unstable vacuum) способен даже порождать целые вселенные“ (Эпштейн, 2013: 320), как Пустота буддизма порождает Полноту нирваны, как нищета духом в христианстве ведет к обо́жению, наполнению „богатством“ Бога, так и „бедная религия“, рожденная из „бунта души“ против атеократии (атеизм+теократия) и религархии, опустошающих душу, становится ростком *нового дерева* религии, более того, религии будущего человечества. Именно в этом, на мой взгляд, состоит плодотворность концепции „бедной религии“ М. Эпштейна как *увидении* им „нового цикла религиозной истории“, новой тенденции религиозного развития человечества.

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# RELIGIOSITY AND ALTRUISTIC ORIENTATION IN ECONOMICALLY DEVELOPED EUROPEAN SOCIETIES

**Summary**

In this paper, we examine the relationship between religiosity and altruistic value orientation in economically developed European societies. The data come from the European Social Survey (ESS). Religiosity within ESS is measured by three dimensions – self-evaluation, frequency of attendance of religious services apart from special occasions and frequency of praying apart from at religious services. Altruistic value orientation is measured by rating of personal importance of helping people and caring for others well-being. Using cross-sectional data from the last round of the ESS (from 2016), from thirteen economically developed European countries, we revealed very weak relationship between all three dimensions of religiosity and altruistic orientation. Secondly, using data from all the prior rounds of the ESS, from 2002 to 2016, we also examined trends of both religiosity and altruistic value orientation within the same societies. The results indicate decline of religiosity and rise of altruistic orientation in all of examined countries.

**Key words**: religiosity, altruistic orientation, (de)secularization, Europe, European Social Survey.

## INTRODUCTION

The post-World War II period has been marked in sociology (among other topics) by a dynamic debate over the question of whether religion has lost its social relevance or it is, on the contrary, still a very important component of social life. After a period in which the secularization paradigm was dominant (the sixties, seventies and even a good part of the eighties of the twentieth century), a critical turnaround followed, and research in the field of the sociology of religion focused on the various aspects of the revitalization of religion. It was called the desecularization process. From that moment, one of the important initial research premises of contemporary sociology of religion is that no general and *grand* conclusions can be given to the question whether religion is still an important social factor or it's not. Instead, analyses must focus on individual examples of both societies and religions. *Ergo*, many studies have shown that secularization has indeed taken roots in some societies, while in other communities this has not been the case. Because of that, the *micro* or *middle-range* position is the only one that is adequate for understanding the complex role of religion in contemporary society.

Also, one of the most important questions is whether religion is equally important at the individual and at the collective level in contemporary societies. In other words, contemporary research on religiosity must take into account the difference between personal spirituality and the social function of religion. On the basis of this difference we are setting our research question in this paper: taking altruistic value orientation as an important element of sociability, we want to examine is it influenced by religiosity. In this way we can get indirect answer to the question: does religion have a social function today or it is important only on the individual and introspective level?

In accordance with aforementioned research imperatives, we decided to put our analysis at the level of *middle-range theory* (Merton 1998)[1] and we are going to try to explain the connection between altruism and religiosity in the case of European economically developed Christian-dominated countries. These countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. We first want to examine the degree of religiosity in the mentioned countries, and then we will examine whether there is a connection between altruism and religiosity. In these developed societies secularization processes were convergent with the processes of modernization (off course, we are taking into account the differences between the mentioned countries) so that's why they are interesting to analyse the nexus between altruism and religiosity. Also, previous researches have already shown a decline of social functions of religiosity, so we continue to study the trend on the most recent data.

## PROCESSES OF (DE)SECULARIZATION AND THE DECLINE OF RELIGIOSITY IN WESTERN EUROPEAN SOCIETIES

In the aftermath of World War II, the secularization paradigm was dominant in the sociology of religion. One of the most influential authors of the sociology of religion, Peter Berger (1973), said that a multitude factors led to a diminishing importance of religion and the role of the church in (Western) societies. The main cause of secularization Berger, like Weber, saw in the Christian dogma and its connection with the Enlightenment.[2] Berger presume that other factors also contributed to secularization (social, economic, and technological changes that took place in Western societies in the mid-twentieth century were a catalyst for reducing the influence of religion in society), but Berger was more concerned with the link between Christian dogma and secularization so he didn't analyse other causes in detail. On the other hand, some other authors (such as, for example, Brian Wilson) focused on social change as a major cause in transforming religiosity and withdrawing religion from public life. Wilson (1976, 1982) emphasizes the convergence between modernization (industrialization, urbanization and technological advancement) and secularization. Wilson proposes a number of concepts that can be applied in different historical situations, considering different contexts. This author said that the global transition from "community" to "society" (as Tönnies defines it) influenced on the reducing the role of

[1] In short, Merton (1998) believes that *grand* theories are part of the history of social thought, and that contemporary research requires focus on individual cases using a number of different theoretical approaches. In this way, he formulates an idea of *middle-range theory* which can be applied to the study of different social phenomena, including religion.

[2] Weber believed that religion was the basis of worldviews everywhere, except in modern West. The Enlightenment succeeded to neutralize the influence of the religious. According to Weber, in the West at that stage of development science has encompassed almost the entire worldview. Paradoxically, the answer to the question of why the Enlightenment succeeded in initiating the process of dissolving the world lies again in the specifics of the religious ethos of Western Christianity (Jovanović 2016b: 456; Jovanović Ajzenhamer 2019: 162).

religion in societies. The most important force in this general context is process of rationalization, emphasizes Wilson. Rationalization manifests itself primarily as a transformation of social control, which loses its moral dimension and becomes more technical and anonymous. Like Weber,[3] Wilson also said that rationalization manifests itself primarily in the growing bureaucratization of social interactions in different areas (Tschannen 1991: 398–399; Hamilton 2001: 185–214).

The most influential authors in the field of the sociology of religion in the 1970s and 1980s (David Martin, Richard Fenn, Peter Berger, Brian Wilson, Daniel Bell, Thomas Luckmann etc.) emphasized the various causes of secularization. They were disagreed about the way in which this process is proceeded, and to what extent it encompassed different societies, but still, the conclusion that secularization had taken over Western societies was the most common among famous sociologists of religion until the 1990s (ibid.). All the authors that we mentioned were very dedicated to prove and explain the new process of reducing the influence of religion in social life.

Despite the fact that secularization paradigm was the dominant theoretical framework of sociological research in the second half of the twentieth century, a series of empirical studies that have shown that religion is not an insignificant factor in the lives of individuals (especially in the United States and other non-European societies), the emergence of alternative religiosity (New Religious Movements[4]) and increase of the number of fundamentalist movements around the world, challenged the hypothesis that secularization is the dominant social process when it comes to religion. Berger (1999) himself said that he was wrong in his estimations. He acclaimed that the process of desecularization is now one of the major social process towards the end of the the twentieth century. After these changes, contemporary researches on religion become defined by the imperative of heterogeneity. In other words, macro perspectives and holistic paradigms are avoided, so societies and religions are analysed first in individual contexts, and then in comparative analysis. Various historical, political, economic, and dogmatic contexts are being studied, so today we talk about the development of religion in post-socialist Europe, in Western European societies, in American society, etc. Of course, the African and Asian perspectives, as well as the differences between Catholics, Orthodox, Muslims, Jews, etc., are not ignored. Correlations between religiosity and various indicators such as class, age, gender, ethnicity, etc. are also analysed. Like we said in the Introduction,

[3] The process of rationalization is one of the key concepts in the Weber's sociology. This process is immanent to the West, but has permeated different societies (not only Western) in different volumes. The process of rationalization can be identified in different social spheres, from economics and politics to religion. Although Weber has not given a exact definition of rationalization, this concept remains paramount to his sociology. There are several types of rationalization such as practical, substantive, theoretical and formal and all of these can influence different social phenomena. Rationalization in the religious domain, among other things, means the removal of magical elements and it is often parallel with the processes of rationalization in other spheres: in art, economics and politics (Jovanović, 2016a: 94–99; Jovanović Ajzehnamer, 2019: 156–160). In this paper we won't elaborate on this extremely complex topic; we will just underline the conceptual continuity that Wilson follows when he uses Weber's argument to complete his researches on secularization.

[4] Eileen Barker (2004) formulated the concept of the *New Religious Movements* as a generic term for all forms of alternative eclectic religiosity that have emerged since the 1970s, primarily in the United States.

middle-rang theory is now the most prominent theoretical and epistemological starting position in religion studies. In this way, sociologists can complete far more accurate sociological picture of the survival or disappearance of religion in different societies.

When it comes to Europe, studies published at the end of the last century shows that religious situation at the Old Continent is very complex. Some indicators show that religion is losing its traditional role, that religion is individualized, alternative forms of spirituality are becoming more common, fewer and fewer people pray and go to church, etc. Also, there is an increasing occurrence of eclectic religiosity in which individuals combine different elements of traditional religiosity with cyber religiosity, mysticism, esotericism, etc. This is what Ulrich Beck (2010: 49) calls *Do it yourself religiosity*. William Sims Bainbridge (1997: 363–383) thought that this kind of practice is adequate example of application of the theory and logic of rational choice in the field of religion. In other words, individuals, as if they are in a large supermarket of religious ideas and practices, choose what they like best, and then practice this *religious mix* at the individual level.

While there is no doubt that religiosity in Europe has changed and that traditional religious practices and beliefs are becoming less important, on the other hand, most respondents in the academic researches at the end of the twentieth century said that rituals such as weddings and funerals at church, or baptism, were still very important to them. Therefore, it is very difficult to reach a clear conclusion when it comes to the role of religion in European societies. At first sight, one might say that religion lost its social significance, and that the various eclectic forms of religiosity become dominant, however, the situation is not so simple. When it comes to post-socialist countries, the situation is quite different then in Western European countries. In most post-socialist countries, we can mark the revitalization of religion, even at the level of collectivist feelings (Blagojević, 2015). *Ergo*, when we talk about Europe in general, the situation is quite diverse, but when it comes to Western Europe, secularization is indeed quite entrenched, and this is especially evident when it comes to the social role of religion.

Grace Davie, first on the UK example (1994), and then later at the sample of other Western European countries (2005), has shown that indicators of belief in God and dogma are far more powerful and represented than ritual practices and feelings of belonging to certain religious communities. She calls this phenomenon *believing without belonging*. This is especially true when we are talking about Protestants, but it is present in Catholic population also. Davie is one of the more vocal proponents of the middle-range theory and idea that societies must be viewed as separate objects of study. She explains that the traditional belief in the monotheistic god is now combined with various Eastern practices and beliefs (we have discussed about that eclectic religiosity earlier), and that this is part of the personal equation of the believer. On the other hand, indicators of a sense of belonging to a religious community are diminishing, despite the fact that some traditional rituals are still practiced. One of her main conclusions is that, if we analyse Western Europe, spirituality and religiosity have not lost their significance, but only on an individual level, while the collective role of religion has diminished.

In the trace of the Davie's conclusions, we are going to analyse new data obtained in 2016. We want to examine is the continuity of *belief without belonging* continued, and we want to research how the lack of a connection between altruism and religiosity contributes to the explanation of the loss of the social role of religion in Western European societies. But first let's look briefly at one recent paper that was conducted on the same data we are going to use, but the author analysed the population of young people. This *excurse* will be a good introduction to the story of the predictions of the future of religion in Europe, and the role it will play in the social life of future generations.

Stephen Bullivant (2018), on the basis of ESS data (2014-2016), in the category of youth aged sixteen to twenty-nine, saw an increase in those who did not declare themselves as members of any religion. Interestingly, in eight of the thirteen countries we analyzed, more than 50% of young people declare that they do not belong to any of these religions. These countries are: Spain, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden. In the remaining five analyzed countries, youth non-religiosity is also (relatively) high. These remain countries are: Austria, Ireland, Portugal, Switzerland and Germany (Table 1).

Table 1: Detailed breakdown of 16-29 year-old religious affiliation in 22 European countries (ESS 2014-16)




Source: Bullivant 2018: 6.

If we observe only population of young Catholics, we can conclude the situation is somewhat different, since in this case only the youth of Portugal and Ireland declare themselves as believers in more than 50% of cases. In all other countries that we are going to analyse, a low degree of religiosity has been identified among young Catholics (Bullivant 2018: 8). It is easy to identify decline of conventional religiosity among young people, and that's the case especially with Catholic countries and, above all, economically developed ones.

As we have said, Bolivian's research gives us the jolt to continue analysing religiosity in economically developed countries, but taking into account the whole population, not just the young people. Our hypothesis is that the data from 2016 will show us the same trends that Grace Davie has already observed. We assume that in Western (economically developed) societies will emerge weak link between religiosity and social cohesiveness (in this case, we examine altruism as one of the more important variables of social dynamics and integration). In other words, we assume that the degree of altruism is impacted by factors other than religiosity, which indirectly can tells us that religion in these countries is losing social functions. As we said, one of the basic and most important ethical principles of most of the world religions is the care of others and it emphasizes altruism, so if these value orientations are induced by other factors, and not by religiosity, we can indirectly conclude that religion has lost that kind of social role. Also, based on the ESS data, we will show that there is a continuity of decline in religiosity, especially when it comes to collectivist and institutional dimensions. If we keep in mind the conclusions from the Bullivant research (2018), we can assume that this trend will continue.

## RISE OF ALTRUISTIC VALUE ORIENTATION

The rise of altruism can be observed in the light of value changes in post-industrial societies. More concretely, as Inglehart (2018) states, when a society attains sufficiently high levels of existential security that a large share of the population grows up taking survival for granted, it brings coherent and roughly predictable social and cultural changes, producing an intergenerational shift from values shaped by scarcity (so called survival values), toward increasing emphasis on so called postmaterialist and self-expression values.[5] Ingelhart and Welzel (2005: 143) argue that these values reduce the need for group protection and weaken pressures for group conformity – people adopt increasingly independent conceptions of themselves. Creating ties to other people becomes no longer a matter of external constraints; it becomes a matter of intrinsic choice, which helps people move beyond the narrow boundaries of extended kinship (ibid.). Individuals are less likely to accept restrictions of their liberties for the sake of group conformity and start to view other types of human beings as intrinsically valuable beings (ibid.).[6]

[5] High levels of existential security could also be conducive to secularization (see also: Kistler et al., 2017). Ingelhart and Welzel (ibid) argue that unprecedented levels of economic development that a growing number of societies have attainedin recent history diminishes material, cognitive, and social constraints on human choice, and it reduces the need for group protection. When existential threats recede, self-expression values and individual autonomy tend to become more widespread (ibid.). See also: Norris and Inglehart, 2004; Inglehart, 1990; Abramson and Inglehart, 1995.

[6] Ingelhart and Welzel also state that from the human development perspective, this wide variety of psychological and cultural traits does not represent idiosyncratic aspects of given cultures – this pattern tends to be linked with socioeconomic conditions, and is it also culturally universal (ibid).

In a similar way, Welzel (2013: 10) writes about dominance of so called emancipative values[7], which emphasize freedom of expression and equality of opportunities. Using data from the World Values Survey, Welzel showed that emancipative values are on the rise within economically developed societies for which longitudinal data are available. He argues that emancipative values inspire people to follow their intrinsic motivations rather than being remotely controlled, and this intrinsic impulse comes with increased empathy for other people's legitimate concerns, which creates a prosocial form of individualism that sees even remote others as equals – it becomes easier for people to join forces for shared concerns.[8]

Individualization from this point of view does not undermine society but transforms it, shifting the mode of affiliation from imposed to chosen loyalties (ibid: 194). It is seen as a universal form of humanism that cuts through group boundaries and makes people more open to concern for remote and dissimilar others; it emancipates: it occurs when receding existential constraints liberate people from their dependence on narrow, uniform, and closed support groups that they have not chosen (ibid: 193-194). Individualization diminishes people's dependence on support groups against their will and at the same time as it increases their chances to join and form groups which they prefer – it does not bring the end of people's tendency to connect, but it brings the freedom to connect and disconnect as people choose, and social relations, group loyalties, and collective affiliations become more of people's liking (ibid: 194). Thus, individualization frees people to affiliate with communities as wide, diverse, and open as they like them (ibid: 193-194).

In another article, Welzel (2010) states that emancipative the individualistic nature of emancipative values implies a basic sense of human equality, which makes possible a universal form of altruism. According to him, Kagitcibasi (Kagitcibasi, 1997, 2005, in: ibid.), Schwartz (Schwartz, 2004, in: ibid.), and Etzioni (Etzioni, 1993, in: ibid.), also criticize the merging of autonomy and selfishness into individualism – they argue that individual autonomy can be altruistic, going together with social relatedness, concern for others, and solidarity with others.

## METHOD

As we said, our analysis is twofold. On the one hand, we examine the cross-sectional correlation between religiosity and altruistic value orientation. On the other hand, we examine trends of these variables. In both cases, we use data from the European Social Survey. Beginning in 2002, every two years, data are being collected in a number of European countries. Within each wave of this survey, religiosity is measured through three dimensions: intensity of religious beliefs, participation in religious services, and frequency of praying.[9] On the other hand, the altruistic value orientation is measured by one item from the Schwartz's values framework (Schwartz,

[7] See also: Flanagan and Lee, 2003; Hagenaars, Halman, and Moors, 2003; Inglehart and Baker, 2000).

[8] In a similar way, Förster and his colleagues (Förster et al., 2008) write about a shift from "prevention focus" to "promotion focus".

[9] Religiosity refers to the various dimensions associated with religious beliefs and involvement, and there is growing importance of evaluating religiosity in research as a multidimensional concept, focusing on its subjective, cognitive, behavioral, and the social and cultural components (Bergan and McConatha, 2001). See also: Yeniaras and Akarsu, 2016, ten Kate et al., 2017, and Mentus, 2017, 2018, forthcoming).

2012). Our isolated samples consist of respondents from thirteen West and North European countries. All of the countries in our samples are economically highly developed, according to the World Bank classification.[10] These are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.

Within the European Social Survey, self-rating of religiosity is measured using question: "Using this card, how religious would you say you are?", where 0 meant "Not at all religious", while 10 meant "Very religious". On the other side, participation in religious services is measured using question: "Apart from religious activities at the occasion of social events as weddings, funerals, christenings, and circumcisions, about how often do you attend religious services these days?", where 1 meant "More than once a week", while 7 meant "Never". On the other side, frequency of praying was measured using question: "About how often do you pray?" and the answers were the same as for participation in religious services. Altruistic value orientation is measured using question: "Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you. It's very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for their well-being". The answers are given on a six-point scale, where 1 meant "Very much like me", and 6 meant "Not like me at all". In our analysis, frequency of attendance of religious services apart from special occasions, frequency of praying apart from at religious services and altruistic value orientation are coded inversely.

We examined the cross-sectional relationship between religiosity and altruistic value orientation using data from the last round of the European Social Survey, from 2016. An isolated sample for this purpose was consisted of 24,869 respondents, with a minimum age of 15 and a maximum of 100 (*M* = 47.44, *SD* = 18.829), and with 51% of females, and 49% of males. In order to carry out the trend analysis, we used all of the eight rounds of the European Social Survey, beginning in 2002 and concluding in 2016. We analyzed the mean values of each of the three dimensions of rationality and altruistic orientation within all of examined countries. Characteristics of samples from all waves are very similar to those in the last wave.

## RESULTS

Self-evaluation of religiosity indicates moderate religiosity within sample (*M* = 4.37) (Table 2). Nearly half of the respondents rated their religiosity with 4 or less, while only 5% of them rated themselves as "Very religious". Second, only 0.6% of respondents attend religious services apart from special occasions every day, and 2.3% more than once a week, while more than 60% of them attend religious services never or "Less often" (*M* = 1.37). Similar share of respondents pray never or "Less often" apart from at religious services (*M* = 2.11). The results also indicated a high level of altruistic value orientation within sample (*M* = 4.96). Three-quarters of the sample rated importance to help people and care for others well-being as "Very much like me" and "Like me". On the other side, only 2.6% of the sample answered on the same question as "Not like me at all" or "Not like me".

[10] https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

| | N | Min | Max | *M* | *SD* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Important to help people and care for others well-being | 24697 | 1 | 6 | 4.96 | .929 |
| How religious are you | 24775 | 0 | 10 | 4.37 | 3.103 |
| How often attend religious services apart from special occasions | 24806 | 1 | 7 | 1.37 | 1.474 |
| How often pray apart from at religious services | 24646 | 1 | 7 | 2.11 | 2.401 |

Regression analysis indicated the predictor structure of altruistic value orientation: the statistical significance of the model is determined, but it is very weak ($r = .116$, $r^2 = .013$, $\Delta r^2 = .013$, $F_{(3/24413)} = 110.267$; $p < .001$). All religiosity dimensions are very weak predictors of altruistic value orientation (table 3). Statistical signify-cance of the model could be result of the large sample size.

Table 3: Multiple linear regression with altruistic value orientation as a dependent variable (n = 24,869).

| Independent variables | B | SE | Beta | t | p |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| How religious are you | -0.014 | 0.003 | -0.048 | -5.328 | .000 |
| How often attend religious services apart from special occasions | -0.025 | 0.005 | -0.039 | -4.634 | .000 |
| How often pray apart from at religious services | 0.039 | 0.004 | 0.1 | 10.76 | .000 |
| R Square = 0.013; Adjusted R Square = 0.013; SEE = 0.922 | | | | | |

* B – unstandardized coefficients; SE – standard error; Beta – standardized coefficients

The results generally indicate very weak relationship between all three dimensions of religiosity and altruistic value orientation. In further analysis, we examined trends of three dimensions of religiosity and altruistic value orientation by country, from 2002 to 2016.

Fig. 1: Trends of self-evaluation of religiosity by country




First, as it can be seen from Figure 1, results indicate clear declining trends of self-evaluation of religiosity. The most striking cases are Sweden, Netherlands, and United Kingdom.

Fig. 2: Trends of attendance of religious services by country



Our second dimension of religiosity, attendance of religious services apart from special occasions also clearly declined, especially in cases of Netherlands and Ireland (Figure 2).

Fig. 3: Trends of frequency of praying by country




Finally, the third dimension of religiosity, praying apart from at religious services, declined in all examined countries, and the fall is most evident in cases of Netherlands, Ireland and Finland (Fig. 3).

Fig. 4: Trends of altruistic orientation by country



On the other side, there is clear rise of altruistic value orientation in examined countries. Sweden and Finland are the most striking cases (Fig. 4). The results, thus, indicate clear lack of relationship of religiosity and altruistic orientation, not only in the cross-section, but also through time.

## CONCLUSION

The analysis in our paper was twofold. Our results, first, confirmed many previous findings about the decline of religiosity in economically developed societies. This is the case with all three examined dimensions of religiosity – self-evaluation, frequency of attendance of religious services apart from special occasions and frequency of prayer apart from at religious services. We identify a decline even in intrinsic religiosity, not just in indicators relating to the collective aspects of religiosity (and this is a fundamental difference from the researches conducted by Davie). Second, the results also showed a clear tendency of the rise of altruistic value orientation among the populations of these countries. Both processes, the decline of religiosity and the growth of altruistic orientation, could be explained by rising dominance of self-expressive or emancipative values within these societies.

Finally, we examined the cross-sectional relation between religiosity and altruistic value orientation at the individual level within these societies. The results indicated very weak relationship. In economically developed societies, therefore, religiosity is losing its importance, especially in relation to altruistic value orientation. We can assume that the degree of altruism is influenced by other indicators and that it does not depend on whether person is religious or is not. In this paper, we have analysed only one aspect of sociability but we underline that similar research should be done with some other value orientations in order to obtain a more complete and comprehensive analysis. Also, given the Bullivant's research of religiosity of young people in Europe (especially of young people in Western societies), we can assume that the trend of declining religiosity, as well as the disappearance of the social role of religion will continue.

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# THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN BANKING BUSINESS IN ISLAMIC LAW

**Summary**

In recent decades, the world is rapidly developing Islamic banking, as well as specific types of banking, in addition to conventional banking, as the prevailing concept of operations of banks around the world. In contrast to conventional banking that is primarily focused on profiting, Islamic banking is based on the principles of justice and fairness, in order to achieve equality in society, for the benefit of society as a whole, and in the spirit of learning Islamic religion. Islamic banking is based on Islamic law and that of the Islamic faith. Referring to the basic sources of Islam - the Quran and the Sunnah, the concept of Islamic banking, which is theoretically justified Sharia prohibits certain institutes such as interest; risk; uncertainties; deception; hazard, etc. Considering that interest (riba) is forbidden by the Quran, the profit and loss sharing principle, as well as partnership relations in mutual business ventures, constitute the core operations of Islamic banks. Since the interest loan is prohibited, the Islamic banks are prohibited to avoid jobs involving excessive speculative risk (Gharar). Also, Islamic banks are forbidden to finance activities that are considered harmful, or immoral for Muslims (e.g. the production and distribution of alcohol and alcoholic beverages, drugs, weapons, pork meat, organizing games of chance, dealing with pornography). The duty of the Islamic bank, as well as every Muslim, is the separation of zakat, a kind of religious tax. The obligation of the zakat is based on the interpretation of the nature of the property in the Quran. Since Islamic banks are profitable institutions, like the conventional banks, specific ways of doing business are designed by Islamic law and morality (e.g. murabaha, mudaraba, musharaka, istisna, ijara)..

**Key words**: Islam, banking, Islamic banking, prohibition on interest, sharia.

## INTRODUCTION

Almost all authors who write about Islam do not fail to emphasize the integral dimension of Islam. They point out that Islam does not pretend to regulate the relationship between man and the exalted creator, but also all other segments of human relations and actions. Some Muslim authors widely argued that Islam has done a system which would solve many of the social problems facing the modern, globalized society. Special attention of Islamic experts occupies the topic of the normal functioning of the financial markets, and therefore the operation of banks, as the main actors in the financial markets.

Islamic banking is based on Islamic law and that of the Islamic faith. Of course, Islamic banks have both Muslim and non-Muslim clients, whether in Islamic or Western European countries.[1] The owners of shares of Islamic banks, as clients of

[1] There are many examples that prove this view. Malaysia is a country with a long tradition of Islamic banking, where nearly 50% of customers of Islamic financial institutions are non-Muslim. This can be justified clearly on the basis that the religion of the participating parties has never been an issue for consideration in any Islamic financial transaction. (Aldohni, 2011:6).

Islamic banks, can be other denominations (e.g. Christians, Jews, atheists, etc.) (Jovanović, 2017: 230). The essence of Islamic banking is the prohibition of interest, which has forced Islamic banks to operate under the principle of dividing profits and losses with the carrier of the financing venture.

## THE EMERGENCE AND GROWTH OF ISLAMIC BANKING

Islamic banking as a specific type of banking business appeared after World War II. The first banks are established in the newly formed countries of Asia and Africa, just liberated from the colonial powers of the West European countries. In addition to the political liberalization movements against the Western occupation, a call for cultural authenticity was another main theme of this period. The cultural authenticity movement found that „theories, concepts and methodologies can be derived from the culture of various non-western civilizations". What cannot be ignored in the context is the extent to which religion has contributed to Islamic culture (Aldohni, 2011: 10).

The emergence and growth of Islamic banking in Muslim countries is a result of different elements. These elements are religious, social, economic and political. There were strong movements for the restoration of national identity, above all, the introduction of the Islamic faith in the all aspects of individual and social life. This means that regulations, principles and rules that the Quran and Sunnah contain should apply to all aspects of life. However, not everything went smoothly. In some Muslim countries such as Egypt and Syria, the religious movements are met with resistance of the ruling political regimes. With the advent of the oil crisis in the 1970s and the rapid development and enrichment of Near and Middle Eastern countries, the rapid development of Islamic banking has begun thanks to its natural resources, primarily oil fields. Due to the rapid increase in oil prices, enriched Islamic countries were required banks that would encourage further economic development. Middle Eastern countries have invested their wealth in further developing the economy. Thus, Bahrain became the main banking center of the Middle East, and Dubai is the leading shopping and tourism center (Jovanović, 2017: 232). The first Islamic banks were established in the mid-1940s in Malaysia, in Pakistan in the late 1950s, in Egypt in the 1960s, in India in 1969.

The effort invested primarily by economists Ahmad El Nedžara resulted in the opening of the first Islamic bank in Egypt in 1963. *Mit Ghamr Saving Bank* was founded as a profit-sharing deposit bank. The Bank is not charged interest in its operations. On the other hand, the bank invested in trade or industry, directly or in partnership with others, and shared the profits with their depositors. So, it functioned as a savings bank and investment institution, not as a commercial bank. In 1967, a bank abandoned the experiment of the interest-free business model and turned into a commercial bank because of the increasing pressure of the Egyptian government, which was slightly in favor of this kind of business (Dudić, 2012: 102).

Today, the *Islamic Development Bank (IDB)* is the largest Islamic bank in the world, established in Jeddah. The Islamic Development Bank was the first Islamic financial institutions to benefit from the inflow of oil-related wealth. The IDB established in 1974 with the support of the Saudi Arabian government and the Organization of Islamic Countries – OIC it is primarily an intergovernmental bank aimed at providing funds for development projects in member countries (Lewis & Algaoud, 2001: 7). Members of the Islamic Development Bank are 50 Islamic countries and, among the largest shareholders, are Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait and Libya. The forward important development in Islamic banking took place in the 1980s with the formation of the two international Islamic holding companies. Primarily, *House of Islamic Funds (Dar al-Maal al-Islami Trust - DMI)* founded in 1981 in the Bahamas and headquarters in Geneva, and *Al-Baraka Group*, established in Saudi Arabia and operates 15 banks and over 2.000 companies, including insurance corporation, industry, research centers with activities in 40 countries (Lewis & Algaoud, 2001: 12).

The regulatory framework of Islamic banking differs from country to country, although in the world dominated by two systems of Islamic banking, depending on whether in a particular country allowed conventional banking in addition to Islamic banking. In a system of pure Islamic banking, states allow only the operations of Islamic banks in its territory (Jovanović, 2017: 235). This form of Islamic banking has taken involves the restructuring of the whole financial system to accord with an Islamic precept. Only three countries in the world where this transformation of the system is underway are Iran, Pakistan and Sudan.[2] In Iran, all banks have operated under Islamic law since 1984 when interest (*riba*) was abolished from banking operations, and profit-sharing techniques substituted (Lewis & Algaoud, 2001: 14). The second form has been an attempt to establish Islamic financial institutions side by side with traditional commercial banks. In such a mixed system, the types of institutions which have developed are Islamic banks created in Muslim countries (e.g. Egypt, Indonesia, Qatar, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Turkey), and Islamic investment and holding corporations operating in both Muslim and in non-Muslim countries (e.g. United Kingdom, France, Switzerland and USA) (Lewis & Algaoud, 2001: 14).

The Islamic banking movement was not limited to Islamic institutions in Muslim countries. The first Islamic bank in Europe was established in Luxembourg in 1978. It was the *Islamic Banking System*, now it is *Islamic Finance House*. Shortly after that, in Denmark was founded the *Islamic Bank International of Denmark* in Copenhagen and *Islamic Investment Company* in Melbourne in Australia. Western European banks have been active in Islamic finance from the beginning. European co-mmercial banks took interbank deposits from the Islamic financial institutions which were collected by the Muslim populations in the countries in which they operated. Western banks which received interbank deposits from Islamic institutions, used this funds in accordance with Sharia principles. Among the most attractive Western participants were *Citibank* and *Union Bank of Switzerland*, which have their windows for interest-free business (Dudić, 2012:103).

Islamic banking law is not codified, nor in all Islamic countries introduced in the same way. For example, Islamic banking is regulated by law in Indonesia, Malaysia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait and Sudan. Through government regulation, the Islamic banking was introduced in Kazakhstan and Qatar, while in Afghanistan, Bahrain and

[2] It is interesting that in these countries, in parallel with the adoption of regulations, the establishment of regulatory bodies, the formation of the capital market, Islamic banks have recorded high rates of growth in deposits and transactions. With a rapid rise of participants and assets imposed by the need to introduce the modern risk management in banks. Therefore, the Islamic banks of Iran, Pakistan and Sudan, at the initiative of the competent central banks, have adopted the European concept of risk management in banks, inaugurated in the recommendations of the Basel II and Basel III (Radovanović, 2018: 98). For more information about the financial markets in developed countries see (Sovilj, 2019: 160-170).

Ethiopia, the central bank is responsible for issuing regulations governing the operations of Islamic banks (Jovanović, 2017: 248).

## THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE ISLAMIC BANKING CONCEPT

The comparative analysis with conventional banking reveals certain advantages and disadvantages of the concept of Islamic banking. The main advantage is that Islamic banks are less susceptible to financial crises, which was observed during the global economic crisis in 2007. The considerable resistance of Islamic banks to stress has been reported. Secondly, the introduction of Islamic banking into the country reduces the cost of such a way of doing business. The Islamic banking enhances competition in the market, which could lower the cost of finance for Shariah-compliant products. For states with small demand for Islamic banking services (states with a small Muslim population), the Islamic banking window could be the only feasible way of providing services, thus enhancing financial inclusion (Song & Oosthuizen, 2014: 12). Islamic banks base their businesses on the experience of conventional banks. Hence, they avoid the errors made by conventional banks in their development and operations (Jovanović, 2017: 236).

On the other hand, there are many disadvantages of Islamic banks. Primarily, the Islamic bank should misjudge the profitability of investing in a particular business venture and it should make a loss in its operations. In that case, the loss suffered its depositors that lead to loss of confidence in a particular bank. Secondly, it is difficult to monitor the operations of Islamic banks, due to the complexity of business operations and financial transactions. Furthermore, in Islamic banking, the business risk is more pronounced in comparison to conventional banking. The reason for this is the responsibility of the compliance of each banking business with Shariah. If the business is estimated to be contrary to Islamic law, the bank is obliged to abandon its undertaking (Jovanović, 2017: 236). If the Islamic bank has taken a risky business, it must be terminated, and it may cause a serious loss in its assets. The issue of how distressed Islamic banks should be resolved in accordance with Shariah principles is still under deliberation. This issue is further complicated for Islamic banking operating within a conventional bank. If the authorities are faced with a distressed conventional bank, they may not be able to carry out an orderly resolution satisfying financial stability objectives and Shariah principles that could potentially modify the treatment of the Islamic banking (Song & Oosthuizen, 2014: 12).

## THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF OPERATION OF ISLAMIC BANKS

The business of Islamic bank is based on the following principles: prohibition of interest charges; allocating funds to a charity fund; prohibition of immoral activities; prohibition of precarious business and prohibition of the premium insurance contract.

*Interest prohibition (riba)* - Islamic banks are prohibited to pay interest to depositors (passive interest) but also to collect interest from their debtors, borrowers (active interest). There are different interpretations of whether any interest is prohibited or only one that represents usury. The prevailing view was that any interest was forbidden.[3] The prohibition of interest in all financial affairs, especially banking was introduced in Islamic law since it prohibited people from exploiting one another due to the Islam was allowed people to earn money solely through their work.[4]

As a key element of modern operations in the financial markets, interest has a very long history, dating back to ancient civilizations, from the Babylonian Empire and ancient Greece to the Roman Empire and the Persian Empire. In support of this, there are numerous controversies about the justification of the use of interest, ie its prohibition, led by the most eminent philosophers of the ancient world - Plato in the *Laws*, Aristotel in *Politics* (Lekpek, 2013:301).

The other monotheistic confessions such as Judaism and Christianity applied the prohibition of interest advocated by Islam. The unambiguous prohibition of interest in Christianity is based on a numerous texts from the Old and New Bible, which strongly condemn the payment of interest. In this way, they emphasize its social harmfulness and immorality (in the Bible book of Exodus 22: 25-26; Leviticus 25: 35-37; Solumon's stories 28: 8; Psalm of David, 15: 5; the New Bible: the Gospel of Luke 6:35). Judaism rejects interest as an undesirable and immoral category. However, it makes a distinction between members of Judaism and those who are not, and allows interest to be paid to members of other denominations (Lekpek, 2015: 364).

The question of the prohibition of interest was also interested in Christian thinkers during the Middle Ages, among which are an especially prominent theologian and philosopher Thomas Aquinas. In his work "Sum of Theology" (*Summa Theologiae* or *Summa Theologica*), starting from the basic Christian postulates, Aquinas criticizes the use of interest, considering the socially unacceptable and immoral. As social circumstances changed over time and the influence of the Church permanently diminished, so began to reconsider attitudes about the moral and social unacceptability of interest. During the 16th century, in the Christian church appeared factions reviewed the prohibition of interest payments, emphasizing that the prohibittion of interest should only refer to excessive interest (usury or greenery). Finally, under the influence of social change, the Catholic Church also relented and, in 1839 lifted the prohibition on interest payments (Lekpek, 2015: 364-365). The conclusion is that the power of the prohibition of interest in Christianity weakened in parallel with the decline of the social influence of the church. On the other hand, the prohibition of interest in Islam has maintained its existence until now. However, there are different views about interest in Islam. Some religious schools believe that prohibition of interest in Islam refers only to the too high interest, as well as the interest on consumer loans.

How important is the issue of prohibition of interest in Islam, is the fact that the 12 verses in the Quran refers to riba, and that is the word riba is mentioned eight times. Muhammad adhered to the literal prohibition of interest. In his discussions with his followers, he emphasized the prohibition of interest and its perniciousness

[3] Islamic lawyers distinguish two types of interest: *riba al-nasi'ah*, which refers to the interest the borrower charges on the debtor, given the time it takes the borrower to repay the loan, and *riba al-fadl* concerning the exchange of goods, with the same commodity exchanges in unequal amounts. According to Islam, goods of the same kind can only be exchanged promptly, in the same quantities and qualities (Marinković & Lekpek, 2013: 54).

[4] In addition to the usual ways of acquiring property such as inheritance, legal transactions of exchange (barter), gifts, leases, partnerships, other ways of acquiring private property are permitted, except for labor: booty and the Caliph's assignment, etc. (Stanimirović, 2015:111-113).

to man and society. The aforementioned Muhammad's proclamations on the prohibition of interest were recorded in the form of hadith. The importance of the hadith for the followers of Islam is invaluable, due to the fact that it explains in detail how Islamic teachings should be applied (Lekpek, 2015: 366-367). The Islamic thinkers find justification for the interest prohibition in its unfairness.

*Charity (Zakat)* – The Quran states that people will have various incomes and financial positions and that they have the right to possess their wealth. Those who are awarded the wealth will, however, have duties towards the society, and their wealth should be used to benefit the whole community and not to exploit others' needs. This is simply the balance that Islamic economic theory aims to achieve (Chapra, 2006: 98). Every Muslim who achieve earnings above that needed for a decent life to him and his family is obliged to set aside a certain amount (usually 2.5% of income) to help those Muslims who are in need. Also, every bank is obliged to establish a merciful (charity) fund, in order to collect contributions from wealthier clients and to redistribute them to poor citizens. The obligation of the Zakat is based on the interpretation of the nature of property in the Quran, according to all assets belong to God, and he only temporarily entrusted to a man who acquires it for life. The assets have a social role in Islam and must be used in the public interest. In addition to the zakat, which is a compulsory giving of charity to the poor, there is a sadaka in Islam, which is voluntarily given by the Muslims to the poor citizens (Jovanović, 2017: 252).

However, the obligation of the Zakat is one of the crucial obstacles to the establishment of Islamic banks in non-Muslim countries. The problem gets more complicated in Western European countries where there are some Muslim minorities who, for religious reasons, are reluctant to deal with conventional banks. The absence of formal Islamic banks, in this case, would create opportunities that underground financial authorities purporting to be Islamic can exploit. Investing or transferring any money through these organizations, over which the authorities have no supervisory powers, may be a real threat to any government. In practice, this money has been misused to finance terrorism against Western countries, despite that banks which collect money are not involved in such actions (Aldohni, 2011: 23-24).

*Prohibited transactions (haram)* - The Islamic banks are prohibited to avoid businesses involving excessive speculative risk (Garar). Islamic banks cannot finance activities or items forbidden in Islam because those activities are considered harmful or immoral for Muslims (e.g. the production and distribution of alcohol and alcoholic beverages, drugs, weapons, pork meat, organizing games of chance, dealing with pornography). The participation in the production and marketing of luxury commodities is considered as unacceptable from a religious point of view when Muslim societies suffer from a lack of essential goods and services such as food, clothing, health and education (Lewis & Algaoud, 2001:30).

*Prohibition of precarious businesses (maysir and gharar)* - Islamic law forbids all activities to Muslims which the result depends on some uncertain facts. There are two types of such activities. The first are gambling (maysir) - gambling, betting, lottery. Also, Islamic law forbids any business activities which contain any element of gambling. The reason for that prohibition is that Islam does not accept the acquisition of assets without effort. Another type of precarious business is one in which the emergence of rights or obligations for participants or their amount depends on the fact that is uncertain at the time of their undertaking (gharar). This type of operations is forbidden by Sunnah. This prohibition applies in a number of circumstances like as when the seller is not in a position to hand over the goods to the buyer or when the subject matter of the sale is incapable of acquisitions (Lewis & Algaoud, 2001:31). The other prohibited activities are speculative transactions in the stock exchange; trading with derivative financial instruments in the stock exchange (e.g. futures and options) and premium insurance contracts. On the other hand, the transactions are allowed where the uncertainty is caused by objective price movements in the market, given that is a necessary fact to be reckoned with in the trade (Jovanović, 2017: 254).

*Cooperative Insurance (Takaful)* - Premium insurance business is prohibited under Islamic law due to the uncertainty that it contains.

## DETERMINATION OF MONEY IN ISLAMIC BANKING

The exaggerated role of money in today's world has led to the situation that the modern man can all determine the price, but nothing value. Money in the context of Islamic banking represents only a means of exchange, that is, a way of defining the value of things. Money has no value in itself. On the other hand, money is a medium of exchange in an asset oriented economy, and a store of value (Sarker, 2012: 1).

As opposed to conventional banking, Islamic banking is variously defined money. The money in the conventional banking is a good that is sold or leased, while in the Islamic banking money cannot be sold (Budimir, 2016:66). Islam forbids money to make money. In order to the money be useful, it is necessary to turn it into a commodity, which is for sale, and that can make a profit. So, for money to be useful, it must turn into something that is inherently beneficial. Only then the Islamic bank can make a profit in business. For example, financing a home or some project requires from Islamic bank to invest funds and take a proportionate share of the ownership and risk to justify the profit (Budimir, 2016: 66).[5]

According to the Quran, trade and usury are not the same. The trade is the basis of economic growth, while usury is a phantom profit without an asset base. The question is not whether it is possible to have an economic system without interest, but how something that has nothing to do with real economic activity, such as interest, is generally able to sustain itself in the face of all the systemic crises and instability it causes. The conclusion is that the interest-free banking does not mean non-profit banking, but something more stable and secure ethical alternative.

## CONCLUSION

Islamic banking is one of the fastest growing global financial sectors for which investor interest was evident even before the global financial crisis. Only with the spread of economic crisis, investor interest in Islamic banking has increased due to the efforts to find alternative ways of investment. According to some estimates, the value of the "global Islamic market" is about a billion dollars. Today, Islamic banks operate in more than 100 countries. This is a sufficient argument that the financial world has recognized this way of business attractive, prosperous and safety (Sovilj, 2019: 522).

[5] Available at: http://poslovnisvijet.ba/islamsko-bankarstvo-fenomen-modernog-drustva/, 1, 20. 03. 2019.

Islamic Bank achieved a dizzying revenue in 2011, have a thousand billion dollars, which is 18% more than the previous year. According to the available data, at present there are 350 banks operating under the Islamic Law. Although most of them are located in Muslim countries, some of them present in other countries, including USA and Europe (Marinković. 2013: 108). In Australia, there are two Islamic bank, six in the Bahamas, in the United States 38, in Denmark, France and Ireland one, in Germany and Switzerland operates five Islamic banks, 23 in the United Kingdom, four in Luxembourg. In the region, there are two Islamic banks whose business is in line with the Sharia. These are *United Bank of Albania (UBA)* founded in 1992, and *Bosna Bank International* established in 2000 in Sarajevo (Dudić, 2012: 106).

In Europe, Islamic banking is the most developed in the United Kingdom. Following the establishment of the *Islamic Bank of Britain, Lloyds TSB' Group* has become a leader in Islamic law services. In the United Kingdom, the number of clients increased by 120% in the period between 2005 and 2006, the number of open accounts for 200%, while the number of savings deposits increased by 76% in the same year, reaching the amount of £ 83.9 million. In that way, London aims to become the financial center of Islamic Banking in Europe (Radić, 2016: 11). The UK has announced that it intends to be the first Western country to issue Islamic bonds - sukuk. Since Islam prohibits interest, sukuk carry a profit or rent on the base asset, where the bond is a part of the ownership of these assets. The sukuk market is increasingly liquid, with a current value of £ 40 billion. It is estimated that its value at the global level could reach 250 billion pounds. The number of Islamic banks in Europe is growing due to the increasing number of migrants from the Arab world. Furthermore, the European customers are attracted to business transparency of Islamic banking, because the Islamic banks are required to specify in what they invest their money (Dudić, 2012: 109). Given the current social situation in Europe after the numerous migrations from the Arab world, we are concluded that there will be a rapid development of Islamic banking in the forthcoming period. It is interesting that in response to the predicted growth of Islamic banking, the Belgian bank KBC, created a "Catholic Fund", which follows Catholic principles in its investment policy (Dudić, 2012: 109).

Taking into consideration the aforesaid, we conclude that the concept of Islamic banking is based on the principles of justice and fairness. The Islamic banking seems fairer to traditional conventional banking, as it seeks to facilitate social equality, with a fairer redistribution of wealth and providing equal opportunities to all society

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# ВОСПРИЯТИЕ ПРОШЛОГО И КУЛЬТУРНАЯ ПАМЯТЬ В ОРТОДОКСАЛЬНОЙ ХРИСТИАНСКОЙ ТРАДИЦИИ

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**Аннотация**

В культуре православного монашества прошлого, как прошедшего, вовсе не существует (А. Сидоров). Монаху в качестве образца для подражания предлагается как житие св. Пахомия Великого (IV в.), так и житие св. Серафима Саровского (XVIII-XIX вв.). Весь положительный опыт, приближающий к Царству Небесному, включен в эту культуру, актуализирован в ней.

В определенной степени эквивалентом прошлого как такого, что прошло и забыто, в ортодоксальной христианской традиции есть понятие „ветхое“ („ветхий Адам“). Труды аскетов часто содержат призывы освободиться от греховного прошлого как „совлечь с себя ветхого человека“. В понятии „ветхое“ научная традиция обнаруживает, прежде всего, аспекты неминуемого и необратимого вещественного разрушения. То есть, если понятие „прошлое“ передает в большей степени смысл временной дистанции, то „ветхое“ - это тоже прошлое, но в понимании его неизбежности, необратимости, временного конца. Это качественное состояние глубоко диссонирует с культурой православного монашества, с ее порывом в вечность, преодолением временности, глубинной телеологичностью, аскетичной напряженностью, аксиологическим максимализмом. То, что в историческом опыте и культурной памяти не соответствует ценностям данной культурной традиции, не переходит в ее прошлое, а, фактически, изымается из нее, становится „не-культурой“. Эти наблюдения позволяют заключить, что культура православного монашества как часть ортодоксальной христианской традиции, имеет другую структуру, в отличие от культуры светской. Если последней присуще темпоральное расслоение на архивную, забытую, преходящую, непреходящую, живую и др., то в культуре православного монашества прошлое не является ее структурной частью.

**Ключевые слова:** мемориальная культурология, прошлое, культурная память, ортодоксальная христианская традиция, православное монашество, темпоральное расслоение культуры.

## АКТУАЛЬНОСТЬ ТЕМЫ

Концепт культурной памяти активно разрабатывается в современной культурологии. Мировая и, прежде всего, европейская культура переживает процесс трансформации, что порождает вопросы о культурной идентичности народа, нации, социальной и культурной группы, человека как родового существа. Это, в свою очередь, актуализирует анализ истории и культурного прошлого, запечатленного как в региональной или национальной культуре в целом, так и в отдельных составляющих ее культурных традициях.

Одной из частей современной культуры является христианская традиция, в том числе и в ее ортодоксальном варианте (реализуется в практике бытования православного монастыря, культуры православного монашества в целом). Продолжая существовать и сегодня, эта культурная традиция, тем не менее, в сознании большинства ассоциируется всецело с прошлым, историей. По-видимому, такое восприятие привело к ситуации, что в современной культурологии отсутствуют исследования понимания прошлого (собственного, культурного, исторического) и связанного с ним феномена культурной памяти в контексте данной культуры. Представление одного из подходов к восполнению этого пробела составляет цель данной статьи.

Используемые в статье понятия „ортодоксальная христианская традиция“ и „культура православного монашества“ рассматриваются как близкие, сопоставимые, синонимичные. При этом первое из них несколько шире второго. Понятие „ортодоксальный“ здесь не является синонимом понятия „православный“, но ставит акцент на консерватизме данной традиции, ее близости монастырским кругам.

## ПОНЯТИЕ КУЛЬТУРНОЙ ПАМЯТИ И ЕЕ СПЕЦИФИКА

Мемориальная культурология – это ветвь культурологии, изучающая культурную память во всем разнообразии ее проявлений. Сегодня выделяют несколько ведущих концепций памяти. Одна из них – Мориса Хальбвакса (Хальбвакс, 2005), имеет название социологической концепции памяти. Ее автор выделяет „автобиографическую память“ и „социально-историческую память“. Если первая принадлежит непосредственно человеку, то для второй характерно включение в определенные социальные рамки, которые и придают ей то или иное направление.

Далее можно назвать историческую концепцию памяти. Здесь культурная память связана с ее актуализацией в так называемых „местах памяти“. Таковыми является все, что наделено этнокультурным смыслом для повседневного сознания широких масс и символически проявляет себя в географических пунктах, вещах, реальных или вымышленных событиях, теоретических представлениях, художественных образах, ритуалах, названиях, именах и т.п. Историческая память актуализирует в „местах памяти“ ощущение принадлежности к определенной культуре, указывает общие ориентиры человеческой жизни и деятельности. В исторической концепции память превращается в транслятор исторической традиции. Главным предметом истории становится не собственно событие прошлого, а память о нем, тот образ, который запечатлелся у его участников и современников, передался непосредственным потомкам, реставрировался или реконструировался в последующих поколениях.

В качестве третьей назовем собственно культурологическую концепцию памяти Яна Ассмана (Ассман, 2004), который выделяет следующие типы памяти: коммуникативную (актуальную, персональную, личностную) и культурную. Коммуникативная память не формализована, она основана на непосредственном общении. Культурная память формализована, она требует устоявшейся традиции, символического воплощения в образе, танце, особом месте, тексте и т.п. Коммуникативная память действительна для 3-4 поколений в пределах 80-100 лет. Культурная же память направлена в далекое прошлое. Носителями коммуникативной памяти являются современники тех событий, которые в ней запечатлены. Культурная память для своего сохранения и передачи требует специально подготовленных специалистов. Коммуникативная память передается устным словом. Культурной памяти требуются особые способы фиксации (практики записывания; практики воплощения – позы, жесты, ритуалы). Влияние культурной памяти на общество по-разному осуществляется в различных культурах: „горячий“ тип – культуры активно апеллируют к своему прошлому; „холодный“ тип – культуры преимущественно живут сегодняшним днем.

Таким образом, в мемориальной культурологии под памятью понимается действие, опосредованное инструментами, представлениями, бытованием того или иного общества в ту или иную эпоху. Культурная память – это не то, что мы имеем в сознании, так сказать, автоматически, это скорее то, что мы конструируем при помощи определенных средств. Культурная память, таким образом, предстает как определенная система взглядов и убеждений, относящихся к прошлому, принадлежащих к сфере социального сознания, в котором собственные воспоминания смешиваются с сообщениями, полученными от других. Особенно выпукло качество „сконструированности“ культурной памяти выступает в случае, если речь идет о событиях, современников и очевидцев которых уже нет в живых. В то же время, сами современники событий тоже являются носителями определенных убеждений, что создает своеобразный „фильтр“ и „эффект ореола“ при восприятии смысла и оценки значимости произошедшего. В противном случае (если бы все очевидцы оценивали событие абсолютно одинаково) мы бы не имели столько разночтений и „белых пятен“ в изучении и изложении истории.

Понятно, что концепты „прошлое“ и „культурная память“ тесно связаны. Каков же образ прошлого в культуре православного монашества и шире – в ортодоксальной христианской традиции?

## ОБРАЗ ПРОШЛОГО И КУЛЬТУРНАЯ ПАМЯТЬ В КУЛЬТУРЕ ПРАВОСЛАВНОГО МОНАШЕСТВА

По представлениям культуры православного монашества и православной традиции в целом Богу не свойственно меняться или эволюционировать. Он есть Абсолют, Совершенство, и нет ничего, во что бы он мог „преложиться“, то есть, не существует такой цели вне его самого, к которой ему бы стремиться, ибо он сам есть Цель и Предел бытия мира и человека. Так и культура православного монашества, концентрируя в себе (в идеале, по определению) и отражая результаты воплощения божественных требований к человеку, не декларирует в качестве своих черт и идей изменчивость, эволюционизм, новаторство. Прошлое в контексте этой культуры не есть хронологическим, это не простая констатация наличия этапов ее развития, которые прошли из-за движения времени вперед. Понятие „прошлое“ по отношению к ортодоксальной христианской традиции есть, как представляется, не хронологическим, но качественным.

В культуре православного монашества ни в чем существенном из ее традиций и канонов нельзя проследить этапы безвозвратно ушедшие, пройденные и преодоленные.

По выражению А. Сидорова, в культуре монашества „прошлого, как прошедшего, вовсе не существует“ (Сидоров, 1998: 8). Действительно, монаху в качестве образца для подражания предлагается как житие св. Пахомия Великого (IV в.), так и житие св. Серафима Саровского (XVIII-XIX вв.). Весь положительный опыт, приближающий к Царству Небесному, включен в эту культуру, актуализирован в ней (Смолина, 2016).

По мнению Н. Тарабукина, „совершенное сознание монаха живет прежде всего настоящим“ (Тарабукин, 2001). Например, архимандрит Сергий (Шевич) учил, „проживать каждый день так, как если бы он был единственным, каждое утро полагать начало дню, до некоторой степени дистанцируясь от прошлого“ (Сержантов, 2010: 81). Анализируя аскетико-мистический опыт Симеона Нового Богослова, П. Сержантов пишет: „смиренномудрие пронизывает Симеона, он безмолвствует, и, внимая себе, сосредоточивается на настоящем, не заглядывая с ожиданием в будущее. Мирское прошлое Симеоном забыто“ (Сержантов, 2010: 171). Прошлое, таким образом, (жизнь монаха до пострижения, когда не было такой усиленной аскетической молитвы) – это безвременье, то, что отвергнуто (грех, страсти). Это прошлое находится фактически вне культуры монашества. И акцент здесь делается не на темпоральности, а на ценности (или ее отсутствии) этого опыта для духовного роста личности.

Интересно, что прошлое в сознании современного человека расположено однозначно сзади, а в ощущениях человека средневековья, по наблюдению Д. Лихачева, прошлое находилось впереди. „Прошлое было где-то впереди, в начале событий, ряд которых не соотносился с воспринимающим его субъектом. "Задние" события были событиями настоящего или будущего. "Заднее" - это наследство, оставшееся от умершего, это то "последнее", что связывало его с нами. "Передняя слава" – это слава отдаленного прошлого, "первых" времен, "задняя слава" – это слава последних деяний“ (Лихачев, 1967: 356).

В культуре православного монашества события, закрепленные в культурной коллективной памяти, принадлежат не прошлому, а настоящему. На каждом этапе существования настоящего. Этому способствует доля мистических представлений данной культуры – о вечной загробной жизни святых в Царстве Небесном.

Считается, что коллективная культурная память складывается из убеждений, касающихся тех событий, с которыми индивид соотносит себя в качестве члена данной социальной группы. В случае культуры православного монашества следует подчеркнуть, что здесь от человека требуется не только приятие, но активное и сознательное воплощение в своей жизни ценностей, содержащихся в культурной памяти. В таком случае это уже не столько память, сколько часть настоящего личности и ее актуальный жизненный регулятив.

Если в светской культуре коллективная культурная память активно участвует в процессах социальных трансформаций и сама меняется в ходе их протекания, то в культуре православного монашества культурная память ориентирована на процессы духовной жизни личности, порядок совершенствования которых не зависит от исторических обстоятельств: „лествица“ духовного восхождения личности к обожению признается неизменной. Следовательно, трансформации здесь имеют индивидуальный характер и темп при консервации основного корпуса нарративов, составляющих культурную память.

По отношению к светской культуре утверждается, что культурная память имеет сакральную окраску, ей присуща приподнятость над уровнем повседневности. Воскрешение культурно значимых воспоминаний осуществляется в ритуализированной форме. В культуре православного монашества предписывается не точечное и ситуативное обращение к событиям прошлого, но постоянное молитвенно-духовное общение с действующими лицами Священной Истории – Богом, Богоматерью, святыми. То есть здесь можно говорить не столько о ритуализованном воскрешении культурных воспоминаний, сколько о длительном (в идеале – постоянном) пребывании в мистическом контакте с ними.

Пьер Нора указал на наличие ниши между историей и памятью (Нора, 1999; Кислюка, 2016). Он отмечает, что по мере становления светской культуры и революционными процессами в странах Европы история стала восприниматься одной из версий прошлого, а культурное наследие стало тем фактором, который помогает сформировать национальную идентичность. Несовпадение определенной версии сконструированной коллективной культурной памяти с цепью имевших место исторических событий (особенно при условии наличия их живых свидетелей) и образует указанную нишу.

В отношении культуры православного монашества в данном аспекте можно отметить следующее:

а) часть событий Священной Истории, запечатленная в культурной памяти ортодоксальной христианской традиции, является областью предания, так как, по определению, не могла иметь современников вообще или среди ныне живущего человечества (отношения Адама и Евы, Каина и Авеля, события до Потопа и др.);

б) главным в данных событиях является не их внешняя „материальная“ оболочка, но внутренний смысл, „послание“ Бога людям;

в) события Священной Истории не допускают иной трактовки кроме официально принятой православной церковью.

Такую трактовку истории определенным образом можно соотнести не с линейным, а с крестообразным представлением о времени. Одним из представителей такой модели времени является современный греческий богослов митрополит Иерофей Влахос: „Тот, кто видел нетварный свет и соединился с Богом, не ждет второго пришествия Господня, но живет в нем. Вот почему в христианском учении существует понятия не о линейном, но о циклическом или крестообразном времени. Именно поэтому прошлое, настоящее и будущее действительно воспринимаются как некое неразрывное единство. Это и есть так называемое 'сжатое время'„ (Иерофей, 2006: 21).

Понятие культурной памяти, как уже было сказано выше, связано с явлением „места памяти“, наличие которых позволяет представить воспоминания в осязаемой физической форме. Прошлое, однако, отличается тем, что оно уже не существует. В таком случае, каждое воспоминание при попытке его воспроизвести становится, как утверждает Р. Тердиман, „нынешним прошлым“ (Terdiman, 1993). В культуре православного монашества следует отметить существование „вневременного прошлого“. Дело в том, что в качестве культурного прошлого здесь отобрано и транслируется лишь то, что признается значимым для духовной жизни и спасения человека. В этой связи такое прошлое имеет вневременной характер. Оно содержит дидактические и моральные принципы как для человека вообще, так и для каждого конкретного индивида, и не столько вспоминается, сколько переживается.

Частным случаем воплощенной культурной памяти являются сувениры. Увозя их с собой после посещения знакового места, представитель светской культуры рассчитывает тем самым на приятные воспоминания. В ортодоксальной христианской культуре предметы, приобретенные во время посещения святого места, в большей (например, икона, молитвослов) или меньшей (фотографии святого места) степени обладают анагогической функцией – призваны возводить ум человека к Богу, что есть не просто воспоминание о его наличии, но общение с ним.

Культурную память в контексте культуры православного монашества можно, безусловно, рассматривать как форму трансляции и актуализации культурных смыслов. В то же время сами эти смыслы выходят за рамки собственно культурных, представая божественными, мистическими, формирующими настоящее и будущее каждого отдельного человека и человечества в целом.

Явление проповеди, традиционно включающей в себя ссылки к событиям Священной Истории и на эпизоды из житий святых, порядок годового круга религиозных праздников, можно рассматривать как способы актуализации культурной памяти ортодоксальной христианской традиции. Они обеспечивают содержание памяти, ее структурирование, припоминание информации внутри данной культуры.

Культурная память нуждается в постоянном подкреплении и всегда имеет своих особых носителей, которые обеспечивают воспроизводство культуры и передачу следующим поколениям определенных норм, важных и существенных в контексте данной культуры.

Так, в культуре православного монашества для более эффективного прохождения монашеского пути подвижничества признается необходимым, чтобы новопостриженный инок (иногда еще ранее, на стадии „послушника“) поступал в духовное руководство к более опытному монаху. Это явление известно под названием старчества. Наставления наиболее авторитетных монахов, канонизированных, обладавших даром слова, получили свою фиксацию в письменных (печатных, рукописных, а также устной традиции) произведениях и составляют Святое Предание (авторитетный источник норм в православии наряду с Писанием – Евангелием). Среди таковых произведений можно назвать сборник Добротолюбие, „Лествица“ св. Иоанна Синайского, проповеди свв. Иоанна Златоуста, Василия Великого, произведения Исаака Сирина, Максима Исповедника, Феофана Затворника, Игнатия Брянчанинова и многих других.

Известно, что некие нормы будут воплощаться в деятельности в том случае, если есть люди, которые могут воссоздавать структуру или деятельность по данным образцам или нормам (Щедровицкий, 1995: 52). В культуре православного монашества можно обнаружить выделенные Г. Щедровицким (Щедровицкий, 1995: 50-56) семиотические средства для обеспечения механизма воспроизводства:

а) сама деятельность, которую необходимо восстановить согласно норме, выделена в качестве образца. В культуре православного монашества в качестве такого образца может служить старец, настоятель, общение с ним в процессе исповеди, ежедневной процедуры „открытия помыслов“. Например, в конце XIX – начале XX веков при повторном открытии многих монастырей после известного периода секуляризации, было предпочтительнее, чтобы среди его первых насельников были прежние монахи этого монастыря, либо для его устройства приглашались иноки из другой авторитетной обители. Подобный пример – основание многочисленных обителей в Украине и России выходцами из Киево-Печерского монастыря и учениками прп. Сергия Радонежского;

б) нормы деятельности транслируются в описаниях. В исследуемой сфере это личность Христа в Евангелиях и агиографические произведения. Способ действия здесь – подражание. Но, в то же время, если образец отделен временным (историческим, климатическим и т. п.) барьером, то у желающего ему подражать монаха появляется поле для творчества, которое выглядит как умение преломить норму на новые условия (Смоліна, 2014).

Законы развития внешних условий, в которых воссоздается норма, и самой культурной нормы различны: „условия подчиняются "естественному" развитию "среды", а "нормы" сохраняют свое постоянство, несмотря на все изменения условий. В определенные моменты это приводит к конфликту" (13, с. 54). Отсюда появляется необходимость в некоем внешнем институте, который бы скорректировал норму согласно изменившимся условиям. В культуре монашества таковыми институтами выступают Церковные соборы, новые толкования Писания авторитетными богословами, „справка" церковных книг и др.

Стремление стать монахом в православии воспринимается не как следствие обучения, а как дар, изначальная предрасположенность тех, „кто может вместить", особое (и редкое) качество данной конкретной личности. В агиографической литературе многочисленны образы индивидов, наделенных этим даром. Их характеристики, как правило, с самого детства, заключаются в избегании шумных компаний и детских игр, стремлении к одиночеству, проявлении особой религиозности (например, еще в младенческом возрасте пр. Сергий Радонежский в постные дни среду и пятницу отказывался от материнского молока и др.), особых знамениях свыше, сопровождающих его (ее) детство и юность, высоком уровне и концентрации страданий (испытаний), выпавших на долю данной личности.

Как быть монахом нигде специально предварительно не учат. В духовных академиях и семинариях готовят священников, а не монахов, но после окончания студент может выбрать: принять постриг или жениться. Следовательно, элементы культуры монашества „разлиты", „вплетены" в культуру церковную, христианскую.

Идея общего прошлого, единых предков играет большую роль для существования культуры. Ощущение совместного прошлого создает чувство единства и солидарности в настоящем. Так культурная память способствует интеграции нации и позволяет отделить „своих" от „чужих". Определенные эпизоды культурной памяти в ортодоксальной христианской культуре способствуют не только интеграции верующих, но имеют статус догматов (например, Рождество Иисуса Христа от Девы Марии), непризнание которых ведет к отпадению от веры. В то же время, помять о прошлом здесь не приводит к замыканию в границах данной культуры, но призывает к объединению всего человечества (согласно апостолу Павлу, нет ни Еллина, ни Иудея, ни обрезания, ни необрезания, варвара, Скифа, раба, свободного, но все и во всем Христос (Кол.3:11)).

Следует отметить, что в определенной степени эквивалентом прошлого как такого, что прошло и забыто, в ортодоксальной традиции есть понятие „ветхое" (например, „ветхий Адам"). Работы аскетов часто содержат призывы освободиться от греховного прошлого как „совлечь с себя ветхого человека". С. Лишаев отмечает, что „ветхое" в данном случае имеет смысл „древнее", хотя само значение этого слова выходит за пределы такого содержания: „Ветхое не является древним, хотя древнее часто бывает ветхим“ (Лишаев, 201: 17). В понятии „ветхое“ научная традиция обнаруживает, прежде всего, аспекты реальности и необратимого вещественного разрушения: „Все то в природном и культурном мире, в чем видим разрушение его материально данной определенности как неизбежный и необратимый процесс, мы <...> называем "ветхим". <...> ветхость является определенным образом воспринятой вещественностью, обнаруживает вещное вещи как ее конечность, временность. Вещь, воспринята как ветхая вещь, предусматривает невольную редукцию предметно-содержательного (формируемого сознанием) аспекта ее существования и акцентирует временное существование вещного“ (Лишаев, 2010, 21-22).

То есть, если понятие „прошлое“ передает в большей степени смысл временной дистанции, то „ветхое“ - это тоже прошлое, но в понимании его неизбежности, необратимости, временного конца. Это качественное состояние глубоко диссонирует с культурой православного монашества, с ее порывом в вечность, преодолением временности, глубинной телеологичностью, аскетичной напряженностью, аксиологических максимализмом. Однако то, что в историческом опыте не соответствует ценностям данной культурной традиции, не переходит в ее прошлое, а изымается из нее, становится „не-культурой“. Эти наблюдения позволяют отметить, что культура православного монашества как часть ортодоксальной христианской традиции, имеет другую структуру (в отличие от культуры светской), и прошлое культуры не является ее структурной частью.

## ВЫВОДЫ

Таким образом, в культуре православного монашества прошлого, как прошедшего и отвергнутого в его общепринятом понимании, не существует. Весь положительный опыт, приближающий к Царству Небесному, включен в эту культуру, актуализирован в ней. То, что в историческом опыте и культурной памяти не соответствует ценностям данной культурной традиции, не переходит в ее прошлое, а, фактически, изымается из нее, становится „не-культурой“. Эти наблюдения позволяют заключить, что культура православного монашества как часть ортодоксальной христианской традиции, имеет другую структуру, в отличие от культуры светской. Если последней присуще темпоральное расслоение на архивную, забытую, преходящую, непреходящую, живую и др., то в культуре православного монашества прошлое не является ее структурной частью.

Кроме того, можно говорить о парадоксальной многовекторности культуры православного монашества. Светская культура с начала эпохи Нового времени и до сегодняшнего дня ориентирована, как известно, на будущее. Культура монашества обращена к божественной вечности. Во-первых, вечность, по определению, существует всегда. Во-вторых, божественная вечность, согласно христианскому учению, имела в земных условиях конкретные исторические границы и форму своего проявления в личности Иисуса Христа. Ориентируясь на его Личность, культура монашества обращена в прошлое. В-третьих, однако, встреча человечества с вечностью ожидается в определенной эсхатологической перспективе, „жизни будущего века“, будущего Царства Праведников. В связи с этим можно утверждать, что культура монашества обращена также и к будущему. При этом каждый из трех обозначенных ориентиров включает в себя два других. В результате в культуре православного монашества на сакральной основе происходит объединение темпоральных (и исторических) измерений прошлого, настоящего, будущего и вечности. Содержание этих измерений включено в сжатом виде в культурную память данной культуры.

Кроме того, явление культурной памяти в ортодоксальной христианской традиции предполагает практическое к себе отношение, то есть оно существует в данной культуре в качестве регулятива не только собственно культурной, но и индивидуальной жизни ее представителей. Такое положение дел позволяет заключить, что культурная память у представителей монашества имеет тенденцию сближаться с индивидуальной памятью.

Непреходящая актуальность фактов Священной Истории для ортодоксальной христианской традиции свидетельствует о ее принадлежности в „горячему" типу культур в классификации Я. Ассмана.

Переход темпоральных категорий в разряд аксиологических характерен не только для культуры монашества. Например, то же мы наблюдаем в нововременной культуре с появлением идеи прогресса: новация, прогресс и будущее возникают, в определенном смысле, синонимами. Но в культуре православного монашества то, что касается духовного подвига, прошлого, по сути, не существует. Сами эти темпоральные категории ассоциируются с духовным состоянием человека, его местом на пути духовного совершенствования.

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## CHURCH CHOIR AS A SOCIO-CULTURAL SYSTEM

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**Summary**

The article substantiates the possibility of studying the modern Orthodox Church choir as a socio-cultural system, which is due to two projections of its being – social and culture-creating. The main determinants and factors of formation of the church choir as a socio-cultural system are revealed, the functional roles of singers in the team are typologised. The principles of interaction of the individual and collective consciousness within the church choir are considered, the role of unity (conciliarity) in its liturgical activity is defined. The main characteristics of the life cycle of the church choir as a socio-cultural system are given, its typical stages and potential crises are characterized. The fundamentals of team management, including the method of controlled crisis, are formulated.

**Key words:** Orthodox Church choir, socio-cultural system, the life cycle of the church choir, the method of controlled crisis.

The definition of the church choir as a socio-cultural system is not traditional for modern art criticism. The concept of „socio-cultural environment" is more usual for the definition of teams. In some cases, this definition is correct, if we are talking about a rather amorphous union of people. However, if we are talking about a structured team with a certain hierarchical structure, well-thought-out relationships and functions of people whose activities have a purpose, then clearly such a team cannot be called an environment. The environment has certain characteristics and can „share" its characteristics with the person who gets into this environment. In this case the relationship of man and the social environment can be built quite differently. A person can „dissolve" in the team, to a certain extent losing his or her individuality and taking the quality of the social environment. He or she can resist the environment or distance themselves from it. But in some cases, to use a Gospel image, a man can act as „leaven", which, on the contrary, impose upon the environment the qualities, rules, values, etc. Under the influence of human the environment can be transformed into a system, it highlights the hierarchical elements, build relationships aimed at achieving a specific result.

Practice shows that those teams work effectively, which formed the properties of the system. Moreover, in the case of creative teams, such a system is not purely social, since it is not aimed at solving social problems (ensuring survival, for example), but at achieving an artistically and spiritually valuable result, which lies in the field of culture creation. Thus, we are talking about a socio-cultural system.

Why is the efficiency that the team acquires when it becomes a system important for the church choir? Here it is necessary to dive a little into the specificity of the work of the church choir.

First of all, the peculiarities of the organisation of work in the church choir are connected with the specificity of the schedule, according to which both services and rehearsals take place. They depend on the schedule of services in the church.

There are two main variants of the liturgical schedule: monastic and parish. Monastic, as a rule, provides daily services. The participation of the choir in such a schedule can be organised according to various schemes. The first scheme consists of a brotherly or sisterly chorus that serves constantly. In this case, the singers in the choir may permanently vary, because the monks (singers) have other obediences and from time to time miss services and / or rehearsals. The second scheme is alternate, when two (or more) choirs are formed in the monastery, they serve in turn, most often replacing each other in a week, and are simultaneously involved on major holidays. If we are talking about large monasteries in which more than one liturgy is celebrated per day, there may be other schemes of alternation, which depend on the schedule of services in all churches. If we have a seminary, an academy, precentor courses and other singing structures nearby, specific schemes are also possible. The third scheme provides for a festive choir of a large number of professional singers, which does not participate in weekday services and is invited only to Sunday services and major holidays.

At parishes, as a rule, divine services are performed on Saturdays and Sundays and on significant holidays by the decision of the prior. Large parishes mainly add Saturday worships to this scheme. One or two choirs (small and large) can sing at the parish, in large cathedrals their number sometimes reaches three (the third can be another small, as well as a youth choir, a Sunday school choir, etc.). Thus, there are two most common schemes of team work. The first one provides for the participation of a professional choir on weekends and holidays, the second one requires a large workload of the small choir with services on Fridays and Saturdays and during the week for both small and large holidays.

Thus, most often the precentor of a professional choir finds himself in a situation where the choir meets only twice a week (on Saturday evenings and Sunday mornings) with one small and one long break: from Sunday to Saturday too much time passes, during which such skills as, for example, the sense of timbre ensemble, blunts. Rehearsals also usually take place on one of these working days for the choir. Thus, both the choir and the precentor find themselves in not the best conditions from a methodological point of view, because the sparse schedule does not contribute to the improvement of skills and significantly complicates the work of the team.

An important aspect of the organisation of the work of the church choir is that in a professional team almost all participants have another main work. According to the survey, more than 16% of choristers are teachers of musical institutions, 11% are employees of theatrical and philharmonic professional choirs, 5% lead professional and amateur choirs, 3% are singers of amateur choirs and soloists of musical institutions, about 60% are students of musical specialties and only 1-2% of singers of church choirs are not engaged in secular musical activity. The main employment of singers is also bad for attendance of services and rehearsals. Skipping one weekend immediately forms a two-week break in the activities of a particular person in the choir, which, of course, violates the principle of consistency of both his personal work and the work of the team. However, these circumstances are insurmountable.

The work of the church choir also has a specificity associated with the continuity of the liturgical process. It deals with methods of organising music material to provide quick and accurate access to it. Requirements for these methods are higher in groups that serve without a second choir, because they actually do not have pauses to settle repertory and organisational issues.

The rehearsal work of the church choir is also very specific. First, the number of services in which the choir participates usually is twice the rehearsal time, which is typical only for church choirs. Rehearsals usually take place once a week and are dedicated to preparing the repertoire for the next service. The young teams barely have time for the usual Sunday repertoire. The precentors often appoint additional rehearsals before the holidays. As time passes a certain repertory framework of the service is „worked out", and only then the precentor gets a certain freedom to study works that are not included in the „mandatory programme" of the church choir. Usually the choir spends from 1 to 3 years to form a stable liturgical repertoire. At the same time, the Sunday repertoire is studied faster, the festive one – much slower, because a number of hymns are performed in the church only once a year.

Such field of the church choir activity as a system of punishments and rewards also has some specific features. In monasteries the usual measures for such structures can be applied, particularly the appointment of bows as punishment. However, such measures cannot be applied to professional singers, who, mostly, are not very deeply church people, and are unlikely to perceive such punishments adequately. Some choirs practice financial penalties for being late for services, but these measures are used in a limited way. In fact, the severity of punishment depends only on one factor: the value of a particular singer for a particular team. Rewards in the church choir also do not have much variety. All these „levers of influence" are entirely in the hands of the prior, the precentor can only recommend certain fines and bonuses, but the last word is not for him. Thus, in fact, the precentor has no means of influencing the choristers, except his own authority, the authority of the Church and – more – Christ himself.

Such complex conditions of existence of the church choir demand subtle and complex work from the precentor, for which he is usually not ready. To sum up: with high requirements to the church choir, it has a complex schedule, low financial interest and unfavourable organisational specifics. In such circumstances, the question of a conscious development of the church choir as a system is particularly acute.

We should also mention the use of digital technologies in the work of church choirs. The surveys of 182 precentors-respondents have showed that 85 of them constantly use digital technologies in the precentor's activity, 48 – do it infrequently, 14 – do not use them yet, but they are going to master them, 35 – do not use them and they are not going to master them. So, according to the results of the observations and surveys, more than 73% of precentors somehow use them in various activities.

The most popular among precentors are:

1) Internet portals for searching musical material, sequence of services, liturgical instructions, texts, audio recordings, etc.;

2) mobile applications such as liturgical instructions, troparion, Orthodox calendar, prayer book;

3) score-editing applications for typing and editing scores, creating their own adaptations, arrangements, author's compositions;

4) social networks for communication of choir members, promotion of their creativity, preservation of audio and video materials, as well as the exchange of scores, information, communication;

5) specialized resources adapted for the organisation of Internet broadcasts;

6) mobile phones and tablet computers for urgent access to scores or texts during service;

7) portable digital equipment for audio and video recording.

This prevalence of digital technology in the church environment is somewhat unexpected. However, it would be interesting to compare the level of „informatisation" of precentors and conductors of secular choirs. The observations show that the first ones if not outperform their secular colleagues, then accurately do not lag behind. A certain explanation of this fact is, firstly, the average age of modern precentors who are younger than leaders of secular choirs, secondly, the lack of published music and spiritual repertoire libraries makes precentors surfing on the Internet from the very beginning of their work. So, in this sense, choir leaders are stimulated by several factors and simply have no other options than to quickly assimilate all possible resources.

An important feature of an effective system is its *synergy*. Synergy in religious activity is directly related to the personal prayerful mood of the singers, their desire to be united in Christ and the core of church life which is conciliarity.

Conciliarity is one of the four main properties of the Church defined in the Orthodox „Creed“. It is a concept that goes back to the dogma of the Holy Trinity and is related to the understanding of the Church as the Body of Christ. „In the light of the Trinity dogma, conciliarity appears to us as the mysterious identity of unity and multiplicity – unity, which is expressed in diversity, and diversity, which continues to be unity“ (Losky, 2019). It is the conciliarity of the prayerful feeling that is the condition for the synergistic effect of the socio-cultural system, which is the church choir (Voskoboynikova, 2016).

The church choir as a socio-cultural system has its own life cycle of spiral (preferably) or linear type and can be considered in the categories of socio-cultural dynamics.

If we are talking about a professional team, then, as a rule, its creation and the process of work correspond to the following 6 stages:

1) planning (formulation of tasks and starting parameters of the team: quantity, quality, gender ratio, level of education);

2) formation (search and acquisition of the singing staff);

3) training (mastering the repertoire, bringing the sound of the choir to a certain level of compliance with the precentor’s requirements);

4) stabilization (the stage of complete learning and free use of all the necessary repertoire, the release of rehearsal time for additional tasks);

5) crisis (imbalance of the system for different – often personnel – reasons);

6) destruction or restructuring (partial change in the structure of the team).

Let us dwell upon the important stages in more detail.

Having become the head of the team, the precentor is not always able to quickly determine the creative capabilities of a person, its value for choral sonority, predict the regularity of participation and other details of the working process. The precentor is often a graduate of a higher musical institution, whose motivation is not so much participation in the service, but the opportunity to create his own choir. The Church provides sufficient conditions for this, but often the ambitions of a young leader prevent him from seeing the true meaning of church service.

The stage of training in the church choir according to the observations of the precentors and the singers themselves, for each member of the team lasts at least a year. Besides, festive chants are the most difficult for singers. They mostly have a higher complexity than the usual Sunday repertoire, but they are used only once a year, so a confident knowledge that does not require additional rehearsal effort comes in at least 2 or 3 years. Consequently, it takes at least two years to master the repertoire, and more than three years to master it confidently. It should be noted that the training stage keeps both the precentor and the singers in maximum tone.

At the stage of stabilization of the team the turnover of the staff is significantly reduced, the choir sings the invariable liturgical hymns almost by heart. This, on the one hand, provides opportunities to devote the free rehearsal time to expanding the repertoire and preparing concert programmes. On the other hand, the psychological comfort of being sure of their own awareness, as a rule, is reflected badly on the activities of singers, who cease to be in strained attention and begin to be distracted during the service, switching to a „semi-automatic“ mode of operation. At this stage, there comes a dilemma that can be conditionally expressed through the concept of „comfortable boredom“, because the choir is in a comfortable, relaxed state, and at the same time begins to get bored from its own awareness in the repertoire.

The stabilization stage is also potentially pre-crisis because the psychological well-being of the singers in the team is changing. If in the first years of service in the choir, each new member of the team tries to strengthen their professional positions, to establish relations with the precentor and colleagues, experienced singers already understand that their skills and knowledge of the repertoire have a significant value, this can lead to a certain imbalance of the precentor's power in the team. Thus, the precentor during this period should find other creative forms of work corresponding to the new level of the choir, raise the bar of professional requirements for the team or look for additional motivation for the singers.

It is known (also from my own 16-year experience of working as a precentor [2]) that precentors and singers of church choirs have several motives for staying in the team: religious, epistemological, aesthetic, social and financial. Religious motives come from personal faith, a desire to serve God with one's talent, need to be at the service etc. Epistemological motives are determined by the need for knowledge of Church life, professional musicians' need for getting acquainted with a new repertoire, mastering the liturgical service, and sometimes with a desire to work with a particular precentor or a precentor's intention to create his own choir. Aesthetic motives are usually associated with repertory policy or the singers of the choir, which one wants to join for aesthetic reasons. Social motivation can be determined by finding like-minded people, interesting things, a platform for communication, etc. Financial motives derive from the possibility of additional earnings.

Obviously, the motives of being in the team can not be the same for everyone. However, in each team it is possible to determine the leading motivation. The most truthful information is acquired not so much by questioning as by observation. Each leading motivation in the team has its own „markers“ through which it manifests itself.

Financially motivated teams are characterized by instability of the singers under the conditions of the economic crisis, their attention to payments is increased. Indirectly this motivation is manifested in the low attendance of services that require additional time or transport costs (for example, a festive service on Sunday evening, when after the morning liturgy you need to spend an extra few hours waiting or extra money for the way home and back).

Socially motivated groups must have joint leisure time, make trips and pilgrimages, visit each other, etc.

Aesthetic motivation of the group begins from the precentor and is expressed through the search for extraordinary musical material, the introduction of the latest choral works into the service (usually works written by the precentor himself, someone from the choristers or a familiar composer). The dominance of aesthetic motivation is quite steadily associated with the performance of non-canonical works at the service.

Epistemological motivation in church and choral work, as a rule, is manifested through the restoration of ancient chants. The study of canonical singing by the choir is necessarily associated with an active process of cognition in the field of the history of choral singing, the study of certain forms of notation, the implementation of transcripts, the learning of vocal specificity.

Religious motivation is externally manifested, first of all, in the behaviour of the choir in church. Singers in such groups always have the befitting worship appearance, know how to react to certain phrases of a priest, participate in the rites and sacraments of the Church. Attendance in such choirs can grow at festive services, as important not only for the Church, but also for each member of the choir personally. In such teams, as a rule, singing in the choir is perceived as obedience, payments are not a leading value, there are almost no conflicts for this reason, economic crises affect the singers of the choir insignificantly.

The choir as an effective system is characterized by the presence of common values and a common leading motivation for all its participants. Thus, working on the formation of the choir, it is necessary to give paramount importance to these items, since it is the commonality of goals and their high moral level that is the key to the synergistic effect of joint activities.

An important component of the church choir as a system is its internal hierarchy and the functions of each member of the team. The roles of team members in the overall process can be assessed from different perspectives. There is a traditional classification according to the socio-psychological properties of the individual that secures the presence in the team of the following types: collectivists, individualists, precisionist, conformists, etc. Classification by function in the creative process reveals the following functional roles: „generators of ideas“ (creative specialists, ideologists), performers, experts, critics, „favourites“. Such classifications to a certain extent relate to church choirs, but their small size and the specificity of the activities make us use other classification features. It is important that the functional roles defined by us not only relate to the socio-psychological sphere, but also reflect the creative priorities and strengths of certain performers.

„Leader“. Usually it is the leader of the group, determining its repertoire and rehearsal policy, he is also a full-fledged singer, and sometimes the author or arranger of songs. Ideally, the leader should be the most experienced of all team members, have certain professional preferences, be a respected person. This allows maintaining the hierarchy of governance inherent in Church structures based on the authority of the leader.

„Counter-leader“. He or she tries to compete with the head at the level of professional skills and creative charisma. In the context of the general motivation of singers, the presence of a counter-leader is not destructive. From the position of synergy, the counter-leader brings the team as a system out of equilibrium, which is though comfortable, but has no potential for development.

„Dispatcher“. It is a singer with not very flamboyant, but multifunctional abilities. His or her role is to control the creative process from within the team and „patching“ various „holes“. The dispatcher „hedges“ the precentor and singers, picking up the „failure“ places, prompting a note in case of error. During the service these people are also indispensable in the matters related to the knowledge of the Church Statutes, specificity, etc. In small groups the function of dispatcher is often performed by the precentor.

„Generalist“. It is a diligent performer with a fairly large voice capabilities and small ambitions. Such people are completely necessary in small teams, because thanks to them the problems arising with the availability of the singers „here and now“ are always solved. This role is mostly performed by women who are fluent in two or three choral parts (including tenor) and qualitatively read music at sight.

„Basic chorister“. This can be considered any singer who confidently knows his part. Typically, they have a choral voice, a certain mobility, but require governance.

„Timbre chorister“. This is a singer whose voice determines the timbre of the part. The theoretical idea that voices should „merge“ into one timbre works better in large groups. In small groups, which are often church choirs, among the 3-4 singers of the part one is sure to dominate. The selection and training of the timbre choristers in the part should be treated very carefully.

„Soloist“. His or her vocal talent and functions give rise to overestimation of self-esteem, which leads to a reluctance to adapt to the singing of other singers, meet the precentor’s requirements, etc. Therefore, in church choirs that do not have, as mentioned above, free time for the re-education of such a person, there is a trend to „grow“ soloists from the ordinary choristers, and not to seek for the choir those who have already mastered this role.

„Improviser“. Such people are rare. As a rule, they are talented, interesting and creative. It is from them that the choir can get good arrangements and fresh ideas. One significant drawback of the improviser is that he or she is almost completely uncontrollable. It is almost impossible to impose on them a certain course of action, or to foresee what can be expected of them. In addition, disciplinary measures do not have much influence on them, because the degree of their talents gives them reason to hope for a lenient attitude.

Now when the functional roles of the singers are defined, it is important to identify how they interact in the structure of the team, and what the balance of creative forces should be. From the timbre positions, the formation of the singing group resembles the setting of light for artistic photography. There are three main groups of light: drawing, filling and contouring. This is how the sound of the choir is formed. There are three functional groups of voices: voices that „draw“, that is, give the sound a specific bright timbre colour, voices that „fill“ this sound, adding volume and saturation, increasing the amplitude of its dynamic capabilities. There are voices that, if necessary, set off the main timbres of the choir. The last group is formed at the request of the precentor and may be absent. The second group of voices is the most important, let's call them the main ones. They provide the basic functionality of the choir, even if they do not give it a bright timbre, which in the liturgical sense is secondary. The voices that define the main timbre of the choir contribute to its recognition by ear, give specific features to its timbre „face“, so let's call them identifying. Among the main voices, in small teams the greatest demand is for dispatchers and generalists – mainly because of their multifunctionality. Of course, it is better to accept into the choir a person who may not have a big voice, but can, if necessary, „wander“ from part to part without harming his voice and the quality of the sound of the choir. Among the identifying voices, the presence of timbre singers must be ensured first of all. The presence of soloists is not obligatory. And broadly, since the whole identifying functional group is less important than the main one, it is possible not to complete it when recruiting a small choir.

There are singers who, by their professional qualities, can meet the requirements of several functions. For example, a soloist with a certain talent and experience can perform both the functions of a dispatcher and a generalist, can almost always perform the functions of a timbre singer, but on the contrary it is not always the case. Therefore, even the proposed method of definition and modelling the functional structure of the choir leaves a lot of space for the precentor's guiding creativity.

The aforementioned functional structure of the choir significantly complicates the process of its staffing and directly vocal and choral work. However, the effecttiveness of the correct modelling proves its worth in practice. A clear understanding of the tasks of each singer in a small choir, which is the church choir, significantly increases not only the quality of the choir, but also its „working reliability“ in the face of such factors of instability of the choir as attendance, experience, as well as the complexities of church service conditions.

Speaking about the construction and functioning of the church choir as a socio-cultural system, we have already mentioned that the precentor actually has no leverage over the singers, except his own authority and their internal motivation.

The idea that the creation of financial and other conditions can fundamentally solve this problem is illusive. Relatively speaking, the „product of the activity“ of the church singer lies in the field of spiritual categories, so the incentives are there as well. People who pray sincerely will not be able to sing worse than they can, regardless of the payment. Yes, they may not have the best organisational conditions, because they will be forced to earn their living by something else. The experience of European countries, where it is not common to financially reward for church singing, shows that religiously motivated singers form the basis of choirs, finding opportunities both for their own participation in the service and for attracting (and sometimes training) new singers.

Discussions around the financial issue have recently escalated among the precentors in Ukraine, reaching offers to sabotage the service until the payment of singing is not set at the desired level. At the same time, the precentors in temples with high pay for singing face the same problems – they are familiar with low attendance, dissatisfaction among singers, and the possibility of losing them because they can look for higher-paying places. This expansion of the methods of inter-class struggle into the „territory“ of the Church is a signal that singing in the church has become a work, and it is high time the precentors (and the priesthood, too) proceeded to solving other problems. Can we offer the singers anything besides money? Do we have a truly Christian spirit in us? Do we help our singers to develop and improve spiritually? Can we create an atmosphere in the choir in which you want to stay NOT for money? Unfortunately, few of the precentors regard this as their task. So, until the situation changes, church singers will remain mercenaries, and church singing will depend on the prior's ability to pay.

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# THE SPANISH CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE SECULAR INSTITUTIONS

**Summary**

The inquisitorial institution of the Iberian Peninsula (XV-XIX) was the instrument of the society's religious control in the hands of the absolute monarchy, while its mixed nature was recognized in its dual character based on the status of an ecclesiastical court concerning to the origin of its legitimacy and functions. At the same time was presenting a royal court due to the administrative framework. This article will analyze the relationship between the Spanish Catholic Church of the Iberian Peninsula, mainly referring to the regions of today's Spain, towards the secular institutions of the society with an emphasis on the processes conducted by the Tribunal of the Holy Office of the Inquisition that was authorized by the Pope's in suppersssing heresy. In the narrower plan, the elements of the procession of the auto da fé will be analyzed where its dual origin, intertwined with liturgical and profane elements will become more prominent in the typology of sanctions and penalties that transcend the legal frameworks of the canon law and transposed under the jurisdiction of the secular authorities. This study will try to present an analysis of these dual courts, whose systems of operation lead to the confrontation of different strategies, but also to their cooperation.

**Key words**: Roman Catholic Church, secular institution, ecclesiastical institution, inquisition.

## INTRODUCTION

The inquisitorial themes occupied a plethora of works, for some included popular histories, novels and essays with frequent tendencies to sensationalism, and stress on cruel death punishments, torture techniques and pedagogy of fear allowing that the stories around its ferocity being equally mythological as historical. Dutch and English Protestants of the sixteenth century attacked their Spanish enemies by judging its symbols and evidences of inquisitorial fanatism and brutality, while in today's political discourse it is often tended to invoke the Spanish Inquisition as a stigma for zealous persecution and religious intolerance. In the end, methods of its procedures were evident: it blended religious and secular authorities in diminishing to those who were considered as 'cultural others', torture and secrecy were proven methods in winning of the sentences, and exemplary character of its procedures was created in order to warn its observers of the consequences of a similar heretical and blasphemous behaviour.

From the mid-1970s in Spain within the area of inquisitorial studies has started the new historiographical process called the historical revision of the Inquisition. It was influenced mostly by the death of Spanish dictator Francisco Franco in 1975, when the repressive regime finally ended, allowing the Spanish archives to be reopened and its sources to be re-examined. Affected additionally by the developments in other fields of social sciences especially within social and cultural history, the revisionists challenged established historical theories and presented new proofs gained from once sealed inquisitorial documents that undermined the current grounded historical explanation of the inquisitorial phenomenon. From that time until mid-1990 a team of exquisite historians advanced the inquisitorial scholarship impressively by focusing on its legal, political, religious, and social mechanisms.[1] With an aim to re-write the inquisitorial history and uncover its infamous historical stains, it was discovered medieval and early modern roots among a plethora of contemporary issues, like societal persecution of religious minorities, as well as the role of secular and ecclesiastic authorities within this process. Since cultural diversity and religious pluralism are phenomena rooted in the history of European soil and its democratic managing has become a priority in recent years, it should be acknowledged that the experiences of Hispanic religious homogenization and the process of forced acculturation led by severe inquisitorial persecution of religious minorities should be seen as a cautionary warning of the consequences of failure. Therefore, this article will analyse firstly, the relationship between the Roman Catholic Church of Spain and the secular institutions, with an emphasis on the processes conducted by the Tribunal of the Holy Office of the Inquisition that was authorized by the Pope's in suppressing heresy; and secondly, will be explored the ritual of the auto da fè whose dual origins intertwined between liturgical and profane elements, visible especially in the typology of penalties and execution of judgments went beyond the legal framework of canon law, and consequently fall under the jurisdiction of the secular judiciary.

## HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

For those who are not medievalists or specialized in the early modern period of Iberian Peninsula, a short introduction in the background of this historical phenomenon known as the Tribunal of the Holy Office of the Inquisition will be made. To start with, the term *inquisition* (*The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, 2005: 836-837) derives from Latin noun with a meaning of *a searching* or *inquiring into*, *an examination* (C. du Cange, 1883-1887: col. 373a) describing a legal strategy used in ecclesiastical procedures and developed in the twelfth century. It originated in ancient Rome in which a supervisory authority examined and accused a suspected defendant whose own bad reputation, i.e. *mala fama,* served as a heretical charge. As one of the responses to heretical movements developed during the late Middle Ages, the Latin Christian Church combated heresy by appointing bishops and other papally appointed clergy to visit their diocese at least twice a year in order to seek and prosecute heretics and other spiritual outcasts (Peters, 1989: 1-4).

The episcopal Inquisition, which was also active in France, Germany and Italy, was only implemented in the mediaeval Aragon, and not in Castile, where Christianity was still unaffected by formal heresy during this period. However, when Isabella I of Castile and Ferdinand II of Aragon acceded to the throne, they built an alliance with the idea of religious homogenization to stabilize their power. Contrary to the medieval tribunal controlled by the Pope, the Catholic monarchs established the Inquisition under their authority which was at the time affected by internal conflicts. Consequently, the modern Inquisition was created in Castile, after which it spread to Aragon and replaced the prior practice (Kamen, 1997: 6–7).

[1] For Anglophone scholarship of the inquisitorial studies, see Hossai, 2007. For the archival situation of inquisitorial scholarship in Spain, see Henningsen, 1986.

Ferdinand ruled his kingdom autonomously and showed remarkable interest in interfering in Castilian politics, presenting himself as one of the closest descendants of the house of Trastámara and calling on a legal right of 'jure uxoris'. He was determined to establish an institution that would be entirely controlled by royal authorities, as was the case in Castile at the time (Samardžić, 2005). On November 1st, 1478, Pope Sixtus IV issued a bull, *Exigit sincerae devotionis affectus*. The bull bestowed exclusive authority to Catholic monarchs over confiscation in their kingdoms and the right to appoint for every town or diocese in the both Crowns three inquisitors, who were to be prelates, religious order members or secular priests, over forty years of age and masters or bachelors in theology or licentiates or doctors in canon law. The bull additionally gave permission to both Ferdinand and Isabella to dismiss and substitute them (Llorca, 1949). Differently from medieval tradition, this shift of power was rather new, hence inquisitors were politically subject to the crowns, even though the Pope still formally provided their authority and jurisdiction. This practice was qualified in 1484 when, despite initial papal opposition, Tomás de Torquemada was appointed as the Inquisitor General for the Crown of Aragon, in addition to Castile. It was the first time that was created a formal bond between ecclesiastical and civil jurisdiction, since the involvement of the crowns in the appointment of the inquisitorial agents switched inquisitors' loyalty (Betankur, 2009: 35). This act marked the transition from medieval to the new inquisition when bigger interferences of civil and secular authorities begun within once solely Church's procedures. The attitude of the Catholic monarchs stems from their policy of centralization, characteristic for the monarchs of modern history. The inquisitorial institution implanted in Castile and revived in Aragon under new terms of ostensible power-sharing served as an instrument in achieving absolute monarchy that unfreequently acted against the criteria of the Holy See.

## VICTIMS

From the long existence of the Inquisition, different types of targets predominated in different periods. In the first years after inquisitorial establishment, religious and secular courts focused on the persecution of religious minorities, such as converts of Jewish origin charged for practising judaizing activities clandestinely. During the first decades of the sixteenth century the Tribunal persecuted Christian mystical form known as *alumbrados,* Lutheranism, Erasmianism and another religious group, known as *moriscos*. From the end of the sixteenth until the early seventeenth century with the mass Portuguese immigration in the territories of Crown of Castile and Crown of Aragon, *conversos* of Jewish descents were again persecuted. At the same time, inquisitorial courts fought against heretical claims, blasphemy, and new spiritual and philosophical sensibilities, such as Molinism and Freemasonry.[2]

The persecution was selective, and the Inquisition imposed the harsher punishments to *conversos* and *moriscos*. The sentence for heretical crimes from a broad range of minor and harsher penalties often included the confiscation of property. This type of penalty left almost impecunious heirs and families of the convicted. Therefore, these actions were imposed with a high financial interest, especially when considering the wealth that the defendants possessed. The vague definition of the

[2] For inquisitorial targets, see: Homza, 2006: xxviii-xxxvii.

heretical crimes minimalized the possibility for defendant's defence, while additionnally unofficial action of inquisitorial personnel was restrained from the strict rules (Lea, 2010). At the core of the legal inquisitorial system, two main aspects prevailed: the secrecy of its procedures and the testimonies made in favour of only one party. From the depositions were erased the names of the prosecution witnesses, and the defendants could not know the names of those who reported them or the circumstances of their criminal offence (Betankur, 2009: 505-515).

In this article, we will focus on the persecution and prosecution of religious minorities known as *conversos*. In 1492, after the fall of Nasrid Kingdom of Granada of the both Christian Crowns finally ended the period of Catholic Reconquista. Consequently, a belated obsession with suppressing religions that once coexisted in the Iberian Peninsula emerged and the idea of religious homogenization was created. The earlier period, known as 'convivencia' finally ended.[3] In the end of 14th century, after convivencia, began periods of violence, persecution, forced conversion, campaigns of the limpieza de sangre, establishment of the Inquisition, and finally the expulsion from Castile and Aragón in 1492 of the Jews who refused to convert, thus suggest that the experiences of Hispanic cultural homogenization should rather be seen as a cautionary warning of the consequences of failure. The religious obsession of the dominant Christian caste in diminishing alterity resulted in the creation of socio-religious groups known as *conversos*, referring to the descendants of Jews converted to Christianity who culturally did not effectively assimilate within Christian society and whose religious beliefs and spiritual practices grew increasingly suspect in the eyes of the Church. They were suspected of secret adherence to the religion of their ancestors. Since such acts were considered heretical in the eyes of the Catholic Church, the converts of Judaic origin were persecuted for their religious beliefs since the accused were baptized Catholics and not Jews. Hence, besides the financial interest of the inquisitorial courts the most notable in the confiscation of defendant's property, discrimination was additionally one more aspect of the Church's prejudiced treatment of the conversos.[4]

Since the dawn of dispersion, Jews of Iberian Peninsula cherished love for lands we today call Spain, embracing its language, tradition and culture. However, after the Edict of Faith was issued, they had been given a period of four months to leave their homes. The biggest Judaic diaspora at the time calculating roughly around 300.000 souls left Spain never to return (see "Introduction" in: Gerber, 1992). The one who

[3] The Coexistence (*la convivencia*) is the term coined by Spanish historian Américo Castro in 1948 as part of a controversial thesis about historical identity of Spaniards. It refers to „the peaceful life, i.e. 'coexistence' of Christian, Muslim, and Jewish communities in medieval Spain and by extension their cultural interaction.[3] The interpretations of historians differ considerably for the concept of *convivencia*. For instance, some suggest that the Jews, Muslim and Christians lived in a remarkable harmony, pointing out the exemplary reign of Alfonso the Vise, who called himself „king of three religion ". However, it is undoubtedly an idealized representation of the idea. While it cannot be neglected that there was considerable interacttion among Christians, Jews and Muslims on all levels of society, such as intellectual, cultural, matrimonial and mercantile, the nature of this relation unfrequently was additionally marked by suppersssion and violence and between these communities remained a culture of hostility (Castro, 1948; Baxter Wolf, 2009).

[4] "The Jews and the Converso Problem" in Yitzhak Baer*, A History of the Jews in Christian Spain,* vol. 2 The Jewish publication society of America, 2001: 244-300.

stayed faced the conversion as the ultimate solution of not leaving their soil. This socio-religious group, split between the willingness to safeguard their former religion and cultural heritage secretly and the necessity to interact on all social levels with their gentile neighbours, embraced a variety of strategies in preserving their collective identity. However, it was not foreign to Jews to adapt to this specific lifestyle since, from the dispersion they had built their identity on a particular cultural behaviour exhibited from living in the diaspora. Their ability to adapt to imposed surroundings and circumstances emerged from the idea of chosenness (Gürkan, 2008) that is at the core of Judaism. In order to preserve their cultural identity and at the same time interact with other nations their culture had become distinctly multi-coloured. This dualistic lifestyle that the "New-Christians" embraced, especially after the pogrom, did not remain passive to outside influences and finally caused a creation of the number of cultural and especially religious typologies (Azrija, 2009). The mass conversion of Sephardi Jews to Christianity provoke the formulation of the new social, political, and religious category. It was not a category based on their origin; however, it was a formulation made by the Catholic Church to distinct baptized people of Judaic descents. The precedential phenomenon for differentiating a social class of baptized individuals to highlight their allegedly cultural distinction is unique in the history of medieval and early modern Iberian Peninsula (Graizbord, 2013).

The interpretations of historians vary in the aspect of conversos' religious integration. For instance, Netanyahu's central revisionist idea that later adopted Roth was that the conversos of Spain were not at all clandestine Jews. The foundation of Netanyahu's monumental historical piece "The Origins of the Inquisition in Fifteenth-Century Spain" is that conversos of Spain were considered not as anusim (forced converts) but as apostates, i.e. genuine Christians, for which they were unjustly persecuted. Roth also in "Conversos, Inquisition and the Expulsion of the Jews from Spain" concluded that the crypto-Judaism in Spain is a myth created by academics who are not experts in the medieval history of Iberian Peninsula. However, neither one of these scholars acknowledges the importance of the term *converso* and its semantic change which additionally affirm their central hypothesis (Edwards, 1997). Therefore, we cannot agree with such a view, especially when considering the amount of work concentrated on the Iberian peninsula and outside it both Netanyahu and Roth had neglected, and that conclude, contrary to both scholars, the existence of religious typology known as conversos.

## BETWEEN ECCLESIASTICAL AND SECULAR

Differently from the Medieval, the Modern Inquisition was defined as an institution with central administration and absolute jurisdiction, established with the permission of the Holy See, which allowed it to lead trials against the suspects. The Grand Inquisitor was authorized to lead a proceeding against any baptized individual. In the Western Christian world, he had the most significant authority after the Pope. Therefore, the Holy Office had almost the most extensive ecclesiastic jurisdiction in Castilian and Aragonese history. On the contrary, the Tribunal was economically and administratively dependent on the Crown (Arsic, 2016; Komelja, 2003).

The inquisitors could not act without the royal support in ordering the judiciary to enforce the decisions of the Holy Office, especially in acts such as arrests and executions. The medieval Inquisition thus derived its legitimacy from the powers vested in the Pope. Still, its actual operation depended on the recognition of jurisdiction by the political authority which provided the means of labour. In Castile as well as in Aragon the inquisitorial power had ambiguous mixed entity: The Holly Office was an ecclesiastical tribunal, because any authority and jurisdiction exercised by the inquisitors came from Rome, but it was also a secular tribunal, using power delegated from the Crown. Consequently, it was allowed a lot of room for political manoeuvring (Betankur, 2009: 434-457).

The auto da fé, literally translated as the act of faith, was a public performance enacted during the medieval Inquisition (and later developed in the territory of the Iberian Peninsula), at which those who had been convicted by the Inquisition had their sentences pronounced. It was a public spectacle established to demonstrate the victory of the Catholic faith over heresy as well as to impress and frighten the population with the horror of the same. It thereby served as a public warning by promulgating the dire consequences of heresy. As such, it became a symbol of the Inquisition and an achievement of the inquisitors to stage a colossal representation of the Judgment day. Paradoxically, the success and cruelty of the spectacle also converted it into the ant image of the Christian church, in which the sufferers of the Inquisition became its genuine victors (Bethencourt, 1992; Flynn, 1991).

During the medieval Inquisition, autos da fé were modest and confined to practical work, only to the execution of punishment. Four types of autos were practiced: firstly, there was the "auto general de fe" (a solemnity with many accused); secondly, "auto particular de fe" (with several accused without the solemnity of an "auto general" due to the absence of inquisitorial authorities); thirdly, "auto singular de fe" (held with one accused either in the church or in the street); and finally, "autillo" (issued privately in the audience room of the Tribunal to individuals for minor offences) (Llorente, 1981). The place of the solemnity was mainly outdoors at the principal square of a city and infrequently in churches or consecrated buildings, so that as many people as possible could attend. These plazas were usually surrounded by royal residences or town halls; hence, in a manner of symbolically demonstrating the Tribunal's dependency of the crown (Betankur, 2009: 346; Arsić, 2018).

The most noticeable example of intertwining among secular and ecclesiastical was presented in the execution of the harsh punishments, such as death penalties. The Inquisition did not possess coercive powers, however it relied on the cooperation of the secular authorities to enforce their decisions. This type of sentences had been carried out by representatives of the secular authorities by which the relaxation to the secular arm explicitly meant the death by burning. Although in ecclesiastical law the intervention of secular arm has generally been unsought, in late medieval and early modern period its assistance was requested, especially in heretical trials when Church officials could not administer the proper sentence.[5] Therefore, the inquisitors could not pronounce a death sentence, since clerics by canon and ecclesiastical law did not have the authority to carry on the capital punishment and to shed human blood. Therefore, they designed the mechanism which operated since the thirteen century by which the inquisitors formally pronounced the sentence for heretical crimes and turn the accused over to secular authorities. They consequently executed the sentence by burning in person or in statues if the defendant escaped before the trial (Peters, 1989).

[5] See: 'Secular arm' in: *The Oxford Dictionaty of the Christian Church*, 1477-1478.

By contrast, the significant difference between secular and inquisitorial tribunals was that the ecclesiastical authorities gave great importance to the repentance of the defendant. For instance, if the convict repented before the ‘relaxation’ he or she could be ‘mercifully’ strangled before the pile was set on fire. An unrepentant heretic condemned to the stake in the eyes of the Church is seen as the loss of one Christian soul and the devil's triumph. For that reason, the priests tried so hard to force the convict to repent before the execution (Betankur, 2009: 380-388).

## CONCLUSION

The Holy Office had dual nature functioning between ecclesiastical and secular. The authority belonged to the Church, but although the Pope passed it on to Catholic monarchs and their heirs, the Tribunal was not an entirely secular institution in the service of the Crown. While the medieval was exclusively an ecclesiastical institution without any royal interference, the modern inquisition contained elements of the ecclesiastical and the secular. Since the end of the 15th century, the monarchy has acquired and gained the right to appoint the grand inquisitors and to administer its finances from the Pope. Hence, it can be concluded that the inquisitions of Spanish kingdoms had a mixed status and were considered as royal courts.

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