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ISLAM AT THE BALKANS IN THE PAST, TODAY AND IN THE FUTURE

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***WE ARE THANKFUL FOR THE FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE
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INTRODUCTION: FACING THE ISSUE OF ISLAM AT THE BALKANS

Yugoslav Society for the Scientific Study of Religion (YSSSR) and its Program Board have brought about the decision that the Fourteenth traditional International YSSR Conference should be devoted to the "Islam at the Balkans in the Past, Today and in the Future". Fifteen distinguished domestic and foreign sociologists of religion dealing with a complex issue of the position of Islam at the Balkans will debate, for two days, on June 29-30 at Babin Zub, a well-known resort on the Stara Mountain), in four plenary sessions, namely:

I ISLAM AND CHRISTIANITY AT THE BALKANS: PERSPECTIVES OF THE CULTURE OF PEACE

II MUSLIMS OF THE BALKANS: IDENTITY AND ITS TRANSFORMATION

III FROM THE HISTORY OF ISLAM IN YUGOSLAVIA AND SERBIA:
ISLAM COMMUNITY AND DERVISH ORDERS

IV ISLAM-CHRISTIANITY BORDER ZONE AND THE ISSUE OF GENDER IN ISLAM

It has also been decided to continue with the four-year practice, that is, that the papers should be published in an anthology of papers in English while the debates should be published as a separate book in Serbian after the Conference. The Anthology before the readers comprises papers arranged according to the plenary sessions.

The idea to devote the Conference to Islam has come from Dragoljub B. Đorđević, President of the YSSSR who has also conceived of the Conference's basics, Dragan Todorović, Secretary General of the YSSR who has, like so many times before, carried the greatest organizational burden and Ljubiša Mitrović as the leader of the project *Culture of Peace, Identities, and Interethnic Relations in Serbia and the Balkans in the Eurointegration Process* (149014D) who has most enthusiastically supported the whole idea. These three distinguished academic figures from the University of Niš are also, as expected, editors of this Anthology.

**ISLAM AND CHRISTIANITY AT THE BALKANS:
PERSPECTIVES OF THE CULTURE OF PEACE**

Darko Tanasković

ISLAM IN THE BALKANS, ISLAM WITHIN THE BALKANS

Islam and the Muslim communities in Europe have been attracting more and more public and academic attention in recent years. This growth of interest is caused primarily by the emerging of the social phenomenon of radical neoislamism, whose protagonists are the inadequately integrated members of the first and second generation of immigrants from the Muslim world.

On the other hand, Muslim communities in the Balkans, who are the only representatives of the historic and authentic European Islam, have unjustly been excluded from the debate about the situation of Islam in Europe.

Therefore, there is no argument over the actuality and the importance of the issue that this conference is addressing. Also, it is equally obvious that its scientific study so far has been theoretically and methodologically deficient and inconsistent. I have decided, therefore, to offer my modest contribution to this gathering in the form of an unpretentious theoretical and methodological essay. Considering the limitation of space and time I have at my disposal, I will try to organize my presentation through a few basic points. Each of them will be explained and, if necessary, illustrated with examples from the reality of Islam in the Balkans. I believe it must be clear to everyone that this approach inevitably implies a significant selectivity and a high degree of generalization. Of course, many aspects of Islam in the Balkans will certainly stay out of my reach and perspective, which doesn't mean that I am over-looking or underestimating them. It will bring me great joy, and it will certainly be most useful, if this theoretical and methodological stimulus gives rise to a discussion and critical replies already during the conference. Through discussion, it can be expanded, supplemented and, if necessary, corrected in a way that is most productive. Its basic intention is to help, eventually to point in a direction through a question, least of all to teach.

I have already pointed out that Islam in the Balkans is a very complex and multidimensional phenomenon. I will try through my essay to touch on dimensions and aspects of this complex issue which I find to be the most important. It is also fundamentally important to stress that, for it to be successful in analysis and learning, contemporary academic approach to Islam in the Balkans must lend itself close to the everyday complexity of its object of study. This approach, after taking everything into consideration, must be holistic. Of course, to this synthesis of knowledge an unavoidable contribution must be given by the specialized studies of certain areas. Coordination between them would be most desirable. Although I will attempt to mention all the main ways of existence and manifestation of our theme, I hold that it is useful, during my opening remarks, to make one more suggestion. I am certain that in the study of modern occurrences that are connected to the Islamic phenomenon in the Balkans, it is necessary to pay more attention to the cultural and civilizational, and not only religious and political dimensions. Because, unlike in Western Europe, Islam does not exist only **in** the Balkans, but also deep **within** Balkans.

1. For the appropriate theoretical basing and methodological organizing of the whole academic approach to the Islamic problem in the Balkans, it is a matter of principle to answer the following question: Is there a specific "Balkanic Islam" or we

can only speak of “Islam in the Balkans”. It is not an easy question to answer. The answer to this question, prior to discussing the Balkan case, assumes establishing a methodological balance between two opposing tendencies which have marked international islamology in the last decades. On one side we have the supporters of Islamic relativism. They insist on the diverse manifestations of Islam in different regions of the world. They refuse any possibility to speak of Islam as a monolith and, as they see it, an abstract ideological construct produced by orientalism (in a sense that is attributed by E. Said). They often like to say that there is not one Islam, but many “Islams”. On the other side are the supporters of the so called “essentialist” view. Mostly they do not deny the historic and cultural reasons behind the diverse regional and local manifestations of Islam, but they point out that this difference in appearance should not be absolutised. The essentialists warn that if we relativistically overestimate the importance of surface appearances of “Islams”, we will lose the awareness of its deep rooted unity, which may lead to wrong conclusions and even worse actions. When applied to the Balkans, it would mean that the muslims in Bosnia and Hercegovina, in Kosovo and Metohija, in Macedonia, Bulgaria and in Greece are different in many aspects, but at the same time all of them, despite those differences, are Muslims like their counterparts in Turkey, Iran, Egypt and Malaysia.

Within the islamological tradition, the dispute between relativists and essentialists has been a long standing one, but has been intensified in the second half of the XX century, during which the problematic of the relation towards Islam in the West has been actualized politically and ideologically, and not only academically. Without going into specifics and nuances, we can conclude that in the most influential circles of world power the relativistic view on Islam was considered “politically correct” right up until the end of the nineties, while with the intensification of the actions of the Islamic terrorism and the fight against it, and especially after September 11, 2001, the influence of essentialists has strengthened. I am certain that there can be no dilemma in the conclusion that the success and the credibility of Islamic studies will always be proportional to the achieved balance between the essentialist and relativist approach. The problem is, however, that this type of balanced theoretical and methodological model is not easy to establish, and even harder to implement consistently.

All that has been said relates in the full measure to the situation in the Balkans. His already classic, pioneering study of Islam and Muslims in the Balkans in the postottoman period A. Popovic has titled, certainly not coincidentally, *Balkan Islamic Islam (L'islam balkanique*, Berlin-Wiesbaden, 1986). In concurrence with the observation made by M. Todorova of a “mighty ontology of Balkans” and the lucid remark of I. Sekulić that “Balkan is a whole and a purpose” (*Balkan*, Belgrade, 2003, 25), I think that it is justifiable speaking of a “Balkan Islamic Islam”. While doing so, and with Islam in general, we should keep in mind not to slide into excessive relativism and to forget that Balkan Muslims deeply belong to the Islamic *umma*, the world community of Allah believers. If we neglect this fundamental fact, and some such tendencies have appeared, it is impossible to understand and explain the meaning of some movements and occurrences in modern balkanic Islam.

2. I have mentioned Popovic’ study *Balkan Islamic Islam*. A group of his collaborators has decided to pick up where he left off (1989) and to make the first academic synthesis about Islam and Muslims in the Balkans in the postottoman period. They titled their book, not coincidentally, *New Balkanic Islamic Islam, Muslims-protagonists of post communism (Le Nouvel islam balkanique. Les musulmans, acteurs du post-communisme*. Paris, 2001). In connection to this book, but also to the Balkanic Islamic Islam, there is an important fundamental question: In addition to suggesting an at-

tachment and reliance on Popovic' study, does the attribute from the title *New* point to something more, to the existence of some "new Balkanic Islam"? I had the opportunity to personally ask the authors of the book this question. They didn't show a willingness to give me a straight answer. Furthermore, they said that by choosing this title they wanted to open in the islamological circles a debate on the same question they have been asking themselves. Nevertheless, on the basis of the contents of the book, and on the views expressed in an interview by one of the two coauthors N.Clayer (A.Rossini, "L'islam nei Balcani. Conversazione con Nathalie Clayer", *Osservatorio Balcani*, 12.03.2004), and most of all on the basis of reality of Islam in the Balkans, I believe that there is enough arguments to conclude that we are witnesses to the creation of political, religious, social and cultural preconditions for the shaping of a partly new Balkanic Islam. Two main characteristics of this process are: (1) the activation of Muslims in the Balkans as a more self aware and independent protagonists of social and political events after the fall of communism (which is pointed out in the subtitle of the book by our French colleagues), and (2) that which qualifies Islam in the Balkans as "new" makes it less balkanic, i.e. distances it from its traditional balkanic (religious, organizational and cultural) forms and models. Science must face with these changes objectively and responsibly.

3. For the study of modern reality of Islam in the Balkans to bear fruit with factually sound and reliable knowledge, it is necessary to establish the main factors which over the course of the last two decades have influenced its development. Those are the same factors which have decisively influenced the whole Balkans, and Southeastern Europe. They are in part exogen, and part endogen, and they manifested themselves in a changeable casual-consequential interaction.

Considering the limited scope of this contribution, I will be forced to only list the abovementioned factors, with a short commentary for each and a few illustrations. Each of them deserves a separate discussion. First of all, the fall of communism, the abolishing of the old model of a bipolar world and the beginning of a democratic transition of the whole region, coupled with a parallel process of euroatlantic integration, present the macrofactors in establishing a framework for all social and political processes in the Balkans, and further. In the area of former Yugoslavia, and in the immediate surrounding, the tumultuous disintegration of the federal state was the decisive influence on the Islamic social component. Only in Yugoslavia, out of all the Balkans, was the transition followed by a war. The war, especially that "civil one, with a strong basis on religion and nationality" (N.Kecmanović) in Bosnia, as well as the fighting in Kosovo, and in Macedonia, were a strong generator and catalyst for changes in the Muslim communities and in their relations with their non Muslim fellow nationals and neighbors, but also with a universal Islamic *Umma*.

In the specific Yugoslav circumstances of a strong bond between the elements of national and religious, the politicization of Islam, in the context of a post-communist democratization, severely cut short by the challenges of war, has manifested itself as a radicalization. Even if there was no war, the simultaneous processes of disintegration and democratization of the complex Yugoslav area would have probably lead to a radicalization. War only accelerated the process and took it to its extremes. While it may seem that it is paradoxical for a democracy to cause a political and ideological radicalization, in the Yugoslav case it is actually a norm or even fate. Wasn't it that a explicitly (pan)islamistic *Islamic declaration* by Alija Izetbegović (1970) was released for its second and official edition at the same time (1989) when its author established SDA, as a parliamentary political party of Muslims from Bosnia, latter day Boshniaks? Political organizing and national self determination of a population whose faith (and the culture which is based on it) is the only *differentio*

specifica in regard to its fellow Christians couldn't be carried out without a radical reliance on Islam. Radical politicization naturally lead to an Islamic radicalization. In wartime conditions and existential peril, while strengthening the ties with non-Balkan Muslim, there has also been an emergence of extremist fundamentalist tendencies. Lately there has been much concern in the public about the actions of the followers of wahhabism in Bosnia, Sandžak, Montenegro and in Kosovo, which is a truly new, non-Balkan manifestation of Islam. Wahhabis are "newcomers in the Balkans" (O. Potežica, article in the *Politicalology of Religion* 1, Belgrade 2007, 205-228), but the carriers of this phenomenon today are local Muslims as well and their numbers are not sparse. The same author reminds that in the Bosnian Muslim community there were warning signs of the unacceptable wahhabi tendencies back in the beginning of the 1980's. In the years of democratization, war and in the few postwar years that followed, there was a refusal to even consider a possibility of a wahhabi danger in Bosnia. However, in March 2006. even Rijaset, highest organ in the Islamic community in Bosnia, was forced to proclaim its "Resolution on interpretation of Islam", in which they condemned occurrences of unacceptable interpretation and aggressive behavior. Balkan Muslims, on average and in general, cannot be considered fundamentalist or extremist, but it wouldn't be recommendable to deny or overlook the fact that Islam in the Balkans has, in the course of the last few years, in general became more politicized and partly radicalized.

4. In the debates about Balkan Islam and its contemporary metamorphosis, it is often said that Muslims in the Balkans are followers of the Ottoman, pragmatic version of Islamic teaching and its practice. Undoubtedly that is true. Ottomans were Sunnis of the Hanafi Rite, i.e. they legally followed the school of legal thought which was established by the Islamic scholar Abu Hanifa (VIII century). On the other hand, wahhabism emanates from the postulates of a more rigid Hanbali school (named after Ibn Hanbal, VIII-XIX century). Generations of priests and religious functionaries and intellectuals in the Balkans, active at the end of the 19th century and through the first half of 20th century, were in most parts formed in the tradition of the moderate and mildly reformist program of the Cairo university "Al Azhar". When it comes to the education of contemporary Muslim theologians and religious functionaries the situation has changed considerably in the meantime. This is not just the question of differences in details between followers of different established schools of legal and religious thought, which is often matter of finesse, but about a general redirection of organized educational effort.

I am certain that one of the most urgent tasks that stand before scholars of Balkanic Islam is the multifaceted and deepened familiarizing with the actual educational system and Islamic schooling in the region. The education already has a key and soon will assume a decisive influence on determining a direction, in the matter of understanding and applying Islamic teaching, which the Muslims in the Balkans will predominantly take. The leaders of Islamic communities in the Balkans were deeply aware, even in the communist/socialist era, of the fundamental importance of religious education for their own spiritual survival and preparing for a time of renewal, which was expected to come some time soon. A great and persistent attention has always been paid to the creation of a network of institutes for religious education in the country, as well as sending a great number of scholarship holders to the secondary school education, and especially university and specialist education in the centers of the Islamic world. When it comes to Yugoslavia, this important subject was competently covered in a well informed article written by Dragan Novaković ("The schooling of students from the Islamic community of Socialist Federal Repub-

lic of Yugoslavia abroad”, *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke*, 2006, 287-303).

The period of democratization brought a “boom” of Islamic religious schooling in all Balkan countries, especially in the regions where Muslims have the highest numbers and most developed educational tradition and infrastructure, as in Bosnia, Sandžak, Kosovo and Metohija, in Macedonia and in Bulgaria. It can be said, without exaggeration, that the establishing of a developed network of religious schools, from elementary through secondary to higher, is potentially the most significant effect of the renewal of Balkanic Islam in the period of “transitional democracy”. Of course, Islamic communities still send their future theological and intellectual elite for their advance studies to the prestigious centers of Islamic world (it would be interesting to see to which!). However, in doing so they don’t have to insist on a hard to achieve mass numbers anymore, since they have at their disposal a much enlarged and systematically completed school network at home. New generation of religious functionaries, Muslim intellectuals and activist is being produced at home, which is a qualitative difference compared to the time three or four decades ago. What is and what will be the prevailing religious profile, mental build and world outlook of these new generations? In order to make a reliable prognosis, it is necessary to carefully study the lesson plans and programs of Islamic religious institutions on all levels, to flip through manuals and textbook materials, and get acquainted with the biographies of religious teachers and professors. In the case of university professor and assistants it is not unimportant to follow their academic work and publications. So far, according to my knowledge, such comprehensively planned researches, except some initial and partial work, has not been conducted. Therefore, it wouldn’t be appropriate to make any kind of definitive judgment. However, the general impression is that the profile of the people who are coming out of Islamic schools is changing.

5. All this talk of education leads us in the cultural and civilizational dimension of Balkanic Islam. In the introduction it was emphasized that I consider it extremely important, but also pretty neglected. This remark needs further clarifying. In Balkans there is a proportionally long tradition of describing and academic research in that which is usually called “Islamic/ottoman/oriental cultural heritage”. It’s easy to understand why this heritage was meticulously covered by the Balkan Muslims themselves, but it was also researched by their Christian relatives and neighbors, and even foreigners. Depending on the motivation of the researchers, as well as the system of values characteristic of their world outlook, the scientific methods and areas of interest have differed. Let’s just say, without the possibility of developing and adding nuances, that the Muslim researchers were generally inclined to overestimate, and the non-Muslim researchers to underestimate the value of Islamic cultural heritage in the Balkans. For both groups a certain symptomatic selectiveness was characteristic (see A.Popovic, “Quelques réflexions au sujet de l’héritage ottoman dans la recomposition politique et identitaire des sociétés balkaniques”, *La perception de l’héritage ottoman dans les Balkans*, Paris, 2004,129-130). In any case, it wouldn’t be right to claim that the cultural dimension of Islamic phenomenon in the Balkans was not studied. This dimension is, however, almost completely removed from the perception of its contemporary social and political reality, although in life they are unseparable.

Despite the significance that I attribute it, this time i will not, unfortunately, be able to exhaustively elaborate on my conviction that it is necessary to include the culturological plan in the scientific study of contemporary Balkanic Islam. I dedicated an entire work to this theme, and the lecture was given at a scientific simpozium in Italy (“L’Islam nella letteratura e nell’arte dei popoli balcanici”, at the Conference

“Storia religiosa dell'Islam nei Balcani”, Gazzada/Varese, 05-09. 09.2006), so i hope that it will soon be available in the proceedings of that conference. My theoretical and methodological suggestion that it is relevant to include the cultural dimension in sociological and politicological analysis' of our complex theme derives from my conviction that it is necessary to seek a comprehensive and integral approach. Because the reality of Islam in the Balkans is, as much as it is embedded in the ground of faith and politics, perhaps is even more deeply rooted in the humus of culture. Actual phase of the process of identitarian quest and self organizing of Balkan Muslims, not deprived of dramaticity, is marked by establishing a distance to some of the attributes of the Balkan cultural and civilizational model which objectively connects them to other Balkanites. Wehabbis are not a challenge for their Balkan brothers in faith primarily because they follow Ibn Hanbal and not Abu Hanifa, but because they force them in everyday life to deviate from their centuries old models of behavior. On the other hand, non Muslims in the Balkans are not bothered by the fact that Muslims are forming their own political parties and are going to their religious school, but by the fact that they are starting to resemble Arabs and Asians by their physical appearance, behavior and dress code, while rapidly shifting their order of social priorities and intrusively insisting on differences that didn't exist only yesterday. That is how is created a special syndrom of a bilateral collective schizophrenia, a separation from oneself and from others, with a pronounced conflict charge on both sides. On the cultural plan, it is most evident that Islam is an integral component of Balkan civilization. Not Muslims nor Christians can decide for it to suddenly stop being so.

The study of the past, present, and especially possible future of Islam in the Balkans will not be truly productive if it doesn't evenly and comprehensively include all of its aspects-political, religious, social and cultural, in their real life interaction. Because, Islam is not only **in** the Balkans, it is also **within** Balkans.

Ljubiša Mitrović

**DIALOGUE AND CONVERGENCE OF ISLAM
AND CHRISTIANITY IN THE BALKANS AS A
PRECONDITION FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE
CULTURE OF PEACE, COOPERATION AND
INTEGRATION AMONG PEOPLE***

"The twentieth century has taught us that no doctrine is in itself necessarily liberating; all of them can easily slide, all of them can be perverted, all of them have blooded hands, communism, liberalism, nationalism, each of the major religions and even secularity. None has exclusive right to fanaticism and no one, vice versa, has an exclusive right to humanity."

Amin Maalouf

Theoretical and Practical Importance of Critical Definition of the Topic

In the last thirty years inter-religious relations in the world have grown severe. This phenomenon is explained in different ways. Some researchers think it is caused, primarily, by the crisis and failure of the modernization strategy in the countries of the so-called Third World; others explain it by the failure of the ideology of communism and atheism.

The revival of the religious phenomenon, re-traditionalization and re-tribalization have all raised again the issue of the strategy of development in addition to the relationship between secularism and fundamentalism. In a sharp form Huntington has formulated, in his study "The Clash of Civilizations," a unilateral thesis about the primary role played by the conflict of cultures and civilizations with respect to other kinds of conflict in the 21st century.

Our opinion is that this culturalist paradigm has a limited effect and that we should dive deeper than the phenomenon or relative autonomy of current religious and ethnic conflicts, to search for a more profound matrix that would present a more comprehensive explanation of the character and essence of the conflict in our times. Namely, religious and ethnic conflicts very often represent only a form of re-directing conflicts, cultural camouflages and identity, that is, a form of manifestation while, at the same time, they cover a more profound latent structure of the conflicts which are of structural nature, related to social inequalities, structural violence between the developed and the underdeveloped zones of the world system. In a word, the character of the real system of distribution of the social power which is, in the

* Prepared within the project *Culture of Peace, Identities, and Interethnic Relations in Serbia and the Balkans in the Eurointegration Process* (149014D), implemented at the Faculty of Philosophy Niš, and financed by the Ministry of Science and Environmental Protection of the Serbian Government.

current form, antagonistic and asymmetrical, atomizes and divides the social tissue of the global world system, by generating and producing various controversies in the relations between the “North” and the “South,” the rich and the poor while using religious and ethnic conflicts for its own needs. A scientific and multidisciplinary analysis should face all these new forms of illusory consciousness and ideological interpretation in order to demystify the real sources of social conflicts at present and thus provide for development of the rational consciousness of social actors. Yet, it has also expanded the field of cooperation among different religions on the way of developing ecumenical consciousness and responsibility for the present and future development of mankind as a community of equal citizens and peoples as well as wealth and unity of cultural varieties.

Doctrinal Similarities among Different Religions

History and the sociology of religion have enabled us to come to the conclusion that all the mainstream religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, etc.) regarding their doctrines have numerous similarities in their understanding of God, peace, love and tolerance. Đuro Šušnjić is right when in his “Sociology of Religion” he states that “all the religions speak about the same thing though in different ways and in different languages.”¹ In this, some are more metaphysical, some more naturalist, other cosmological and others anthropological-culturological but everywhere the cosmos is the defining attribute and so are structure and function which are similar and only expressed in a different language. Let’s just remind ourselves how it is said, to paraphrase *The Talmud*, that the world lies on three foundations: truth, law and peace! It is said: truthfully and peacefully judge at the city gates... be a disciple of Ahran who likes peace and tends to peace, while, at the same time, it is said in the Bible that one “should love his neighbor as his brother and peace must be a deed of all the people,” while in the Qur’an it is said that “to kill a man is like killing the whole of mankind.”

A careful analysis of all the great *Books of Truth*, in different religions, reveal to us, more or less explicitly, the same leading thoughts, namely, Place your trust in God (Allah), love your neighbor, “respect your neighbor’s cosmos.” In a word, we should respect different worldviews which, again, means, we should be tolerant and should co-exist with other religious differences in the world.

The sociological explorations have pointed to pluralism and dialogue of different religions in the world as well as multiple functions of religion in the social life such as anthropological-psychological and social-cultural.

The sociological analysis should explain the structure and dynamics of the relationship between religion and society as well as society and religion in the course of history and at present; it should also discuss different expressions of its manifest and latent functions in the social life. In our study, *Balkans-Border and Bridge among the Nations* we have already dealt with geostrategic aspects of the encounter and conflicts of the religious cultures and civilizations at the Balkans. We have pointed to an inherent and instrumental role of religion in the social life underlining the fact that the conflict of the religious cultures is most often mixed and related to a wider deterministic set of factors, namely, geostrategic, social-economic, internal, international, and the like. We have found out that “where there is no autonomy of the religious subsystem with respect to the political (which is one of the legacies of the civil revolution which expresses itself, among other things, in the separation of the church from the state), most often the church is used and abused for political

¹ Đuro Šušnjić, *Sociology of Religion (Sociologija religije)*, I, Čigoja, Belgrade, p. 25

purposes, that is, it is reduced to a servant of the current politics instead of serving, as an integral part of human rights and freedoms, for satisfaction of human anthropological and psychological needs.”²

Geohistorical Practice of the Balkans about the Conflict and Dialogue between Christianity and Islam

By their structure the Balkan societies are multiethnic and multireligious. This is a geospace with politically “imperfect” borders at which different civilization arches and types of religion (Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism and Islam) cross each other.

The historical and sociological research shows that at this geospace there has been a long period of different religions and confessions, the period of coexistence and convergence of the parallel religious worlds. About their coexistence and conflict there are numerous records. Let us remind ourselves of Cvijić’s studies as well as Andrić’s records (especially his study entitled *The Development of the Spiritual Life under the Influence of the Turkish Rule*), then *Writings about Bosnia from 1920s* in which Andrić points to ethnic and religious conflicts while writing about Bosnia as a space where three religions coexist, when even the towers of different shrines (Cathedral, Church and Mosque) tell different time. Using this example, Andrić points to profound collective religious divisions among the peoples stressing that, under the impact of the collective unconscious, love and hatred, in this region, are expressed more passionately and more explosively.

The ethnic and religious differences were often abused in the past either by the internal elites or by external foreign powers for manipulations in their struggle for power and for generating conflicts among the peoples.

In the contemporary publications there are three delusions concerning the cause of the crisis on the territory of the former Yugoslavia as well as the nature of the ethnic and religious conflicts. *The first* or geopolitical one is related to the geostrategic position of the Balkans and the role of the great powers, that is, their penetration into the Balkans. *The second* or the collapse of the communist systems and the syndrome of the “shock of the past,” that is, re-traditionalization and re-tribalization and *the third* is the culturological paradigm related to Huntington’s thesis about the conflict of the civilizations, that is, the conflict of different cultural and religious orientations.

The Jewish scholar Raphael Israeli in his study “From Bosnia to Kosovo: the Reislamisation of the Balkans”, points to two tendencies of the growth of pan-Islamism in the world and the emergence of fundamentalist movements as part of the strategic game of the USA for the sake of instrumentalizing the Islam factor in the Balkans and Eurasia. Yet, the problem is more complex than this.³

The real truth about the conflict in Bosnia as well as Kosovo and Metohija lies in a poly-determinism of the factors, in a combination of both the internal and external factors, geostrategic as well as cultural-civilization. It is, namely, a multireligious and multiethnic space which has been used as a polygon for disintegration of the country. This disintegration is a factual product of the conflict of theocracies, camouflaged by the instrumentalized religious culture as well as an expression of the geostrategic impact of the outside forces.⁴

² Ljubiša Mitrović, *Balkans-Border and Bridge among the Nations*, Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, Belgrade, 2000, p. 65

³ See more about in the study by R. Israel, “From Bosnia to Kosovo: the Reislamisation of the Balkans”, Hrišćanska misao, Belgrade, 2002

⁴ More about it in the author’s studies, *Balkans-Border and Bridge among the Nations* (2000) and *Towards the Culture of Peace at the Balkans* (2004)

Sources of Contemporary Islam Fundamentalist Movements

There exist *different hypotheses about the revival of the religious phenomenon*, rise and expansion of the fundamentalist movements at present.

Firstly, this phenomenon is a historical product instead of a doctrinaire one. That is, fundamentalism of the humiliated Islam world is not a tradition from the past but a postmodern phenomenon; it is an unavoidable ideological reaction to the failure of the Western modernization in the Third World countries. This is a topic of Robert Kertz's study *Krise, die aus dem osteu kam* as well as of Amin Maalouf's study *On Identity*.

Secondly, it is an expression of the implosion of the atheist ideology of communism and of the crisis in the societies in transition.

Thirdly, it is the results of the failure of the anti-systemic movements (classical-worker and communist, anticolonial and national-liberational and new-student movements and of the New Left) in denying the legitimacy of capitalism as a global social system.

Fourthly, it is a reaction to the asymmetrical model of globalization in the world and the growth of structural inequalities in the world.

As an expression of these processes at present, formulated in numerous (hypo)theses, in the last two decades we have been witnessing a revival of the religious, of re-traditionalization and re-tribalization, of the emergence of religious and ethnic fundamentalist movements as a new form of the identity of the resistance to the New World Order powers, that is, actors of the world domination. We are witnessing the dominance of the religious both by the powers of the world center (manipulation, production of crisis, demonization) and by the actors of the anti-system resistance in a new form (fight for preserving identity, that is, identity conflicts).

In his study *On Identity* (1998) Amin Maalouf, pointing to the history of relations between the development of the society in the Muslim world and Islam as a religion, has critically questioned the thesis that only Christian societies are predetermined for all the times to be carriers of modernism, freedom and democracy while the Muslim ones are doomed, from their beginning, to despotism and regression. He openly points out how the militant Muslim movements of the present times are not, to paraphrase, some pure product of the Muslim history but they are a product of our deranged epoch, its tensions, its distortions, its practice, its hopelessness. Further on, he adds that he sees neither in the history of the Muslim world even the slightest mentioning of establishment of any "Islam republic," nor of the coming of any "Islam revolution."⁵

Maalouf pleads for modernization of the Islam world and cherishing of an open plural identity whose carriers should be the links or bridges connecting different communities and different cultures. He concludes by remarking that you can read ten big volumes about the history of Islam from its foundation and you will understand nothing about what is going on in Algeria. Read thirty pages about colonization and decolonization, he adds, and you will understand it much better.⁶

Dialogue and Convergence of Different Religious Cultures at the Balkans are Possible and Necessary as a Precondition for the Culture of Peace and Cooperation among the Nations

In his study *The Clash of Civilizations*, S. Huntington discusses, among other things, the relationships among different religions and modernization proc-

⁵ Amin Maalouf, *On Identity*, Paideia, Belgrade, 2003, p. 52-53

⁶ Amin Maalouf, *On Identity*, Paideia, Belgrade, 2003, p. 53

esses in the contemporary society. The author has divided all the religions into complete and instrumental. The first type of religion comprises those closed, fundamentalist and rigid ones that, in the process of acculturation, refuse cooperation and interpenetration; they exclude each other and collide, opening up a process of the conflict of cultures. The instrumental type of religion enables a dialogue, interpenetration, mutual enriching and complementary nature of tradition and modernization. Namely, complete religions are authoritarian and they hinder modernization and development while instrumental ones are open for modernization processes and challenges. In his study, Huntington takes, as examples of instrumental religions, Roman Catholicism, Protestantism and Orthodox, while as an incomplete religion, Islam which belongs to the group of firm and resistant religions. On the basis of this analysis, Huntington has derived his conclusion about a possible conflict of the religious civilizations in the 21st century.

Such a sharp division of religions (into those that are closed and traditionalist and those that are open as carriers of modernism) is subdued to criticism by certain researchers including, among others, Amin Maalouf and Immanuel Wallerstein.

Namely, Immanuel Wallerstein, in his study *The Decline of American Power: The US in a Chaotic World* (2004), in which he discusses the relations between geoculture, structural inequalities and the formation and activities of the fundamentalist movements, emphasizes that the demonization of the anti-system movements of the Third World today (from nationalist movements as form of resistance identity) is extended to include religious fundamentalist groups. Behind this geoculture at present there lie structural inequalities between the North and the South, the countries of the world center and the world periphery. The conflict in late 20th century (in the form of religious and ethnic wars) has a more profound structural matrix. That is why I. Wallerstein is right in saying that the presentation of the theme as *secularism versus fundamentalism* is blurring of the situation and that the basic conflict is in fact that between those who try or try again to establish a hierarchical world order in which some are privileged while the majority of others are not and those who want to make a maximally democratic order in which equality will rule.⁷

The revivalism of the religious and the emergence of fundamentalist movements in the late 20th and the early 21st centuries are both an expression of a profound structural crisis at present and of antagonism among different parts, classes and layers of different societies in the global world system. Also, the conflicts at the Balkans, as a specific geospace, can be observed as an expression of its peripherization in the world division of labor and a new historical form of instrumentalization by the great world powers. Namely, re-Islamization of the Balkans in the late 20th century went hand in hand with the disintegration of the geospace into numerous dwarfish states for the sake of the realization of the global geostrategic interests of the great powers. This is done according to the model which is also applied to the territory of the former Soviet Union for the sake of disintegrating socialist countries by incising them along “the politically imperfect borders” by instrumentalizing ethnic, religious and civilization differences.

Finally, the question is posed *whether any further dialogue between Christians and Islamists at the Balkans and in the world is possible?* Having in mind that the doctrinal differences among different religions (when it comes to the attitude to God, man, ethnics of peace and mankind) are not great and unbridgeable, we can give a positive answer to the above question: that the dialogue is not only possible but necessary in addition to tolerance and convergence of different religious cultures

⁷ I. Wallerstein, *The Decline of American Power*, CID, Podgorica, 2004, p. 115-116

but only within the context of the modified structural global conditions of the modern world and the struggle for better relationships among citizens, nations and states in the world. Only in the sense of democratic, symmetrical globalization which respects the unity of differences of the cultures in the world and within the system of an associative distribution of the social power, it is possible to have an open dialogue in addition to interpenetration and convergence of different religious cultures in the Balkans and in the world.

As there is no global peace in the world without global social justice, so there is no dialogue between the unequal, between those who want to impose their prayer and culture on others in the form of neocolonial culture of dependence and the world MacDonalidization.

I would like to finish my discussion by reminding us to the need to practice *dialogic of cultures* and plural cultural identity (E. Morin) at the Balkans and in the world while reading Jacques Attali's message in the article entitled *Democracy Without Borders- "We Must Build New Cathedrals."* We must create and conquer new civilization values that would affirm multicultural and multiethnic common core of mankind: we must preserve our national identities but without defining identity as a negation of the Other. This is the precondition for creating *planetary democracy* in which cultural differences on the planet will be preserved.⁸

⁸ Jacques Attali, *Democracy without Borders*, Treći program, 100, 1994, p. 204-208

Bogdana Todorova

BULGARIAN ETHNIC MODEL – TOLERANCE BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS

RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY AS A TOPIC IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Why is this a Philosophical Problem?

Each religion is accustomed to think of itself as either the one and only true faith, or at least the truest and best.

Religious pluralism in particular refers to a belief according to which all religions are of the same truthfulness and ensure salvation for their followers. This doctrine stands opposed to religious unification and exclusivism according to which only one religion and its doctrines enjoy truthfulness and salvation quality and are capable of saving those who have embraced them. According to religious inclusivism, one faith is regarded as truthful and capable of saving its followers but it differs with religious unification in that the former believes the followers of other religions may also be saved. So inclusivism holds that people embracing other faiths are indeed unknown followers of one and the same truthful religion while in religious unification only those professing one single faith shall be saved.

Where is the birthplace of religious pluralism – the Eastern /Islamic lands included/ or the Western world?

Traces of religious pluralistic thought has existed in the Islamic world /Ikhwan al-Safa and Ghazzali/ in the past and of course not in the form it exists as one of the important issues in the philosophy of religion today.

Ghazzali believes all Muslim sects and schools shall be saved. In his reference to a narration according to which the Holy Prophet has said: “Soon it will be when my Ummah shall be divided into 72 Sects”, Ghazzali has noted two statements: Only one of them will be saved.

Only one of them will be doomed.

The first statement establishes truthfulness only in one sect while the second regards all but one as truthful. So Ghazzali had accepted a kind of “religious pluralism” confined to 72 Muslim sects. He believed that only one sect was truthful and would enter Heaven without any intercession or any temporary punishment in hell while other sects shall be ostracized because of ideological shortcomings or will enter heaven only after mediation by intercessors, or, after being purged due to a temporary stay in hell.

“Religious differences among the world’s people or the religious disputes within the Islamic Community may be likened to a deep sea in which most people have drowned and only a small group has been saved while every group considers itself as the “saved sect”, and every sect is satisfied with what it holds to. [”Almonq iz Min al-dhalal”, Ghazzali, pp 17-18]

Is it important to present the difference between “religion”/Din/ and “religious law”/Shariah/ in the Islam if we seek the dialogue between Muslims and Christians?

The Qura’an regards religion as unified and religious law as diverse. The notion “religion” is used always as a singular word in the Qura’an and never in the plural form as “religions”. Religion is a unified issue that does not render itself to multiplicity. The unity of religion and the notion that Abraham’s religion was Islam, has no interpretation other than the fact that religion is belief in one God and submission to Him and is a result of His worship and this constitutes the foundation of all canonical laws. The truth of religion relates to man’s idea of God and His attributes and acts. This is not subject to any change and all messengers of God had been missioned to promote this single religion.

The Holy Qura’an also speaks of diversification of laws and ways that deals with practical and ethical teachings that relate to individual and social aspects of man’s life and his responsibility before God and people. The difference in these laws result from the difference in the intellectual capability of nations and their various conditions. That is why one thing may be lawful /halal/ in one body of canonical laws and unlawful to another.

Religious pluralism is acceptable with such a reading to intellect, reason, religion itself and religious law. The Qura’an calls upon Muslims to establish peaceful coexistence with the “people of the book” under the umbrella of Monotheism and reminds all to note that oneness of God is the common principle in all divine religions.

“Say: O’people of the book, come and let us gather around the word held in common among us: We should not worship anyone but God, nor should we ascribe any partner to Him; now if they turned away, say to them: Bear witness that we have submitted to God” [Al-e-Imran:64]

There is another principle upon which we can have a practical way for peaceful coexistence and that is the principle of “tolerance” which is different from pluralism. From my point of view the pluralism may only justify the doctrinal aspects of religion and not the religious injunctions.

It is sometimes said that religious pluralism is a product of post-Enlightenment western liberalism. But this is a error, since the basic pluralist idea predates the 18th Century European Enlightenment by many centuries. It was taught by such thinkers as Rumi and al-Arabi in the 13th Century. Indeed even within Christianity itself there were expressions of religious pluralism long before the 18th century Enlightenment. Thus Nicholas of Cusa in the 15th century wrote that “there is only one religion in the variety of rites /De Pace Fidei, 6/.

So it’s an error to think that religious pluralism is a modern western invention.

But why all this matter? Indeed, does it matter?

Yes it is, because we live as part a world wide human community that is at war with itself. In many places peoples are killing and being killed in conflicts that are both validated and emotionally intensified by religion. This is possible because each faith has traditionally made its own absolute claim to be the one and only true faith. Today, to insist on the unique superiority of your own faith is to be part of the problem. For how can there be stable peace between rival absolutes? In the words of the Catholic theologian Hans Kung “there will be no peace among the peoples of this world without peace among the world religions”. I would add that there will be no real peace among the world religions so long as each thinks of itself as uniquely superior to all the others. The only stable basis for peace will come about when dialogue leads to a mutual acceptance of the world religions as different but equally valid relationships to the ultimate reality.

BULGARIAN ETHNIC MODEL

Such a dialogue exists in Bulgaria which is a remarkable country right with its religious model of nearly 14-century cohabitation of Islam and Christianity. Here these are developed parallel “without changes in their doctrines and never trying to be modern but keeping inalterability of the divine guidelines of their doctrine and the consequent morality from it” (Jelev, 2005: 39).

The problem of the “Bulgarian ethnic model”, European values and tolerance between Christians and Muslims is again a particularly live issue today. The Bulgarian ethnic model is this reality which distinguishes Bulgaria from Serbia, Macedonia, Kosovo and Bosnia.

Here on the Balkans is formed a special kind of Islam – the Balkanian Islam. Within the Osman Empire the Christian culture, faith and language manages to remain sharing territory with coming Islam culture in order they to cohabit up till now. The Islamic culture not only comes and adapts to the Balkans but even also turns to leading religious and political-economic system.

Meanwhile the Orthodox and the Muslims never fight because of religious reasons since there are developed here in the best way in symbiosis the Christian view for neighbourhood and non-interference in the internal problems of other religion, and the Arabian principle of tolerance making unique Balkanian Islamic culture that differs from the Muslim culture in other Muslim lands. Even today the downtown of Sofia is a place where stay close each to other Muslim mosque, Catholic and Orthodox church and Synagogue.

Firstly, in Bulgaria Islam is a sign of civilization tolerance and the ability it not just to co-exist with other religious values and cultures but also to enrich them without losing its own significance. Here Islam is more believed to be ethnic affiliation but not religious one in classical sense. Islam is ethno-mark for one’s historical roots and ethnic origin. The reason for this self-identification explains how the Bulgarian Muslims receive Islam and why it is unique for them, and why they differ from the traditional religious concept of Islam. The Muslims here were born Christians and during the Osman invasion start to receive Islam in the late 14 century. Bulgaria is their own homeland. There is not an opposition in Bulgaria between Orthodoxy and Catholicism which could lead to historic pretensions or internal conflicts, and this helps the peaceful cohabitation of Islam and Orthodoxy. The last is the case with the historic pretensions of the Croats (The Tomislav Kingdom from 9th century) and the Serb (The Dushan Kingdom from 14th century). The followed development of the relations of the Croatian Catholics and the Serbian Orthodox is a natural consequence from the schism in the European Christianity. The irreversible right of these people to have their own State is considered heritage of the European Christian values which gradually turn into secular version of liberal democracy and which leads to discrediting Islam as an irreversible element of the religious area. On the other side, Europe cannot accept such “occasional” turn to Islam on behalf of the part of the Balkanian population, and also the connection with something strange to its post-Renaissance nature. Another obstacle is incompatibility of Islamic identity and the European doctrine of liberal democracy.

It is a fact that “the right West” for a long time considers the Bulgarians and the Romanians “not exactly European” or “Europe second hand” and also that the real East borderline moves from the East borderlines of Austria and Germany to the Polish-Slovak-Romanian-Bulgarian borderlines... Or we can use the concept for “the line of split” and then we see that this line always goes through the borderlines of the Slave people. “The Barbarian” East Europe is still the area to the east of Eastern bor-

derlines. And practically everyone agrees with this two-side split of Europe in Western and Eastern.

Answering the question of a journalist "Who has the right to be called European" the professor of Harvard Samuel Huntington describes the borderline of the East and the West as the line "of centuries existing separation of the West Christian people and the Muslims and Orthodox" showing his own idea that in the global world religion and nationality go together.

The question is that this European secularism hides serious geopolitical interests. To the same part of the Balkans is applied structural approach which means the Balkans are considered separate area with specific characteristics.

In western Europe problems between Christians and Muslims come as a result of the intensified immigration of Muslim communities during the last 60 years. On the Balkan peninsula this problem has existed for centuries. Emigration is not under discussion here. We are discussing communities which lived together for hundreds of years and do not have traditionally established relationships, history of conflicts and combinations between these two elements.

The domestic historical and cultural identity contains specific version of Islam – not exactly to establish Islamic country but to consolidate people (as it is in the Osman Empire which combines different nationalities). There are not in Bulgaria such military conflicts as in Bosnia and Kosovo that increase religious identity, but members of ethnic minorities actively participate in common political life. The result is a political party on ethnic and religious basis. Governing the country is in fact impossible without the presence of this party.

Being member of the Byzantine territory Bulgaria develops the way of tolerance. The Bulgarian language presents the Slavonic languages group (which is the language of the majority here) but not the Turk languages group as it is by the Turks living in Bulgaria who are minority.

Many different ethnic groups were settled separately on the territory of Bulgaria during the Ottoman domination times. Some of them practicing or related to Islam – Turks, Gagauz, Tartars, Gypsies, Kazalbashes, etc. All these determined themselves as Turks only after 1947 because in the census lists there was no other opportunity to register Muslims in Bulgaria except the category "Turks".

This mixture of religious, language and ethnic elements makes the Balkans paradigm that is hard to understand. And it will be a big mistake if the people here accepted to copy American model of developing which exist in American society. It is very important the East society to understand the necessity of Balkanian people to have their own country. The feeling about the native land and histories, about preservations of cultural variety, communication with cultural monuments and tombs of ancestors, necessity of participation for a monolingual and religious generality does not represent risk dangerous " the Balkan nationalism ". Balkan people should used in the policy not naive utilitarian to the purpose, and real requirements, concerned their existence. /Yanaras, Ch.2002:93/

The second feature of the Bulgarian Islam is its belonging to Chanifism or this is one of the legal schools in Islam. Radical ideology cannot be destroyed physically as it is in North Caucasus and the Volga district but one of the factors for this is namely Chanifism. For example, Hisb Ut-Tahrir ideologically opposes to Chanifit school since they do not call themselves Sunni (they have other methodology concerning understanding Hadises, they reject some concepts of the Sunni Akida – an important movement in theology that examines questions of creed and social ideology).

I think Chanifism is an Islamic alternative of radicalism. Discord in Islam comes not from the different schools. Thanks to published literature that is spon-

sored from different Arabian countries, we have full information for Uahabism and its creator Ibn-Abdel Uahab, but we do not know Abu Chanifa and the rest traditional legal schools in Islam. That is why we do not understand Islamic religion and associate it with extremists' manifests and exclusivism. The roots of terrorism under the slogan of Islam traditionally are connected with two medieval sects that are radical – Charadjits and Ismailits.

According to Islam murder and suicide are forbidden and consequently the groups which do this are not in Islam any longer. That is why the opposition is possible one way – not just to follow and restrict production of forbidden literature by the State organs but to accent to translation and teaching classical Islamic books in order Islam to be really researched and understood. In the Islamic world justice is always important and if the other confessions do care for social needs of the Muslims then the reasons for conflicts are minimal. Unlike Russia where attention is on the vertical construction of State, Bulgaria keeps important relations and interaction between separate individuals and groups (that is horizontal relation) on the grounds of the so-called by the Bulgarians and the Turks “Komshuluk”. This is a model of successful management of pluralism that has to be accepted in all Europe – return to interaction of different groups, preservation of horizontal and matrix set. Cohabitation of the Bulgarians and the Turks reflects specifically on their religiosity. The accent here is on affiliation to Christian or Islamic culture in general which is the ethno-mark for self-identification of person. As a whole the Muslims in Bulgaria are more religious than the Christians. Necessary communication with God through prayer is an obligatory condition for both Christians and Muslims but most of the people do not keep it. Each fourth Bulgarian Christian goes to church very rarely or does not go at all, compared to 35% of the Turks and 44% of the Muslims. In our country it is widespread the right of everyone to have his own God and also there are many Muslims who do not judge Atheism. Many Bulgarians help in reconstructing or building Tekes and mosques. “Always vakaf” is the slogan of the Muslims who help to reconstruct Christian temples. Here religious and ethnic alienation is turned for a long time in something that is different but familiar. Any attempt to ignore this system of cohabitation that is shared from Christians and Muslims leads to opposition by ethnic and religious features. That is why the Balkans and specially Bulgaria are strategically important for the EU as a real borderline that prevents from fundamentalism and chaos, which is called by European specialists through the Arabian term “fitna”.

Many indicators now seem to give hope that it is only a matter of time before the mainstream Muslim Diaspora in Europe will be successfully integrated into the continent's social and economic fabric. The issue of political integration is another question altogether.

Conclusion

Muslims in towns and metropolitan communities throughout the Union were beginning to introduce their faith into their politics on the local level in a highly practical manner. What does this mean for the other Abrahamic religions and especially for European Christians? Catholics, Orthodox and Protestants alike should ask themselves: "What is the added value of the existence of God?" If Christian social and political organisations are going to dialogue with likeminded Muslim organisations in the future they will need to be able to answer this question. Or to put this question to Christian faith-based organisations even more bluntly: "In a practical, day-to-day sense, does it really matter if God exists or not?" [E.Dabbous:2004]

Including with the civilizations interests, the Western world aspires to the strategic control over resources the Islamic world. Muslims in the world approximately about 700 million. It potentially the biggest market for the West. The Islam still has not opened to western style of a life, and effectively keeps the religious values and traditions. Confrontation it not " clash of a civilization, but antagonism between the basic social values. For the West is a personal freedom, and for the Islam - justice. Nitshe formulates the thesis, that human freedom sooner or later destroys justice. Freedom kills, betrays in the name of individual interests which immanent resist to the world. But justice is that which gives rise to freedom - freedom to have the God and to trust it! Hana Arend spoke about desert in us - modern people.

In fact, religious tolerance demands our own self-restraint, forgiveness and repentance, an inner jihad against these impulses of the human nature, which provoke egoism, self-isolation, self-delusion and hate. That is why, our role of scholars is increasingly decisive in order the active nihilism in the name of the faith to be exposed.

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**MUSLIMS OF THE BALKANS:
IDENTITY AND ITS TRANSFORMATION**

Srđan Barišić

MUSLIMS IN THE BALKANS: PROBLEMS OF (RE)INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND TRANSFORMATION OF IDENTITY

There are more than eight million Muslims living in the Balkans at present, which makes almost one fifth of the whole population. More than six centuries of presence of Islam has made transculturation processes leave permanent marks; therefore, it is hard to negate the fact that cultural identity and Muslim tradition represent a constituent element of the Balkans' cultural identity. The population of the Islam believers in the Balkans represents regionally differentiated and ethnically heterogenous religious community which obtained its "identity" after suppression of the Ottoman reign, and tempestuous history and numerous socio-political changes in the Balkans in the 20th century influenced significantly this religious community as well.

If we exclude Albania and The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Muslims living in the countries of Balkan peninsula represent religious minority, spacially concentrated in certain regions, such as Kosovo, Sandzak, Western Macedonia and Thrace in which, regionally speaking, they represent the majority. However, the border character of these regions influences to a large degree on the position, as well as on the identity of the Muslims. Numerous shifts of the existing and establishing of new Balkan borders, integration and disintegration processes all cause changes within the Islamic community, both in organizational institutional and identificational sense.

The Balkan Muslims belonged to the unique and centralized religious community of the Ottoman Empire and they professed Sunni Islam of Hanafi rite, which is characteristic of them at present, as well. However, numerous Sufi orders have survived throughout the Balkans and they operate nowadays. Autonomous Islamic communities in the Balkans were formed at the end of the 19th and in the first quarter of the 20th centuries by liberating of Balkan regions from Ottoman reign, by their becoming independent and by their falling under non-Islamic rule. At the beginning, the Balkan Muslims' position was defined by international congresses' decisions and by special treaties between newly formed states and the Ottoman Empire, which would later become Turkey. By complete liberating and becoming independent of Balkan states, autochthonous Balkan Muslims became integral part of the Balkan identity and significant actors in the modern Balkans' history creation.

Identifying of Muslims with the former Turkish invader has for a long time represented a great obstacle in establishing interreligious tolerance in traditionally non-Muslim (Christian) environment. The tendency to ignore Islamic past or objective needs and religious rights of Muslims is noticeable in most Balkan countries,¹ and a similar ignorant attitude towards the Islamic inheritance also exists in the northern regions in which Islam was (and still is) present.² Ethno-confessional iden-

¹ About the problems with which the Balkan Muslims face, see: Barišić, Srđan (2006): "Džamijska kultura u jugoistočnoj Evropi", in: Mitrović, Lj., Đorđević, D., Todorović, D. (ed.), *Geokultura razvoja i kultura mira na Balkanu*, Niš: Institut za sociologiju Filozofski fakultet – Univerzitet u Nišu

² An example of national history monumentalization in Hungary can serve as an illustration of the Islam past ignoring. The monument dedicated to the thousandth anniversary of the Hungarians' arrival to

tification, as the basis of the Balkan communities' collective identity, influences substantially on the interreligious tolerance level; therefore, numerous interethnic disagreements project on interreligious relations.³

Islamic communities in the Balkans

Muslims in Greece predominantly inhabit Thrace (Western Thrace), the north-east of Greece, the Rhodos and Kos islands and Athens. Official evaluations of the number of autochthonous Muslims in Thrace show that there are about 120 000 Muslims there,⁴ whereas the number of immigrant Muslim inhabitants living in the rest parts of the country ranges between 200.000 and 300.000.⁵ Unlike ever-growing number of Islamic communities in the capital of Greece, the Muslims in Thrace represent a respectable group whose religious rights are protected (among other things) by the Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923, by Greece and Turkey. According to this treaty, the Muslims in Thrace are guaranteed the rights to preserve and maintain *vaqfs*' and *muftis*' offices, to practice Sharia within the purview of family law, the right to educate themselves religiously and to build mosques.

The Muslims in Thrace are organized in three *mufti*'s offices headquartered in Komotini, Xanthe and Didymoteicho whose jurisdictions coincide with administrative regional division. There are over 300 active mosques, and Muslims obtain their religious education in two Muslim lower seminaries, in Komotini and Ehinis. Although ethnic structure of the Muslims in Thrace consists of three ethnic groups, the Turks, Pomaks and Roma, according to the Treaty of Lausanne, the government of Greece recognizes only one *Muslim minority*, which is simultaneously the only acknowledged minority in Greece. According to the Greek government, ethnic Turks form approximately 50% of the minority, Pomaks 35% and Muslim Roma 15%. Unlike tripartite ethnic structure of the Thracian Muslims, the situation in the capital of Greece is, in that sense, much more complex. The Islamic population in Athens is comprised of immigrants from Turkey, Albania, Arab countries and other countries, and it is estimated that this ethnically heterogeneous Islamic community has more than 100 000 believers. Religious life of these Muslims goes on in more than 20 *masjids* (prayer houses), and lack of an official mosque in Athens, as well as of sites for burials, forces numerous Muslims to go to Thrace in order to perform important rites.

In Bulgaria, Muslims largely inhabit the region of the Rhodop Mountains (north-western Thrace) and the north-eastern part of the country near the cities of Shoumen and Razgrad. Almost a million, 966 978 of Muslims, to be more precise, (which makes almost 13% of total population) declared in the register from 2001,⁶ practice their religious life in more than 1000 mosques and *masjids* in Bulgaria

Panonia, The Millennium Monument in Hero's square, by György Zala, symbolically ignores the Islamic domination period in Hungary: behind the central monument (an obelisk on whose top there is a "winged angel" - the protector of Hungary) there is a colonnade 85 meter long, consisting of two separate parts, whereat this separation signifies historical period of 150 years (1541-1686), the period when Budim and Pest were under Turkish rule.

³ An example for this could be ignition of mosques in Belgrade and Nish, which represented reaction to escalation of interethnic conflicts between the Kosovo Albanians and Serbs from Kosovo and Metohia, in which a great number of orthodox temples was destroyed.

⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hellenic Republic, <http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Policy/Priorities/Global+Issues/Human+Rights/MUSLIM+MINORITY+OF+THRACE.htm>

⁵ Since a statistical record on citizens' religion is not kept when it comes to census, according to the evaluations Muslim population makes about 1.3% of the total population (International Religious Freedom Report 2006, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71383.htm>)

⁶ National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria (2001), http://www.nsi.bg/Census_e/Census_e.htm

(Merdjanova, 2006). Organizationally speaking, The Islamic community in Bulgaria consists of the Chief mufti's office in Sofia and 11 regional mufti's offices headquartered in Plovdiv, Dobrich, Aitos, Razgrad, Kurdzali, Shoumen, Smolyan, Goce Delchev, Pleven, Krumovgrad and Haskov,⁷ which reflects spatial concentration of Muslims in the country. Religious education is provided by three medreses located in Shoumen, Rouse and Momchilgrad, as well as by Institute of Islamic Studies in Sofia, a higher education institution.

Apart from the dominant Sunni Muslims, a group of Shiite Muslims, the members of Alevi order, known as Alians or Kizilbashi (red heads) in Bulgaria, inhabit the north-eastern part of Bulgaria. According to the 1992 register, there was 85 733 Shiites, which made 7,7% of Muslim population in Bulgaria (Merdjanova, 2006). Just like in Thrace, Turks represent the ethnic majority of the Islamic community in Bulgaria. Three other ethnical groups of the Islamic community are Pomaks, Roma and Tatars.

About two thirds of Albania's total population are Muslims (65-70%),⁸ if not because of their religious belief, then because of their customs. The absolute atheization period of Albanian society, which began in 1967 with prohibition of religious activities and closing of religious objects, and which was made official with proclaiming of "atheistic" state by 1976 Constitution, was finally ended in 1990, when public confessing of the religion was permitted again. Apart from substantially more numerous Sunni community of Muslims, which makes about 55% of Albania's total population, there is also a significant cluster of Bektashis, which makes approximately 15% of the population. In addition to these two communities, there are numerous Sufi orders, such as Rifa'iyye, Qadiriyye and other.

The Sunni community was resumed in February in 1991 and soon afterwards it made connections with Islamic countries and organizations, in order to provide support for betterment of very unfavorable conditions in the country. Already in 1992, Albania became the member of the Organization of Islamic Conference, thus establishing closer cooperation with the Islamic world.⁹ With the help from Islamic countries and organizations, Muslims built and renovated hundreds of mosques, opened about ten medreses and various institutions. Thus, in 1996, the Albanian Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization was established, playing an important role in promotion of "modern" Islam with a powerful national connotation (Merdjanova, 2004).

During the renovation of Bektashi community, foreign help was significantly more restricted and it largely came from Iran. The World Center of the Bektashis in Tirana was reopened in March in 1991, and the first postcommunist national session was held several months later. The Bektashi community's organizational structure was established and today it consists of six *gyishata* (an administrative unit gathering several tekke) or centers in Albania, and of three more centers outside Albania, in the USA and Macedonia (Bektashis of Albania 2000:13). Bektashis obtain their religious education at Sunni medreses and at the World Bektashi Centre in Tirana; they obtain university education in the Bektashi Centre in Detroit and Iran.

With the disintegration of SFR Yugoslavia and formation of the new states in the first years of the previous century's last decade, formerly unique Islamic community in Yugoslavia transformed into several independent Islamic communities.

⁷ Мюсюлманско изповедание – Главно мюфтийство: Районни мюфтийства http://www.genmufti.net/cv_mufti.php?cv_id=0

⁸ International Religious Freedom Report 2006, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71364.htm>

⁹ However, when the Socialists took charge in 1997, the country redirected to cooperation with the West, and Albania brought down participation in the Organization of Islamic Conference to the level of an observer.

The Muslims in Macedonia make the total population's third¹⁰ and they predominantly inhabit the western parts of the country, the parts near the border with Albania. Apart from the majority group of Sunni Muslims, there are six dervish orders (tariqas) in Macedonia (Halvetiyye, Qadiriyye, Sinaniyye, Rifa'iyye, Naqshibandiyye, Melamiyye) as well as the bektashi order, organized in singular communities. *The Islamic Community in Macedonia*, an organization of the Sunni Muslims established by the 1994 Constitution, represents the largest and most influential religious institution of the Muslims in Macedonia. At the head of the Islamic community in Macedonia is Reis-ul-ulema (supreme mufti or head of Islamic community) whose headquarters is in Skopje, and the headquarters of the mufti's office is located in the following towns: Skopje, Tetovo, Gostivar, Kumanovo, Kicevo, Struga, Ohrid, Stip, Bitolj, Debar, Prilep, Resen and Veles. Education institutions of the Islamic community in Macedonia are "Isa Beg" medrese and Islamic Faculty in the village of Kondovo, near Skopje, and religious life is organized in 590 mosques, mesjids and Islamic centers and 10 tekkes.¹¹ Within the Islamic community in Macedonia, there is also the Council of Dervish Elders (*Meshihat na Tarikatite*), which governs a certain number of dervish orders (Muslims of Macedonia, 2000:18). As for ethnical structure, Albanians make the majority of the Islamic community in Macedonia; they are followed by Turks, Roma, Torbeshi, Bosniaks and Gorans.

The Sufi orders in Macedonia are organized in *Islamic Dervish Religious Community*, which was established in 1992. This community gathers a significant number of Halvetiyye, Qadiriyye, Sinaniyye, Rifa'iyye and Naqshibandiyye, and *Shejh-ul-Ulema* is at this organization's head. Ethnically, the Islamic Dervish Religious Community mainly gathers Roma, and Albanians, Turks and Torbeshi, as well.

Bektashis inhabit Tetovo, Gostivar, Kicevo, Ohrid, Struga, Bitolj and Resen. At the forehead of the *Bektashi community* in Macedonia is Baba, based in Tetovo, and there are 8 tekkes¹² under his jurisdiction. Ethnical Albanians make the majority of the Bektashi orders' members.

According to the 2003 census, 110 034 Muslims live in Montenegro, which makes 17,74% of the population.¹³ *The Islamic community of Montenegro* was based according to the Constitution of the Islamic community from 1994. Meshihat of Islamic community, at whose head is Reis-ul-ulema based in Podgorica, coordinates religious activities in 13 local communities in: Podgorica, Ulcinj, Bar, Ostros, Dinos, Tuzi, Rozaje, Berane, Petnjica, Bijelo Polje, Pljevlja, Plav i Gusinje. About 100 mosques is active, and the first medrese's construction in Montenegro is in progress. According to ethnical affiliation, Bosniaks make a significant group of the Muslims in Montenegro; they predominantly inhabit the north and north-east of Montenegro;¹⁴ then, there are Albanians, who inhabit the eastern and south-eastern (coastal) parts and 'Muslims' (22% of the Muslim's population in Montenegro are 'Muslims').

Of all Islamic communities in the Balkans, the most complex organizational structure is that of *The Islamic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina*. After reorganization initiated with the Constitution decision of the Council in Sarajevo in 1993,

¹⁰ International Religious Freedom Report 2006, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71394.htm>

¹¹ Комисијата за односи со верските заедници и религиозни групи, Влада на Република Македонија <http://www.kovz.gov.mk/ISLAMSKA/islamska.htm>

¹² Комисијата за односи со верските заедници и религиозни групи, Влада на Република Македонија <http://www.kovz.gov.mk/ISLAMSKA/islamska.htm>

¹³ *Vjeroispovjest, maternji jezik i nacionalna ili etnička pripadnost prema starosti i polu* (2004), Podgorica: Zavod za statistiku Republike Crne Gore (<http://www.monstat.cg.yu/Popis.htm>)

¹⁴ After successfully ended Balkan wars, Montenegro was annexed regions in which a larger number of Muslims lived (Plav, Gusinje, Berane, Rozaje, Bijelo Polje and Pljevlja) (Novaković, 2003:76).

the Islamic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina consists at present of Islamic communities in Croatia, Slovenia and Sandzak (a south-eastern region in Serbia), according to the 1997 Constitution. The headquarters of the Council, Rijaset (supreme administrative body) and Reis-ul-ulema of the Islamic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is in Sarajevo, and the mufti's offices on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina are located in Sarajevo, Travnik, Zenica, Bihac, Mostar, Gorazde, Tuzla and Banja Luka. Outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, within the Rijaset, act the muftis in Zagreb, Ljubljana and Novi Pazar. Meshihat of the Islamic community in Croatia, Meshihat of the Islamic community in Slovenia and Meshihat of the Islamic community in Sandzak, as autonomous organizational units, acknowledge the Islamic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina as their mother community, and Reis-ul-ulema as their religious chief.

Among the most important institutions of the Islamic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina is certainly the Faculty of Islamic Science in Sarajevo, the oldest and the most prestigious institution of the Islamic higher education in the Balkans. Also, there are two Islamic Pedagogical Faculties in Bihac and Zenica. The headquarters of Vaqf's Direction, the Centre for Islamic Architecture, El-Kalem publishing house and the Muslim Informative Newspaper Agency (MINA) are settled in Sarajevo. Apart from Gazi-Husrev Beg medrese in Sarajevo, the medreses in Travnik, Tuzla, Mostar, Cajangrad and Cazin are also well-known medreses in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Meshihat of the Islamic community in Croatia is the roof organization of the Muslims in Croatia, whose number is 88 749 according to the 2001 census, which makes 1,28% of the total population.¹⁵ The Muslims, living on the territory of Croatia, are organized in 13 Mejlis (an administrative unit gathering several dzemats) located in the following towns: Dubrovnik, Gunja, Labin, Osijek, Porec, Pula, Rijeka, Sisak, Slavonski Brod, Split, Umag, Varazdin and Zagreb (where mufti's office is).¹⁶ In addition to one mosque in Zagreb, there are 20 masjids. The Zagreb medrese "Dr Ahmed Smajlović" is an Islamic high school. Most of the Muslims in Croatia are Bosniaks.

The Meshihat of the Islamic community in Slovenia situated in Ljubljana represents the most powerful religious and administrative body of the Islamic community in Slovenia. According to the 2002 census, there are 47 488 Muslims living in Slovenia, or 2,4%¹⁷ of the total population, who are largely of Bosniak ethnical origin. The Muslims in Slovenia have been trying for decades to fight for their right for praying space, but even after Slovenia's becoming autonomous, that right was not satisfied. The initiative for the first mosque's construction in Slovenia started in 1970, and in 2000 the first Slovenian mufti re-actualizes the mosque's construction.

The Meshihat of the Islamic community in Sandzak was founded in 1993 and it covers the part of Sandzak, located in Serbia.¹⁸ According to the 2002 census, there are 142 655 Muslims living in Sandzak, or to be more precise, in the following boroughs: Novi Pazar, Tutin, Sjenica, Prijepolje, Priboj and Nova Varos, which

¹⁵ Stanovništvo prema vjeri, po gradovima/općinama, popis 2001. Republika Hrvatska – Državni zavod za statistiku, <http://www.dzs.hr/>

¹⁶ http://www.islamska-zajednica.hr/islamska_zajednica/medzlisi.php

¹⁷ Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, Census of Population, Households and Housing, 2002, http://www.stat.si/popis2002/en/rezultati/rezultati_red.asp?ter=SLO&st=8

¹⁸ The part of Sandzak belonging to Montenegro operates within the Islamic community of Montenegro, which is autonomous and is not defined by Constitutional acts as a part of the Islamic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

makes 60,56% of the total population in the mentioned boroughs.¹⁹ The seat of Meshihat is in Novi Pazar (which is the seat of the Islamic community's mufti in Sandzak), and The Islamic Pedagogical Academy and "Gazi-Isa Beg" medrese are in the same town. Ethnical Bosniaks make almost absolute majority of the Sandzak Muslims and they practice their religion in over 120 mosques.

In addition to the Islamic community in Sandzak, which operates within the Rijaset of the Islamic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is also the autonomous *Islamic community of Serbia*. After the dissolution of SFR Yugoslavia and the unique Islamic Community in Yugoslavia, the Meshihat of the Islamic community of Serbia was founded in Nis in 1994, which covers the territory of Serbia, without Kosovo and Sandzak. With its headquarters in Belgrade, the mufti's office of the Islamic community in Serbia has 52 dzemats (which are basic organizational units), controlled by three Mejlis located in Belgrade, Novi Sad and Nis (Barišić, 2005:604). Within the scope of the Islamic community of Serbia, three mosques in Belgrade, Nis and Mali Zvornik are active, as is the Belgrade medrese. Ethnical structure of the Muslims of the Islamic community of Serbia is highly heterogeneous and it includes Roma, Gorans, Bosniaks, Egyptians, Ashkalis, Albanians, Turks, Serbs... By further institutional development of the Islamic community of Serbia, new institutions like Mejlis in Mali Zvornik are formed, and the Rijaset of the Islamic community of Serbia has been recently formed by the new Constitution's enactment.²⁰

Apart the Islamic community of Serbia and Islamic community in Sandzak, there are two local Islamic communities in the south of Serbia, in the following boroughs Bujanovac, Presevo and Medvedja, one of which operates within the Islamic community of Kosovo, and the other operates autonomously. The Muslims in the mentioned boroughs, among whom there is a significant community of Roma apart from the Albanians' majority, from 1971 are organized within the scope of the Islamic community of Kosovo. However, an autonomous *Islamic community of Bujanovac, Presevo and Medvedja*, independent on Islamic institutions in Kosovo, was established in 2003.

The organizational centre of the *Islamic community of Kosovo* is in Prishtina. The Meshihat of the Islamic community of Kosovo, at whose head is the Chief mufti, is organized in 8 regions with centres in Prishtina, Gnjilane, (Kosovska) Mitrovica, Prizren, Pec, Urosevac, Presevo and Djakovica.²¹ The most important education institutions of the Islamic community of Kosovo are located in Prishtina, where, apart from Alaudin medrese, the Faculty of Islamic studies also exists, from 1992.

With respect to ethnical structure, Albanians make the of Kosovo Muslims' absolute majority,²² although there are small groups of Turks, Gorans, Roma and Bosniaks.

There is traditionally a significant number of sufi orders in Kosovo, mainly concentrated in the province's western part, that is in Metohia. Operating of 9 dervish

¹⁹ *Veroispovest, maternji jezik i nacionalna ili etnička pripadnost prema starosti i polu* (2003), Beograd: Republički zavod za statistiku

²⁰ In the session of the Islamic community of Serbia's Council, held on February, 19th, in 2007, the proposal of the Islamic community of Serbia's Constitution was passed, and Rijaset, as the executive body of the Islamic community of Serbia, was formed. (<http://www.izs.org.yu/vesti/aktivnosti/index.php>)

²¹ Kushtetuta e Bashkësisë Islame, Prishtinë, 2002 (<http://www.bashkesiaislame.net/kushtetuta.html>)

²² The number of Kosovo habitual residents is estimated to be from 1.9 to 2.2 million inhabitants. According to UNFPA researches from 2003, there are 88% of Albanians, 7% of Serbs and 5% of other ethnicities. (*Kosovo in figures 2005*, Statistical Office of Kosovo, 2006, <http://www.ks-gov.net.esk>) According to unofficial estimates, about 90% of Albanians in Kosovo and Metohia are of Muslim confession, whereas 10% of them are Christians (catholics).

orders is known, that of: Halvetiyye, Qadiriyye, Rifa`iyye, Sa'diyye, Shaziliyye, Naqshibandiyye, Bektashiyye, Mevleviyye and Sinaniyye (Đurić, 1998:108; Dazings, 2005:158; Dérens and Geslin, 2006).

The relation of religious and national identity

It can be said that socio-political changes in the Balkans, especially tumultuous in the 20th century last decade, influenced to a great extent on the way of Islamic communities' reorganization. By forming new national states, ethnical principle frequently represented the basis for Muslim identity redefining in the Balkans.

The tendency to equate confessional and dominant ethnical (national) identification within Islamic communities in the Balkans is perhaps best noticeable in the example of Muslims in Thrace. The largest ethnical group within the Islamic community in Thrace are Turks, who together with Pomaks and Roma, represent the acknowledged Muslim minority in Greece. The Treaty of Lausanne, among other things, guarantees the right of education for the Muslim minority in Thrace, which is executed in over 240 minority schools in Thrace. However, since the Turkish language is the only language of the minority which exists in written form, it simultaneously represents the official language of educational institutions of the Muslim minority in Thrace. Pomaks and Roma accept the Turkish national identity by accepting the language through educational system, in addition to mutual confessional identity. This assimilation process was supported by the Greek authorities' decision from 1951, because of which Pomaks were forced to choose education in either Greek or Turkish, which again was the way to solve the minority within minority problem through ethnical homogenization of the Muslim minority.²³

Unlike the stated example of ethnical homogenization of the Islamic community in Thrace, this process needs to be observed in a wider context in other parts of the Balkans. The European socialism's crash caused the Balkan societies' identity crises, and the beginning of the social transformation process throughout the Balkan peninsula was marked with nationalism awakening, religion revitalization and social conflicts on various levels. Transformation (transition) of the Balkan societies in the period of powerful nationalism revival opened the possibility of religion instrumentalization in political purposes. The conviction common to all Balkan nations, that religion is deeply rooted in national identity, influenced the fact that a nation is regularly identified with religion, that is ethnical affiliation is regularly identified with confessional affiliation, and, in that sense, religiosity renewal had the function of nations' and states' legitimacy, homogenization and mobilization.

This identity transformation did not go round Muslims, who, after 1989, also joined national attitudes' formulation and who took active part in new social circumstances' defining. This reactionary nationalism, caused by equating national and religious identity of other communities, leads to the paradox that substitution of the national term 'Muslim' with the term 'Bosniak' happened paralelly with increasing insisting on Islam, as establishing factor of Bosniak national identity (Xavier, 2000). Still, long disputed Bosniak national identity²⁴ found its place in both civic

²³ *Report: The Pomaks*, Greek Helsinki Monitor, <http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/english/reports/pomaks.html>

²⁴ The denial of national affirmation of the Muslims in former Yugoslavia was based on an attitude that Muslims are "historically and biologically" a part of Croatia, that is of Serbian nation, depending on whose nationalistic point of view it was pointed out, and that religion is the only thing they differ from the mentioned ethnicities. Something that is frequently (consciously) overlooked should be mentioned here and that is the fact that, by accepting Islam and Qur'an, Muslims accepted a whole different culture and civilization, which deeply pervaded their lives (Vukomanović, 2001:98).

and religious sense, or to be more precise, it became the constituent entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the entity of the Islamic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina.²⁵

National (ethnic) homogenization of Islamic communities is present in Kosovo and in the western part of Macedonia, where Albanians make the dominant ethnic group. The so-called “albanization” process of the Islamic community in Macedonia is perhaps most evident in the Albanian language domination in the organization’s organs of public opinion.²⁶ Albanians make absolute majority in Kosovo, proportionally to the province’s ethnic structure. One should not overlook the fact that, among Albanians, national identity has precedence in relation to religious, or more precisely to confessional identity, as well as the period of Albanian identity’s strict ateiization in the second half of the 20th century. However, the Balkan identities’ transformation at the beginning of the 1990s, arouses reactional nationalism among Albanians; the reactional nationalism’s core is ethno-confessional identification, that is connecting national and religious identity (Xavier, 2000).

In Bulgaria, postsocialistic transformation influenced most on the Muslims of Slovenian origin, who did not succeed in defining their collective identity all the way. Predominantly living in rural, economically underdeveloped regions, the Pomaks were under the pressure of both majoritarian Bulgarian (orthodox) identity, they are connected to due to their ethnic origin, and of strong Turkish identity within the Islamic community, they are linked with due to their religious affiliation. Unenviable economic and social position of the Pomaks at the beginning of the Bulgarian society’s transformation process contributed to the fact that their identity became politicized to the point that it divided in three parts (Merdjanova, 2006). For one part of the community, ethnic affiliation was primary in relation to religious affiliation, so they accepted the majoritarian Bulgarian national identity, and they even converted to it. The second part of the community accepted the national identity of the largest and most influential Turkish ethnic group within the Islamic community, giving precedence to religious identity.²⁷ The third part of the community strived to proclaim the new ethnic identity, based on Islamic tradition.²⁸

The problems of representative organs' legitimacy

On the basis of several examples of ways Islamic communities’ representative bodies are constituted, we will try to indicate the complexity of position of the Muslims in the Balkans, and the problems with which they face in finding the best and alternative institutional solutions, which enable their rights’ and interests’ affirmation and protection.

Greek authorities’ decision from December 25th, 1995, according to which up-to-then legal procedure of muftis’ selection was annulled, led to disagreements bet-

²⁵ Articles 1 and 4 of Constitution of the Islamic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina

²⁶ The *El Hilal* magazine comes out twice a month in the Albanian language, and once a month in the Turkish and Macedonian languages in substantially lower circulation (Muslims of Macedonia, 2000:34). The Islamic community in Macedonia’s official Internet presentation is edited in the Albanian language, exclusively; visit: <http://www.bim.org.mk>

²⁷ By introducing multi-party system at the beginning of 1990, the Turkish minority forms the Movement for Rights and Freedoms political organization, whose basic goal was protection of interests of Turkish and other Muslim minorities in Bulgaria. With its parliamentary activities, this movement got great support from the Pomaks in certain regions, and it played a significant role in “attracting” their cultural identity to national identity of the Turks (Todorova, 1998:495). This “attraction” is often interpreted as assimilation or “Turkification”, to be more precise.

²⁸ These kinds of requests are politically articulated by founding Democratic Party of Labor, at the end of 1992 (Todorova, 1998:486-487).

ween parts of the Islamic community in Thrace and Greek authorities, as well as to disagreements within the very community. According to this decision, Greek authorities choose and appoint two muftis in Komotini and Xanthi and one assistant mufti. To be more precise, the Minister of Education and Worship chooses one of the suggested candidates based on his personal qualifications, after consulting boards in both administrative regions, consisting of respectable Muslim minority's representatives. The mufti is appointed by a presidential decree adopted on the proposal of the Minister of Education and Worship, and he can be acquitted from the function with the same decree.²⁹ While a part of the Thracian Muslims have accepted the authority of the two government-appointed muftis, other Muslims have elected two muftis to serve their communities, since they maintain that the government of a non-Muslim country cannot appoint muftis.³⁰

Between 1992 and 1997, the state interfered a great deal in the affairs of both the Muslims' and the Orthodox Christians' selection of religious leaders in Bulgaria,³¹ which led to divisions within the communities. In February 1992, during the government of the Union of Democratic Forces, the Directorate on Religions declared as 'invalid' the former election of the Chief mufti of the Bulgarian Muslims and seven regional mufti, who was elected during the 'process of revival'. Since they were accused of collaboration with socialistic authorities, they were dismissed from their positions and new representatives of the Islamic community were appointed to the positions. However, the government of the Bulgarian Socialistic Party, which took control in 1994, dismissed the recently appointed mufti and returns his predecessor.

This situation in which two political trends support different representatives of the Islamic community, leads to a division within the community and to creation of parallel representative institutions. During 1995, in two separate sessions, two Chief muftis were chosen and these conditions lasted until 1997, when the Union of Democratic Forces came to power again. The Directorate of Religious Affairs initiated a session in which a new Chief mufti would be selected and which would unite the Islamic community. The session in which the new Chief mufti was selected, was held in October 23 in 1997, and the state officially registered the new Constitution of the Islamic community in Bulgaria.

Unlike previous two examples in which state agencies play a great role in the selection of religious congregations' representative organs, in the examples which follow, we will see that disputes within Islamic communities emerge on other bases as well.

The last elections for the new Skopje mufti and Reis-ul-ulema showed the whole complexity of the situation in the Islamic community in Macedonia. The conflicts within the Islamic community began around the middle of 2005, after the selection of the Skopje mufti (the "Berisha" case), who has a great influence in the Islamic community in Macedonia because of the size of the Islamic community in Skopje and because of his substantial possessions. Due to violent interruption of the session of the Islamic community's Council in the village of Kondovo by unknown armed people and due to the duality of government in the Skopje mufti's office, a

²⁹ Greece: Report about Compliance with the Principles of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1999), Greek Helsinki Monitor (GHM) & Minority Rights Group – Greece (MRG-G), <http://www.greekhelsinki.gr>

³⁰ International Religious Freedom Report 2006, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71383.htm>

³¹ About situation in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in that period see: Hajdinjak, Marko: "The new Bulgarian law on religious communities: solving or creating controversies?", in: Devetak, S., Kalčina, L. and Polzer, M. (ed.) (2004): *Legal Position of Churches and Religious Communities in South-Eastern Europe*, Ljubljana, Maribor, Vienna: ISCOMET (pp. 72-73)

group of the Skopje imams decided to obstruct the work of the Rijaset of Islamic community in Macedonia. The rebelled imams formed a coordination body which would temporarily govern the Islamic community, until a new Skopje mufti and leader was appointed.³² However, even after the replacement of the debatable mufti, that is after new elections for the Skopje mufti, the crisis in the Islamic community in Macedonia was not surpassed. Finally, after 15 months of fierce conflicts among different fractions within the Islamic community, the new Reis-ul-ulema was selected in September 20, in 2006.

There are different interpretations of the cause of the conflict within the Islamic community in Macedonia. According to one of the interpretations, this is a conflict between the older officials of the Islamic community and the younger more educated ones, who aspire to distinguished positions in the community. According to another interpretation, there is a parallel between the conflicting sides in the Islamic community and the conflicting political options of the Albanians in Macedonia. The rivalry between two Albanian political parties, the Democratic Union for Integration and the Democratic Party of Albanians, is reflected in the Islamic community in Macedonia in which precisely these political organizations' voters and activists make the majority. This interpretation is denied by the both parties' representatives, who rejected any possibility that anyone from their party is in any way involved in the "Berisha" case and in the Islamic community crisis.³³

After the election of Reis-ul-ulema of the Islamic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, held in Gazi-Husrev Beg medrese in September 25, in 2005, severe mutual criticisms of the opposing candidates ensued. The up-to-then and the newly appointed Reis-ul-ulema was criticized because he dealt with world politics no more, but instead with his community, and his opposing candidate, the Dean of The Faculty of Islamic Sciences in Sarajevo, pointed out the necessity of reforms in the Islamic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina.³⁴ One of the candidates, the Director of the Vaqf's Direction, gave up on his candidacy for naibu-reisa (the deputy of Reis-ul-ulema), "due to the unbecoming campaign led in the past 15 days",³⁵ among other things.

The situation is certainly most complex in Serbia, where the Muslims are organized in several Islamic communities. Mutual legitimacy questioning of the Islamic communities' representative organs represents a great problem in advocating religious rights and interests of the Muslims, and the absence of a unique religious organization hinders their position, to a large extent. By passing the Law of churches and congregations, in which an "Islamic community" is classified in "traditional churches and congregations",³⁶ and especially by the Republic of Serbia's becoming independent, new conditions for Muslim institutions' reorganization were created.

During 2006, the initiative for uniting all the Muslims in the territory of Serbia in a unique Islamic community was intensified. The advocates of uniting maintain that it would enable better protection of the Muslims' religious rights, as well as the improval of their position. Former rivalry between Belgrade and Prishtina, was moved to Novi Pazar-Belgrade relation after dissolution of SFR Yugoslavia. As area-

³² *Utrinski Vjesnik*, Skopje, May 13, 2005; September, 13, 2005; September 26, 2005. The mentioned events were regularly reported in written media in Macedonia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina (for example, in *Oslobođenje*, Sarajevo, in June 28, 2006) and in Serbia (for example, *Danas*, Belgrade, in October 7-8, 2006).

³³ *Utrinski Vjesnik*, Skopje, September 28, 2005

³⁴ *Oslobođenje*, Sarajevo, September 26, 2005; *Nezavisne Novine*, Bnja Luka, September, 26, 2005

³⁵ *Oslobođenje*, Sarajevo, September 26, 2005

³⁶ Zakon o crkvama i verskim zajednicama (Službeni glasnik RS 36/2006), articles 10 and 15.

dy mentioned, the Meshihat of the Islamic community in Sandzak represents an autonomous organizational unit in the scope of the Islamic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whereas the Meshihat of the Islamic community of Serbia represents an autonomous organization. Both meshihats are interested in uniting all the Muslims in Serbia in one organization, but the problems of relations between the new unique Islamic community and Rijaset of the Islamic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the future headquarters of that unique organization, represent the stumbling block in negotiations between the two meshihats' representatives.

The Council of the Islamic community in Sandzak formed the nine-member Board for uniting the Islamic community in Serbia, consisting of the representatives from the regions of Sandzak, Presevska valley, Vojvodina and the central Serbia. During several meetings of the Board and with the representatives of the Islamic communities' boards, the proposal of the Constitution of the Islamic community in Serbia was made, according to which there should be 4 mufti's offices on the territory of Serbia: the Sandzak, Presevo, Belgrade and Novi Sad mufti's offices. According to this proposal, the highest bodies of the Islamic community should be the Council and Meshihat, whereas *murasala* (a judge's letter of appointment) for the muftis in Sandzak, Belgrade and Novi Sad would be ordered by Reis-ul-ulema in Sarajevo, and for Presevo mufti's office it would be ordered by the president of the Presidency of the Islamic community in Kosovo.

On the other hand, the Islamic community of Serbia, that is the Meshihat of the Islamic community in Belgrade, suggested that a separate Rijaset in Serbia be founded and that the unique Islamic community be consisted of 3 meshihats with headquarters in Belgrade, Novi Pazar and Presevo. According to this suggestion, head office of the Islamic community of Serbia would be in the scope of the Republic of Serbia, and its headquarters would have rotational character. Each meshihat would have the right to preserve the existing organizational structure that is to remain in the composition of the Islamic community, to which it belongs at present; in addition to this, the Islamic community of Serbia would have the observer status in highest authorities in Sarajevo and Prishtina.³⁷

In spite of numerous meetings among high representatives of Islamic communities from Belgrade and Novi Pazar, the agreement on fundamental issues was not achieved. The Novi Pazar Islamic community's meshihat persistently insisted on the tradition of relations with the Islamic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whereas the Serbia Islamic community's meshihat persistently insisted on the tradition of Serbian Muslims, a heterogeneous ethnical structure of the Muslims in Serbia and on territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia.

After a halt in the negotiations about the forming of a unique Islamic community in Serbia, in February 19 in 2007, the Council of the Islamic community of Serbia passed the Constitution of the Islamic community of Serbia in Belgrade and formed the Rijaset of the Islamic community in Serbia. According to the passed Constitution, the elections for representative bodies and organs of the Islamic community of Serbia were scheduled, and the current Belgrade mufti was elected until the election for the acting director of Reis-ul-ulema. The Islamic community of Serbia's officials are optimists who think that this decision will not deteriorate the relations among the meshihats in Serbia, and they unanimously send the word out that "they have not closed the door for negotiations with Novi Pazar."³⁸ This decision of the

³⁷ <http://www.izs.org.yu/vesti/aktivnosti/index.php#47>; Danas, Beograd, 30.1.2007.

³⁸ <http://www.izs.org.yu/vesti/aktivnosti/index.php#50>

Islamic community of Serbia's Council was interpreted in Novi Pazar and Sarajevo as an unilateral and illegitimate act.³⁹

After about more than a month, on March 27 in 2007 more precisely, the Council of Unification of the Islamic community in Serbia, held in Novi Pazar, enacted the new Constitution of the Islamic community in Serbia and constituted the Meshihat of the Islamic community in Serbia, headquartered in Novi Pazar. The current Sandzak mufti was appointed for the Meshihat's president, and the Reis-ul-ulema from Sarajevo attended the Council, as the community's supreme head. This decision of the Sandzak's Islamic community was not acknowledged by the Serbia's Islamic community, headquartered in Belgrade.

And hold fast, all together, to the rope of Allah, and be not divided among yourselves!
(Kur'an, 3:103)

The Believers are only brothers, so make reconciliation between your two brothers and fear Allah, that you may receive mercy. (Kur'an, 49:10)

A century after the first autonomous Islamic communities' institutionalization, with the dissolution of macrostructural frameworks in the 20th century's last decade, the Balkan Muslims found themselves again in the situation which required their identity redefining. Structural and economic crises, nationalism awakening, social conflicts and religion revitalization conditioned selection of the instruments which were at the disposal of the Muslims with the aim of achieving the best starting position in creation of new social conditions in the Balkans. Apart from religious issues, numerous national (ethnic), political, economic, social, demographic and other issues were raised as well, influencing to a great extent on the Muslims' status in the Balkan societies' transformation process.

As we have had the chance to see, ethnical homogenization in Islamic communities (the so-called processes of "Turkification", "Albanization" and "Bosniakization" of the Muslims), is conditioned by religion politization, both by the Muslims and the non-Muslim environment. This double politization also conditions the way of Islam (re)institutionalization in new national frameworks, and with that the protection of the Muslims' religious rights and their position.

By reminding the very Muslims about the universal character of Islam, these obstacles in Islam institutionalization in Europe are indicated in *Declaration of European Muslims*, proclaimed (not to sound ironic) in the Balkans, of all places: "The Muslims cannot expect from the Europeans to appreciate the universal message of Islam if they are constantly faced with an ethnical or national color of Islam. It is not only that the European Muslims can impress the European public by a universalism of Islam, but also Europe is a good place for the Muslims themselves to discover the power and beauty of the universality of Islam." (Declaration, II:3)

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ISLAMIC COMMUNITY IN SERBIA

The time in its continuum of disappearing, leaves the traces of the past. Some of them are materialized in the form of objects and some only in memories, and our interpretations are often influenced by the moment that integrates time and space of our personal experience.

We will begin the speech on Islam in Serbia with an image from Kruševac¹, at the exact time of the repeated negotiations on the subject of Kosovo. Sunday, early morning. We was visiting the Lazarica church². The church was crowded with the military. Soldiers everywhere, standing before icons, kissing them, taking pictures of them, lighting candels, exiting by walking in reverse, kissing the doors and in silence. we walked up to their superior officer and asked him what is happening. He said that they brought the army serving nearby to the church. Having the camera with us we recorded the site and made a few pictures of soldiers standing in front of a board which said that the army that went to Kosovo battle had their last communion in that church. My intention was to show my students that history lasts a long time and how it stays the same regardless of the position we are observing it form.

In this text we will be discussing what has changed and what has remained the same regarding the religion and its presents in the objects, society and the individual experience of people in the Republic of Serbia. The change is that the military is present in the church again after a half a century long political teaching. The number of believers has changed, because their number increases or decreases depending on the political climate and the biological reproduction of course. We notice that the army does not have two cooking pots anymore which one were the symbol of respect and the acceptance of belief and the lifestyle and that pork meat and fat is not used in human nutrition. That manor of the separation of the army³ based on the religious belonging in Serbia has been changing depending on how the gesture was interpreted: as a right or privilege or maybe as an absence of unity which frightens. What's same is the still present paradox that religions of peace and gospel often rather look at each other trough crosshairs of a gun and distancing than trough dialog and tolerance. Also the same is the existence of belief in the own version of the truth contrary to the pluralism of the religious ideas.

¹ The city was built by duke Lazar in the year 1371. He is mentioned for the first time in 1387, in the document by which duke Lazar certifies former merchant privileges to the citizens of Dubrovnik (<http://sh.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kruševac>).

² On the official web site of the city of Kruševac could be found a text which states that it is hard to find a Serb, regardless of the level of education, who has not heard of the duke Lazar Hrebeljanović and the battle on Kosovo. The church, in front of which Serbian army was blessed before going to battle, is the church which was built by the duke Lazar, which is today known as "Lazarica". Since the end of the 14th century, this building dominates in height, which once was Lazar's city, while today it represents one of the most beautiful locations of Kruševac, with green lawns, the remains of the old city and a museum. The space is used during the ceremony of saint Vid (Vidovdan) throughout the month of Jun, when gatherings are organized which with their contents remind of the period from the time of duke Lazar. (http://www.o37ks.com/carapani/?Znamenitosti:Crkva_Lazarica).

³ Lookup: Dragan Pašić (2002): Legal regulation of religious issues of the Yugoslavian Army, IN: Kuburić, Z. Ed. *Religion, religious education, tolerance*, CEIR: Novi Sad. page 161-165.

Interesting are the attempts of cooperation between monotheistic religions and the search for similarities and differences. When Christianity and Islam are in question, the only observation is the difference that the Koran for the Muslim believer is not a product of a human effort, created as a word written by man, but represents the given Word of God which is written and it becomes embodied in the form of The Book – Koran. Srđan Simić (2007) distinguishes an important difference, that what in Christianity corresponds to the embodiment of The Word of God in the perfect personality of the Son of God Jesus Christ, the same is resembled in the form of Koran. Therefore, The Word of God in Christianity has realized itself through the Personality, the Savior, The Son of God Jesus Christ, “Neither is there salvation in any other: for there is none other name under heaven given among men, whereby we must be saved (The Acts, 4:12).” If somebody like to receive islam it is enough to say sincerity that he testimony that there is no other God except Alah and that Muhamed is his prophet (Lawrence, 1992:291).

Historical context

The defeats of Serbian army on battlefields called Marica in 1371 and Kosovo in 1389, and fall of Smederevo in 1459 caused Serbian governmental and political lost. Islamic people was migrating to Serbian territory and a number of native people converted into Islamic faith. It is considered that Bogumils saw in Islam a religion relatively close to their own and in next 200 years they accepted Islam as a religion. Their descendants are people who are today known by name Bosnjaks. Darko Tanaskovic (1992) consider that this thesis was especially popular between muslims but it is not really confirm in historical tests. Conversion of Orthodox population into Islam was mostly a voluntary process but there were cases of forced conversions. Those ones who received Islam enjoyed subsequent privileges. Their only obligation was to take part in wars led by the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire came and gone from this territory but Islam as a religion remained. Serbia got its independancy in 19th century.

Under the Ottoman Empire Muslims in this part of the world were united into one large Muslim congregation. Special Islamic congregations were formed following the Serbian deliverance from the Ottoman Empire. In the period between the second part of 19th century and the First World War Islamic congregation was officially recognised as a religious congregation but not equal to Orthodox Church. This religion was under the supervision of the Government which materially supported this congregation and allowed contacts, which had religious background, with the Islamic centres outside of the Serbia. The head of the congregation was Muftija situated in Nis. After the First World War Serbian and Montenegrin muslims were under the supervision of Muftija who was situated in Belgrade.

Changes and segregations which marked 20 century had influence on this congregation. Desintegration of Yugoslavia was influence on splitting of Islam's community by princip of now born country. In Novi Pazar there are formed Mesihat of Islamic Community in Sandzak (Raska region) which become part of Islam's community in Bosnia and Hercegovina after war in BiH with center in Sarajevo. Mufti of Sandzak, Muamer ef. Zukorlic, represents muslims who are majority in Sandzak. They formed new University in Novi Pazar. This spiritual connection with Sarajevo are not include others muslims from other part of Serbia. The most famous representative of islam in public scene in Belgrade today is Mufti of Belgrade, Hamdija ef. Jusufspahic and his family. They work active in Islam community in Serbia. But, he is not been recognised in this function all Islam's communities in Serbia. The muslims in Belgrade as muslims in Central Serbia and Vojvodina are in position of minority.

Today, in Serbian and Montenegro territory exist several Islamic congregations in: Central Serbia, Sandzak, Vojvodina, Preshevo valley, Kosovo and Montenegro. Since the falling of former Yugoslavia they haven't made one unified organization, because of daily political reasons and other reasons as linguistic, cultural.

Number of muslims in Serbia and Montenegro is not known. Official records do not give real facts. Most of them, motivated by fear, were not used to give public declarations about their religious and national background as they lived in the times of atheism when religion was not popular, and recently when belonging to one nationality group was dangerous. In Islamic congregation there is evidence of members who pay yearly their membership. Ceremony of giving a name to a child is opportunity for recording new members. In this occasion the head of family bring child in the mosk or in appropriate place in the house. However, muslims from different region do not have the same practice. It is supposed that total number of Muslims is around two milions.

According to census 2002. in Serbia (without Kosovo and Metohia), there are near 85% inhabitants who declare as orthodox believers, 5,48% inhabitants say that they are catholic. It is mean that the Catholicism is the second religion in Serbia and the most numerous religion of religious other in Serbia without Kosovo and Metohia. Number of muslim according to census (2002) which is just Central Serbia and Vojvodina, are 3,20%. It means that the Islam is the third religion in Serbia.

Religious objekts

The main historical event for Islam in Serbia and Montenegro is the Turkish conquering, and the most bloody battle is the battle on Kosovo. This battle on Kosovo couldn't stop the Turks' conquest; therefore it became the subject of legend. One of the most beautiful verses of Serbian national poems is about the battle on Kosovo. Kosovo's cycle, national epic poems about the battle on Kosovo and its participants, idealized the heroes, finding the explanation for defeats and transforming this national disaster in well of moral and national strength during the slavery to Turks, that lasted in some parts of Serbia for even 500 years. The Turks gave the oriental and Islam marks to the towns in the conquered areas. The mosques are built in Turkish style and the monuments, turbe, for nobility and nisani, the monuments from stone, for the common people.

Belgrade had in that time during the occupation of Turk great number of turkish architecture⁴. There were over thirty mosque. About that period testify writers from that period. That is how Evlija Čelebija⁵, turkish autor who writes that there were (1660) in Belgrade 6 caravan-saraja, stopping place for caravans, 21 traveling salesmen place, 7 public bath, many fountain and about 7000 bath in house. In that period in Belgrade were 98.000 inhabitants, from this number 21.000 inhabitants are not muslim.

In Belgrade is well preserved the mosque from Turkish period. It is Bajrakli mosque⁶. Was built around 1575. Beside this there are Turbe Šeik-Mustafe – Tekija

⁴ Hazim Šabanović i drugi. (1974) *Istorija Beograda*, Beograd: Prosveta.

⁵ Evlija Čelebija a travel writer, or as he calls himself Evlija Muhamed Zilli son of a Derviš (sejjahi alem) was born in Istanbul in 1611, and died in 1679. During 40 years (1631–1670) he undertook numerous journeys throughout the Osmanlian empire and beyond it, and has also been a part of wars in Kret, Croatia, Hungary, Austria and others under the sultans Ibrahim and Mohamed the 4th. About his observations and experiences in peace and war he extensively wrote in a book of ten volumes under the name *Sejahnama* or *Tarihi sejjah* (http://bs.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evlija_%C4%8Celebija).

⁶“Bajrakli mosque was built around 1575, as one of the 273 mosques and mesdžida, the number of them that were present in Belgrade at the time of the Turks travelogue, (*itineraries of Elvije Čelebije*). Originally it was named Čohadži-mosque, after the founder, a merchant of Čohom, Hadži-Alia. It is a one room

from 1783, and Ali-pašino turbe from 1716-17. From that period there are remainings of city Ram on Danube 25km Northeast from Požarevca which built Sultan Bajazit II (1480-1512).

And at the beginning of 2000 there are the new metresa begins with its work, where can be get high-school education. There are the remnants of 3 mosques in Nis and one is in use. In Sadzak, Novi Pazar, Tutin and Sjenica, Montenegro and Kosovo there are much more.

Detailed statistical data on registered cultural real estate on the territory of SR Yugoslavia (Radovanović and others, 1996), on December 31st 1994, shows the map of the religious architecture according to the regions and religious communities. It is certain that this territory has tradition and is long remembered. There are monuments since the early Christian times which indicate that Christianity has spread quickly and has made roots in all the nations. Interesting question is who where those people who were the first to accept the new ideas, new teachings, the new religion and invested time and money and often their lives in various persecutions.⁷

Generally viewed in Serbia 83% of religious buildings are Orthodox, 9% Catholic and 5% Islamic. Differences between regions are present, Orthodox religious architecture is mainly present in central Serbia 97%, on Kosovo 80%, in Vojvodina 78% and in Montenegro 70%. Islamic religious architecture on Kosovo and Metohia has 18%, in Montenegro 4% and in central Serbia 2%.

The question that is imposed here is the difference between Christianity and Islam in the relation between religious buildings compared to the number of believers. How much are these buildings cultural monuments and how much in the function of everyday religious life. Finally, let's think about the changes in the number of believers of Christian and Islamic confession and the methods by which political and religious changes have occurred on these territories.

Religion rituals

Holy place in Islam is Mecca, in which direction all Muslims turned their heads during their prayers. The fifth Islam duty of every Muslim is, if it is possible, to go on a pilgrimage and visit the important places in Mecca and Medina. There is no place in Serbia and Montenegro significant for pilgrimage.

The holidays are the same for all the Muslim in the world, thus there is nothing specific for believers in Serbia. Two greatest holidays are Ramadan Bairam and kurban Bairam. With the fall of dark, the dinner is prepared. In summer the believers wake up before dawn and have suhur- breakfast. They are all equal and there is no liberation from work. Kurban bajram lasts 4 days. The graves of ancestors are visited in order to pray there. It is connected with the memory on Avram's sacrifices and in the animal form as well.

building with a dome and a minaret. During the reign of the Austria (1717-1739) it was turned into a Catholic church and at that time most of the mosques were torn down. With the return of the Turks, it became a mosque again. Husein-beg, čehaja (assistant) of the Turkish head commander, Ali-paša, renovated the place of worship in 1741 and for some time it were called Husein-beg or Husein-čehaja mosque. At the end of the 18th century it was named Bajrakli mosque, after the flag which stood on it as a symbol for synchronized beginning of prayers in all the mosques. After the renewal in the 19th century which was carried out by Serbian dukes, it becomes the main city mosque. Even today it is the only Islamic mosque in the city of Belgrade. Bajrakli mosque was set on fire on the March 18th 2004, due to the riots on Kosovo and Metohia, as a response to the setting on fire several Serbian churches on Kosovo, but was soon repaired."
[http://hr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bajrakli_d%C5%BEamija_\(Beograd\)](http://hr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bajrakli_d%C5%BEamija_(Beograd))
<http://www.beograd.org.yu/cms/view.php?id=1404>
<http://www.beograd.org.yu/cms/view.php?id=1404&print=y>

⁷ Kuburić Zorica (1999): *Religion and freedom, Religious communities in Yugoslavia*. Niš: JUNIR.

The clothes of believers in namaz (prayer) must be in harmony with Islam, that is to say decent, covered and clean. Men can have covered head too, and women have covered whole body except face, hands and feet. Imams have cap and mantle.

The place of Muslim for common prayer is Medzid, an empty room with carpets. The Muslims are obliged to pray 5 times a day, first time on sunrise, and last time on sunset, one is compulsory at noon and two in the afternoon, which time changes. Muezzins from the mosque call the Muslims to pray. A help for the neighbors, the poor and for nutrition. The ritual slaughter comes after common prayer in the mosque.

One of the problems that the Muslims encounter is nutrition, for the Islam forbids the eating of porc, and in the army, from the fall of communism in Yugoslavia, there is no separated kettle for the Muslims.

In Islam, the main purpose of marriage beside the mutual happiness of its members is children and descendants. Koran and Hadis consider the children as the most beautiful ornaments of this world, and the status of parents is raised on the level of inviolability. Therefore Islam experience and customs give high attention for married life, especially for children and their education. Muslim women are more and more covered, what represents the process of de-secularization after the 50 years of atheism in Yugoslavia. As for attitudes for the controversial questions, abortion is forbidden and the homosexual marriages as well.

Heritage of islam's culture

One of the greatest contribution of oriental and Islam attitudes in the urbanism and culture of residence is spontaneous will to achieve full unite of with natural environment and their mutual penetration. There can be seen a tendency of abandoning of higher hills and giving advantage to the lowlands, because the running water was important factor for religious services and vital moment for urbanism as well. Particular attention was given to the building of plumbing, fountains. Certain public bath-rooms, hamams, built on territory of Serbia and Montenegro are still active today.

Having plans for conquest, military Turkey gave the important significance to building and maintenance of roads and the most outstanding place was given to bridges, from which are preserved the bridges with the specific style of construction.

Islam and the image of religious other in Serbia

I had an interview with the representative of the Islamic community, Belgrade mufti Mr. Jusufspahić and his son Muhamed. The dual image is present here, as with Catholics, of a sense that Islam is a world wide religion and a major part of mentality, but also a feeling of rejection from the dominating religion in which environment they live in. The Orthodox are criticized for not being mutually united and for believing in sorcery and using it on each others, which drives Orthodox believers to often go to imams for help, which resembles a private practice of removing the sorcery and by this they show their acceptance of Islam as a religion. Muslims believe that the Word of God has a healing power, and that the writings that they give as a cure really work. When questioned about sects, I here also got the answer that Jehovah witnesses bother the most with their methods of missionary work. We talked about how dose someone become a Muslim and I especially wanted to find out if it was possible to stop being a Muslim, is there a possibility to leave the faith as with Christianity. I got a short and specified answer that everyone must think carefully before becoming a Muslim because there is no leaving the faith.

With the intent to find the attitude within the religious communities toward Islam, I asked sister Ines (Belgrade archbishopric, Družba klanateljice krvi Kristove)

who I have met numerous times on conferences organized with the intention to assimilate with Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious communities in Serbia, I found out some details which help us to understand the role of Catholic church in Serbia. Her opinion is that the problem with Islam is not the different religious practice, because true Islam believers accept the believers of other religions. "A Muslim is a person who submits to God, so in that plain of religion there should not be any problems. We have religious differences, but that doesn't bother us. What could become a difficulty is the fact that often others in the Islamic majority are not accepted. We wish to make possible for Muslims to live and preach their religion in our environment, and expect Christians to have the same right in Islamic and other countries. The church is asking respect from believers everywhere, but is also supporting the rights of others."

Aleksandar Đakovac, the executive director of the Christian Cultural Center, the associate of Radovan Bigović who is also the coordinator for religious education in that center, says that between Christians and Muslims exists a foundational disagreement about the relationship between religion and the government, because Islam is a constitutional religion and Christianity is based on the separation of the church from the state. Đakovac says: "Our faith suggests creating a religious state. What we have as theology in Islam is the legislature. Where Muslims make the majority of the population, they want to have a religious state. The problem is that Muslims do not accept his country in which they live as their own and some Muslims consider a non Islamic country as an enemy."

Conclusion

With the disintegration of Yugoslavia⁸, which was a multi-confessional state, new states were formed, from which Serbian and Montenegro represents the eastern part of ex Yugoslavia, and in the religious prospective has the dominant Orthodoxy as a religious tradition.

According to estimations in territory of Serbia and Montenegro – 70% are Christians (Orthodox, Catholics and Protestants), less than 20% of Muslims and 10% of the others. Vojvodina has 58% members of Orthodox, 23% of Catholics, 4% of Protestants. Montenegro has 69% of members of Orthodox, 20% of Islam and 4% of catholic community.

The encounter and the presence of 3 dominant religious traditions can be perceived in Serbia and Montenegro: Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Islam. In the northern part of the country the Orthodoxy encounters the Catholicism in the same relation as it encounters Islam in the southern part. The Serbian Orthodox Church has had a strong influence on the identity of Serbian people and its historical role is great. Islam was the religion of Serbian enemies and foreigners who have conquered the Serbian people, who maintaining their faith maintained their identity.

Historical antagonism between Christians and Muslims led to the creation of Kosovo's myth, which had the paradoxal power of influence on the mutual rela-

* COUNTRY OVERVIEW:

[The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes – Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca 1918-1929

The Kingdom of Serbs – Kraljevina Jugoslavija 1929-1941

The Democratic Federal Yugoslavia – Demokratska Federativna Jugoslavija (DFJ) 1943-1945

The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia – Federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslavija (FNRJ) 1945-63

The Socialist Federal Republic Yugoslavia – Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija 1963-1992

The United Republic Yugoslavia – Savezna Republika Jugoslavija 1992-2003

Serbia and Montenegro – Srbija i Crna Gora 2003 – 2006

Republic of Serbia – Republika Srbija 2006]

tions of population. In the predominantly Muslim's area the population growth was very high, while in the Serbian areas we deal with the decreasing of population. These two religious traditions, Islam and Christian, even with the same Serbian people with the same language and culture led to the mutual cooperation and common life, but also to the occasional conflicts, wars and divisions. Other religions in Serbia include Judaism, pro-oriental cults and many new religious movements, which spread suddenly in the conditions of Yugoslav crisis and find their adherents.

In the future research we try to find differences between Muslim which depend from different part of living in Serbia and mutual influence majority and minority, Christian and Muslim and their understanding of theological questions.

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BOSNIANS MUSLIMS AND COUNTRY IN TRANSITION

At the end of the past and beginning of the new Millennium, one of the key issues within social sciences and humanities has been the “*resurgence*” or *revival of religions*, particularly in the context of religious influence over the politics. Although the role of religion had been previously discussed in relation to contemporary social processes and developments, e.g. conditions in Middle East, partially in Africa, South-East Asia or in Indian subcontinent, political revival of religions in the “West” has forced many thinkers and researchers to “urgently” open new questions as well as to re-conceptualize prevailing theoretical frameworks.

In introductory part of the volume “*The Desecularization of the World*”, published by the Ethnic and Public Policy Center from Washington D.C., Peter L. Berger (the editor) very effectively pointed out what is going on when it comes to the global developments. According to Berger, “the world today is as furiously religious as it ever was ... and in some places more so than ever” (Berger, 1999:2)

In scientific and other scholarly discussions, in general, the process of religious revival has been portrayed with several key words – return to religions, desecularization of public life, return of religions, deprivatization of religion, resurgence of religion, “resacralization” of public sphere etc. In addition, it has become increasingly obvious (even more so than it is a case with other similar trends) that an interdisciplinary approach is needed in order to understand the full scope of these phenomena.

Social sciences, and sociology of religion in particular, are faced with the new challenge – political resurgence of religion, and revival of religion as such, have become total social facts (in Durkheim’s sense, having in mind that although external to the individual [...] with a power of coercion by means of which they control him) evident on both global and local levels.

The most important theme of contemporary sociology of religion is *the secularization thesis*, or simply stated the status of religion in modern society. Based on empirical orientation versus metaphysical speculation, the sociology of religion strives to offer answers for new challenges that the discipline is facing.

I can not enter here into profound review of theories associated with early “secularization theory” (P. L. Berger, D. Martin, B. Willson), the works of post-secularists (R. Finke, R. Stark, W. Bainbridge, W. Hadden) and neo-secularists (D. Yamane, S. Bruce), or in the writings and researches of those focused on the multi-dimensional character of secularization phenomena (K. Dobbelaere, J. Casanova, M. Chaves, P. Beyer). However, I would like to underline that O. Riis rightly argues that “the central hypothesis of secularization does not directly relate to a personal religious commitment, but to the influence of religion as a public interest... Religion becomes a matter of private choice, not a social obligation... Privatization implies that religion becomes relegated to the private sphere. It becomes a source of interpreting and guiding the individual existence rather than of legitimating the social structure and upholding the moral order.” (Riis, 1993:375/6) Thus, in order to think secularization today one must essentially think of it as a descriptive, not normative, hypothesis.

Further, Daniele Harvieu-Leger's (2000) explanation of religious eclipse and resurgence is that modernity exhibits continuity but also transformations in the forms of believing (the functional process) even while traditional beliefs (substantive contents) are being widely discarded; according to Harvieu-Leger memory and tradition are the grounds of legitimacy and the means of articulation of specifically religious beliefs and believing.

And that is all the more evident given that the secular nation-state is less and less successful in resisting globalization – more exactly, there is less and less of a solid ground to form a worthy basis for national identity. That is the case even in France where, according to Jean-Poul Willaime (2004), *laïcité* is losing momentum precisely because it has won.

Conflict and post-conflict societies, especially those that are multi-confessional, are conducive to the processes of rising religiosity. Bosnia and Herzegovina, in that sense, is more than typical. Over the past two decades Bosnia and Herzegovina has experienced the process of “return” to religion, i.e. religious revival, or deprivatization of religion *par excellence*. The revitalization of religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina manifests itself as desecularization of public life, and all relevant indicators support the thesis of significant resurgence of religion in its society (increased participation in religious manifestations, emphasis on religious identity, presence of religious communities in political and public life as well as in media, the role of religious leadership in the system of legitimization, within the educational system...etc).

The peculiar aspect is the relationship between religious communities and politics, which is also, to some degree, the case in the entire region. Some of the authors from the region, including Srđan Vrcan, accentuate that very nexus (of religion and politics) as a key social determinant of the process of transition. According to Vrcan (2001), unlike in other countries of Eastern and Central Europe, religion and religiously acquired attributes are outstanding political factors in Southeastern Europe, while at the same time politics is being reshaped as an exceptional religious fact.

But just as the retreat of institutionalized religion in the West does not necessarily mean the retreat of religion¹, similarly, revitalization of religion in public space should not be identified with the rise of personal (individual) religiosity, or spiritualization of private life.

One of the four dominant religious communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the community with the largest number of adherents is Islamic Community. The phenomenon of Bosnian Muslims as heirs of specific religious and cultural tradition – often called “autochthonous European Muslims” in domestic as well as international political circles, media and wider public – has not been much studied and researched. The research is particularly lacking in adequate empirical evidence to support theoretical claims, either to define trends or to make strong assertions. At the same time, different interpretations of issues linked to Bosnian Muslims are multiplying on agendas of various interests groups, from experts in the field, to nongovernmental actors, other religious communities, domestic decisions makers, and political centers of power within European and overseas capitols.

¹ In her research on whether Europe is an exceptional case in the world when it comes to religion, religious beliefs and forms of believing, British sociologist of religion Grace Davie (2002 [2005]) offers suggests as her starting point the phrase – “Believing without Belonging”. According to Davie, Europe is an exceptional case since Europeans are “differently religious” than the rest of the world. Namely, in the majority of European countries there is a trend of declining numbers when it comes to frequencies in visiting churches, in particular for praying, as well as to some other specifics in regards to sacraments in Christianity. Although it is outside the scope of this article, let me remark, at least in a footnote, that what appears to be the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the opposite: one should rather speak about “Belonging without Believing” than *vice versa*.

It is well known that in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Muslims, unlike Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, Montenegrins and Macedonians – did not obtain the status of *Yugoslav people*² until 1971. Until then, during official censuses, Bosnian Muslims had to rely on a wide range of variants and models of self-identification. Accordingly, in the Census from 1948 the offered options were “Muslim – nationally undecided”, but “Serb” and “Croat” as well. For those who did not want to declare themselves as Serbs and Croats during the Census in 1953 option was “Yugoslav – nationally undecided”. During 1961 Muslims could choose to declare themselves in terms of belonging to ethnic (minority) group³ (Muslims as “ethnic group”) and finally, in Census from 1971 they could register under the *people/nationality* (Muslims as nationality). It could be said that Bosnian Muslims (particularly among them members of the Islamic Community, adherents of Islam) in those times found themselves in situations that could be designated as “something in between” national (non-)determination and tactical-pragmatic Yugoslavism.

It is important to mention that after WWII, in the newly established state (former SFR Yugoslavia), Islamic Community (established in 1947 based on the Constitution of Islamic Community acknowledged by the Council⁴) played significant role in religious, cultural as well as political life of Muslims. Islamic Community was, in some respect, a surrogate of national community. Given the lack of concrete national (Muslim) institutions, Islamic Community also had the task of institutionalizing various aspects of public life.

Finally, at the end of the 1980s, the peak of Yugoslav Federation crisis, Muslims – much like all other Yugoslav national corps – re-grouped as political actors. Muslim intellectuals, supported by some representatives of *ulema* (Islamic clergy), helped establishment of political parties, which would reflect and represent political interests of Muslims. Among the newly established parties, the most important party, with the largest number of members and supporters, was the Party of Democratic Action (*Stranka demokratske akcije – SDA*), also known amongst its founders as the “Party of Muslim Cultural-Historic Circle”. In the beginning, leadership of SDA intended to represent interests of entire Muslim population in SFR Yugoslavia (Islamic Community, whose headquarters were in Sarajevo, emphasized, ever since its establishment, the importance of its member’s unity within entire territory). However, with the dissolution of the Yugoslav state, focus has shifted predominantly on Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The war against Bosnia and Herzegovina (1991-1995) thoroughly influenced processes and developments within the community, which resulted in sequences of changes in relatively short period of time. Faced with the brutal aggression and war, rampant war crimes and genocide over the Muslims, as well as with attempts to systematically destroy Islamic cultural heritage in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the forceful “diving” into religion appears to be, as it is, an inevitable process. Consequently, although particularly during the war, but also immediately after the war, what happened in Muslim/Bosnian national body is strong reislamization of national, political and cultural identity and, eventually, construction of new political identity (certainly, reislamization of national identity has been much stronger than eventual attempts to “nationalize” Islam).

² [*Jugoslovenski*] *narod* in terms of nation.

³ *Narodnost*.

⁴ *Vrhovni vakufski sabor* – Council of Islamic Community' Assembly.

However, after 1993, according to the decision of the Bosniak Assembly⁵ held in Sarajevo, the term “Muslims as ethnic group”⁶ is no longer used. Instead, the name “Bosniaks” is recognized as the national name, so the term “Muslims” is used solely in the domain of confessional designation.

The following elements are important to be considered if Bosnian Muslims are subject of research: a) in BiH, since WWII in BiH until today, the term “Muslim” does not exclusively mark followers of Islam, but members of an ethnic group too, so we are speaking about the population whose members are at the same time members of Islamic Community (as smaller group) and national community (wider group); b) no matter whether particular member of that community is self-declared as religious or not, Bosnian Muslims have mostly struggled for an identity, which is more ethnic than purely religious; c) to a great extent, Bosnian Muslims were secularly oriented in the former Yugoslav state, and the former regime contributed a lot to that development; therefore, it is worth to mention, that in Bosnia, just as elsewhere, religious/confessional self-identification is not identical to religious participation and individual religiosity – confession just partly overlaps with religiosity; d) some additional elements, like historical heritage of coexistence with non-Muslims and the geographical position of Bosnia and Herzegovina (complete territorial separation from so-called Islamic countries) influenced the notion of Bosnian Muslims when it comes to religious practice or practicing Islam as such; e) war, and political situation immediately after the war, further influenced processes in the framework of correlations confessional-national-state identity, and these developments have not been finished; f) revival of religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina manifests itself as desecularization of public life, particularly in relation to the politics – religion nexus, i.e. political abuse or religion and *vice versa*, so the Bosnian Muslims, in that respect, are not exception.

With many Muslims, as it is a case with other religious communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the revival of religion resulted in more liberal (and desirable) manifestation of religious feelings, the trend of participation in religious rituals is increasing, religious membership is emphasized, and the presence of religious communities and their leadership in public life and in the media have become common place and part of everyday life.

Along these lines, special aspect is the role played by religious leadership in legitimization of dominant state-of-affairs (pointing back to the relationship between state and religious communities), their persistence in holding positions in society which allow them to influence educational system, as well as claims for privileged positions in order to resolve property claims (return of nationalized property and estate), etc.

Given the current situation, it is important to mention that early post-socialist period in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been characterized by powerful “nationalization of sacral” and “sacralization of national.” In other words, national political ideologies have requested (and have been granted) the support from religious doctrines in order to legitimize new establishments. Bosnian Muslims were no exception. Such interdependence (“symbiosis”) of new ruling elites and religious leadership resulted in an understanding that solving “religious issues” can be done in the

⁵ *Svebošnjački sabor*.

⁶ In Bosnian language there is a distinction between *Musliman* with capital M, and *musliman* written in lower case. The first is understood as name for members of ethnic group (which is, in a way, a secularized notion) for that population in BiH, while the latter is used to denote members of Islamic Community, namely practicing believers. Paradoxically, that distinction made possible the present situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina where there are *Muslimani* who are not *muslimani*.

filed of politics, while position of religious institutions (in this case Islamic Community) in politics becomes more and more central. Certainly, at the level of individuals, confession remains to be the main element of national being. However, in such instance of resacralization, there is also, almost inevitably, an emergence of different interpretations and understandings of Islam in both doctrinaire sense and in terms of practice (ritual and custom).

Finally, for inter-religious understanding, but coexistence too, in multi-confessional and ethnically plural communities, religious identity (not only related to the Muslims, but to any religious people who follows religious teachings) could and should be categorically differentiated from ethnic identity. If that is not the case, one is hard pressed to recognize the critical distinction between religious revolts against the state, which are truly inspired by theology, from pseudo-religious ones, in which religion is merely a referent for group identity.

“Religious identity is a matter of shared theology, ritual, belief. Ethnic identity is a matter of common ancestry, descent, history, language, culture and also (though not necessarily) religion. If we do not distinguish the two identities from each other then we cannot hope to demarcate ethnic from religious conflict. The danger of such intellectual confusion is that, by undermining the legitimacy of religion as an instrument of peace, its inherent potential for conflict resolution will be seriously compromised.” (Milles, 1996:533)

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Sergej Flere

CONSEQUENTIALITY IN THE RELIGION OF BOSNIAN MUSLIMS

Problem

The consequentiality dimension of religiosity was defined by Stark and Glock (1968, 16) as the final of 5 such dimensions (along with the intellectual, belief, ritual and experiential one) and consequentiality has probably been the one least studied (see Hill and Hood *Measures of Religiosity*, where only 3 instances of such studies are mentioned; 1999, 275, 300 and 309). At issue is what the believer is ready to do, to achieve in his relationship with the Almighty. By its nature this dimension is as to extent lesser than ritual and belief (De Jong, Faulkner & Warland, 1976).

Consequentiality in general manifests itself as the concordance, harmony between the believer's words and deeds. It manifests itself as an absence of duplicity and hypocrisy, an issue much insisted upon both in the *Old* and the *New Testament* as well in Sura 63 of the *Quran*. This was studied as religious hypocrisy (Moberg 1986). Empirically, consequentiality was studied rather unspecifically: Faulkner & DeJong (1966) operationalized the concept including attitudes on stores being open on Sundays, admissibility of premarital sex, relevance of political candidates' going to church, and tax evasion. DeJong, Faulkner and Warland used the following measures at cross-cultural study of consequentiality: rejecting lying (on age) at purchase of alcohol, use of marijuana, premarital sex, stealing lesser valued items in stores, admissibility of violent protest and abortion (1976). Although they mainly attained satisfactory factor solutions among US and German sampled students, it remains questionable whether they truly measured religious consequentiality, as some items are rather distant from Christian dogma. It is not known whether consequentiality was studied among Muslims.

Here we conceptualized consequentiality within a perspective more directly focused on what a believer is prepared to do, positively or by way of restraint, in his relationship with God, to what lengths he is prepared to go in order to maintain/gain God's favor, supposing a relationship, possibly an 'exchange' relationship, where a believer does something, in expectation of a return. We considered this as the most important 'difference in the day to day behavior of a believer' (Perrin 2000, 535). This does not mean that the consequentiality-inconsequentiality issue in religion may not fit well into labeling theory, where e.g. Goffman speaks of 'face work' done to attain or maintain the approval of significant others (1967), or functionalist explanations of the complementary functions of official and operant religion.

Thus, consequentiality being a more demanding aspect of being religious, particularly when it comes to renouncing various worldly goods, may be considered within a rational choice perspective: most of the demanding religious behaviors (active behaviors and renunciation of worldly goods) may be considered as the "price" for the "compensator", religious goods that one receives instead of tangible, this-worldly goods (Stark & Bainbridge 1985). Lack of consequentiality in our perspective is thus close to Stark's notion of "free-riding", attaining the gifts of God without giving anything in return, or giving less than would be normative.

Basically, we studied the presence and structure of the consequentiality of religiosity (Glock and Stark, 1968), whether one's religion and its prescripts are truly

lived and carried out in daily life, or whether inconsequentiality is at work. This latter could be considered a religion as a belief and possibly as experience, a religion to which one takes recourse, with a God who may be invoked at times of trial, but without one's religion having much or any impact upon one's everyday behavior. But such a situation would be in contradiction with the notion that religion tends towards an all-roundedness, a harmonious entirety, a world-view which is lived into all day-to-day behavior (Perrin 2000, 534). Thus, we may mention hypothetical situations which may be more or less realistic to the believer, but nevertheless indicating the loyalty, the readiness to accept consequences of one's belief and belonging.

Method

Sample

The present study is based on a survey of university students in four different cultural settings. Our respondents were undergraduate university students, primarily in the social sciences, from environments with predominant and traditional religions in the surrounding population: Maribor, Slovenia (N = 470, Roman Catholic), Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina (Muslim), Niš, Serbia (Serbian Orthodox) and Auburn, Alabama, USA (predominantly Protestant). The analyzed samples contained only the dominant religions: 328 Bosnian Muslims, 369 Serbian Orthodox, 343 Slovenian Catholics and 289 US Protestants. The mean age was 20.3 (S.D. = 1.3), and in all samples the average age varied between 20 and 21. In all samples females formed the majority and care was taken to include a sufficient number of males. The relative share of males varied from 33.9% in the Bosnia and Herzegovina sample to 48.5% in the US sample. In all the analyses presented, only affiliates with the major religion were taken into consideration, comprising a high percentage in all cases: 77.7%, 89.9%, 92.7% and 67.1% (in the American case all Protestant groups were lumped together), respectively.

Instrument

The instrument applied was a questionnaire containing varied items, concentrating on religiosity and its possible correlates. The filling out of the questionnaire under supervised circumstances took 40-50 minutes. It was carried out in Spring, 2005.

The questionnaires were translated from the initial Slovene version into the other languages and translated back for control. Some wording needed to be adjusted in the case of the Muslim sample, substituting mosque or religious community for church, and paradise for heaven. The instrument had been previously tested in Slovenia.

The questionnaire contained items on *intrinsic* and *extrinsic religious orientation*, taken from Gorsuch & McPherson (1989), with con-trait items (originally titled Extrinsic Other) omitted in this analysis. Although the Cronbach alphas for the extrinsic items at the level of all affiliates in the three surroundings for extrinsicness was high ($\alpha = .81$), we decided to separate the social extrinsic and psychological (personal) extrinsic dimensions into two separate scales, because they functioned differently within the analysis of total religious orientation, thus containing 5 intrinsic items, 3 extrinsic personal and 3 extrinsic social items. This was in line with Kirkpatrick's (1989) and Trimble's (1997) suggestion on separating *extrinsicness into two scales* (see Table 1).

The items of *religious consequentiality* are rather general in nature, indicating loyalty and readiness to undertake potentially disagreeable, painful tasks for religious purposes, in various areas of life, almost denominational-doctrine free in na-

ture so that they might reasonably be considered within each of the 4 groups appearing as major in the respective environments (this is not fully attainable). Nevertheless, the level of their being realistic may vary, which does not necessarily affect their ability to indicate consequentiality. The 7 *religious “deeds”* were drafted by the second author after consulting of previous empirical work and particularly the work by Stark & Finke (2001) on the rational choice perspective on religion (see Table 2 for list of items).

The scale of *religious orthodoxy* consists of belief in God, in heaven/paradise, in hell, in one's spiritual being, and in an afterlife (see Table 1 for indication of consistency).

Table 1.
Alpha reliability coefficients for scales of religiosity used in analysis,
by country samples of affiliates

	Bosnian Muslims	Serbian Orthodox	Slovenian Catholics	US Protestants
Religious orthodoxy	.82	.84	.85	.87
'Religious deeds'	.85	.84	.86	.88
Religious orthodoxy + 'religious deeds'	.86	.86	.87	.84
Intrinsic religious orientation	.77	.64	.82	.85
Extrinsic personal religious orientation	.76	.80	.83	.79
Extrinsic social religious orientation	.72	.72	.77	.78

The presence of consequentiality at the individual level is observed by the split of the sample into low and high consequents. Those indicating not being ready to commit half of the average of the summed 7 “religious deeds” (each item attaining same weight) were considered low consequents. Those surpassing the average values in readiness to commit “deeds” were considered high consequents. Affiliates as a whole and pronounced believing affiliates were observed separately.

Hypotheses

1. It is to be expected that “holiness” of more ardent believers will produce fuller consequentiality, less duplicity than the one found among affiliates in general. Thus, higher levels of consequentiality are expected among more ardent believers.

2. It is to be expected that lower consequentiality is to be found among extrinsic believers and higher among intrinsic ones (Bergin 1983; Donahue 1985). This would be in keeping with Allport's idea of extrinsic religiosity as instrumental in nature, whereby an extrinsic achieves, by way of religiosity, extra-religious (psychological and social) ends. In intrinsic religiosity, the motive for religiosity would be autonomous, overarching. Allport summarized the distinction thus: “the extrinsically motivated individual uses his religion, whereas the intrinsically motivated lives his” (Allport & Ross, 1967, p. 434). Since intrinsic religion is the “master-motive”, it

should permeate the entire personality and behavior. 'Other (extra-religious) needs, strong as they may be, are regarded as less of ultimate significance' write Allport and Ross of intrinsics (1967, 434). Among extrinsics '...the embraced creed is...selectively shaped to fit more primary needs'. (1967, 434).


Results

Results on the methodological admissibility of comparisons of samples, carried out by Brown-Forsythe's F tests will not be presented. Admissibility was supported.

For the general picture of readiness to sacrifice among the samples see Graph 1.

Graph 1.

Means in readiness for committing religious deeds among country samples of affiliates



Note: Circles indicate means, lines indicate standard deviations.

7 = absolute absence of readiness to commit sacrifice, 35 = absolute readiness to commit religious sacrifice.

Consequentiality in the Religion of Bosnian Muslims

Table 2.
Mean Value for Affiliates, and Very and Predominantly Religious in Willingness to commit 'religious deeds', with change in Mean Value and distance to Maximum (in percentages; Affiliates vs. Very and Predominantly Religious), by Item and Country Samples of Affiliates

	Bosnian Muslims				Serbian Orthodox				Slovenian Catholics				US Protestants			
	Me an AF F N= 328	Me an VP RA N= 211	Cha nge (in %)	Dis- tan ce (in %)	Me an AF F N=3 69	Me an VP RA N=1 18	Cha nge (in %)	Dis- tan ce (in %)	Me an AF F N=3 43	Me an VP RA N=8 7	Cha nge (in %)	Dis- tan ce (in %)	Me an AF F N=2 89	Me an VP RA N=1 69	Cha nge (in %)	Dis- tan ce (in %)
Wear sym- bols	3,2 8	3,5 7	+8, 91	28, 66	2,4 3	2,7 5	+13 ,23	44, 92	2,0 3	2,5 3	+24 ,48	49, 43	3,3 2	3,6 4	+9, 40	27, 26
Not con- sume..	4,2 9	4,6 3	+7, 99	7,3 1	2,8 3	3,4 3	+21 ,24	31, 48	2,3 2	3,0 0	+29 ,10	40, 00	3,2 3	3,4 7	+7, 36	30, 58
Re- strain from sex	3,8 6	4,2 9	+10 ,96	14, 25	2,6 7	3,2 5	+21 ,56	35, 08	1,8 7	2,4 0	+28 ,22	51, 95	3,6 5	4,0 4	+10 ,70	19, 16
Refuse medi- cal...	2,6 8	2,9 4	+9, 88	41, 19	1,8 4	2,1 6	+17 ,84	56, 72	1,6 8	2,2 0	+30 ,97	56, 09	2,2 2	2,3 7	+6, 71	52, 57
Re- nounc e	2,7 5	3,0 5	+10 ,68	39, 07	2,0 5	2,3 6	+15 ,32	52, 73	1,7 2	2,0 7	+20 ,00	58, 62	2,3 0	2,4 3	+5, 52	51, 37
prop- erty.	3,0 3	3,3 8	+11 ,69	32, 41	1,8 8	2,2 4	+18 ,83	55, 25	1,7 4	2,0 8	+19 ,42	58, 39	2,5 5	2,8 1	+9, 84	43, 87
Sacri- fice life.	3,0 8	3,4 2	+10 ,97	31, 65	1,6 6	2,0 1	+21 ,20	59, 83	1,5 1	1,8 5	+22 ,55	62, 99	3,1 1	3,4 5	+10 ,97	31, 05
Mean 'reli- gious deeds'	3,2 8	3,6 0	+9, 76	28, 00	2,1 9	2,6 0	+18 ,72	48, 00	1,8 4	2,3 0	+25 ,00	54, 00	2,9 1	3,1 7	+8, 94	36, 60

Note: AFF – Affiliates of religions under consideration.

VPRAFF - Very and Predominantly Religious Affiliates.

Range: All seven 'religious deeds' items were measured on a five-point Likert-type scale: 1 = total absence of willingness, 5 = maximum willingness.

As in Table 2, readiness to commit religious “deeds” is always higher among pronounced believers than in the sample as a whole, it pursues that hypothesis 1 is confirmed. This is to be expected already from the findings in Table 1, where consequentiality appears as part of religiosity itself, not as a separate dimension.

In all the samples we find consequentiality to be lower in samples as wholes, than among the ardent believers. Among Slovenian Catholics a lack of readiness to commit “deeds” prevails, they are followed by the Serbian Orthodox. Contrary to them, consequentiality is highest and very much predominant among the Bosnian Muslims, whereas among the US Protestants consequentiality slightly supersedes the normative means. Findings from all samples indicate that those declaring to be

more pronounced believers also indicate a greater readiness, although differences among them are significant. The difference between sample as a whole and the pronounced believers is greatest among the Slovenian Catholics, basically indicating a low general religiosity.

The 7 religious “deeds” may have insignificantly different meaning in the environments under study, although they uniformly point to the readiness to express loyalty and to “pay the price” for one’s relationship to God. It is noticeable that US Protestants surpass insignificantly even the Bosnian Muslims in the readiness to sacrifice one’s life. The Serbian Orthodox are less ready to refrain from medical interventions than the Slovenian Catholics, probably reflecting the impact of the Catholic doctrine on abortion. Data also show that in all environments greater readiness is demonstrated with regard to items 1-3. In contrast, items no. 7 ranks lowest in the two Christian European environments, whereas it ranks 4th in the latter two environments. Readiness to wear religious symbols and clothes may have a somewhat different connotation in the Bosnian environment, as a return to traditional attire is under way among the youth. Bosnian youths surpass US Protestants in everything, except for the readiness to sacrifice life, a particularly destructive element of religion. Owing to a factor homogeneity of the sacrifice items, we may hold that the meaning of the items was uniform among the samples.

Further we will test religious orientation among the low and high consequent believers, limiting ourselves to the pronounced believers. This is so because Allport supposes that intrinsic religiosity is more “mature” and “healthy”, i.e. the issue should be studied among those substantially religious only.

Table 3.
Religious orientation means for low and high consequent affiliates, by country samples of affiliates

Sample Religious orientation	Bosnian Muslims				Slovenian Catholics				Serbian Orthodox				US Protestants			
	N	M	Std Dev	T Test	N	M	Std. Dev	T test	N	M	Std. Dev	T test	N	M	Std. Dev	T Test
INTRINSIC-NESS	62	3.9	.67	.00	7	2.8	.58	.00	8	3.2	.72	.00	8	4.0	.6	.000
Low consequents		7		2	2	6		0	0	1		1	2	0	4	
High consequents	14	4.2	.61		1	3.7	.72		3	3.7	.74		8	4.4	.4	
	9	7			5	2			8	1			7	2	7	
SOCIAL EX-TRINSICNESS	62	2.0	.87	.57	7	2.3	.93	.04	8	1.8	.82	.06	8	2.3	.7	.054
Low consequents		8		9	2	4		2	0	0		4	2	0	8	
Consequents	14	2.1	1.0		1	2.8	.97		3	2.1	.92		8	2.5	.8	
	9	7	6		5	9			8	2			7	4	1	
PERSONAL EXTRINSIC-NESS	62	4.4	.72	.07	7	3.5	.83	.00	8	4.0	.78	.14	8	3.3	.8	.442
Low consequents		5		3	2	6		7	0	8		6	2	1	7	
High consequents	14	4.6	.56		1	4.1	.56		3	4.3	.72		8	3.2	.8	
	9	1			5	8			8	0			7	1	5	

Note: only predominantly and very religious affiliates are considered. The datum for the T test indicates significance.

We have found that all types of religious motivations are more present among the high consequents, indicating that each motivation contributes to religious consequentiality, contrary to Allport's expectations. There is the exception of one sample. Low consequent US Protestants indicate a higher extrinsic psychological religious orientation. This points to the conclusion that only among the US Protestants does the difference between extrinsicness and intrinsicness operate as Allport expected (Cohen, Hall, Koenig&Meador, 2005; Stark&Bainbridge, 1985, 13). In the European samples, including the Muslim one, all three types of motivations attains higher levels among the high consequents.

The described difference between the high and low consequents is statistically significant only with regard to intrinsic motivation, as indicated by the levels of T coefficient. This is so in all samples. Thus, hypothesis no. 2 may be considered confirmed. "The basis of Allport's distinctions are the consequences with regard to religious behavior of the believer on other areas of life' (Stark & Glock 1968, 18).

Conclusion

Although one may not speak of commendability of religious duplicity, we find it in all environments, even among the ardent believers. Bosnian Islam is indicated by the lowest general level of duplicity, i.e. the highest level of agreement between words and deeds, in contrast to Slovenian Catholicism. The greatest readiness to commit "deeds" is to be found in the two most religious environments, which is in keeping with Stark's modified assertion on the religion having impact on behavior in "moral communities", i. e. communities permeated by religiosity, and less on the basis of individual religiosity. (Stark, Kent & Doyle, 1982).

Our findings can be interpreted also in the light of other Stark's assertions, namely that religiosity rises on the basis of greater and more varied offer, but also on the basis of religious conflict, as is the case in Bosnia (Stark & Finke 2000), Whereas in the American case high religiosity may be attributed to the more varied and richer offer, in the Bosnian case the consequences of war at work.

Other findings on the two European Christian environments may be interpreted by the secularization typical of Europe (Davie, 2000), including Eastern Europe (Norris & Inglehart 2004, 111-132).

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**FROM THE HISTORY OF ISLAM
IN YUGOSLAVIA AND SERBIA:
ISLAM COMMUNITY AND DERVISH ORDERS**

Dragan Novaković

PROCESSES OF THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONAL CONSOLIDATION OF THE ISLAM RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY IN THE SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA

Introduction

The Islam Religious Community in the Socialist Yugoslavia continued the tradition of the Islam organization forms which existed, in the Yugoslav regions, since the Berlin Congress. Considering this fact, we find it justified to present briefly, before proceeding to the central topic of this paper, the position of Islam and the Islam community organization in the provinces and the states that existed till 1945. Namely, after the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878, the Austro-Hungarian government adopted several decrees by which an autonomous Islam religious community was established as independent of the spiritual center in Istanbul. By the Emperor's decree, the Supreme Head was established having the title of Reis-ul-ulema as well as members of the Ulema Medzlis while the state organs fully took over the control over the vakuf possessions. Unsatisfied with this state, the Muslims started, in 1899, a struggle to liberate themselves from an excessive state intervention and to set up the right to administer, on their own, their religious affairs, Islam school system and vakuf possessions. After many years of negotiations, the Muslims' requirements were met and built into the articles of the Statute which, after being signed by the Austrian Emperor, went into effect on May 1, 1909.¹

Respecting the accepted international obligations, the Principality of Serbia officially recognized the freedom of confession of the Islam faith in 1868. After the Berlin Congress, the Islam Religious Community (IRC) organization was established headed by the mufti with its seat in Niš. The Supreme Head as well as the imams were on the state payroll while the general supervision over all the activities and operations of the IRC was done by the church department of the Ministry of Education. By the Resolution of the Ministry Council, adopted after the successful ending of the Balkan wars and a considerable enlargement of the state territory, the mufti of Niš became the Supreme Mufti with the Supreme Muftiship also formed.²

By the articles of the St. Nicholas' Constitution dating 6-19 December 1905, the equality of Islam in Montenegro was acknowledged. After the Balkan wars, the Head Office of sharia was formed headed by the Main Mufti with its seat firstly in Old Bar and then in Podgorica.³ The Islam religious community, on the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, as well as in Macedonia, represented, up to the Balkan wars,

¹ See, "Decree of the Provincial Government from October 17 1882 Concerning the Establishment of the Ulema Medzlis and Reis-ul-ulema"; "Decree of the Provincial Government from September 5 1883 Concerning the Establishment of the Vacuff Rule and Resolution from April 15 1909 on the Statute for Autonomous Administration of Islam Religious, Vacuff and Meariff Affairs" in *Messenger of Legal Acts and Decrees for Bosnia and Herzegovina*, years 1882 and 1909, Provincial Publishers, Sarajevo

² See, *Jubilee Compilation of Life and Work of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians 1918-1928*, Part Two, Published by the *Matica* of Living and Dead Serbs, Croats and Slovenians, Belgrade, 1929, text by H. Rebac, "Islam in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians" page 654; "Decree on the Organization of the Liberated Territories from March 18, 1913," *Serbian papers*, No. 181, 1913

³ *Constitution for the Principality of Montenegro* from 6/19 December 1905, Article 129, Paragraph 3 and Article 135, Paragraph 2, State Publishers, Cetinje, 1905 and D. Tanasković, "Islam Community in Yugoslavia", Anthology *Religion and Society*, Belgrade, 1988

part of the unique IRC of the Ottoman Empire which assumed hierarchical subordination to the central spiritual authorities in Istanbul.⁴ The equality of Islam with the other religions was recognized in Slovenia and Dalmatia by an act brought on July 15, 1912 while in Croatia and Slovenia during the First World War on May 17, 1916.⁵

The position of Islam in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was defined by the St. Vitus' Constitution adopted on June 28, 1921 and confirmed by the so-called Coercive Constitution on 31 September, 1931. The religious communities obtained the status of "public institutions with a special position in the state and special privileges" as well as authority to perform, on behalf of the state, some public-legal issues.⁶ The adopted and acknowledged religious confessions, including the Islam one, had an equal status before the law and they could publicly carry out their rituals. The right to preserving connections with the religious authorities outside the state was guaranteed; the autonomous organizations of religious affairs as well as the administration of endowments and funds were provided for. The religious representatives were prohibited from abusing the religious authority, through institutions of worship, inscriptions of religious character or in any other way, for any political party purposes.⁷

By issuing the Act on the Islam Religious Community on January 31, 1930, a unique organization of the IRC was set up for the territory of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.⁸ The state legislature on the Islam Religious Community was completed on June 4, 1930, by adopting the Act on Electing Reis-ul-ulema, members of the Ulema Medzlis, muftis of the Islam Religious Community and duties of the religious clerks of the given Community.⁹ The Constitution of the Islam Religious Community of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was adopted on July 9 1930 and, according to this Act, Islam was an acknowledged faith in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and fully equal to the other religions. The Community exerts its authority on the basis of sharia, the Act on the Islam Religious Community and its own Constitution while its goals are further advancement of religious life and spread of Islam morality and culture among the faithful.¹⁰

Farther changes in the IRC organization and position were directly linked to the international and internal circumstances (emergence of fascism and Nazism, assassination of King Alexander) and attempts made by the former Serbian state administration to win over, by promoting a new policy, Muslim population to support the realization of its plans. By the Decree of the Government from February 28, 1936, the Act on the Islam Religious Community and the Constitution of the Islam Religious Community in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia were put out of effect.¹¹ By the

⁴ See J. Nikolić, "Administration before Liberation," *Memorial of the 25th Anniversary of the Liberation of South Serbia 1912-1937*, Skopje, 1937, p. 983-994

⁵ M. Begović, *Organization of Islam Faith in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia* "Archive for Law and Social Sciences," 1934, p. 379

⁶ J. Stefanović, *Relations between the Church and the State*, Zagreb, 1953, p. 101. Acknowledged and recognized religious communities took evidence, on behalf of the state, of births, weddings and deaths while marital suits were before the ecclesiastical courts.

⁷ On constitutional position of the religious communities in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians or Yugoslavia see more in *Religion and Society*, Stvarnost, Zagreb, 1969, p. 223-249 and *Religious Communities in Yugoslavia*, Binoza, Zagreb, 1979, p. 45-78

⁸ Act on Islam Religious Community of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, *Official Papers of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia*, No. 99-X, 7 February 1930

⁹ Act from June 5 1930 on the Election of Reis-ul-ulema, Members of Ulema Medzlis and Muftis of the Islam Religious Community of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia according to the Article 3 of the Act on Islam Religious Community and Duties of Religious Clerks of the Given Community, *Official Papers of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia*, No.15 on June 5 1930

¹⁰ Constitution of the Islam Religious Community of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, July 9 1930, *Official Papers of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia* No. 167 on July 25 1930

¹¹ Group of authors, *Socio-political and Legal Position of the Religious Communities in Yugoslavia*, Institute for Contemporary History, Belgrade, 1972, p. 12

given Decree as well as by the later published Act on the Islam Religious Community of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the Islam Religious Community managed to free itself, to a considerable extent, of the state tutorship. The rights were given back to the Islam believers to elect directly their representatives to the most important bodies as well as to manage autonomously the vakuf goods along with the defined general state supervision. A new organization concept of the IRC was completed by the Constitution of the Islam Religious Community adopted on March 25, 1936.¹²

Attempts of the Islam Religious Community to Strengthen and Stabilize Its Internal Organization

The end of the World War Two and the country's liberation the Islam Religious Community faced in an absolute organization disorder. The Act on the Irrelevance of Legal Regulations adopted before April 6 1941 and during the Nazi occupation put out of effect the Act on the Islam Religious Community, the Constitution of the IRC from 1936 and all other normative acts which used to regulate the internal organization and all other issues relevant for the normal functioning of the religious community. Thanks to the help given by the state organs, the elections were scheduled and carried out for all the organs of the IRC on the territories of the People's Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro as well as the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija. The elections were held with great difficulties due to non-updated lists of electors, inabilities of lower organs and disturbances by some influential members of the IRC who were not ready to accept the new government as well as an expressed wish on the part of the majority of the IRC to consolidate and regulate its relations with the state.

The first session of the Supreme Vakuf Council at which a vertical organization of the IRC was set up was held on August 26-7 1947 in Sarajevo. The Constitution of the IRC was adopted and, according to its regulations, the new reis-ul-ulema became Ibrahim Fejić just as members of the Supreme Islam Presidency were elected. The handing-over of the menshura to the newly-elected reis was done on September 12, 1947, in the Gazi Husrev-Bey's Mosque.¹³ The established organization was characterized by the unity of the whole IRC on the territory of Yugoslavia as well as the following of the federal structure of the new state.¹⁴

Since the new Constitution aimed at ensuring the work of the IRC in the changed historical circumstances, we find it meaningful to present the basic regulations according to which the complete religious life was organized.¹⁵ The Constitution determines that all the Islam believers in the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia make up a single religious community whose basic goal is to sustain and develop religious life among the members of Islam. The Islam Religious Community publicly professes its doctrine and autonomously administers all the affairs and possessions. The following organs of the Constitution are established: Dzemat, Dzemat Imam, Dzemat Board, Vakuf Commissariat, Ulema Medzlis, Vakuf Council with the Council Board and Vakuf Direction, Supreme Vakuf Council with the Supreme Council Board and the Supreme Islam Presidency headed by the reis-ul-ulema. The Dzemat consists of members of the IRC who live at a certain territory. The Dzemat imam is a representative of the Dzemat and his main responsibility is to perform

¹² *Constitution of the Islam Religious Community of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia*, State Publishers, Sarajevo, 1936

¹³ "Some Facts about the Work of the Supreme Islam Presidency in the FPRY", *Messenger of the Supreme Islam Presidency* (further in the text: *Messenger of the SIP*), 1951/1-3, p. 67-75

¹⁴ *Messenger of the SIP*, 1950/1-3, p. 70-71

¹⁵ Integral text of the first Constitution of the Islam Religious Community in the FPRY was published in the first postwar issue of the *Messenger of the SIP*, 1950/1-3, p. 59-67

religious rituals and care about the overall religious life in the dzemat. The dzemat members elect their Board to take care about possessions and financial needs of the Dzemat. The Vakuf Commissariat is a religious-education and economic organ and it is formed together with two or more dzemats. It primarily supervises the work of the dzemat boards and takes care about all the IRC needs on its territory.

The Ulema Medzlis is the main organ for religious and religious-educational affairs on its territory which is identical to that of the Vakuf Council. It consists of three or four members elected by the respective Vakuf council. This organ manages all religious affairs of the IRC and, in that sense, it supervises the work of lower organs; it interprets particular religious issues; it decides upon the curriculum and syllabi for religious schools and instruction courses approved by the Supreme Religious Presidency; it prescribes qualifications for religious clerks and appoints them. The Vakuf Council is the highest regulatory and executive organ of the IRC on its territory. Four vakuf councils were formed, for the territory of the People's Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia; for the People's Republic of Serbia; for the People's Republic of Macedonia and for the People's Republic of Montenegro. The Council had many responsibilities; to single out only a few of them here, it was to make decisions about organization and work of the IRC organs, to decide upon the building of mosques, religious schools and other institutions, to determine the budget and approve of final bill of lower bodies. The Council Board is an organ of the Vakuf Council while the Vakuf Commissariat is an executive and technical organ of the Vakuf Council and of the Council Board.

The Supreme Islam Presidency represents a unity of all the members of the IRC in the FPRY and it consists of the reis-ul-ulema and one member from each region of every Vakuf Council. The Reis and the members of this body are elected by the Supreme Vakuf Council. The Supreme Islam Presidency determines the main directions of the religious life; it gives compulsory interpretations of religious issues and problems; it decides on the conflicts of authority among particular ulema medzlis; it takes care of religious schools and it gives its approval of their curricula and syllabi; ultimately, it decides upon all the complaints against the resolutions made by the lower organs. The seat of the Supreme Islam Presidency is in Sarajevo. The Reis-ul-ulema is President of the Supreme Presidency and the chief Head of all the members of the IRC in the FPRY. It is also assumed that the Reis has a deputy from the members of the Supreme Presidency.

The Supreme Vakuf Council is made up of all the members of all the Vakuf councils which the councils elect from their members. It meets once a year at its regular sessions while, if needed, special sessions could also be held. The decisions are made if two-thirds of the members are present while for the election of the reis-ul-ulema as well as changes and additions to the Constitution three-fourths of the members are needed in addition to the obligation that for the election or the decision in question at least two-thirds of the overall number should vote. The Council, as the highest organ of the IRC, endows the menshura to the Reis to do the affairs of the supreme head; it brings about the budget and approves of the yearly balance of sheet of the common organs and exerts a disciplinary rule over the members of the Supreme Islam Presidency. The Supreme Council Board is an organ of the Supreme Vakuf Council and it consists of five members that the Council elects from its members. The Council Board prepares sessions of the Supreme Council; it provides for income for the supreme organs and decides on urgent issues instead of the Supreme Council.¹⁶

¹⁶ The Constitution of the Islam Religious Community adopted in 1947 was added to and modified many times. See *Messenger of the SIP*, 1957/1-3, p. 97-104; *Messenger of the SIP*, 1959/7-9, p. 363-371; *Mes-*

The constitution of the republic organs in accordance with the regulations of the new Constitution were accompanied with numerous difficulties. By great efforts made by the supreme organs all the obstacles and resistance were overcome so that this complex task was successfully completed. The vakuf councils of the republics brought about the majority of the needed normative acts, for the sectors of the religious life that the new Constitution passed on to the republican organs. The published composition of all the organs of the IRC showed that to the most important organs of the IRC the carriers of the most responsible functions of the former state were elected. The members of the Supreme Vakuf Council were Dr Zaim Šarac, Federal Minister of Post, Mehmed Hodža, Minister of Mining of the People's Republic of Serbia, Osman Miftari, Judge of the Supreme Court of Macedonia, Fazlija Alikalfić, Dean of the Agricultural-Forestry Faculty of Sarajevo and Mustafa Kamarić, Chief for Legislature and Establishment of People's Rule of the Government of the People's Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁷

The establishment of organization and unity on the territory of the whole Yugoslavia enabled the preparation for elections of the organs of the IRC at all the levels. The elections were held in the spring and summer of 1951 while the constitution of the republic councils was done in the autumn of that year. The constitutional sessions held in the Republics as well as the elections of the representatives for the supreme organs provided for, on November 24, 1951 in Sarajevo, the First Meeting of the Second Session of the Supreme Vakuf Council of the IRC in the FPRY.¹⁸ Problems in the organization of the religious life in the People's Republic of Macedonia gave rise to early elections for all the IRC organs. The Constitutional meeting of the newly-elected Vakuf Council was held in Skopje on July 29, 1954. Due to a large number of resignations and emigration of some members of the highest administration to Turkey, more new people who had had no responsible functions in the Islam Community in Macedonia before were elected.¹⁹ During the fall of 1955, the elections on the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro were held; the supreme republic vakuf councils were constituted. After electing the representatives for the Supreme Vakuf Council, the first meeting of the third session of the highest organ of the IRC was held in Sarajevo on December 4, 1955. The Council members chose, as their president, the retired Vice President of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina and member of the Second Session of the Anti-fascist Assembly of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia, Sulejman Filipović.²⁰

senger of the SIP, 1963/7-8, p. 347; *Messenger of the SIP*, 1964/7-9, p. 440-448 and *Messenger of the SIP*, 1968/1-2-3, p. 135.

¹⁷ Supreme Vakuf Council had 24 members, 9 of them from the territory of the Vakuf Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia, nine from Serbia, five from Macedonia and one from Montenegro. *Messenger of the SIP*, 1950/4-7, p. 189-192 and the Archive of Yugoslavia, of the Federal Commission for Religious Issues, 144484, Archive of Serbia, Provincial Commission for Religious Issues of the People's Republic of Serbia, G-21, F-7.

¹⁸ Number of the members of the Supreme Vakuf Council remained unchanged while the previously established proportion of the delegates from particular Republics was preserved, *Messenger of the SIP*, 1951/10-12, p. 406-439

¹⁹ Proceedings of the Annual Assembly of the Vakuf Council of the IRC on July 29 1954 in Skopje, *Messenger of the SIP*, 1954/9-10, p. 223-235. For the support of the consolidation of the religious life in Macedonia, the Supreme Vakuf Council held its fourth meeting in Skopje on November 17 1954, *Messenger of the SIP*, 1954/11-12, p. 290-312

²⁰ Proceedings of the First Regular Meeting (Third session) of the Supreme Vakuf Council Held on December 4 1955 in the Council Hall of the Vakuf Commissariat in Sarajevo and the Report on the Work of the Supreme Islam Presidency in the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in 1955 submitted to the Supreme Vakuf Council, *Messenger of the SIP*, 1955/11-12, p. 409-431

The development and advancement of the religious life as well as incompleteness of some regulations of the IRC Constitution pointed to the need to adopt special statutes for the territories of some vakuf councils. The Vakuf Council of the People's Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia discussed the issuing of a special statute for its territory at almost every meeting but its prolongation was explained as due to the need to issue the Act on the Legal Position of Religious Communities as well as later announced changes of the Constitution of the IRC.²¹ The Resolution on the Issuing the Statute was put into effect at the First regular meeting (of the third session) of the Vakuf Council for the People's Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on October 1955.²² After extensive preparations and involvement of experts of different profiles in the process of its making, "The Statute of the Islam Religious Community on the Territory of the Vakuf Council in Sarajevo" was adopted at the session of the Vakuf Council on December 16, 1956.²³ The adoption of the Statute in Bosnia and Herzegovina encouraged the other vakuf councils to normatively shape and strengthen their organizations.

This period of time was also marked by the election of a new head. The reis-ul-ulema Ibrahim Fejić gave, on October 30 1957, his resignation because of his poor health and old age. The Supreme Vakuf Council elected, on November 15 of the same year, as the new reis-ul-ulema, Sulejman Kemura, Director of the Gazi Husrev-Bey's Madrasah, Editor of the *Messenger of the Supreme Islam Presidency* (SIP) and Secretary of the Association of Ilmia (Muslim clergy).²⁴

Due to the undefined status of particular organs and insufficiently differentiated functions that they were supposed to perform, on July 13 1959, extensive changes of the Constitution of the IRC were undertaken.²⁵ The changes of the Constitution conditioned the elections at all the levels held in the autumn of 1959. The first meeting of the Supreme Council of the fourth session was held in Sarajevo on December 17, 1959.²⁶ The main task of all the organs elected in the fourth session was to put into effect the new constitutional regulations by which the organization of the religious community would be strengthened as well as the assumptions created for its successful functioning. The reorganization of the Supreme Islam Presidency was done just as the position of the major religious-education chief was established. By the Resolution of the reis-ul-ulema, as the first religious-educational chief was

²¹ Report of the Council Board submitted to the Vakuf Council of the People's Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on July 7, 1955, *Messenger of the SIP*, 1955/5-7, p. 207-217

²² Future Tasks of the IRC, Paper submitted at the meeting of the Vakuf Council on May 3 1955, *Messenger of the SIP*, 1955/11-12, p. 402-407

²³ Proceedings of the Second Regular Meeting (of third session) of the Vakuf Council in Sarajevo held on December 16 1956 in the Council hall of the Vakuf Commissariat in Sarajevo, *Messenger of the SIP*, 1957/1-3, p. 82-96. The Vakuf Council of the People's Republic of Serbia adopted the first Statute on July, 10, 1948 while more extensive changes were made on May 24 1970.

²⁴ The election procedure and address of the new supreme head were published in the *Messenger of the SIP*, 1958/1-2, p. 1-129. The former reis-ul-ulema Ibrahim Fejić died on February 16, 1962, *Messenger of the SIP*, 1963/1-2, p. 3-6.

²⁵ Report on the Work of the Supreme Islam presidency and Supreme Vakuf Council, *Messenger of the SIP*, 1960/1-3, p. 123-134

²⁶ Ratified are the terms of 13 members of the Supreme Council from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 12 from Serbia, 7 from Macedonia and 3 from Montenegro. The Council members elected as their president Sulejman Filipović. The reis-ul-ulema deputy was released from duty as well as all the members of the Supreme Islam Presidency. The choice of the presidents of the republic presidencies was confirmed; they became, according to the New Constitution, together with the reis-ul-ulema, members of the Supreme Islam Presidency. Especially elected Commission suggested while the Council chose from its members new six members of the Supreme Presidency, *First Meeting of the Fourth Session of the Supreme Council of the Islam Religious Community in the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia*, *Messenger of the SIP*, 1960/1-3, p. 116-135

appointed, in March 1961, Husein Đozo, a well-known Islam activist and graduate from the Al-Azhar University. The department for statistics and evidence was established with the basic purpose to follow all the data and changes concerning the status of the religious clerks, building and adaptation of religious objects and other facts of importance for the central and other organs of the IRC.

An analysis of the proceedings of the republic council sessions as well as of the reports on work of the Presidency shows that the central problem of religious life, at that time, was to instruct the main imams to take up the constitutional function and become the pillars of all the religious activities on a given territory. Most of the main imams had no respective education; neither were they able to carry out successfully the assigned tasks. Special consulting service was organized for the main imams but the situation did not change essentially, especially in the regions of Serbia and Macedonia. An additional problem in their work was the mixing of competences with commissariats and an indefinite attitude of these two organs towards the presidencies.²⁷

After the changes to the Constitutions, on May 14, 1963, the conditions were ready to organize new elections for all the IRC organs. The planning of the election activities was undertaken with great care and in several articles published in the *Messenger of the SIP* it is clearly stated what the candidates were expected to do and what criteria they had to satisfy. It was also stated that the relations with the state were good and that there were no reasons to fear any acceptance of the duties within the religious community. The Islam Religious Community was facing great and responsible tasks and they could not be realized without the engagement of the most capable people and without radical generation turnover. The proposed candidates had to satisfy only two conditions: that they were good Muslims and patriots.²⁸ Starting from these attitudes and criteria, the elections were held in the fall of 1963.

The first meeting of the Supreme Council of the fifth session was held in Belgrade on December 15, 1963.²⁹ The Supreme Islam Presidency did not submit a classical Report on its Work but, instead, a unified report on current problems and future tasks of the SIP and the entire Islam Religious Community. It was estimated that the success of the IRC depended on proper work of the new organ "Board of the IC" which is placed at the very hub of the religious life. The supreme and republic organs transferred to the Board the issue of financing religious and religious-educational activities, handling and managing of the IRC possessions, paying off of the incomes for religious clerks, safeguarding, repair and construction of religious objects and responsibility for normal religious life. The report clearly showed that the activities of the Islam Community since the liberation to this very meeting of the Supreme Council could be regarded as the period of adaptation. The established relations with the state organs and further material and organization strengthening provided for a new period of development whose main characteristic should have been an enhanced activity of all the organs of the IRC in solving the most important problems of the religious life.³⁰ The reis-ul-ulema was hosting lunch prepared for all the members of the Supreme Board and guests. On that very day, President of the

²⁷ Meetings of the Supreme Board in this session were held on April 8 1961, *Messenger of the SIP*, 1961/14-6, p. 194-217; on May 5 1962, *Messenger of the SIP*, 1962/4-6, p. 169-187 and on May 14 1963, *Messenger of the SIP* 1963/7-8, p. 344-367. See proceedings of the held republic councils and reports on the presidencies' activities published in the above-mentioned issues.

²⁸ Concerning the Oncoming Elections in the Islam Religious Community, *Messenger of the SIP*, 1963/7-8, p. 275-281

²⁹ *Messenger of the SIP*, 1964/1-2, p. 71-87

³⁰ "First Meetings of the Fifth Session of the Supreme Council of the Islam Religious Community in the SFR of Yugoslavia held in Belgrade on December 18 1963," *Messenger of the SIP*, 1964/1-2, p. 71-87

Federal Commission for Religious Issues also gave a party for the same guests at the Federal Assembly Members' Club.³¹

The platform for new elections comprising the tasks that the IRC should carry out as well as the conditions that the candidates had to satisfy for all the organs were presented by Husein Đozo in an article published in the *Messenger of the Supreme Islam Presidency*. While trying to point out to the essence, he also expressed his view that the values of Islam were being incorporated in the conscience of its faithful and there were no longer any objective reasons that socialism should be regarded as a monster for the believers; neither should religion and religious people be regarded as a threat to the new social order. The economic reform and the Plenum of Brioni released the energy pent up so far and provided for coexistence between the believing people and the then prevailing ideology. The introduced changes gave a unique opportunity to the IRC to protect itself from profiteers, critics and pseudo-politicians who had no courage to stick to their faith and who now tried to impose themselves as saviors of Islam on the Yugoslav territory. The time came for a resolute delivery from all the "saviors smelling of naphthalene" and claimants eager to "mount an almost completely saddled horse" and to give confidence to young and healthy forces conscious of the current situation and able to fight for the prosperity of the IRC and the faith they belonged to. Now it was the time for the older generation to be freed of the responsibility for the development of the religious life; care about the IRC should be left to the young personnel who more powerfully and more properly experienced our social reality and more profoundly felt the new needs of their faith.³²

The Sixth elections for all the organs of the Islam Religious Community in the former Yugoslavia were held in the fall of 1967 while the Supreme Council was constituted in Ohrid on November 13, 1967. The conclusions defining concrete tasks of the Islam Religious Community in the following four year period were unanimously adopted.³³ The realization of the Supreme Council's conclusions which were formulated for the first time in the form of clear and precise tasks obligatory for the Supreme Islam Presidency represented the basis for further activities of all the organs of the IRC elected in the sixth session. During the meeting in Zagreb on November 12, 1968, the Supreme Council stated the obligation of all the organs, religious clerks and believers to collect and send objects of historical values to the Museum of the IRC; it also brought about the resolution to set up the Museum of Education and Culture of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina which was supposed

³¹ The lunch and the reception were attended by Moma Marković, Member of the FXA (Federal Executive Assembly), Patriarch of Serbia German with the Bishop Moravički Sava, Svetislav Stefanović, member of the FEA, Hakija Pozderac, member of the FEA, Vojin Lukić, Federal Minister for Internal Affairs, Avdo Humo, member of the FEA, Dr Milivoj Rukavina, Secretary of the FEA, Todo Kurtović, member of the Federal Parliament, Mato Radulović, President of the Federal Commission for Religious Affairs, Stevan Doronjski, Vice President of the Executive Board of Serbia, Nemanja Marković, President of the Republic Commission for Religious Affairs of Serbia, Hašim Mustafa, member of the Executive Assembly and President of the Commission for Religious Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Drago Stipović, State Councilor in the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs, Milivoje Dilparić, Secretary of the Federal Commission for Religious Affairs, Jovan Sekulić, Director of the Institute for the Protection of the Monuments of Culture of the City of Belgrade, Dr Janez Jenko, Vicar Bishop of the Belgrade Archbishopric, Archpriest Miljan Smiljanić, President and Archpriest Milutin Petrović, Secretary of the Association of the Unified Orthodox Clergy of Yugoslavia, Ibid, p. 72

³² H. Đozo, "Towards New Elections for the Council Members," *Messenger of the SIP*, 1967/5-6, p. 222-226

³³ According to the Constitution of the IRC, the Council from Bosnia and Herzegovina delegated 13 representatives, 12 were from Serbia, 7 from Macedonia and 3 from Montenegro which all in all made up 35 members of the Supreme Council, "The Republic Elections Held and Elected the Supreme Council of the Islam Religious Community in the SFRY in 1967," *Messenger of the SIP*, 1968/1-2-3, p. 104-137

to be located in the newly-redecorated premises of the Kuršumlija Muslim Secondary School in Sarajevo.³⁴

In 1969 the new Constitution of the Islam Community in which all the most important changes done in the period of over twenty years were introduced. Since the basic articles of the text from 1947 are already presented, we will briefly point to only the most basic and essential differences. The name of the religious community, that was valid from 1882, that is, from the Decree on Organization of the Islam Religious Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Austrian-Hungarian administration was changed. The word "religious" was left out and the new name "Islam Community" was introduced and this could be related to the decision made by the former authorities to promote a new nation, the Muslim one. The dzemat boards were abolished as well as commissariat; instead, boards were established as new basic organization form. Similar to the articles of the Constitution of the IRC from 1930, this Constitution again re-introduced mufti into the organization of the IC. Due to mixing of authorities and their non-defined positions, the ulema medzlis and council boards were abolished. Their affairs were taken over by a new body, Presidency, which was, according to the adopted organization scheme, an executive organ of the Council. The words such as "vakuf" were deleted from the definition of the names of the Republic and Supreme Councils. The Supreme Council Board was abolished while the organ of the Supreme Council was now the Supreme Islam Presidency. The presidents of the Republican Presidency were included in the composition of the Supreme Islam Presidency which was supposed to create the prerequisites for better adjustment of politics and for a more efficient work. The jurisdiction of the reis-ul-ulema as the supreme head was better defined while, in the light of the importance of the function he performs, according to the new Constitution, he was elected by a special electoral body instead of the former Supreme Vakuf Council, that is, Supreme Council.³⁵

New elections for all the organs of the Islam Community, in the then Yugoslavia, were held in the fall of 1971. The constitutional meeting of the Supreme Council was held in Belgrade, on December 27, 1971, when the conclusions were adopted as guidelines for activities in the subsequent period.³⁶ The next meeting took place on December 24 1972; it was marked with the resolution of the controversy with the IC organs from Macedonia that expressed their dissatisfaction with the fact that the Supreme Council, at its Constitutional meeting, did not verify the terms of three of its members elected in Macedonia (Šukri Ramo, Dr Halid Šabani and Bedri Osmani). The objections from Macedonia were rejected with the explanation that the above-mentioned council-members stated, before the verification commission, that they were Muslims by faith but they did not belong to the Muslim community, that is, they were not practicing believers.³⁷ After this controversy that

³⁴ Report on the Work of the Supreme Islam Presidency of the Islam Religious Community in the SFR Yugoslavia on November 14, 1967, till November, 12, 1968 submitted to the Supreme Council of the Islam Religious Community in the SFR Yugoslavia at the meeting in Zagreb on November 12, 1968" *Messenger of the SIP*, 1969/3-4, p. 173-189

³⁵ Constitution of the Islam Community in the Socialist federative Republic of Yugoslavia, *Messenger of the SIP*, 1970/1-2, p. 35-48

³⁶ Regular Annual Meeting of the Council of the Islam Community in 1971 with the Report of the Supreme Islam Presidency of the Islam Community in the SFRY in Sarajevo on Its Work in the Period from December 26 1970 to December 27 1971 submitted to the Supreme Council of the Islam Community at its Meeting held in Belgrade on December 27 1971, *Messenger of the SIP*, 1971/3-4, p. 171-197

³⁷ Report of the Supreme Islam Presidency of the Islam Community in the SFRY from December 28, 1971 till September 24, 1972, submitted to the Supreme Council of the Islam Community in the SFRY at its meeting held in Belgrade on December 24, 1972, *Messenger of the SIP*, 1973/3-4, p. 145-174

the IC came out of as a moral winner, no longer were socio-political actors already having responsible state functions elected to its representative bodies.

The Supreme Head of the IC Suleiman Kemura died on January 19, 1975. His funeral was attended by Patriarch German and Archbishop of Zagreb Franjo Kuharić. A special electoral body, as assumed by the Constitution of the IC, elected on March 22 1975 a new reis-ul-ulema Naim Hadžiabdić, former President of the Presidency of the IC for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia. The inauguration and handing-over of the menshura to the new head were done in Sarajevo on May 18, 1975.³⁸

After the elections and constitution of republic councils, the first meeting of the Supreme Council in its new session was held in Belgrade on May 24, 1976. The newly-elected reis-ul-ulema Naim Hadžiabdić held its address which was accepted by the Supreme Council as a program conception of future work. The central place in the Reis-ul-ulema's Address was his estimate that the IC in the then Yugoslavia was the largest and best organized group of Islam believers in Europe and that, for this reason, it has a special responsibility for preserving Islam on the continent. The postwar period was characterized by steady strengthening of the IC; yet, there are many possibilities to eliminate, by much more active engagement of all responsible actors, the perceived weaknesses and thus achieve even better results in organizing and improving the religious life as well as solving conceptual, organizational, staff and financial issues.³⁹

The realization of the platform presented by the reis-ul-ulema marked the overall activities of all the organs of the IC elected in the new session. Due to the need to observe carefully some very important sectors of the religious life, a resolution was adopted to organize a conference in which the highest representatives of the IC from the whole country as well as experts in particular fields would take place. Such conferences were held in Sarajevo (July, 15-16, 1976), Priština (January, 26-27, 1977), Titograd (February, 7-8, 1978) and Sarajevo (March 17-18, 1979).⁴⁰

After four years of work the Supreme Council and all the IC organs completed their terms. New elections were held in the spring of 1980 and after that republic councils were constituted while delegates to the Supreme Council were chosen. The first meeting of the Supreme Council was held on June 11 in the same year; at this meeting President, Vice Presidents and members of the Supreme Presidency were elected. The Report on the Work of the SIP was adopted; in it, the main attention was devoted to the great achievements made in the field of Islam education. As guidelines for future work, the Supreme Council adopted many conclusions and concrete actions for their realization.⁴¹ The newly-elected organs of the Islam Community devoted considerable attention to the improvement of the activities of the IC boards as the basic cells of the religious life on site. After many conclusions of the Supreme Council devoted to the improvement of the boards' work, an analytical text was published in the *Messenger of the Supreme Islam Presidency* whose main task was to point to presidents and employees to some postulates of modern organization of work in boards. A detailed analysis was given of the ways the meetings are presided over, the materials are prepared, the agenda is suggested, the calls for meetings are organized, the meetings are held, as well as of the ways of working with religious clerks and cooperating with mosque boards.⁴²

³⁸ About these events, see *Messenger of the SIP*, 1975/3-4, p. 101-139 and 1975/5-6, p. 203-263

³⁹ "Council's Meeting", *Messenger of the SIP*, 1977/3, p. 305-343, 1978/4, p. 320-370, 1979/4, p. 349-384

⁴⁰ See *Messenger of the SIP*, 1977/3, p. 305-343, p. 320-370 and 1979/4, p. 349-384

⁴¹ Report on the Work of the Supreme Islam Presidency in 1979/80 with the Conclusions of the Supreme Council, *Messenger of the SIP*, 1980/4, p. 161-198

⁴² I. Malbašić, "Organization of Islam Work on the territories of the IC boards," *Messenger of the SIP*, 1982/6, p. 678-689

After the term had expired, the elections for a new session of all the organs of the IC were held in the spring of 1984. The Supreme Council was constituted at a meeting in Belgrade on May 19 1984. According to the established practice, the conclusions were adopted as orientations in the future work of the IC organs at all the levels. The Council insisted on firmer discipline and improvement of the material position of all the religious clerks. Again the need was stressed to preserve the unity of the Islam Community which was to be best achieved by cooperation at all the levels, by agreements and exchange of experiences among particular organs.⁴³

The dismissal of President of the Presidency for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia, Dr Ahmed Smajlović, that took place in this period, was not commented on in the reports on work of the Supreme Islam Presidency which were regularly submitted to the Supreme Council for adoption. One of the most influential theologians who has achieved high education along with the ph.d. at the Al-Azhar University in Cairo was dismissed in March 1985 from all the functions and was also eliminated from the highest ranks of the Islam Community at the request of the state organs that estimated that A. Smajlović took the fundamentalist position and that he steadily carried out the instructions obtained from the Rabit and other international Islam organizations. President of the Serbian Commission for the Relations with Religious Communities explained, in the following way, activities done by A. Smajlović, "The activities of A. Smajlović are judged as unacceptable both for financial abuses as well as for importing into our country and promoting, through printed media and in other ways, pan-Islamic ideas and other unacceptable beliefs. For these reasons it imposes itself as a necessity to prevent further harmful activities of Smajlović's."⁴⁴ The then reis-ul-ulema N. Hadžiabdić described the dismissal of A. Smajlović in a "diplomatic" way, "Reis has said that he has undertaken energetic actions to prevent, in the future, all manifestations of indiscipline and that no one can, without his permit, travel abroad and take part in the work of international Islam organizations. On this occasion the Reis emphasized that the Islam community in Yugoslavia acts as completely independent of Islam organizations (Rabit and the like) as well as the countries that tend to impose on others their way of life and worldviews (Iran, Saudi Arabia)."⁴⁵

Instead of the expected more energetic distance from the dismissed high executive, the Supreme Council and republic presidencies reacted many times to numerous commentaries that were, on occasion of this case and the overall policy of the Islam Community, published in social press. The need to change the so-far-dominant policy was stated in an author's commentary published in early 1986. Dissatisfaction was expressed; changes were asked for in the pedagogical-educational system, publishing, mass education, safeguarding of cultural legacy and heritage and struggle against conservatism. The given demands had no goal to re-question the work done so far or to eliminate some unacceptable manifestations in the religious life but to make the IC organs additionally engage themselves for the sake of achieving even better results.⁴⁶

⁴³ Report on the Work of the Supreme Presidency of the Islam Community in the SFRY with the Conclusions of the Supreme Council of the Islam Community in the SFRY Held on May 19 1984, *Messenger of the SIP*, 1984/3, p. 337-368

⁴⁴ Belgrade Mufti in the Commission, *Information Concerning Relations with Religious Communities, Material of the Serbian Commission*, March, 1985, p. 5. A copy is kept in the Archive of the Ministry of Faith

⁴⁵ "Reis-ul-ulema Paid a Visit to the Commission," *Information Concerning Relations with Religious Communities, Material of the Serbian Commission*, June, 1985, p. 5. A copy is kept in the Archive of the Ministry of Faith

⁴⁶ H. Buljina, "For Faster Development and Affirmation of the Islam Community," *Messenger of the SIP*, 1986/2, p. 121-130

After twelve years as the head of the IR on July 3, 1987, the Supreme Head Naim Hadžiabdić died. With great problems and overcoming numerous resistances given by Albanians-members of the supreme organs of the IC and a special electoral body, as his heir, on October 31, 1987, the Mufti of Tuzla, Husein Mujući was elected. The taking-over of the menshura was done in Belgrade on December 11 1987.⁴⁷

These elections enabled the constitution of the Supreme Council at a meeting in Belgrade on April 8 1988. The conclusions were adopted in which the reis-ul-ulema presented part of his political platform. It was required from all the organs of the RC to promote the policy of brotherhood and unity and thus contribute to stopping the process of Serbs and Montenegrins' moving away from Kosovo. The presidencies and other organs were bound to devote as much attention as possible to the religious instruction and to plan, while designing new mosques, premises for this purpose. The Supreme Council was bound to prevent, as agreed with respective organs, to limit, through changes of the Act on the Legal Position of Religious Communities, the age of those attending the religious instruction.⁴⁸

Dissatisfied with the overall state in the IC and his position, the Mufti of Belgrade launched an initiative, in early 1991, which was accepted by Belgrade Board of the IC, to separate the muftiship of Belgrade from the official IC for the Republic of Serbia and declare its independence. This decision the Mufti of Belgrade was explained in the following words, "The main reason for this decision lies in many years of discrimination of these boards (namely, those of Belgrade, Niš, Novi Sad, Mali Zvornik) by the Presidency in Priština as well as the attempts of Albanization of the Muslim people in Serbia while the most immediate cause is the unconstitutional change of the whole Republic Presidency and its placement under the control of the Albanian separatist and nationalist alternative, the change of the Constitution of the IC and the change of the name of the Republic Presidency into the Presidency of the IC for Kosovo, Serbia and Vojvodina as well as the refusal to verify the term of Belgrade Mufti for membership in the Supreme Council and to accept his nomination for the Supreme Head of the IC."⁴⁹ The then brought decision about independence of Belgrade Mufti is still in effect.

The last three years of work of the Islam Community were characterized with the attempts to take a position in the social changes that were already beginning and to adjust the organization to a new role of religion and religious communities. After the protest of imams in Bosnia and Herzegovina a new policy was promoted; the most dominant influence was of the powers under the pressure of which the reis-ul-ulema H. Mujić, in late 1889, retired and a new temporary deputy of the Supreme Head became J. Selimoski. A decision was made to undertake the change of the Constitution which was adopted by the Supreme Council on April 12 1990.

Since this is the last Constitution of the unified IC in the SFRY, for the sake of a systematic survey, we will only point to the differences which were introduced into the new Constitution with respect to the old one as well as some solutions characteristic for the new text. To the Islam Community in the SFRY also belong Yugoslav emigrants and temporary emigrant workers. The aims of the Islam Community were considerably enlarged as revealing the ambition of the authors of the Constitu-

⁴⁷ About these events, see *Messenger of the SIP*, 1987/4, p. 435-574, 1987/6, p. 710-737

⁴⁸ "Report on the Work of the Supreme Islam Presidency in the SFRY in the period from April 18 1987 to April 8 1988," *Messenger of the SIP*, 1988/3, p. 299-341, "Conclusions of the Supreme Council of the Islam Community in the SFRY," *Messenger of the SIP*, 1988/2, p. 129-131, and "Report on the Work of the Supreme Presidency (Riaset) of the Islam Community in Yugoslavia," *Messenger of the SIP*, 1990/5, p. 114-124

⁴⁹ "Note on the Conversation between Minister of Faith D. Dragojlović and Belgrade Mufti H. Jusufspahić on March 3 1991," p. 1-2. The original is kept in the Archive of the Ministry of Faith

tion for the religious community to replace the state and its organs in many functions. It was assumed that the IC should establish libraries, museums, institutes, archives, health and social care institutions. Cooperation with Islam communities and foreign organizations was elevated to the level of constitutional obligation.

Similarly to the norms adopted by the society, the obligation of the IC was also defined that, in its work, it should respect the principles of public work, the election of its organs, responsibilities, replacement of organs and executives and consulting in administration of its affairs. The new Constitution explicitly and for the first time prescribed the rights and responsibilities of the members of the IC. Every believer had the right to confess and practice his faith, to actively participate in religious life, to educate and bring up children in the spirit of Islam, to elect and be elected into the IC organs, to use the institutions and property of the community, to give proposals for advancement of the religious life and be informed about the work of the IC. The believers of the IC were obliged to adhere to the Islam regulations, customs and traditions, to give contribution for the Community maintenance and safeguard its reputation.

The organs of the Islam Community were identical to the previous one. The names were changed, so that the Presidency became "Meshicat" while the "Supreme Islam Presidency" became "Riaset." The muftiship as a special organ headed by muftis was introduced. The dervish orders were integrated into the structure of the Islam Community and their work was controlled by meshicats of the territories they are active on. The presidents of the Meshicat (Presidency), by the new Constitution, were elected and released from duty by the Republic Council while, by the previous Constitution, this was in the jurisdiction of the Supreme Islam Presidency and the reis-ul-ulema. The Riaset, as the executive organ of the Supreme Council, in addition to the Reis and Presidents of the Meshicats, was now made up of two members elected on each council territory as well. In its constitution, the Riaset selects, from its members, a deputy who manages all the affairs in the case of the reis's absence. The Supreme Head was obligatory elected among many candidates for the period of eight years with the possibility of another subsequent term.

A new organ, namely, the Islam Council, was established with the basic goal to control the constitutionalism and legality and interpretation of the Islam regulations within the IC in the SFRY. The Council had nine members elected and released from duty by the Supreme Council from the ranks of distinguished Islam experts. The members were elected for six years and in that period they could not be in the representational and executive organs of the IC. The Council work was administered by President and two Vice Presidents elected at the constitutional meeting.

The elections were done by secret voting among many candidates while the resignation of the president of the executive organ assumes the resignation of the other members as well. As a sign of loyalty it was also assumed that all the highest executive pledge an oath. During the changes of the Constitution the Commission for making a draft was formed while the public discussion after which the proposal was determined was obligatory. What was preserved was the article about obligatory two-thirds support of the members of the Supreme Council for every addition and change of the Constitution.⁵⁰

This Constitution was adopted at the time when the crisis on the territory of former Yugoslavia was already in the air. Its articles, to a great extent, were the result of the prevalence of those forces in the Islam Community which opted for a greater and more decisive political engagement in all the processes of importance for

⁵⁰ "Constitution of the Islam Community in the SFRY," *Messenger of the SIP*, 1990/2, p. 11-29

the future of the common state. According to the former political aspirations and intentions to preserve the unity of the Community, the Constitution tried to preserve the supremacy of the central organs; yet, it transferred part of their jurisdiction, especially in the procedure for electing the highest executives to the republican organs.

According to the new Constitution, the elections were announced for all the organs of the Islam Community which were held, with great difficulties, in the fall of 1990.⁵¹ The constitutional meeting of the Supreme Council took place in Sarajevo on January 13, 1991. It was decided to have, on March 9, a meeting of the body for electing the supreme head with the obligation that all the councils, by February 15, should submit to the electoral commission their list of candidates. The Council elected the members of the commission for religion-education, finances, proposals and complaints, constitutional commission and that for election and appointment.⁵² With the election of Jacob Selimoski for Supreme Head on March 9 1991 and handing over the menshura on July 4 of the same year, the organization of the Islam Community as intended by the Constitution, was completed.

War events and inability to communicate as well as international recognition of the newly-created states gave rise to the creation of new organizational forms. According to their historical standing that the organization of the Islam Community should adopt itself to state and administrative borders, the elections were held and the authorities of the independent Islam communities for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Croatia with Slovenia were elected. The formation of the independent Islam communities was formally enabled by the changes of the Constitution of the Islam Community in the SFRY which were undertaken at a session of the Riasset in Skopje on February 5. 1993. Then the Constitution of the Islam Community of Sarajevo, Podgorica, Zagreb, Priština and Skopje was brought about. Since such a community could not be organized, at a meeting held in Istanbul on October 10 1994, the presidents of the republican meshicats, joined by a representative of the Islam Community of Sandzak, brought about the decision to abolish the IC in the SFRY. The decision was disputed by many believers and imams thinking it were brought about by the persons who had no official authority to do it but, still, it de facto meant the end of this religious community.⁵³

Conclusion

The actions undertaken by the Islam Community to strengthen and stabilize the internal organization need to be observed within the context of establishing a new socialist order and formation of the state which propagated atheism at the theoretical level and constrained the work of the religious communities in practice. Organizationally decomposed and through the procedure of nationalization deprived of its financial basis, the Islam Community passed through, immediately after the war, a difficult phase of its adjustment to the new reality and the creation of the conditions for coexistence with the system resolute to solve the religious issue definitively. The political needs of the new government brought about fast normalization of the relations with the Islam Community which had to give up, because of this privilege, some of the attributes of independence and accept the financial dependence on the regular state donations. The overall activity, in that phase, which, all in all, lasted for

⁵¹ Meeting of the Supreme Council, Address of Reis-ul-ulema at the Meeting of the Supreme Council, Resolutions of the Supreme Council and Report on the Work of the Supreme Presidency (Riasset) of the Islam Community in Yugoslavia, *Messenger of the SIP*, 1990/5, p. 103-124

⁵² Constitutional meeting of the Supreme Council, *Messenger of the SIP*, 1991/1, p. 96-97

⁵³ The participants of the meeting submitted to the Ministry of Faith of Serbia a letter in which this decision was confirmed. The original of the letter is preserved in the Archive of the Ministry of faith

some twenty years and ended with the official recognition of the Muslim nation and adoption of a new constitution of the Islam Community in 1969 was characterized by precaution, careful assessment of the situation and attempts to avoid some careless move which might provoke a reaction on the part of an ideologically strong state as well as by institutional and organizational preparations for a new concept of action after the political circumstances had changed.

Steady process of liberalization of the Yugoslav society and non-aligned foreign orientation of the state were used by the Islam Community to redefine its position. By consistent adherence to the new Constitution and due to large jurisdiction of the presidency, a very firm discipline of the religious clerks was established while, through the regulatory and controlling-guiding function of the council which comprised some laymen as well, the concept of in-separateness of spiritual and secular spheres was promoted. Workers temporarily working abroad and the first aid from the international Islam factors enabled the creation of its material basis which guaranteed greater freedom and gradual emancipation from the established control mechanisms of the state. A new strategy for the activities of the Islam Community was formulated; the hub of its activities became the building of religious objects, modernization of Islam schooling and advancement of publishing. This phase which ended with the death of Josip Broz Tito and great demonstrations for the cause of Albanian nationalism and separatism in 1981, represented, in a certain way, the golden period in the development of the Islam Community. The reason for this is that, in these twelve years, the internal organization as assumed by the Constitution was enhanced, the relations with the state became stable, the relations with all the important international Islam organizations were established, many mosques and other religious objects were built and the Islam Theological Faculty in Sarajevo started to work. The permission to build a representative Islam center in Zagreb in 1981 represented the surest sign that the Islam Community in the former Yugoslavia was enabled, in the organizational, material and staff sense, to complete all the tasks that might be posed before the largest autochthonous community of Islam believers in Europe.

The last ten years that are theoretically characterized as the third phase that ended with the disintegration of the socialist Yugoslavia can be characterized by a much clearer political positioning and more resolute attitudes of the Islam Community toward various issues as well as actions by the state organs aiming at stopping these processes. A considerable support to these new attitudes in the Islam Religious Community was also given by the graduates coming from the best known Islam Universities who, in a relatively short time, took over the governing of the Islam Community and, as undisputable authorities, tried to order certain segments of the religious life according to the patterns adopted in the states whose complete system functioned according to the norms stated in the Koran. Facing a new and somewhat unexpected challenge a still strong state reacted in 1982 in expressing, at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, an unusually sharp criticism of the policy of the Islam Community, by organizing a very well known trial of the followers of the Young Muslim ideology in 1983 and by initiating changes in the highest authorities of the Religious Communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Association of Ilmia and editorial board of some Islam newspapers in 1985. Supporting the forces in the IC estimated as loyal and exerting pressure openly, the state organs imposed the election of the supreme authority who, at the moment when a profound crisis of the common state was already visible, did not manage to affirm and realize his program in which the central place was taken by the idea to change, by liberation from Albanian domination, the composition of the

highest organs and to strengthen the influence of individuals and groups ready to give, with their engagement, another chance to the unity. The predominance was taken by the new forces unburdened with the sentiments of the past and connected with the political elites that properly understood the essence of the global problems stemming from the collapse of the socialist social order and that knew quite well the dimensions of irreconcilable national controversies and economic crises of the former state. Following their real estimate of the changed circumstances but, at the same time, unready to accept the possibility to have the powerful spiritual power such as the Islam Community disappear from the historical scene, the new forces brought about the Constitution, held the elections and promoted new authorities. The attempts made by the Islam Community to avoid the fate of the then equally powerful Communist Union, lasted even at the time while Yugoslavia disintegrated in the bloody civil war and the new states were coming into being on its ruins.

Milan Vukomanović

DERVISHES IN BELGRADE: THE BELGRADE TEKKES, TARIQAS, SHAIKHS

When a group of Sufis from the Mevlevi Galata Temple in Istanbul performed its impressive *sema* ritual at the Belgrade Youth Center in January 2005, hardly anyone who attended this event was really aware that the Turkish dervishes did not only *arrive* in Belgrade, but *returned* to it as well. In fact, what we learn from the famous *Narrative of Travels* of Evliya Chelebi is that Belgrade was the home of even 17 tekkes in 1660 when this traveler visited the city.¹ Between 1521 and 1867, i.e. for three and a half centuries, dervishes lived in Belgrade, performed their central ritual – *dhikr*, studied great Sufi thinkers, wrote mystical works and poetry, and inhabited one of the main city streets, marked in the 1789 Austrian city plan as *Derwisch Gassen* (Dervish Alley, now Višnjićeva Street).

Where were the formerly Belgrade tekkes located, how did they look like, and which *tariqas* they belonged to? Due to paucity of data related to this aspect of religious life in Belgrade in the given period, it is hard to unequivocally respond to all those questions. Thanks to the Turkish and Austrian city plans, censuses of the Muslims, official documents from various periods, and later research of our (art) historians, at least eight Belgrade tekkes could be localized with a reliable degree of certainty. Unfortunately, two more tekkes that had been mentioned until the late 17th century have not been located.

As late as 1863, at least four out of those ten tekkes still remained in Belgrade. One of the most important, Hajji Shaikh Muhammad's, whose mausoleum has been preserved in its former courtyard, was photographed in 1866, after it housed, for a shorter period of time, the institution of *Pravitelstvujušći sovjet*.² Apart from this house, located at the top of the former "Dervish Alley", right below the present Students' Park, the list of the located Belgrade tekkes included: the tekke on the Sava River, the tekke in the fortress Narin (on the west side of the Upper City), as well as the tekkes named after Shaikh Ali-Efendi, Shaikh Hafiz Mehmed, Shaikh Hasan-Efendi, Shaikh Hashim-Efendi and Mehmed-Pasha Jahjapašić.³ The ones that have not been located included, according to written sources, the tekke in the Tir-i-bala mosque *mahala* and the tekke in Bulbulder (today's Zvezdara municipality).⁴

Owing to its extant photograph, one knows mostly about the Hajji Shaikh Muhammad's tekke at the top of the steep Višnjićeva Street, below the Students' Park. Most importantly, we know exactly how it looked like and where it was located. This tekke was inscribed in the city plan of the Austrian officer Bruschi (1789) right across the Kizlar-Aga mosque from the early 17th century. Furthermore, Felix Kanitz wrote in 1897 that the mausoleum of this tekke housed the graves of three "religious heroes": Horasani Baba-Mehmed, Bagdali Mustafa-Bey⁵ and Hajji-Shaikh Omer-

¹ Evliya Čelebija, *Putopis – Odlomci o jugoslovenskim zemljama* I, trans. H. Šabanović, Svjetlost, Sarajevo, 1957, p. 99.

² See the printed photograph of this house in: Divna Đurić-Zamolo, *Beograd kao orijentalna varoš pod Turcima 1521-1867*, Muzej grada Beograda, Beograd, 1977, illustrations.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 74. This was probably the Subaša Bektashi tekke from Chelebi's list of the Belgrade outings (Čelebija, p. 103).

⁵ Hence the present name of this mausoleum - Shaikh-Mustafa Turbe. After all, his name was inscribed above the mausoleum entrance. Another information obtained from the same plaque is that the turbe was built in 1783-84, and that Shaikh Mustafa was the leader of the Sa'di dervish order (*Ibid.*, p. 71).

Efendi. It is assumed that the tekke in the 1866 photograph was erected in the 18th century, whereas the original Horasani tekke was from the time of Chelebi, i.e., mid-17th century. Rectangular in its base, its dimensions were 17.5 x 8 meters. By its shorter, steep side, its outer wall descended down the Dervish Alley. By its longer side, it was turned towards the present Students' Park. The entrance, as well as the tekke itself, was located on that side. The tekke was entered through the courtyard. Besides the mausoleum, several tombstones and the stable, the toilet and a closed well were also located in the courtyard. A small ground-floor house was also located in this courtyard, while the main house consisted of three rooms on the ground floor (a bigger room, a smaller room and a hall) and four rooms on the first floor. *Semahana*, the room used for the central dervish ritual – *dhikr*, was, in all likelihood, located on the first floor. Unfortunately, this historical building was destroyed in 1892. Only its cellar was preserved deep in the ground.⁶

Who was Shaikh Mehmed (Muhammad) Horasani and which tariqa did he belong to? In his *Travel Narrative* Chelebi mentions the tekke of Mehmed-Pasha Jahjalija (Jahjapašić)⁷, one of the oldest Belgrade Sufi buildings, erected before Pasha's death in 1548. This tekke was located at the bottom of *Derwisch Gassen*, in Doróol, on the block between the present Dušanova, Knićaninova, Skenderbegova and Dubrovačka streets.⁸ Considering that they had the same name and that they were close to each other, it is quite possible that the tekke of Mehmed-Pasha Jahjapašić and the Hajji-Shaikh Muhammad's tekke were both built from the same endowment (*waqf*) of Mehmed (or Muhammad) Horasani. And since Mehmed-Pasha was known as an *akinji* bey, it is assumed that both tekkes originally belonged to the Bektashi order, because the *akinjis* preserved the cult of Hajji Bektash Veli, the founder of the tariqa.⁹ The Bektashis were typically Turkish dervish order, widespread in the Ottoman army. Their shaikhs were normally the imams among the fortress troops.

It is also possible that those two tekkes belonged, in a later period, to some other tariqas. The inscription of the Shaikh-Mustafa mausoleum placed by Husni Yusuf in 1783,¹⁰ reads, for example, that this sheikh was a Sa'di, so it is reasonable to assume that Hajji-Shaikh Muhammad's tekke belonged to this order in the late 18th century. The Sa'dis, as well as the Bektashis and the Rifa'iyas were the typically military tariqas. The Bektashis were also affiliated with the tekke in the Upper City fortress, as well as with the Subasha tekke at the outskirts of Belgrade, also mentioned by Evliya Chelebi.¹¹ It seems that this second tekke is referred to in the *waqf-nama* of the Belgrade Defterdar ("minister of finance") Ahmed-Efendi, who mentions a Bektashi house in Bulbulder. For food in this dervish tekke, this Defterdar allocated 12 akcis a day, while in the same document, the Sa'di and the Khalwatiya tekkes were granted 30 akcis respectively.¹² This document, mentioned by Radmila Tričković, is

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

⁷ Čelebija, p. 99. The original text refers to Mehmed-Pasha *Abali*, but the translator Šabanović thinks that this was an error: Jahjali or Jahjapašić should have been written there instead.

⁸ This was one of the historical locations in the city of Belgrade at the time. This is where the famous Gazi Mehmed-Pasha Jahjapašić mosque (later known as the Imaret Mosque) was located, too. It was built in 1548-1549 in the Moorish style (Čelebija, p. 97). Next to this mosque and tekke, in the same city block, the Jahja-Pasha madrasa and probably the library as well, were located in 1599.

⁹ Cf. Džemal Čehajić, *Derviški redovi u jugoslovenskim zemljama*, Sarajevo, 1986, p. 170 and Hazim Šabanović, „Islamska prosveta i kultura“, in *Istorija Beograda 1*, Prosveta, Beograd, 1974, p. 416. *Akinjis* were the offensive cavalry members who made incursions into the enemy territory. We may assume that some of those Bektashis found themselves in Belgrade soon after its occupation in 1521.

¹⁰ Radmila Tričković, „Promene u varoši posle 1740“ in *Istorija Beograda 1*, p. 670.

¹¹ Cf. note 4.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 670.

precious for research, especially because three well-known Sufi orders in the 18th century Belgrade were explicitly mentioned there. According to this document, Defterdar Ahmed “allocated two houses for the shaikhs of the Khalwatiya order: one of them had five rooms on the ground floor and six on the first floor, while the other had two big ground-floor rooms and a kitchen, one room on the first floor, and a separate building for hay; it also had a well, a garden of 4 dunams and a courtyard of 25 arshins. The shaikhs of the Sa’di order received a house near the mansion (*kona*) of the Belgrade *mukabeleci* in Zerek. This house had five rooms on the ground floor and the first floor respectively, a kitchen, a cellar, a separate room, a half-dunam garden and a small courtyard. For the shaikhs of this dervish order, Ahmed-Efendi left a vineyard of 45 dunams, near an old barn in Varoš on the Danube”.¹³ It is assumed that Defterdar Ahmed was himself a member of some of those tariqas.

Some other documents pertaining to the Ottoman period in the history of Belgrade reveal the names of numerous other dervishes. To begin with, Evliya Chelebi mentions a shaikh Kurudžizade as the head (*dede*) of the Belgrade Khalwatiya, adding that he was a good and pious shaikh and caliph of Mahmud-Efendi, the leader of the main tekke in Uskudar.¹⁴ In the oldest census of the Belgrade Muslims (1536), the dervishes Hamza and Husain from Anatolia were also mentioned, along with Baba Ruhi Ajam, Emir Bagdadi and the scribe Baba Bali from Kulič. Only a quarter century later (1560), the Sufis Shaban-Dede, Baba Bustan, Baba Mahmud, Dedezade, Omer (son of Dedekaim) and Pervane (the dervish in the Ferhad-Pasha *mahala*) were mentioned.¹⁵

At the turn of the 16th century, Shaikh Nurullah Ibrahim bin Iskender, better known by his pen-name Muniri Belgradi, had special reputation in the religious-legal and scholarly circles. Shaikh Muniri was born in Bosnia, educated in Constantinople, having spent most of his life as a mufti and professor of the famous Mehmed-Pasha Jahjapašić madrasa. The writer and poet, encyclopedic and preacher, Muniri Belgradi was the author of numerous religious-ethical and legal writings, including the lost geographic treatise *Seb’yyat*, as well as the genealogy of the dervish orders in the Balkans (*Silsilat al-mugarrabin*).¹⁶ At the end of this writing, one finds a polemical letter that Muniri addressed to the leader of the Malamiya order, Husain Lamekani. Shaikh Iskender died in 1617, and his mausoleum once occupied the corner of Dubrovačka and Skenderbegova streets¹⁷.

Hazim Šabanović assumes that in the 16th- and 17th-century Belgrade a great number of dervish orders were present, including the Bairamiya, Malamiya, Bek-tashis, Khalwatiya, Gulshaniya, Qadiriya, Hindiya, Mawlawiya, Naqshbandiya, Rifa’iya, Sa’diya, Sunbuliya, Shabaniya, Shadhiliya and Ushakiya. It is possible that Badawiya, Jalwatiya, Jerrahi and Sinaniya were also there, even if “they were not mentioned in the sources, but were present in other Balkan centers”.¹⁸

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 670.

¹⁴ Evlija Čelebija, *Putopis*, p. 100. Before 1717 Belgrade had a Khalwatiya tekke from the *waqf* of Koski Mehmed-Pasha, but its exact location is not known.

¹⁵ Šabanović, p. 415-416.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 418. More precisely, this work is known as *The Genealogy of the Ones Chosen by God and Biographies of the Pious Ones*. The best source for the biography and bibliography of Muniri Belgradi is the work of the historian Hazim Šabanović *Književnost Muslimana BiH na orijentalnim jezicima*, Sarajevo, 1973. According to Šabanović, Muniri wrote 121 biographies of the dervish shaikhs who lived in Anatolia and Rumelia until the end of Sultan Ahmed the Third’s reign (1617). The manuscript of this work is kept in Istanbul, while the lesser known work in ethics and law *The Path of the Right Way* is kept in the Gazi Husrev-Bey’s library in Sarajevo.

¹⁷ Čelebija, p. 106. The famous Muniri garden was there. It was described by Evliya in the following terms: „The Muniri-Efendi garden has juicy ‘kumru’- apricots weighing 40 dramas, and juicy sheftelis weighing 100 dramas, as well as the grapes, plums, pears, cherries, melons and watermelons. Well known is also the cherry juice, musels and hardaliya“ (p. 103).

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 416.

However, what we know for sure is that, apart from the Khalwatiya, Sa'diya and Bektashis, the Qadiriya and Naqshbandiya also lived in Belgrade. The Qadiriya had their tekkes in Dorćol and Kalemegdan. In the Upper City, their tekke was located nearby the shahid mausoleum of Damad Ali-Pasha, the conqueror of Morea, who died in the battle near Petrovaradin, in August 1716. Between 1743 and 1746, this tekke was erected by the Belgrade vizier Jahja-Pasha Hatibzade.¹⁹ In the second half of the 18th century, the master of this tekke was Shaikh Mehmed Hashim (the tekke itself was named after him), who was later succeeded by his son Hasan.²⁰ Radmila Tričković based her assumption on the berat from 1793 referring to the nomination of Shaikh Seyd Hasan, son of the late shaikh Mehmed Hashim.²¹ Considering that Hashim-Efendi was a Qadiri shaikh, it is logical to infer that this tekke belonged, at least in one period, to the Qadiriya. Shaikh Hasan-Efendi's tekke probably belonged to the same order. According to the 1863 Turkish plan, it was located at the corner of Gospodar Jovanova and 12 Rige od Fere streets.²² This tekke is mentioned in the Kanlik protocol of 1862, while in another, 19th century document, it was inscribed in the same line with the Bajrakli mosque.²³ This tekke was related to the Kalin mosque from the 1836 list of mosques.

Furthermore, Čehajić and Tričković associate Shaikh Hasan with a tekke that accompanied an unknown 19th century mosque by the old Aga entrance. It is possible that a century earlier, it also belonged to the Qadiriya. In a 1698 death certificate, the tekke near the Šehitlik mosque in Dorćol is also mentioned. Later on, the famous Ali-Pasha mosque was built there. Nearby, in the 19th century, the tekke of Shaikh Ali-Efendi occupied the block between the streets of Visokog Stevana, Cara Uroša, Despota Đurđa and Braće Baruh.²⁴

Speaking of the Naqshbandiya, it is known from a 1680 court protocol that Shaikh Husain ibn Muhammad, himself a Naqshbandi, built a tekke in Belgrade and committed it to the caliph of Ali Samarkandī – i.e. to Shaikh Mehmed ibn Shaikh Isa. For that purpose, Shaikh Husain endowed his estate and a shop. Čehajić, who provides this information, assumes that this tekke was active in the 17th- and 18th-centuries, and that the Naqshbandis succeeded each other as its shaikhs.²⁵ The Naqshbandiya, still very active in Bosnia, performed – besides their standard, loud *dhikr* – the silent *dhikr* of the heart (*kalbī*).

Unfortunately, the origin of another Dorćol tekke, built between Francuska, Simina, Dositejeva and Gospodar Jevremova streets is not known. This tekke was named after Shaikh-Hafiz Mehmed and is visible in the Turkish plan of 1863.

Based on the aforementioned data regarding the Belgrade tekkes, it is reasonable to assume that Evliya Chelebi (often an unreliable witness when it comes to statistics) was rather precise in his report on 17 city tekkes in 1660. One could probably include in this list all the known tekkes from the Kalemegdan fortress, as well as the ones from within, and without the old city limits. It is quite plausible that Belgrade at that time hosted the dervish communities of the Qadiriya, Khalwatiya, Naqshbandiya, Sa'diya and Bektashi. Other brotherhoods were present there, too, but their presence can only indirectly be inferred. It seems that the Islamic mysticism (*tasawwuf*) found its foothold in Belgrade back in the 17th century, both in the practical activities of various dervish orders and their scholarly, literary, philosophical and legal heritage.

¹⁹ Đurić-Zamolo, p. 73

²⁰ Čehajić, p. 136.

²¹ Tričković, p. 671.

²² Đurić-Zamolo, p. 73.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

²⁵ Čehajić, p. 67.

Dragoljub B. Đorđević
Dragan Todorović

TEKKIAS, TARIKATS AND SHEIKS OF NIŠ ROMAS*

Jemka Has Risen¹

Jemka has risen, mother, early in the morning
Jemka has risen, mother, early in the morning
Early in the morning, mother, she cleans the yard
Early in the morning, mother, she cleans the yard

She cleans the yard, mother, she wants to run away
She cleans the yard, mother, she wants to run away
She wants to run away, mother, through the downtown
She wants to run away, mother, all the way to the tekkia

Introduction

One of us has, in the analysis done in a recent study (Đorđević, 2005a:193:212) dealing with the religious-confessional being of the national minorities in Serbia and confirming absolute supremacy of Sunna over Shiism in some of them, written that the elements of Shiite Islam can only be found in the dervish orders mostly located in Kosovo and Metohija. When it comes to the state of Serbia without this province, the inflow of this branch of Islam goes through “Roma” tekkias, tarikats and sheiks dispersed all over the territory from Niš to the far South of Serbia “which” as we have carefully stated in those days, “has to be determined more precisely.”

The religious-confessional being of the Romas is much varied. In Serbia the greatest number is of Orthodox Romas followed by Muslims while it appears that very soon the Protestants will exceed the Roma Roman Catholic in number. In Southeast Serbia, as well as in Niš as its center, comparing to the rest of the state, there are many Roma members of Islam. More precisely, there are many Roma Muslims by origin who, however, hardly remember that their elders were active members of the Islam community. Yet, there are such Romas, indeed an impressive minority, who have remained loyal to “the tradition of their fathers and forefathers.” Among them are dervishes who are, surely, the most interesting party from the sociological perspective. That is why we here present a documentary view of two Roma tekkias in Niš. One of them is located in the settlement named Cattle Square and it belongs to the tarikat of the Kadiri headed by the sheik Muharem Ljatifi; the other one is in the city district known as Beogradmala and it gathers together dervishes from the order of Rifa’iyah headed by the sheik Slobodan Emini.

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¹ From the anthology entitled *Traditional Roma Songs from the Region of Niš* (Mustafić, 1998).

ROMA SHEIKS: TWO INTERVIEWS

Slobodan Emini, Roma Sheik of the Rifa'iyah Order²

A great number of people of Niš, Non-Romas as well as Romas themselves, living in the Beogradmala, on Cattle Square or in the Red Star city district do not know anything about tekkias or dervishes in their neighborhood, do they? Or, have they only heard of you?

That's true. There are people who know nothing about our existence. We are in Ovčepoljska Street number 30 in Niš. We are having, on March 21, one of our holidays which is named *sultan elvuz*, birthday of Haziti Ali. We, dervishes, celebrate it solemnly. On that day we perform a ceremony entitled "The Death of the Dervish." Guests are all those who want to come, the local people, as well as all others who wish to do so. Look, together with us is a sheik from the Prizren tekkia, Sadik Arapi, a Turk by origin; he has been my guest for several days. He is 64 and speaks several foreign languages; in addition to Albanian and Turkish, also German, Roma... And my late father, Halil Emini, is also from Kosovska Mitrovica. In Kosovo there are many more tekkias. The best known is the one in Prizren but there are also many in Đakovica, Kosovska Mitrovica, Orahovac.

Are you a sheik, too?

Yes, I am a sheik. Since 1997. As I have told you, my family originally comes from Kosovska Mitrovica. My father's sheik was Baba Šaban. He died some time in the sixties in the past century while the new sheik of my father became Sadik Arapi, present here. I was promoted to a sheik by my father who was just a dervish but in the presence of another three sheiks, one of them being Sadik Arapi before whom I had previously passed all the exams.

Are there different dervish orders?

Yes, there are the Rifa'iyah and the Kadiri orders. I am a priest of both the orders. More exactly, I have become a sheik in the order of Rifa'iyah while as a dervish I was in the order of Kadiri. My sheik was then the sheik Enver from Kosovska Mitrovica. If I am in the position to, if I have the knowledge and feel capable of, I can become a sheik of Rifa'iyah, of Kadiri, of Hagia, of Sherbendia, of Bedevia, of Halvetia, of Sinanya... there are 12 orders, all in all.

Could you be a sheik to the Bektashis, too?

Yes, I could. Our sheik is from the order of Rifa'iyah and Hagia.

Since we see no other premises, are we to assume that this one is a tekkia?

Yes, this is a tekkia. This is our classroom in which we, dervishes, carry out our rituals which are called *evrad* and *sherid*. Every Friday evening, at six, we perform *zhikr*, a ritual for glorifying the name of Alah. On Monday we completed a ten-day fast known as *Ashura* and this week we have been celebrating, having guests.

² Interview took place on February 1 2007 in the Rifa'iyah tekkia in Niš, located in the Beogradmala city district.

Is your tekkia part of some wider Rifa'iyyah organization; do you have a statute, a list of members?

Yes, we are an organization. The Islam tarikat community in Prizren still exists, established as early as in the former Yugoslavia. My father was there, took his exams, was with sheik Džamajlija, guided by sheik Riza Bajrami. So, my father passed his exam before the dervish-nakip, he is some sort of the sheik deputy.

Is the Prizren tarikat community still publishing its journal?

Yes, they are issuing their Bulletin, in Albanian and Turkish, as far as I know. They used to do it in Serbian but they do not do it any more. In Roma, either, they don't publish it.

You do your rituals in Roma language?

When we celebrate *Mawlid*, this is Mohammed's birthday, we pray in Roma; recently there has been the Qur'an published in Roma, translated by Muharem Serbezovski; one local friend of mine has got it as a gift.

Do you have any problems with the Islam Community in Niš?

No, none whatsoever. I have been, till recently, Vice President of the Islam Community in the Niš mosque. The two of us were khojas, imams and practiced sharia law. But I cannot physically manage to be there any longer and to do tarikat duties at the same time, to attend funerals, weddings, Mawlids, and the like. More recently we have had here another *dzemat* (local office) so that other people are appointed to that office while I have retired.

What kind of organization is in the tekkia?

I am now a sheik; before being promoted into a sheik, I was *shezade*, sheik's son. After my father's death, I inherited him here, in the tekkia. There are six brothers of us altogether and only I am a sheik; all the others are *shezade*. In addition to them, there are also flag-bearers, breadmakers, shoemakers, sacrifice-givers, tea-makers; these are all dervishes who have obtained their title and this even from the sheik personally. They are obliged to do concrete tasks in the tekkia, to bear flags, prepare tea, etc. All of them, however, cannot come up before the sheik in the tekkia unless adequately dressed, that is, unless they are dressed in the *ajdarije* or garb. On the day when we are celebrating the sultan *evluz*, we make a big *zhikr* and use needles for piercing. The sheik chooses in advance four dervishes who are to dance and pierce themselves with needles. On that day there is the main rehearsal at which it is defined precisely how and where the dervishes should pierce themselves. I must emphasize that, without the sheik's approval, the piercing ritual must not start; when he gives a sign, then they start, to their own heart's desire, to pierce different parts of their bodies. Likewise, piercing must not stop without the sheik's order being heard first. If some careless dervish wounds himself, then the sheik makes a *dova* (a prayer) and stops bleeding. However, this happens very rarely since on that day we feel especially strong, we give the best of ourselves, on that day, we are *teslimi*, that is, giving over ourselves to God. On that day there is a lot of singing and all the nicest attributes of God are mentioned.

Who is allowed to attend the ritual?

Everyone can. Romas and Serbs can, Muslims can as well as Orthodox and Roman Catholics, all who feel, on that day, the will to attend it; everyone can watch it while respecting the rules of behavior in the tekkia. I necessarily, on that day,

choose special people who have to be at service to the guests; if someone cannot be standing, he is provided with a chair to sit down; if someone feels sick, he may leave and return again...

What did you say the date was?

That is, in Alah's name, on March 21.

Can we come and take photos?

You are free to come, watch, take photos, record.

How many active members are there in the tekka?

There are my own dervishes that I have myself promoted, seven of them while many of them are also in Germany and Italy. There are also older dervishes promoted by my father while he was alive. Altogether, there are about 35-40 of us. On celebrations, especially on Friday when we are giving *zhikr*, there may be even more of us; I invite my neighbors, cousins, friends... They are not dervishes nor are they in the tarikat but they attend prayers.

This is your house, isn't it?

Yes.

And you have turned it into a tekka?

No, I haven't. It goes like this: the tekka has been at this place for some time. First there used to be a shack here which we turned into an earthen house (*chatmara*) and decorated it and equipped it nicely. Yet, during one visit Sheik Riza Bajrami from Kosovska Mitrovica to the Mawlid in Niš we accompanied him. Very soon my brother called us to return home immediately for he noticed a flame burning here.

Did someone set a fire?

No, it just happened, on its own.

Did you interpret it as some special sign?

No. Only after the fire did we tear down the remains and erected a new building, the way it looks today. In this we were helped by all people, dervishes, cousins, friends, neighbors....

The dervishes who come to the tekka are largely Romas? Do some other Muslims come?

People come because of different problems, different diseases and family troubles. They bring a gift, they bring candles, they bring a towel but they also pay. People give money but there is no price set in advance; people give as much as they are willing to give. I have photos of the people who came here, to see me, for different reasons and who are thankful for my helping them.

Do you give them anything?

We are *dovadzije* or praying people, people who pray to Alah; we can cure with mere water. Only the day before yesterday there was a woman doctor from Niš to see me, she is thankful for the help she has received from my hands and from Alah.

How old are your dervishes?

Well, my son is still small; I have two sons, of four and six years of age. I have twelve-year old dervishes and those of 65 or maybe even 70. But mostly they are young people. I have opened another tekkia, in the Belgrade settlement of Kotež, in the neighborhood of the singer Džej Ramadanovski. There I have not prepared a sheik but there are dervishes who I have produced. But, in Belgrade, there are other sheiks, these are my friends and companions, older people.

Please, tell us, honestly, how are you received by other Romas who are not Muslims but, instead, let's say Orthodox, Adventists or Jehova's Witness?

We have no problems with anyone; I am on friendly terms with all of them. At one funeral I met one who is in the Roman Catholic Church; I invited him to come to me, to the tekkia; I was with him on August 15 when the Ascension of the Holy Mother of God is celebrated and when the Romas go to their church on a mass scale. They call her Mary while we call her Mehrema, Mother of Jesus. We talked, we asked each other about our health, children and the like. I also met one from St. Panteleimon's Church; I was in his premises in the Church. Neither with my neighbors do I have any problems.

So far as we know, there is another Roma tekkia in Niš?

Yes, there is. They are Kadiri while we are Rifa'iyyah tekkia. But this one is the oldest. My father was a dervish first, then sheik, that is why our tekkia is the oldest. From our tekkia there came many people who had completely mastered the proper religious behavior, unlike from the others. I now have a prepared dervish who is ready to talk with a sheik at any moment.

It means there are more tekkias?

Yes. This one is the Rifa'iyyah one. But, from this tekkia of ours another tekkia is produced, not far from here in Moravska Street. The other tekkia is Kadiri and there is another sheik there. He came after my father. His name is Muharem.

Are you a competition to each other?

No. We are good to each other. He also has *zhikr* on Thursdays and Sundays; so we also go to him. His wife died and his daughter got married in Montenegro so that he is over there more than he is here. I think he has also established a tekkia there.

Do you think he will receive us and talk to us?

This I do not know; that's his good will; I do not object to it. But if I meet him by chance, I will tell him to receive you.

You have always been a Muslim; you have come from Kosovo?

I was born in Niš in 1976. My father came from the city of Kosovska Mitrovica. We have been living in Niš for thirty years. My father used to work in the Jastrebac Pump Factory; he got retired and received his pensions. My mother is still alive and she is an old *sheikana*. Sheik's wife gives religious instructions to women.

Do women have an access to the tekkia?

Yes, they do but they have to be properly dressed. And they have the right to enter only at the time of the *zhikr*, that is, prayer on Fridays.

So, the role of women is to teach other women?

Yes. My dervish's wife is called *dervishanka*. She can be in the *tarikats*. She can drink this *sherbet* (what we call the *sherbet-giving* of the dervish) and to enter the *tarikats*. That is why every sheik must have two *tarikats*. Two or more. What does it mean? If I have given *sherbet* to the dervish Rifa'iyyah, then his wife, too, wants to become a *dervishanka* and to drink the same *sherbet*; thus, they become brother and sister and, in the future, they must not have relations like husband and wife. That is why the educated sheik gives to the dervish the Rifa'iyyah *sherbet* while to the *dervishanka* he gives the Kadiri *sherbet* so that they could preserve their marriage. There are some who give the same *sherbet* to the husband and wife.

Well, you have been here for so long; your father opened up a tekkia long ago. Would you mind if some other orders appeared around you?

No, it would be no problem. I don't know how to explain this to you but I am not obliged to give it to my child. Who deserves, he will get it. I have a brother born in 1952. Older people say, "Who is under a pear tree, he is the one who eats the pear." I have been with my father since my earliest childhood....

Well, we are more referring to some newcomers from other places, those who would come to your neighborhood now and decide to open up another tekkia. You would not mind it?

Well, no, I do not mind it. Let him come from Skopje, from Belgrade, let him come from where he wants to come, I cannot do anything about it. Let him buy a house here or an estate, let him start setting up a *tekkia*; I am the first who will come to help him and to aid him financially.

We see you have small children. When they start going to school, you will make no problems?

God give us good health, my children will go to school regularly. When they complete elementary school, I will have them enrolled in the *madrrasah*; if they want it, they will go to the theological faculty, too. I would like best to enroll my children in the *madrrasah* in the Sandzak. I have recently been, that is two weeks ago, in Novi Pazar and sat with Mevlud Dudić in his office, this was a visit by the *dzemat* of Niš. These were negotiations about the integration of the whole Islam Community in Serbia in one single body and headed by one single *reis*. I had tea with him; he gave me the Qur'an with his own signature; they also gave us some other books.

What do you think, who will be a new reis?

Well, let me see.... The new president of the Niš mosque is my uncle and he attended the final negotiations early that week. I have heard this is to be the elder son of Hamdija Jusufspahić, Muhamed Jusufspahić, if they all agree. If not, then the *reis* from Sarajevo will remain. He knows "how to play the game," while someone new will have to learn the rules first...

Is it familiar to you that in Niš there are remains of an older tekkia? If you knew Neša Arsić, keeper of Zajda Badža who died in the meantime, he told us that there used to be an older tekkia...

Here, let's me tell you. There is another *tekkia* in Niš. They are all active but not for something we are doing here. To these *tekkias* you may go to pray for good health, for happiness, to light up candles, to bring some gift and they are all down

there in the Jewish cemetery. It happened long ago; people have heard that, well, something happened in those places; people have been going to them for a long time but all this is not by the rules; there are no sheiks there. Usually the tekkias are in the houses; these places are very clean. I have been there, I have visited them but they always need someone to care about them, to clean them, to aerate them... As for some other older tekkias, I do not know.

Do you have a job?

I used to deal in trade, only occasionally. Now I have stopped since I cannot make it to all places, to funerals, to dirges...

In a week, are there any developments in the tekkias every single day?

I am every day in the tekkia, I constantly have duties to Alah. Our sheik has given us the right to do our *night ibadem*, at night, one or two hours after midnight, we do bowing or *sabah*; we have five daily bowings or *namaz*. On Friday is *zhikr*; every dervish must be properly dressed, must have done his *avdes* or Muslim religious washing. If I am not here, then every dervish is obliged to give *selam*, to come to this place where I am sitting now, to do his prayers and then to go back to his place.

Are dervishes obliged to come to the tekkia every day?

My house is open all day long. I may have guests and the guests may come any time they want. The dervish may come alone or with his wife but we do not have to go to the tekkia; we can enter my house which is right here, next to it, to sit, to socialize, to eat and talk... We know exactly how we behave when we are friends and how we behave when we are in the tekkia. In this room I am the elder for them and they do as I tell them, what I tell them. They do not have to show up on weekdays but on Fridays they have to turn up. With me, the following is the order: if the dervish cannot appear, for some reason, on a Friday evening, he is obliged to announce it and ask permission from me since I, as a sheik, must know what is going on with him. One more thing: when the dervishes come to the tekkia, they must tell it to their family, wife or parents. Therefore, he is not going some place to drink alcohol, to gamble while saying he has visited the tekkia. Also, the one who decides to drink sherbet from me and become a dervish, he is obliged to come with his wife so that she can, before the camera and everyone else, allow him publicly to do so. If he is under age, then his parents have to do it. Hence, one accepts faith with his own will and with permission, not by coercion.

Muharem Ljatifi, Roma Sheik of the Kadiri Order³

We know you have been a sheik for quite some time; since when exactly?

I have been a sheik since 1997. While attending the first class of the elementary school I started going to the tekkia, long ago, in 1972; in those days I had the status of *mihib* or disciple. My teacher was Sheik Tafa Mustafa from Kosovska Mitrovica; later on I married his daughter. In 1986 I became a dervish while I was promoted, in 1997, to sheik by Sheik Šeriza Bajrami who was also from Kosovska Mitrovica. Previously I had passed an exam before Sheik Harasani Hatijah from Đakovica. This tekkia has been since 1964 and it belongs to the tarikats Kadiri order. Before that, there had been no dervishes; it all started with Šeriz Bajrami. He, to-

³ Conversation took place on April 14 2007 in the Kadiri tekkia of Niš, located at Cattle Square

gether with Tafa Mustafa, worked in the mosque of Niš; then this place was sharia. Since in the mahala there were many old people who, in time, found ever more difficult to go to the mosque, they decided to open up, here, in the mahala, a tarikat shrine.

Is your tekka a member of some community of dervish orders?

Yes, of the one in Kosovska Mitrovica. However, I seldom go there; most often I am here where I have properly registered the tekka in the local community "Đuka Dinić." As you can see, the tekka is in the house whose owner I am, also, and everything is registered with the city authorities. For a while I thought I could find some other location for building a new object but I realized it was too complicated so I gave it up.

What are the relations of your tekka with the Islam community?

We have no problems; neither have we ever had any. We also practice five *namaz* or bowings, we practice *avdez*, we can freely sit with khodjas and talk to them. I personally know the mufti of Belgrade Jusufspahić, while with the mufti of Sandjak, Zukorlić, I have no relations whatsoever. I actively participated in the activities of the mosque of Niš up to 1998 when my first wife died; after that, I withdrew.

Do you have any active members in the tekka?

I had them till two years ago, about 50 people when most of them moved away to Germany as asylum-seekers. I also have a shrine in Belgrade with approximately sixty believers, as well as in Podgorica with about 120 members. Here, however, today I almost have no believers, especially since I remarried again, three years ago, to a woman quite younger than me.

Do you have or prepare any assistant?

My son should be in future my deputy but he does not want to get active yet, says he is still too young. I have some disciples who are yet to take an exam with me but for this the presence of some other sheiks from Mitrovica is needed. We do not consume alcohol at all; we practice *avdez* and *namaz*; we make *ashram* in the evening and in the morning and so on.

Do you regularly hold *zhikr* in the tekka?

Yes, regularly, twice a week, on Thursdays and Sundays, between five and seven in the afternoon. The second most important ritual is *namaz* with a lot of praying. The *namaz* is preceded by bowing; then we give *Mawlid*, followed by *zhikrulaj* which usually lasts for three or three hours and a half. Special *zhikrulaj* we do on the month of Moharram, after Kurban Bayrami, preceded by three-week fasting and praying; for ten days we are dressed in black and we cry. No music, no television; only God's word and talks about Prophet Mohammed, Ali and other significant religious figures. When these ten days of strict fasting and praying are over, we usually buy a lamb and prepare a solemn dinner, invite guests and celebrate. Another special *zhikrulaj* is done on every March, 21; the prayer is read and attended by as many people as possible; and, together with other sheiks, depending on how they feel, these people socialize for three or four hours. For instance, this year, I had two guests from Skopje and Đakovica; from Niš, there came my wife's brother and another man, both of them sheiks, too. This exchange of visits happens between March 21 and 25 every year.

Are only Romas members of your tekkias in Niš, Belgrade and Podgorica? How old are they?

No, there are other Muslims here, most of all Albanians and Shiptars but there are also Orthodox people, believe me. There are not many Montenegro Muslims. The reason for this is that I know many languages, in addition to Roma and Serbian, I also speak Arabian, Turkish, Shiptarian and German. The youngest members are 10 or 12 years old; the oldest are 60 and 70.

How are you received by other Romas in this *mahala*, no matter if they are Muslims or Orthodox? Are there any Roma Protestants and how do they treat you?

I am very well received; after all, I have been living here for as many as forty years. People come here; I go to their places. To tell you something honestly, neither Orthodox nor Muslims are the best of the believers, here, in my region. Let's say, true Muslims do not eat pork while here there are Romas who do it. As far as I know, No Protestant Romas are there in our *mahala* for the time being while personally I would not mind their coming here.

Do you visit other tekkias, not only Kadiri?

I have been to the Helvetis, Bektashi, Rifa'iyyah, Sinanya and some more; I have also attended churches; I go everywhere where I feel people are good but where they are not, I do not go. Till 1997 we had in our tekkia the possibility to pierce ourselves. If, in piercing, blood appears, it means it is not honest and the other way round. However, piercing is an honor which has to be achieved; it is achieved only by those who truly deserve it; it is usually organized in three or four years. When we visit other tekkias, we inevitably ask to talk to the elders since our order is the oldest and we have to be respected before all others even though they may be, considering their age only, older than us.

What did you do before you became a sheik?

In the beginning I only adhered to the Muslim faith. I was born in Gnjilane but I lived in Istok, in the vicinity of Peć. When I came to Niš in 1968 to do my military service, I met my first wife here and got married. I had previously kept a tinsmith's shop in Istok and together with my six brothers we also kept a shop in Klina. We have always been Muslims as long as we can remember. My ancestors were, nevertheless, long-lived people: my grandfather lived till the age of 130 while my father till he was 122. Today I live only on the role of sheik. People come to look for salvation or because they expect some benefit; I relieve them of witchcraft, I make *zjafet* (special prayer) for the house. We also make *zhikrulaj* in a new house but only if the host wants it voluntarily. I used to work for six years in Austria so that now I am considering the possibility of submitting my requirement for pension since I am getting close to sixty-five. As for schooling, I have only two classes of elementary school but I do not see it as a great shortcoming. For my professed honesty God has endowed me with this power and this knowledge but I would like to tell you that I had to, before taking my exam, learn seventy and two thousand questions....

What are your relations with other tekkias in Niš?

With the tekkia of Dane Emini I have personally very good relations; we greet each other when we meet in the street but I do not enter his tekkia. The main reason for this is that they pierce themselves every fifteen days and the *zhikrulaj* they make because of that it is not pleasing to us. They are not much liked by other

Muslim leaders, either, since they somehow put it that they are larger than God himself which is not true; we are only servants of God. At large gatherings, they pierce their children and make a spectacle of it which I do not like and that is why we do not exchange visits with them, except on great holidays though even then we first announce our visit and ask there would be no other people to disturb us. You know, even according to the Islam doctrine, it is a sin for man to *nakadi* or disfigure himself so that our order does not imply piercing at all; I say, maybe once a year or less than that and even then only for those who have deserved it. I have personally denied piercing to myself, but I do not prevent others from doing it if they want it so. Here, you see, on the walls there are lined-up all these needles for piercing but I do not use them. In all this, hygiene is well taken care of but, God forbids, something may happen, and in a second man can die; all in all, this is a great risk.

How do you estimate your chances for enlarging your membership here in Niš?

To tell you truly, when I am here, I feel like a sick man. That is why I more often in Podgorica where my daughter got married; I have other believers there and care about their education since they will put the blame on me if they are not fully ready for the exams they will take tomorrow. Otherwise my neighbors are good people; I have no problem with them but they are simply not interested in joining some faith, entering a church, or a mosque or this. They are unbelieving people; they do as they can and they only come to me when something terrible happens to them so they ask for help but, most often, it is too late for any kind of help. My duty is to accept to come, if they call me and not by force, to the funeral; I most often go to poor people and I enable them to make their wish come true even when they have no money to pay for it though my wife's brother Demir Toska, for instance, has a fee set in advance for his services, charging hundred euros or more for a prayer. In Niš there are four tekkias but none of them is, except for mine, registered. The second one is Dane's in Beogradmala while in the neighborhood of his there is a tekkiya of my wife's brother Demir Toska of the Kadiri order and another of Rifa'iyyah order headed by Osman Biga, which was once supported by the father of Dane Emini... In the vicinity of my tekkiya, there is an object which I have opened up but this attempt has not succeeded; people gather together sometimes there but this place is not furnished at all. On principle, I think that the tekkiya will not open any more; it is more likely that they will close down those already existing. I have, all in all, sixteen grandchildren by my daughter and by my son and I am aware this is a small space which will not satisfy all the needs of the faithful; moreover, I have more interested people among the young, namely those who are now between eight and twelve years of age. That is why I have planned to buy an estate and build a genuine big tekkiya that would gather together a great number of faithful and that would be in the sharia instead of the tarikat since I am sticking to the basic principles of faith and this is the most important thing. There is an instructed disciple of mine from Podgorica who is now living in Germany and there he gathers together about 120 believers, not only Romas... And I would also like one of my descendents to become a sheik in the future.

What does it really mean when you say that the tekkiya is not official?

For someone to be an official sheik, this has to be confirmed by many other sheiks from the Kadiri order. My teacher first instructed my wife's brother Demir Toska and then me; this has been confirmed by other sheiks as well and that is why he is as official as I am. Dane Emini, however, was proclaimed only by his father who was truly a sheik but not in the presence and with the approval of other sheiks. This

is the same case as with Osman Bigo who possibly has one more tekkia in Kraljevo or Kragujevac, I am not sure. I have even heard a story how Dane's father did it because he owed some money to Osman and, unable to pay off his debt, he promoted him to the title of sheik, in return. I have, for instance, prepared the documentation to proclaim my son as a sheik and if something happens to me unexpectedly, God forbids, he will be able to take over this position. But, until he gets approval from other sheiks, he will not be a true one. And this, just as I have described to you using my example, is preceded by taking a serious exam. And everyone who passes the exam for sheik gets a flag on which there are prayers of all the twelve tarikats written on as on mine here in the corner. I repeat, I have nothing against any of them; I greet everyone in the street.

Conclusion

If we have (Đorđević, 2007), while taking only a secondary interest in Islam, allowed ourselves to reproach our outstanding Islamologists for failing to make us more exhaustively familiar with everyday Islam on the territory of Serbia,⁴ (of which one of those criticized, Darko Tanasković, has been aware of it even earlier),⁵ then it seems decent that we should try a little to do something about it. While dealing with Roma topics, we have, on several occasions, studied "Islam here and now" among the Serbian Muslim Romas (Đorđević and Todorović, 1999; Đorđević, 2001; Đorđević and Todorović, 2001; Đorđević and Todorović, 2002; Đorđević, 2003; Đorđević, 2005b; Todorović, 2005). And thus, starting from the cemeteries, through the culture of death and cult places, we have come to the tekkias, tarikat and sheiks of Niš Romas all the time keeping in mind an idea obtained from Petko Hristov, a well-known Bulgarian ethnologist, about the process that is rapidly going on in his country, about "Tsiganization" of their numerous tekkias,⁶ as well as an observation made by Ružica Cacanaska, sociologist of religion from Sofia, that there is an increasing number of Roma Muslims among Macedonian dervishes.⁷ There are also indications that many Jemkas, from Niš to Leskovac, from Vranje to Preševo, like the one in a beautiful and old Roma song from Niš, want "to run away, mother, all the way to the tekkia." To confirm this, it is indispensable to undertake a special research project.

⁴ "It's a true wonder that the least known and least explored are *domestic Islam* and *Islam population*, from Kosovo and so-called Valley of Preševo through the Sandzak and Belgrade to Novi Sad and Subotica, unlike quite considerable coverage of "faraway" Islam in Iran or Afghanistan or Arabian Peninsula (Two scientists exploring Islam are most often present in our public, namely Dr Darko Tanasković, Professor of the Faculty of Philology, and Dr Mirosljub Jeftić, Professor of the Faculty of Political Sciences, Belgrade. To both of them, as fellow colleague, we address the following remark: they have not made us familiar with empirical Islam on the local territory.)" (Đorđević, 2007:17)

⁵ As we are informed by Ljiljana Čolić (1995:10): "The statement made just now (of Darko Tanasković's, author's note) that Islam is at issue obliges us here and now to undertake new research projects for the sake of better learning and understanding the activities of the dervish orders on our territory in order to be able to objectively estimate their power and influence."

⁶ Said in a personal conversation with D. B. Đorđević in Sofia in October 2006

⁷ Said in the conversation with D. B. Đorđević and D. Todorović in Skopje, in February 2007

QUESTIONNAIRE
ROMA SHEIKS FROM NIŠ
D. B. Đorđević 2007

1. We know you have been a sheik for a long time. Since when exactly?
2. Who has promoted you into a sheik?
3. What is the name of your tarikāt?
4. Is your tarikāt a member of some community of dervish orders?
5. What are your relations with the Islam Community, with Effendi Jusufspahić, mufti of Belgrade or Muamer Zukorlić?
6. Why is the relationship such as it is?
7. How many “believers” or active members do you have?
8. Do you have assistants?
9. Is the tekkia in a private house or not?
10. Do you regularly do *zhikr*?
11. What else do your rituals comprise?
12. What is the main ritual and when is it?
13. Are active members in the tekkia only Romas or do you have other Muslims as well?
14. What is age structure of dervishes and all those who come to the tekkia regularly: are they young, middle-aged or old?
15. How are you received by other Romas: Muslims, Orthodox, Protestants?
16. Do you visit other tekkias as well?
17. What did you used to be? What are you now?
18. Has your family always been Muslim?
19. What are you by education?
20. How do you see other tekkias in Niš; are there any?

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Ph. 2. Slobodan Emini, Roma Sheik of the Rifa'iyyah Order, Belgrade Quarter, Niš, 2007.




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**ISLAM-CHRISTIANITY BORDER ZONE
AND THE ISSUE OF GENDER IN ISLAM**

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ANTI-PLAGUE EUROPEAN-OTTOMAN BORDER IN SERBIA IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY IN THE FOREIGN HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Modern Research Focused on the Plague in the Islamic World

The modern historiography started from the middle of the 20th century to pay a great attention to social and cultural aspects and consequences of the plague¹ zoonosis having raged over the Ancient World, especially along the Mediterranean coastline from the 6th to 19th century. Due to huge losses in population² caused by two outbreaks, the disease had an effect on the development of civilization in the Ancient World. During the first pandemic (6th-8th century) the plague was most probably that “*magnificent person of the history*”³ that crucially contributed to the collapse of the Eastern-Roman Empire, and the early spread of Islam over these territories. During the second pandemic which started by the middle of 14th century, the plague “solved” a deep crisis of then Western Europe, causing disastrous losses in population it secured resources for the economic progress of the survivors and for the growth of West-European communities from the 15th century onward.⁴ The spread of the zoonosis resulted in that this disease became highly ranked on the list of the most important historical events according to the public opinion then prevailing in the developed world⁵, and made the attention of various experts become focused on this disease. Thus the plague in the second half of the 20th century was the “main hero” in several major historical works. They thoroughly described the medieval plague cataclysm, the “Black Death” (abundance of European chronicles refer to it), while the plague raging over the Ottoman Empire was much less presented, or to say more precisely, to the extent the disease had affected the military and trade presence of West-Europeans in the Levant. Over the recent years this situation has rather changed because of the newly created huge interest in development of the

¹ The disease is a naturally contracted zoonosis which appears, as a sort of an ecological being, in favourable natural biotopes. It is where the natural hosts of the carrier, the coccobacillus, live, primarily the rodents. The germ circles among them in the way that the parasite fleas suck the blood from the infested bodies and regurgitate it in the bodies of healthy hosts which are thus being infested. A man becomes infected in the same way as a rodent, when being bitten by an infested rat flea. Infection was transmitted among people in various ways, by bites of rat fleas, human fleas, or directly, through the air. This happened in the surrounding of a dying person whose lungs were thus affected that countless bacilli escaped into the respiratory tubes and then into the atmosphere to be inhaled by people who thus became immediately infected, with a 100% fatal result. It is a pneumonic plague, while by regurgitating the bacillus by an infested flea an easier and more conventional variety of plague is transmitted, with fatality in 70% of the infected – without a modern therapy. See: Fox D., K. Yersinia, *University Lecture, 1997-2003*. www.pnas.org; *A Brief History of Infectious Diseases*, Bayer Pharmaceutical Division www.bayerpharma.na.com.

² During the first two of three pandemics, the plague killed nearly one third of the world population. See: Mollaret H.H., *Emergences et Reinsurengences de la Peste, Histoire des Maladies, Editions medicine et hygiène*, 50eme annee, Genève, 1982, p. 2472-4.

³ Biraben J.N et Le Goff J., *La peste dans le Haut Moyen Age*, Annales.E.SC.24.1969, pp. 1494-1510.

⁴ Zivojinovic D., *Uspom Europe 1450-1788*, Belgrade, 1995, pp. 71-5.

⁵ Hallber J., *The Plague Years*, Minnesota Medicine, Minnesota Medical Association, Vol. 8, 1998.

Islamic world where the plague had produced long-term demographic effects.⁶ A particular historical focus was concentrated on the epidemicity of plague in the areas of the Ottoman Empire such as Egypt, Syria, and others, which were of the trade-related or military interest for the West Europeans. Their presence there was remarkable, especially in the 18th and 19th century and therefore they carefully watched the epidemicity of the disease. In that period, the plague was almost the main subject of any diplomatic, military, trade, naval or other correspondence referring to the Levant, the place of the endemic, wherefrom the pestilence threatened to be imported in Europe.

Unlike the Middle East, the border line of “Turkish Europe” (especially its inland) generally was not a trade-involved or otherwise interesting area of the Empire, moreover the presence of West Europeans was relatively insignificant for centuries – except in Greece. Therefore the inland of “Turkish Europe” was much more isolated than the West. That is the reason why the problem of plague was not tackled in the past in this area thus resulting in a shortage of documentation referring to that border Region which contagious epidemicity is rather rarely mentioned in foreign literature. As concerns Serbia, South Slavic countries and the West Balkans, the lack of knowledge about the effects of the zoonosis in the Ottoman Europe was compensated with the domestic historiography⁷ accompanied with the domestic history of medicine.⁸ A disastrous extent of centuries long plague raging (coming from Anatolian, Istanbul and West Balkan foci) in the territory of Serbia has been clearly elucidated. Within this framework it has been presented the attitude that Serbia suffered from the zoonosis more than any other European country, and not only demographically but in view of its development as well. The reason for this can be found in its unique position of a plague-stricken border between two separated civilizations – the Christian and Islamic, which lasted over centuries.

Serbia at the Beginning of the 19 Century – Turkish “Plague-stricken Border”

Specific and consequential suffering of border-located Serbia from the plague, primarily because it was divided by means of a global anti-plague border, has appeared recently in a foreign historiography in one of the most popular works about the development of the Ottoman Empire. It explains, inter alia, the mission of Ottomans – to islamize the entire former Roman Empire, that is the whole Europe, having encountered various obstacles in their conquering historical path. Within this context the plague (in Serbia) was mentioned in the following way:

*“There were... practical... and ideological barriers, on the Muslims’ path towards Europe. In the 14th century already, first Venice and Raguza (Dubrovnik), and later Marseilles and other Christian seaports started to take protective measures against the plague. This turned into the system known as the quarantine with a 40-day wait prescribed by the authorities of Venice in the 15th century, and which involved all visitors who arrived from the Ottoman countries. With the increasing difference between the East and West concerning the health and hygiene standards the quarantine became a permanent institution... indispensable to protect Europe against the pestilence. This decision was strictly implemented regardless the religious affiliation, nationality, status or position... **over the time the institution of quarantine had become the main obstacle for a closer relationship and communications between the Islamic and Christian Worlds**”.*⁹

⁶ Dols M., *The Black Death in the Middle East*, Princeton University Press, 1977.

⁷ Katic R., *O pojavama i suzbijanju zaraznih bolesti kod Srba od 1202 do 1813. godine*, Serbian Academy of Science and Arts, Special Editions, Naučno delo, Belgrade, 1965.

⁸ Stanojevic V., *Istorija medicine*, Medical Publishing Co., MEDICINSKA KNJIGA, Belgrade-Zagreb, 1959, pp. 865-1101.

⁹ Luis B., *Muslimansko otkriće Evrope*, Avangarda, Belgrade, 2004, p. 188.

This civilization significance of plague, embodied in the “Iron Curtain”, which as early as in the Middle Ages was established between two Europes, i.e. the Western and Turkish Europe, is of the main importance for this report and has not been mentioned until nowadays. Generally, Europe raised a rampart in response to the pestilence from the Ottoman Empire, and it was so proof that it prevented “*the communications between the two worlds*” thus impeding a harmonized and ascending development of Serbia, cutting it actually in two. A modern historian of Islam illustrated both material and psychological effects of the anti-plague barrier (between the worlds) to the separated developments of two parts of the Continent, with the words of one of rare English travellers who had passed the Austrian-Turkish border towards the East in the early 19th century. With his impression about the “sanitary protocol” in Zemun, he pictured the depth of the civilization gap which had been made between the two Europes, primarily caused by plague as it is commonly thought nowadays. Serbia found itself in that gap and experienced hardship over centuries, being separated from the world of safety and abundance, primarily because of its geopolitical position within the fatally infected vilayet – the way how Europeans thought of Turkey. All these are described in an old record from the beginning of the 19th century about the Zemun quarantine protocol, which supports the opinion that the plague had created an “apartheid” between civilizations that lasted for centuries, and divided Europe in view of its development. The above written record also illustrates that the zoonosis had isolated the population of Serbia, both from the European mainstream and one from another:

*“Two borderline cities are less than a rifle range away from each other but, nevertheless, their inhabitants are not in contact. **Hungarians on the north-hern, and the Turks and Serbs (“Servians”) on the southern side of the Sava river, were so far away from each other as if there were fifty spacious provinces lying between them.** Among people who were roaming near me through the streets of Semlin (Zemun), there might have never been a single one who ever went to have a glance at the foreign race, which was living behind the walls of the castle at the opposite side. The plague and fear from it have separated these people from each other. All arrivals and departures are banned because of the fear from its yellow flag. If you dare to breach the rules of quarantine, you will be brought to the court at the highest speed. The court will pronounce the sentence at the distance of several yards. Instead of a gentle whispering into your ear, a sweet hope that faith gives, the priest will console you from the same distance as that required for a duel, after which you will be carefully shot and neatly buried in the land of lazarets. When everything was prepared for our departure, we went down into a fenced part of the building of the quarantine, where we waited for the” compromised”¹⁰ officer of the Austrian government, whose duty was to watch the border crossing and who, owing to that, lived in conditions of a permanent isolation. The boats with their “compromised” rowers had already been waiting. After coming in touch with any being or thing belonging to the Ottoman Empire we could not go back to the Austrian territory if we did not spend 14 days in prison in the lazaret. Therefore we considered it was important... to see that none of things... for our further journey had not been forgotten. In such our concern and effort to avoid that sort of misfortune, **we managed to organize our departure from Semlin (Zemun) with almost such ceremonial and solemn consideration as if we had been preparing to go away from this world.** Several kind people... came down to the river bank to wish us a good trip. And now, while we*

¹⁰ A compromised person is the one who came in either direct or indirect contact with any person or thing from the plague-stricken area, or stayed there for a while. He lived isolated and that was legally regulated. The translator’s remark paraphrased.

*were standing with them 3-4 yards away from the “compromised” officer, they asked us if we were quite sure that we had finished all our jobs in the Christian countries, and if we had any requests to make before we left... Then we shook hands with our friends from Semlin (Zemun) and they immediately moved several meters away from us so as to leave us in the centre of the area between them and the “compromised” officer. Then the latter one approached, and **once again asked us if we had finished with the civilized world, giving us his hand..., and this put an end to the Christian world for a very long period**”.*¹¹

This description of Zemun clearly illustrates the reasons why hardly any citizen of the Christian world dared to travel through Ottoman Serbia, moreover there were no obvious trade-related or other interests which could justify the exposure to the danger of contagion – as it was the case in trade centres of Thessalonica, Alexandria, Istanbul or similar.

Indeed, it appeared that in “compromised” Ottoman Serbia only the plague was certain, the calamity which had divided people of two riverbanks of the Sava even in two “races” – as described by a Britton, who appeared to say good-bye to his life when he faced a sombre ceremony of the Austrian anti-plague protection. A feeling of menace which got this adventurous Englishman in Zemun, the overland gate of the Ottoman Empire, shows how “compromising” of Serbia had made Europe far away. In the 19th century there was a phobic fear of diseases in Europe, the result of a collective trauma, due to numerous regularly occurring massive deaths on the Continent until the 18th century because of importation of the pestilence. It is only such a fear that can explain, and justify, the described send-off – a true writing off of the “civilized” passengers to the plague-stricken Levant, where the zoonosis was raging savagely even in the modern times when it had already been suppressed in Christian Europe. Yet in the 14th century, free Christians became aware that the pestilence of an oriental origin raged most severely in dirt. So they started to suppress it energetically and institutionally, by the quarantine and other kinds of isolation but also by various sanitation concepts and did as much as they knew in the Middle Ages. This includes various measures of communal hygiene, such as, for example, the fumigation for the purpose of air cleaning and the organized hunting for various “suspected” animals, insects, pests, etc. but also the measures of personal hygiene as it was the idea of changing clothes before going to bed and many others. Over the time, all these contributed to the hygienic sanitary situation in free Europe where numbers of rats and fleas were decreasing and generally cleanliness was prevailing therefore significantly suppressing plague and its effects as well as other infections.¹²

Muslims (including Ottomans) did not do that since their attitude towards the disease was completely fatalistic because of the religious reasons which have been clarified today. The Islamic dogma had already during the Justinian’s pandemic (6th-8th century) declared communication of plague and plague-related death as the will of God, which a Muslim should receive peacefully and without grumbling – in order to prove the strength of his religious belief¹³. This attitude

¹¹ A. W. Kinglake., *Eothen*, London, With no date, pp. 9-11, Quoted in the work No. 7, pp. 188-193.

¹² Sublet J., *La Peste Prise aux Rets de la Jurisprudence*, Studia Islamica, Vol. 33, 1971, pp. 141-4.

¹³ The view of Islam about the plague can be summarized in three tenets. The first says that the contagion came from God, the second says that one should neither leave nor enter the plague-stricken land (which is in contradiction with the first tenet) and the third says the plague is a „mercy“ for Muslims, and punishment for infidels. These tenets were presented and confirmed in a number of hadises – through short stories about tradition relating to works and words of Muhammad the Prophet (see: *Pojmovnik Islama*, Bozovic R. i Simic V., Narodna knjiga, 2003, page.130). Hadises about plague were presented in the collection of these written records called *Sahih al Buhari* (see: *Oxford History of Islam*, prepared by John L Esposito, Clio, 2002, 989) but they were also mentioned in other collections of hadis. The Islamic dog-

originated from interpretation of some parts of Koran and relevant hadis from which by a complex (very confusing) exegesis it was indirectly derived that the Prophet Mohammad thought that the disease had appeared by the fault of infidels. Thus it was indirectly derived that no-exception of Muslims from the disease was in fact a sort of invitation by a higher force to take part in the holy war, the jihad. According to their belief, peaceful acceptance of disease and death caused by plague gives a Muslim, who responds as their religion prescribes, i.e. gladly accepts the disease, the “mercy” – the status of shahid or martyr for faith. This consent or rather constraint among Muslims to leave themselves to the disease, caused its undisturbed raging over the whole Islamic world. The Muslims did not change their way of life to survive the Black Death and therefore a big sanitary-hygienic difference was made between free Europe and Ottoman Europe (which included Serbia as well). This difference stabilized medieval quarantines. On the other hand, Christian population of Ottoman Serbia could not protect themselves according to the European model, institutionally, what led to their severe suffering until they achieved independence-freedom. After that, Serbia quickly established a feasible anti-plague protection in accordance with the Austrian model. In 1838 it moved the European plague iron curtain to the south-east towards the Ottoman Empire.

Free Serbia in 1838 as a Sanitary Efficient Country

After gaining independence, Serbia became an important country for the West, first of all because the safety of the developed part of the Continent in view of the overland importation of the oriental disease-pestilence was primarily dependent on Serbia’s sanitary efficiency. For that reason, Europeans watched the process of establishing the anti-plague barrier in free Serbia, what was not easy because there were few of them who entered the country which was part of Ottoman (plague-stricken) Empire for centuries. Authorities of European major powers got first information on the Serbian overland quarantines from the French state documents. They generally referred to one main source, the book by a traveller from the 19th century, Ami Bue, who was especially interested in our regions, mostly in the “Slavs” and plague. Bue became a source not only to his contemporaries but also to later historiographers.¹⁴ In the basic work about plague in the Ottoman world, Serbia was described somewhat less than Bosnia, Herzegovina, Greece, Albania, Macedonia, Rumania, Egypt, Syria and other regions where the presence of West Europeans, especially French or Turkish people was more remarkable and safer as well. This work originally quotes Bue’s description of the beginnings of institutional anti-plague protection in Serbia (1836), which was carefully studied by the European Authorities, and which reads:

“Along the whole Turkish border, various barriers are placed, or there are fences, made of woven tree branches, stuck in the ground, whilst the militia stations are placed at the distance of 1-2.5 miles, so that it is necessary to form patrols to protect the border which cannot entirely prevent the violation of rules... The militia serve in the sanitary cordon of Serbia in the same way as “Grenziers” or Granizers” do in Hungary, except that in the latter country if all citizens have to be soldiers, they at least do not have to pay any of financial obligations of other citizens... Unlike that, in

matic view of the plague was explained in detail and synthesized in the presented three basic tenets in a voluminous work about the plague in the Islamic world by American orientalist M. Dols (cited in the bibliography under the ordinal number 4) from which it has often been quoted briefly, such as in the article: The Islamic World up to 1600 “The Black Death“, The Applied History Research Group, The University of Calgary, 1998. www.ucalgary.ca

¹⁴ Sublet J., *La Peste Prise aux Rets de la Jurisprudence*, Studia Islamica, Vol. 33, 1971, pp. 141-4.

Serbia, they pay taxes as all the others, what they do not think is justifiable, although they are allowed to be occupied with their handicrafts, while they are standing guard...”.

This is how Bue described the sanitary cordon, which was established by the administration of free Serbia according to the Austro-Hungarian model, mobilizing military capable border population into militia (anti-plague) forces. It is interesting to mention that first Serbian border guards, in spite of a language barrier, managed to complain to Bue that they had to waste their time in a cordon without tax exemption which was granted to their Hungarian colleagues for the same task. The traveller and author (geologist) understood border guards, probably because he knew a little Serbian, he discretely boasted with in his description of the Aleksinac anti-plague quarantine. The story got an exotic tone because of the use of local expressions, such as:

“...There were... three to four small house” (cottages) which were clean enough for travellers one class above peasants, whilst the latter ones were lodged in a sort of a stable, and there was a proper stable and one more storehouse (barn) as well as a huge courtyard where goods could be spread... The Institution is managed by the Commander of this place, Mr. Dimitrijevic, the Hungarian Serb. One German doctor and two clerks from Hungary joined the quarantine...”.

Ami Bue had described the Aleksinac quarantine just before the plague from the Ottoman Empire “passed the border” (1837-38) for the last time and hit the towns along the route of Belgrade-Nis, especially Paracin and Cuprija. This epidemic was suppressed with the assistance of doctors from the Austrian quarantine in Zemun but in the first place by isolating the area with military troops. After this event, the health organization of the country started functioning in a satisfactory manner according to the opinion of the French administration.

Even a quick insight into several major historiographical works about the Ottoman Empire shows that Serbia in fact got separated from Europe “as if thousands of vast provinces separated it from Europe” (according to the words of a British traveller and author) and it was not because it belonged to the Ottoman Empire, but because of the fatal disease, which reigned for centuries throughout the Empire and thus in Serbia as well, and to say more precisely the dogma which supported that disease, instead to suppress it feasibly. That dogma had made of Serbia an anti-plague barrier and it had given Serbia the status which prevented it to accomplish its geopolitically conditioned mission to link the East and the West, thus depriving it from all benefits which belong to a mint of civilizations. When it finally became free, for just a couple of decades Serbia had dramatically changed its sanitary status in the eyes of Europeans. The place of plague-caused deaths at the beginning of the 19th century became the country “which health care is satisfactory” – with the effort of the whole nation, distressed by long lasting slave position and development stagnation accompanied with unnecessary enormous suffering caused by plague, in addition to perilous rebellions until the 19th century. The price of the after-war success of newly liberated Serbia in establishing a proper overland anti-plague protection, thus becoming a guard of Europe against the plague, can be easily understood even from the above presented, quite modest segment of the history of contagions in the Islamic world.

Conclusion

The modern western literature about the Islamic world in its part referring to the Ottoman Serbia explains indirectly a tacit resistance of Western Europe to accept Serbia was part of its cultural, economic and other milieu. It appears that the plague border which existed for centuries was deeply rooted in minds of the West Europeans. Until the present day it has maintained in their minds a quite irrational perception of Serbia as a rather oriental country. The "borderline Serbia" will still need to make many efforts to get rid of a virtual long-lasting civilization barrier, which, mostly due to plague, had divided Europe into the Christian and Ottoman parts long time ago.

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Danijela Gavrilović

GENDER, RELIGION, FUNDAMENTALISM – THE CASE OF ISLAM*

The gender dimension is always mentioned when discussing fundamentalism. Among others, one of the foundations of fundamentalism is the relationship between the sexes, which is changing in modern society, stepping away from religious values. Islam is the religion most often mentioned in relation to the position of women, which is prescribed by this religion and mostly regarded as inappropriate.

As an issue, the position of women in Islam is now a general topic, discussed by both scientists and the public at large. The intention of this text is to shed light on the problem pointing at the fact that such a position of women is not exclusive to Islam, and also that it is determined by external trends in society, that it oscillates in time and is different from one country to another. Our principal thesis is that the position of woman in Muslim societies may be understood not only on the grounds of religious influence, but also on the basis of the level of social development, which is seen from different positions of women within the Muslim world. Different in time periods and social context, from class to class, local conditions, and regions.

It is an established fact that the position of woman in all major religions of the world is very unfavourable. It is also a fact that, in cultures formed under the influence of these religions, women are to a certain point deprived of rights. Here we must also have in mind the fact that countries in which these women live vary in levels of development so that women in them may exercise their rights on various levels, too. In terms of religion, we may say that women start from the same initial position – that of lack of rights. Since Eve, the history of woman's sin and guilt has gone hand in hand with her existence. We must here consider that in Koran Eve receives an equal treatment, i.e. her guilt is considered the same in amount as that of Adam.

Islam is a religion on which most written texts have come from the West, from the enemies of Islam, and is also a religion almost totally equated with fundamentalism since September 11. For this reason, a sociologist's study of Islam, with an intention to view the situation objectively, is a priority, especially in this area, itself burdened by the conflict between Islam and Christianity.

The study of the position of women in Islam is a general topic on the one hand, yet, on the other, in our language there are relatively few texts treating the problem. The first idea suggested by our title would be that women are deprived of rights in Islamic societies. In our country, this problem is simplified and insufficiently considered, without the analysis of the social situation in which the Muslim woman lives. Texts are usually based on the analysis of religious instructions given in Koran and Hadis, and on the possible consequences of such statements. Whenever the position of woman is treated through the lens of Koran and tradition, as is usually the case when religious texts are analyzed, many interpretations emerge, some burdened with ideological exaggeration. These texts are interpreted differ-

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ently, depending on the goal of the interpreter. Western readers find in them grounds for an unequal position of women, while feminists from Muslim countries call upon early Islam and equality of women for which one may also find confirmation in Koran. Feminists in Islamic countries are trying to show what real needs and problems of women in these countries are. They claim that Koran allows woman much more than is the case in practice, and therefore wish to exercise their rights in accordance with Koran and genuine Islamic tradition.

The position of woman in Islam gains in weight and overcomes the boundaries of the very problem (in itself relevant), since this question is considered crucial in the discussions on tradition or modernity, tolerance or fundamentalism. Analysis of the position of woman in Islam is often ideological, whether the author is from the West or the Islamic community itself. In the Muslim literature we “find” that the position of woman in Islam is the most appropriate, as it best suits her nature. On the other hand, women veiling themselves in Islam become a symbol and metaphor of Islamic societies and their anti-modern tendencies. The story of women and inequality is entangled in a broader context of fundamentalism, imperialism, ethnic, and religious defence. The gender issue is very sensitive, as it is used for various ideological “battles”.

In sociological study round the world this is not so, as we encounter numerous texts and books treating women in Islam.¹ These texts relate theoretical concepts and ideas with the practice and life of women in various social contexts.²

Muslim women live in varying social contexts, and therefore their position differs in response to concrete social conditions. The position of woman cannot be studied in a simplified way – differences in this respect are huge even within the Islamic world. Let us consider Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, these are specific societies, with different levels of modernization, and hence different position of woman.³ The relationship between state policy and the position of women is relevant, too, as women's inequality is grounded in social policy as well.⁴ In her introduction to a series of texts, judged as a very important contribution to this issue and to the rectification of prejudices and simplified interpretation, Denise Kandiyoti insists on the different heritage of Muslim countries (empires, kingdoms, colonies), different modernization levels, and, finally, different social policies in terms of women's rights. Profound changes in modern Muslim societies, including equal education for boys and girls, and economic pressure taking woman to the labour market are two factors strongly undermining the patriarchal Islamic construction.

Here one should have in mind the fact that numerous Muslim women live in Western countries, and their position deserves a separate analysis.⁵ In the West, there are many women from other confessions converting to Islam. A possible ex-

¹ Fatima Mernisi, *The Veil and the Mail* and by the same author, *Beyond the Veil – Male/Female Dynamics in a Modern Muslim Society*, Mahnaz Afkhami, *Faith and Freedom – Women's Human Rights in the Muslim World*, Anwar Hakmat, *Women and the Koran – The Status of Women in Islam*, Carol L. Anway, *Daughters of Another Path – American Women Choosing Islam*, Amina Wadud, *Qur'an and Women – Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman's Perspective*, Jan Goodwin, *Price of Honor – Muslim Women Lift the Veil of Silence on the Islamic World*, Geraldine Brooks, *Nine Parts of Desire – The Hidden World of Islamic Women*, Suha Sabbagh, *Arab Women – Between Defiance and Restraint*, Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and John L. Esposito, *Islam, Gender and Social Change*, Haideh Moghissi, *Women and Islam, Critical Concept in Sociology*.....

² See, Haideh Moghissi, *Women and Islam, Critical Concepts in Sociology*, ROUTLEDGE,

³ See, Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and John L. Esposito, *Islam, Gender and Social Change*,

⁴ See, Denise Kandiyoti (ed.), *Women, Islam and State*,

⁵ See, *The Muslim Veil in North America: Issues and Debates* by Helen Rose Ebaugh, 2005. Women and Islam: Western experience...

planation is that Islam offers security and determination in the otherwise anarchic world. A research among Norwegian women converting to Islam shows this fact does have some importance.⁶

The position of Muslim women in the social environment must be treated in the context of Islamic values. Values of a society determine the reigning norms in it. In that sense, conversion of normative systems from one social context into another is impossible without a prior development of the global society to a stadium in which it becomes able to accept a common normative order. The concept of human rights is often not accorded with accepted social values in a given society. In Islam, the relationship between the sexes is not based on the idea of equality, but on that of complementarity.

Here one of the main points in fundamentalist reactions has to do precisely with the change of woman's position. The changed position of woman, as influenced by modernization, is interpreted as woman's moral degradation. Whichever religious tradition it may come from, fundamentalism responds precisely to this aspect of social relations.⁷ Theoreticians point to the current link between these tendencies and the changed position of women as influenced by fundamentalism. In the period 1950-1970 equality of women was promoted, only to be followed by the stifling of women's rights and their retreat from the public domain.⁸ *Sharifah Zaleha binti Syed Hassan* deals with the position of women and fundamentalism in Malaysia.⁹ After liberation from colonial power, the Malaysian woman moved to the public domain, infiltrated into many fields, earned the right to employment and participation in public life. Problems stemming from modernization are ascribed to the renunciation of original Islamic values and one of the first ways to return to them is to return to tradition, particular eating or dressing habits. The pressure on the woman becomes obvious. *Walter E. A. van Beek*¹⁰ finds a number of common traits of all fundamentalisms in spite of numerous differences that occur in various cultural traditions. "As for the cultural domain, fundamentalists insist on the prevalence of evil, control of sexuality, role of the family, family hierarchy and relations between family members".

One of the key topics related to the position of women in Islam is the dressing code. In the West, the veil over women's faces is taken to be a sign of inequality and disembodiment. Additionally, veiling of women which occurs today and was not prevalent in mid 20th century is, not without a reason, interpreted as a fundamentalist tendency. However, the veil does not always have to be a token of fundamentalism. It can also be approached as a symbolic act whose purpose is cultural defence (prevention of the decay of national, ethnic, local or any other culture)¹¹ or cultural transition (a situation in which religion helps a minority group or group of immigrants preserve marks of their identity once they believe this identity is jeopard-

⁶ Carol L. Anway, *Daughters of Another Path – American Women Chossing Islam*.

⁷ See proceedings *The Freedom to do gods Will. Religious Fundamentalism and Social Change* – Garrie Hear, James J. Bussuttil, who treats different types of fundamentalism coming from different religious traditions. For instance, the Jewish fundamentalism. In all these the position of woman is a key point.

⁸ See Jan Goodwin, *Price of Honor – Muslim Women Lift Veil of Silence on the Islamic World*.

⁹ See proceedings *The Freedom to do gods Will. Religious Fundamentalism and Social Change* – Garrie Hear, James J. Bussuttil.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ See Danijela Gavrilović, Da li je moguće rasplesti lavirint svetog – Religija u funkciji legitimacije i integracije u savremenom svetu (Is It Possible to Disentangle the Maze of the Sacred – Religious for the Purpose of Legitimating and Integration in Contemporary World), in Dragoljub Đorđević (ed.), *Muke sa svetim (Troubles with the Sacred)*, Niški kulturni centar, 2007.

ized).¹² This is particularly the case with Muslim women in the West, where the veil has the function of separation, identification as opposed to the dominant community and retreat to one's own community, and also expression of disagreement with social circumstances at every given moment. It is believed that the strongest reason behind this practice is that the community at large should recognize the stereotype related to Muslims and make a distinction between it and cultural practice coming from Islamic principles.¹³ Results of a Canadian study suggest that wearing a veil is not an indicator of an inferior social position of women. The Muslim woman is not just a passive victim. Rather, a veil is an identification marker.¹⁴ On the other hand, in a text entitled "Safe Road to the Public Sphere", Linda Woodhead points out that a woman with a veil has actually found the way to reconcile the requirements of her community and modern society, because so covered she can move around in public unhindered and carry out social functions. The veil provides this woman new freedom in the modernized world.¹⁵

Particularly interesting is the issue of revitalization of Islam in this part of the Balkans, and also the reemergence of women with veils. This practice was largely extinct in the socialist Yugoslavia. Now it has reemerged in Bosnia and Sandzak. Sociologists have not yet studied this phenomenon so that there are no accurate estimations on the number of women in Muslim areas covered with veils, as there is no information on whether they have done so always or just in the few years behind us. It would also be interesting to carry out a study on the age structure of women wearing veils in our region. There are a few possible reasons for this phenomenon: revitalization of religion after the collapse of socialist ideology, typical not only of Muslim areas; turn to religion in periods of crisis; women covering themselves for reasons of cultural defence and cultural transition. Undoubtedly, rising numbers of people fasting or dressing along with religious rules indicates increased religiousness, and the research would show which kind of religiousness this is. An interesting question that wants an answer in Balkan environment is how much the return to Islam has affected decrease in women's freedoms. One of the consequences of transition will certainly be the loss of some rights women earned in the socialist period. If one adds to this possible cultural regression, decreased differentiation between secular and "religious" spheres of life, this will be important for the loss of women's privileges in the region.

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¹² Ibid.

¹³ More on this practice in Sajida Sultana Alvi, Homa Hoodfar, and Sheila McDonough (ed.) *The Muslim Veil in North America: Issue and Debates*, Women's Press, Toronto.

¹⁴ Therese Saliba, Carolin Alen, Judith Howard, *Gender, Politics and Islam*, 2002.

¹⁵ Linda Woodhead, Women and Religion, in *Religion in the Modern World*, Routledge, 2002.

Dragana Stjepanović-Zaharijevski

“THE FEMALE” ELEMENT AND ITS INFLUENCE ON ISLAM*

1. The shift from matrilineal to patrilineal structure was a major change in the social structure that occurred in the 7th century Arabia. This transference was marked by a strengthening of individualism and new spiritual values. The ground was set for Islam. Numerous evidence testifying of the Prophet's time points to matrilineality and dignity of women. In her comprehensive interpretation of history, Amaury de Riencourt provides evidence that women in those circumstances did not own property because it belonged to the tribe, was supervised by the uncles and brothers; a higher reputation did not secure their actual power. After the Prophet died, men, up to then known to be sons and descendants of women, began viewing themselves as sons and descendants of men (De Riencourt, 1998: 300). Families were soon comprised purely of persons related through the male lineage, and individual property ended up in the hands of sons or brothers. With the advent of patriarchalism, polygamy flourished. By introducing polygamy, Muhammad wished to suppress selfish individualism, to offer a kind of social security to numerous women in need, and also to secure more followers to be born. It seems that exactly this early polygamy, whose purpose was social security, resulted in the degraded position of woman in the Islamic world.

Veiling the face, an old custom prevalent in the Middle East, was a status symbol and privilege of free women. In time, other meanings came to be associated with it, including that of the “protection” of women from the public. As was the case with polygamy, original intentions were transformed into new peculiarities of Muslim life. Business and trade gathered men, and, instead of tribal matriarchal community, male society strengthened, although Muhammad wanted women to actively participate in the life of the Islamic community. This wish was expressed through the cherishing of “cults turned to the woman”, which did not last long, but do testify of the importance of female paganism. By pushing aside the goddesses, men also pushed women aside from the public scene and expanded on their own benefits.

It seems that in excluding women from the public domain the Islamic society went further than any other society. Women were removed from social and political life, which largely spared the community the gender-related problems so that “this exclusively male complex mixture of numerous communities was able to evoke not only a real sense of democratic unity but also a unique racial intolerance...” (De Riencourt: 309-310). The spread of Islam was followed by a serious degradation of women's position. In such conditions, a new field emerged for woman – mysticism, in the form of Sufism. The degraded Muslim woman turns to the “emotionalism of Islamic mysticism” (313). Once again, the feminine element emerges in religion, opposed to the masculine one, which is immersed in the ethical, legal, or theological observation of things (Prophetism). This way old fertility cults give way to historical reality and valuation of this reality. The masculine principle suppressed the feminine one. Women remained in the “mysticism of nature”.

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The official Islamic fate is masculine and prophetic, but, on the other hand, feminine mysticism surpasses the rational and the pragmatic and can be viewed as the feminine principle surpassing the masculine element, cherishing a passive attitude in succumbing to nature. This passivity reproduces the aggressive, masculine principle, based on a totally opposite position – that affirming the “active Creation” (Archbishop Anastasije, 2005: 174). Hence, Islam is realistic and practical, it accords everyday life along with the one pattern given to people by God via His Prophet.

2. Centuries of patriarchal interpretations of Islam suggest the marginalization of women and their retreat to the private sphere. The issue here is that the Islamic tradition and religious scriptures primarily classify the “feminine” element among the laws of nature, so that treating women and men as equals is considered unnatural. The holy book, “the published Islam”, as the principal written authority, defines Islamic principles and the structure of social institutions, which, in accordance with the “political Islam” are appended and elaborated through Hadiths and Shariat laws. These writings have received different interpretations. The question is whether Koran legislature on marriage and the family supports equality or discrimination of women and men?

Traditionalists find the idea of the “secondness” of women close. It comes from the “God-given difference”, which cannot be accorded with the story of equality of women and men. Men are naturally superior, and this is the end of it. Contrary to this one finds the feminist stream claiming that doctrinal texts of any religion, particularly Islam, are more or less sexist because sexual reasons are used to deduce justification for social, religious and other discrimination of women. Changes in education, increasingly including the female population, are contributing to the political and social emancipation of women, and hence changes in the attitude of modern religions to woman. “Islamic feminism” is used by Muslim women in their fight for equality. Calling upon Koran and the principle of equality of all, they claim that the marginalization of women is a result of historical and political tradition.

The right of men is directly stated in Koran: “Men are the protectors of women because of the greater preference that God has given to some of them and because they financially support them. Among virtuous women are those who are steadfast in prayer and dependable in keeping the secrets that God has protected. Admonish women who disobey (God's laws), do not sleep with them and beat them. If they obey (the laws of God), do not try to find fault in them. God is High and Supreme.” /An-Nisa, Women, 4:34/ (Archbishop Anastasije, 2005: 175). Let us pay additional attention to some Islamic principles with regard to woman:

- by her nature, woman is totally equal to man:

People, fear your Lord, He who creates you out of one man... (Sura An-Nisa, Ayat 1)

- through her piety, woman can be rewarded or punished, just like man

He who does good, whether a man or a woman, and is a believer, will be given a beautiful life to live, and truly rewarded with a better prize than they have deserved (Sura An-Nahl, Ayat 97)

- woman is respected as a wife

And one of His proofs is that for you, out of your kind, he creates women, so you should calm down beside them, for He establishes love and mercy between you... (Sura Er-Rum, Ayat 21)

- equality of women in education is supported

The search for knowledge is an obligation laid upon every Muslim (Hadith of Ibn Majah and Bajihaqi)

(this Hadith is known among Muslims because it has an addendum: *and Muslim women*).

- woman is given rights equal to those given to man, where man is to take care of the family

„...they have legal rights and duties equal to those of men, except that men have one degree of advantage....(Sura El-Bekare, Ayet 228).

- male polygamy is allowed and sanctified

“if you are afraid of not being able to maintain justice with her children, marry another woman of your choice or two or three or four (who have no children). If you cannot maintain equality with more than one wife, marry only one or your slave-girl. This keeps you from acting against justice (An-Nisa, Women, 4:3)

- veiling the face is encouraged

“O, bearer of faith, tell your wives and daughters, and all wives of believers to wear their capes. This is the best, so they could be recognized, and not disturbed. For Allah forgives and is merciful. (El- Ahzab, Allies, 33:55, 59).

- testimony of two just men or one man and two women is proposed

„And name two witnesses, two men of yours, and, if there are no two men, then one man and two women, that you accept as witnesses; if one of the two women forgets, let the other one remind her....(Sura El-Bekara, Ayat 282).

In further text we discuss some contradictory interpretations of these statements. Sulejman dr Topoljak sees no discrimination in them and suggests that the advantage of man as mentioned above pertains to custody and care of the family because man is physiologically stronger, more experienced and “may better fulfill the interests and needs of the matrimony” so that “according to the Shariat he is obliged to protect woman, support her, and, in exchange for that, she is obliged to be obedient in all that which is allowed.” (Topoljak, S. 2006: 30). The explanation of the testimony model with two women goes along with the claim that woman is equal to man in humanity and honour. Islam allows women to make financial dealings, but their “primary task” is – care for the family. Woman is immersed in the family, she spends most of her time and thoughts in relation to the house, so it is possible, Topoljak explains, that, testifying before a judge, she could forget, make a mistake, or overlook something – hence, her statement needs to be corroborated by another woman. Some Shariat obligations do not pertain to woman because by this her nature and business are “respected”, as are her natural inclinations, first of all affinity to raising children. Islam is explicit in claiming that supreme command of the state is man’s business. And Topoljak, but one of the many supporters of this view, says that it is undeniable that such difficult tasks are not accorded with woman’s mental and emotional structure, because they require much patience, superiority of reason over emotions, and substantial courage, so “we can do nothing but thank Allah that woman is not such, because, if she were, life would be devoid of its most beautiful traits: humility, meekness, love” (p. 45)

The most common justification of discrimination of women is found in stressing natural rights as defined by the Creator. Although women have the same rights and duties as men, “men are still one degree above them” because “woman should fight for the right that Allah has given her, and not for equality with man, because equality entails the same rights and obligations, something woman very often cannot carry out, due to her psychological and physical traits” (Mustafa As-Siba, 2004: 9). From this, it follows that woman should fight for the return to her natural role, that of a woman, not a man. It is a duty of all in Muslim areas to make future such that “woman should enact her natural rights as a daughter, girl, sister-in-law,

wife, mother”. According to Islam, physical and psychological differences between man and woman have their role and task. Hence the appeal for a balance of nature and thus for a natural role of woman accorded with nature (i.e. with Allah’s laws). Only thus, says Mustafa As-Siba, can man and woman complement one another and establish harmony. If this natural law is disturbed, for instance “if, through upbringing, woman exchanges her natural meekness for harshness, her husband will never feel meekness, nor will her children, and they have a natural need and right to it. This condition causes further deviations and imbalance in natural Allah’s laws” (p. 9-10).

There is consideration of solutions to the problem here: the salvation is to be found in the “Islamization of relations” between men and women. Islamization entails returning to the examples of those interpreting Islam based on evidence from Koran. And thus we return to the beginning, because promotion of the current position of woman in Islam depends on the view of interpreters. If equalling women with men is also subjugation, because, in order to achieve something women often have to put in the effort they cannot objectively take – then there is obviously no end to the vicious circle of, as supporters claim, “stable and moral Muslim society”. Through their positions, the aforementioned interpreters of Islamic holy writings attempt to point out the need for defending woman’s dignity and her rights guaranteed by Shariat, trying to keep her at bay from the public domain, which is dangerous as it “abuses the woman’s femininity”.

Society based on Islamic principles keeps woman away from all which is contrary to her nature, or all which could prevent her from carrying out her primary mission. It is believed that woman’s position is in the private domain because public affairs are simply at odds with her nature. If she still takes this latter path, the woman is recommended to carry out such tasks only “in urgent need” and realize it would be best for herself, her family and society as a whole if she could devote herself to something not in the least easier than public affairs, something more exalted and honoured, more suitable to her humanity and dignity, than pure work for securing daily existence.

It is a fact that Islam equally supports men and women to receive education. Still, in recent centuries woman has usually not been allowed full access to education. This fact is mostly acknowledged, but it is followed by the justification that an education needed for Muslim girls would allow them to gain experience accorded with their primary role because “according to her physiognomy, a girl is prepared to be a mother and wife, which means she should learn things that would be useful in her future life” (Mustafa As- Sibai, 2004: 146). In this context, labour outside the house is deemed inappropriate for the woman, as it could represent an obstacle to her motherly commitment. The argument is supported “from a social point of view, as it is doubtless proved that employing women as civil servants constraints the usual field of activity for the male population” (148), and this is not of general public interest, therefore: “this induces us to call upon the responsible representatives not to widely open the doors of employment to the population of women. Rather, they should direct women’s employment in those areas in which only women can be successful” (150) – referring to professions traditionally taken as more “natural” for women (midwives, teachers, cooks, etc.). In all this, attention is drawn to the major danger because by allowing woman the opportunity to work outside her home the family is doomed to break up and children do not have proper care. It is obvious that, along with such a view, the entire parental responsibility is placed upon woman.

Such authors point out that Islamic philosophy “preserves” the honour of woman and directs her toward the social position of mother and wife. In turn, this strongly entails the need for the husband or relatives to commit themselves to supporting the woman and her children. Still, there are authors who do not approve of the Muslim woman being imprisoned in a “golden cage”, but do narrow down the space for her movement by pointing out that a modern, educated Muslim woman can indeed be useful to her faith if she takes an active stance in solving the crucial problems of Islam, one of which is “work with Muslim women so they could become more aware, mobilized and trained, where this huge mass of women could take an active role serving their faith, community, and other Islamic activities” (Topoljak S. 2006: 37).

It is true that woman is a legal subject in Islam, but it is also true that in public life, as stated by Muna Jusufspahić, there is a difference between men and women. Illustrating this, she states that, for instance, women do not attend funerals. The interpretation resembles those above: “they pray, but do not go to the funeral, because one must not cry there, for the soul of the deceased will have a hard time if people cry” (Savić S. 1998: 179). Such justification of Islamic practice encourages stereotypical patterns of sexual/gender characters where it is culturally and socially acceptable and expected only for women to cry and be unable to control themselves. The statement follows that no one denies that Muslim women are mostly constrained to the house, the family and child rearing, although there is misunderstanding. So, in order to explain what this is all about, M. Jusufspahić claims that “production of people is very significant” where “woman is the main producer”. Accordingly, this may only mean concord with the well-known position that the principal role of woman is to give birth and raise children – which is a social behaviour in line with the sex whose natural characteristics are suitable to the roles of the mother, wife, housewife. End of story. If the duty of Muslim woman is to give birth, the duty of man is to secure all resources she needs for a life in happiness, so she could best fulfill her task.

3. In further text, we discuss the phenomenon of women “outside the circle” – those who have dared cross the line of the established distinction between the private and the public domain, and thus defined the “feminine aspect” of Islamic culture and civilization. Thence, along with the growing patriarchalism of the Islamic community, followed by benefits man has in both public and private domains, one should also observe the growing “Islamic feminism”, shedding light on the “feminine” influence in Islam.

The “male” interpretations given above will now be appended to the “female” view. Worthy of our attention is the thought of the Egyptian poet and writer Neval Saadavi, who vouches for a mental and ideological liberation of woman, is against fanaticism and intolerance, against anything suppressing women’s sense. She opposes all that is enforced, and takes it that nudity and veils covering woman’s face are “two sides of the same coin. Which means that woman actually doesn’t exist, except as a worthless body, while with man it is different, because he is the reacher of the decision.” (Ferhat J. 2005: 26). N. Saadavi states that since the seventies things have changed, and are now going in two directions: “a backward movement, icing, enclosure from within... and a movement leading to increased liberty and independence, advocated by many women” (27-28). In this author’s opinion, Islam is characterized by a total denial of the role of theologians, which makes human beings directly responsible before Allah for “their understanding of Islam”. Hence every sensible Muslim woman, intellectual, instead of adopting positions and solutions, has a duty to interpret Ayats and Hadiths from Koran with her own reason. “The

true protection of a woman is her common sense, consciousness, knowledge, will, courage, and strength in facing problems, and not hiding behind the hijab” (36). The morality of a genuine, strong woman reveals itself when she contends life problems, and not when she stays in the house all day; what points to woman’s virtue best is her ability to protect herself, her understanding of responsibility, and not putting the blame on someone else.

By revealing the long-forgotten lady-rulers in the world of Islam, Fatim dr Mernissi, a sociologist, is disrupting the myth of a solely masculine Islamic politics. The principal thesis of this researcher is that there is a difference between the “political Islam” (exercise of power and human works inspired by passion and motivated by interest) and the “revealed Islam” – divine messages, ideals written in the holy book – Koran. The latter is equalled to the published Islam or the spirit of Islam. By presenting the history of the feminine in Islam, F. Mernissi stresses that the ideal of political power held by reactionary Muslim politicians has nothing to do with the ideals of early Islam. Lack of feminine form for words *imam* and *halifa* (crucial to expressing the concept of power) coincides with the fact no woman has ever carried these titles. Their titles pertained to earthly power and governing the community (sultanas, malikas). They very successful as their name was mentioned at the *hutba* – “mentioning women on Friday hutbas in the mosque is an exception in the political history of Islam, and those women who made this happen officially sanctioned the breach of the prohibition” (F. Mernissi, 2005: 121), and also as they had the right to forge their own coins, which is the second criterion of sovereignty in Islam. The women in question here are those who managed to find themselves “outside the circle” of dogmas, prohibitions, and protections. F. Mernissi uses a historical-critical method to research political Islam and finds its feminine tradition, basing her claims on classical Islamic sources. She speaks of “forgotten lady-rulers in the world of Islam” who had political power, providing an overview of 15 different models of woman’s reign, where she adds this is a different image of Islam to which one should add everything that is not only the image of imams and rulers. History shows that halifa, God’s envoy on earth and supreme source of epistles of divine authority, has always thought woman does not deserve to have power, not even earthly power. Hence, F. Mernissi believes, the dominant male aspect of Islam, excluding woman from the masculine domain, pushing her to the fringes. The usual claim today is that Islam forbids woman to access politics, but these findings show that there is another truth – in fact, a few historical truths. If one should only admit there were lady-rulers in the world of Islam – this would be a big step forward, because it would shed new light on Muslim history and help remove numerous layers of patriarchal interpretations.

Feminist theorists are also trying to suggest that most organized religious beliefs in the modern world are in essence sexist.¹ The fact is that woman in Islam does not have equal opportunities. Her restriction to the private domain, usually imposed and prescribed, leaves her no room to express her own wishes and abilities, which hinders her chances to act toward a better position in the scale of social values. In the Muslim world, “Islamic and Muslim feminism” is ever more present, representing the path and way of struggle for women, as a response to various types of pressure and oppression they have been exposed to. Islamic feminism promotes the rights of women and principles of equality of women and men within Islamic dis-

¹ “Sexist social relations are those in which the masculine denies the value of the feminine. Patriarchy is an order based on sexism and domination of men over women, which openly or tacitly uses all institutional and ideological mechanisms it has (law, politics, economy, morality, science, medicine, fashion, culture, education, mass media, etc.) in order to reproduce and preserve patriarchal relations in society” (Mršević Z. 1999: 139).

course. There are also attempts, however, of its strengthening through secularization, turning to the structures of civil society and broadening requests for enacting the rights of women. For instance: feminist activists in Iraq are requesting that the law be separated from religion, whereas conservative forces require that Shariat be the basis for the new Constitution. Naila Al Ubaydi, lawyer and member of Women’s League, one of the oldest women’s groups in Iraq, upon hearing of the draft of the new Iraqi Constitution, where the clear suggestion was that equality of the sexes would be “accorded with Shariat regulations”, says: “We are not afraid of Shariat, Islam guarantees rights to women. We are concerned by arbitrary interpretations of Islamic law” (Presarijum, 2005: 3). Feminist activists require that men and women in Iraq should be granted equal rights according to international standards, and that among top decision-making positions in the Government there must be no less than 25% women. On the other hand, other women, those covered from head to toes, claim that Shariat is not against women’s rights. Rather, it grounds them more deeply: “I prefer Shariat, I am afraid of the so-called gender equality and do not believe in it”. This difference of opinions among women themselves is a problem since the path of gender non-discrimination begins with the recognition of forms and ways of discrimination. How does one interpret veiled faces and heavy clothing, mandatory male escort in public locations, exclusion from public life, polygamy, unilateral decision on the termination of marriage? Answers to these questions vary from “subjugation” to “the sole correct and acceptable model of living”.

Let us only pay attention to the veil phenomenon. It is said that in the time of the Prophet this old custom was a privilege of free women. Later on, it assumed other interpretations, related to the “protection” of women. Islam of the past and Islam of the present are, among other things, marked by the same detail: a covered woman. The form is identical, but the meaning of the detail often remains unknown. The opinion of F. Mernissi seems acceptable: that the cry for the return of the veil for women is a desperate move (278), a sign of the wish to cover that which must not be mentioned, that “the will of the people is as dangerous as the will of women”. Covering woman is covering will, but also covering resistance – which is a secure method of reproducing the established, masculine social order. Hence the affirmation of all those interpretations tending to be recognized as genuine interpretations of Koran. For if Koran says that the feminine history has been long delineated, who would dare to change anything in this respect.

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ABSTRACTS

Darko Tanasković

ISLAM IN THE BALKANS, ISLAM WITHIN THE BALKANS

Islam and the Muslim communities in Europe have been attracting more and more attention in recent years. This growth of interest is caused primarily by the emerging of the social phenomenon of radical neoislamism, whose protagonists are the inadequately integrated members of the first and second generation of immigrants from the Muslim world. In this conceptually reduced and globalized "internet Islam", without a direct stronghold in tradition, they find a common denominator of their confused identity. The dominant feature of this identity is the confrontation with the West and with the values it symbolizes. Today, when the experts talk about "Muslims in Europe", almost without exception, they think of the immigrant communities in the countries of Western Europe. When confronted with the challenges of "neoislamism" in these communities, some intellectuals have attempted to promote and affirm the ideas and projects of a tolerant and pluralized "euroislam", as the only perspective of a harmonious integration of European Muslims into a modern secularized western society.

The Muslim communities in the Balkans, as the only representative of the historical and authentic European Islam, have unjustly been excluded from the consideration of the situation of Islam in Europe. Unlike their immigrant counterparts in Western Europe, Balkan Muslims are highly culturally integrated in their European, mostly Christian surrounding. Furthermore, elements of the Islamic/Ottoman/Oriental cultural heritage and behavioral patterns are an integral component of the identity of the majority nonmuslim population, what is evident, but not always adequately valorized.

While socially and culturally nonintegrated Muslims in Western Europe through radical neoislamism are attempting to overcome a deep identity crisis, Muslims in the Balkans were faced with a different drama. They found themselves thorn between on one hand being well adapted and rooted in their surrounding and on the other hand their need to reaffirm their attributes of national, ideological and political difference and autonomy through Islamic political radicalization.

In the study of modern issues connected to the Islamic phenomenon in the Balkans, it is necessary to pay more attention to the cultural and civilizational, and not only religious and political dimensions. Because, unlike in Western Europe, Islam does not exist only *in* the Balkans, but also deep *within* Balkans.

Key Words: Islam, Europe, Identity, Neoislamism, Euroislam, Balkans, Culture

ISLAM NA BALKANU, ISLAM U BALKANU

Islam i muslimanske zajednice u Evropi privlače tokom poslednjih godina sve veću pažnju. Tome presudno doprinosi uobličavanje društvenog fenomena radikalnog neoislamizma, čiji su nosioci neadekvatno adaptirani pripadnici druge i treće generacije useljenika iz islamskog sveta. Oni u redukovanom i globalizovanom "internet-islam", bez direktnog uporišta u tradiciji, nalaze zajednički imenitelj sopstvenog poremećenog identiteta. Osnovno obeležje tog identiteta jeste konfrontacija sa Zapadom i vrednostima koje on simbolizuje. Kad se danas govori o "muslimanima u Evropi", gotovo bez izuzetka se misli na imigrantske zajednice u zapadnoevropskim zemljama. Pred izazovom "neoislamizma" u ovim sredinama, nastoje se afirmisati ideje i projekti tolerantnog i pluralističkog "evro-islama", kao jedine perspektive skladnog integrisanja evropskih muslimana u moderno sekularizovano društvo Zapada.

Muslimanske zajednice na Balkanu, koje jedine predstavljaju istorijski i autentični evropski islam, neopravdano su isključene iz razmatranja situacije islama u Evropi. Za razliku od imigrantskih zajednica na Zapadu, balkanski muslimani su u visokoj meri kulturno integrisani u svoje evropsko, pretežno hrišćansko okruženje. Štaviše, elementi islamskog/osmanskog/orijentalnog kulturnog nasleđa i biheviorističkih obrazaca integralna su komponenta identiteta pripadnika većinskih nemuslimanskih populacija, što je evidentno, ali ne uvek i adekvatno valorizovano. Dok socijalno i kulturno neintegrisani muslimani u Zapadnoj Evropi kroz radikalni "neoislamizam" pokušavaju da prevaziđu duboku krizu identiteta, muslimani na Balkanu suočili su se u novije vreme s drugačijom dramom. Našli su se u raskoraku između sopstvene kulturne adaptiranosti i ukorenjenosti u okruženje, s jedne, i potrebe da kroz isla-

mističku političku radikalizaciju potvrde atribute nacionalnog, ideološkog i političkog razlikovanja i autonomnosti, s druge strane.

U proučavanju savremenih pojava vezanih za islamski fenomen na Balkanu neophodno je pokloniti veću pažnju njihovoj kulturnoj i civilizacijskoj, a ne samo uže religijskoj i političkoj dimenziji. Jer, za razliku od Zapadne Evrope, islam ne postoji samo *na* Balkanu, već i *u* Balkanu.

Ključne reči: Islam, Evropa, identitet, neislamizam, evro-islam, Balkan, kultura

Ljubiša Mitrović

DIALOGUE AND CONVERGENCE BETWEEN ISLAM AND CHRISTIANITY IN THE BALKANS AS A PRECONDITION FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE CULTURE OF PEACE, COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION AMONG PEOPLE

Throughout the history, multiethnic and multireligious societies have been formed in the Balkan region. Ethnic and religious differences have been frequently abused and instrumentalized by great forces, domestic rulers and structures of power for the sake of manipulation, causing a rift in the population and ruling the region. Nowadays, the thesis on the clash between cultures and civilisations has again come under the spotlight.

The author in his work tackles the issue of the possibility of there being a dialogue and convergence between Islam and Christianity. The core of the author's analysis is the role of various religions in the Balkan region, a special research into the possibilities for a dialogue between Christians and Muslims, the significance of the strategy of convergence between different religious cultures, modernization and secularization processes aimed at the creation of civil society and the development of the culture of peace for the benefit of equality of all citizens and all nations.

Key Words: Religious Culture, The Balkans, Dialogue, Convergence, Culture of Peace

**DIJALOG I KONVERGENCIJA ISLAMA I HRIŠĆANSTVA NA BALKANU
KAO PRETPOSTAVKA RAZVIJANJA KULTURE MIRA,
SARADNJE I INTEGRACIJE MEĐU NARODIMA**

Na balkanskom geoprostoru istorijski su formirana multietnička i multireligijska društva. Etničke i religijske razlike često su u prošlosti zloupotrebljavane i instrumentalizovane od strane velikih sila, unutrašnjih gospodara i struktura moći radi manipulacije, deobe stanovništva i vladanja ovim prostorom. U savremenosti je ponovo aktuelizovana teza o sukobu kultura i civilizacija.

Autor u svom radu problematizuje pitanje mogućnosti dijaloga i konvergencije islama i hrišćanstva. U fokusu njegove analize je uloga različitih religija na balkanskom geoprostoru, posebno istraživanje mogućnosti dijaloga između hrišćana i pripadnika islama, značaja strategije konvergencije različitih religijskih kultura, procesa modernizacije i sekularizacije za izgrađivanje građanskog društva i razvoja kulture mira u službi ravnopravnosti svih građana i svih naroda

Ključne reči: religijska kultura, Balkan, dijalog, konvergencija, kultura mira

Bogdana Todorova

**BULGARIAN ETHNIC MODEL –
TOLERANCE BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS**

The problem of the "Bulgarian ethnic model", European values and tolerance between Christians and Muslims is again a particularly live issue today. Its topical quality is determined by: 1. The new political situation in Bulgaria and 2. Even greater problems in the interaction between Christians and Muslims on international and general European scale and in case of new influence of panarabism and panturkism in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian ethnic model this reality which distinguishes Bulgaria from Serbia, Macedonia, Kosovo and Turkey. Clarification of this issue shall present an opportunity for a successful management of diversity in pluralistic European societies and in Bulgaria.

Why the West-European model for prevention and analysis of religious conflicts in Bulgaria does not work? Is the cultural diversity in the Bulgarian national identity standard for ethnic tolerance or a method which makes Bulgaria vulnerable to separatist claims? Is the Bulgarian ethnic model dangerous? Does it present guarantee for the European security?

Key Words: Bulgarian Ethnic Model, European Values, Tolerance, Christians, Muslims

**BUGARSKI ETNIČKI MODEL –
TOLERANCIJA IZMEĐU HRIŠĆANA I MUSLIMANA**

Problem “bugarskog etničkog modela”, evropskih vrednosti i tolerancije između hrišćana i muslimana je danas ponovo goruće pitanje. Njegov tematski kvalitet je određen: 1. novom političkom situacijom u Bugarskog i 2. čak većim problemima u interakciji između hrišćana i muslimana na međunarodnom i opšteevropskom nivou, kao i slučajem novih uticaja panarabizma i panturcizma u Bugarskoj. Bugarski etnički model odražava ovu stvarnost koja Bugarsku čini različitom od Srbije, Makedonije, Kosova i Turske. Razrešenje ovog problema pružiće mogućnost da se uspešno tretira različitost u pluralističkim evropskim društvima i Bugarskog. Zašto zapadnoevropski model prevencije i analize religijskih konflikata u Bugarskog ne funkcionišu? Da li je kulturna raznolikost bugarskog nacionalnog identiteta standard za etničku toleranciju ili metod koji Bugarsku čini osetljivom na separatističke tendencije? Da li je bugarski etnički model opasan? Da li on predstavlja garant evropske bezbednosti?

Ključne reči: bugarski etnički model, evropske vrednosti, tolerancija, hrišćani, muslimani

Srđan Barišić

**MUSLIMS IN THE BALKANS: PROBLEMS OF (RE)INSTITUTIONALIZATION
AND TRANSFORMATION OF IDENTITY**

This text deals with position of Muslims in the countries and regions of the Balkan peninsula, especially with position of Muslims living in former Yugoslavia republics. Muslims on the Balkans are regionally and ethnically a heterogeneous group that has had continuity of cultural and religious tradition for six hundred years. Balkan Muslims are a religious minority, concentrated in areas of Thrace, Kosovo, Sandzak and western Macedonia, with exception of Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

By analyzing legal position, ethnic structure, institutional development and organizational structure, we will try to define problems of islam institutionalization in the Balkans. We will pay special attention to the relations between islamic communities in former Yugoslavia and to perspectives of how to overcome divisions originated after the one national states have been formed.

Key Words: Islamic Community, Muslims, Ethnic Groups

MUSLIMANI NA BALKANU:

PROBLEMI (RE)INSTITUCIONALIZACIJE I TRANSFORMACIJE IDENTITETA

U tekstu se analizira položaj muslimana u zemljama i regionima Balkanskog poluostrva, sa posebnim osvrtom na položaj muslimana u bivšim jugoslovenskim republikama. Muslimani na Balkanu predstavljaju regionalno izdiferenciranu i etnički heterogenu skupinu sa šestovekovnim verskim i kulturnim kontinuitetom. Ako izuzmemo Albaniju i Federaciju Bosne i Hercegovine, muslimani u zemljama Balkanskog poluostrva predstavljaju versku manjinu, prostorno skoncentrisanu u oblastima kao što su Trakija, Kosovo, Sandžak i zapadna Makedonija.

Analizirajući pravni položaj, etničku strukturu, institucionalni razvoj i organizacionu strukturu islamskih zajednica u zemljama Balkanskog poluostrva, kao i odnos nemuslimanske sredine prema muslimanima, pokušaćemo da definišemo probleme institucionalizacije islama na Balkanu. Posebna pažnja posvećena je odnosima između islamskih zajednica na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije i perspektivi prevazilaženja podela nastalih nakon stvaranja jednonacionalnih država.

Ključne reči: islamska zajednica, muslimani, etničke grupe

Zorica Kuburić

Rifat Namlidži

ISLAMIC COMMUNITY IN SERBIA

In this text authors give a short review of the Islam's presence in Serbia in the historical and social context. Special attention is given to the religious objects which are present and to the religious architecture which as a silent witness reminds of the time which stands still in the space of sacral. In this text we pay attention to heritage of islam kulture in Serbia. Religious rituals, ceremonies, the lifestyle of Muslims and the value system are presented.

Key Words: Islam community, Serbia, Religious Objekts, Religious Sacrament, Attitude toward Religious Other

ISLAMSKA ZAJEDNICA U SRBIJI

U ovom tekstu autori daju kratak prikaz prisutnosti islama u Srbiji u istorijskom i društvenom kontekstu. Posebna pažnja posvećena je verskim objektima koji su prisutni i verskoj arhitekturi koja kao nemi svjedok podseća na vreme koje se zautavlja u sakralnom prostoru. U radu se ukazuje na tekovine islamske kulture u Srbiji. Predstavljen je i stil života muslimana, vrednosni sistem i verski obredi.

Ključne reči: Islamska zajednica, Srbija, verski objekti, verski obredi, stavovi prema religijski drugom

Dino Abazović

BOSNIAN MUSLIMS AND COUNTRY IN TRASITION

During the last two decades, within Bosnia and Herzegovina, the resurgence of the religion have been rather evident process; moreover, the return of religion in public life, its shift from “invisible” (private) to “visible” (public) sphere, is considered as deprivatization of religion par excellence. One out of four dominant religious communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and community with largest number of adherents is Islamic Community. The phenomenon of Bosnian Muslims as heirs of specific religious and cultural tradition – in domestic as well as international political, media and wider public more and more often entitled as “autochthonous European Muslims” – has not been to a great extent studied and researched, in particularly not in way to include adequate empirical evidence to support theories, neither to define trends or make strong assertions. At the same time, different interpretations of various issues linked to that population are multiplying on agendas of different interests groups, starting with experts in the field, than via nongovernmental sector, other religious communities, domestic decisions makers, and ending with political centers of powers within European and Overseas Capitols. This article will examine the issues of “reislamization” of ethnical, political and cultural identity within Muslim/Bosniak national entity that resulting in construction of new political identity.

Key Words: Bosnian Muslims, Secularization, Desecularization, Reislamization, National and Confessional Identity, Post-conflict Society and Country in Transition

BOSANSKOHERCEGOVAČKI MUSLIMANI I DRŽAVA U TRANZICIJI

U posljednja dva desetljeća u Bosni i Hercegovini evidentan je proces povratka ka religijama, odnosno povratka religije u javni život, njenog prelaska iz “nevidljive” (privatne) u (po)javnu sferu, dakle deprivatiziranje religije par excellence. Jedna od četiri dominantne vjerske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini, i zajednica sa najvećim brojem pripadnika, jeste Islamska zajednica. Fenomen bosanskohercegovačkih muslimana kao baštinika specifične vjerske i kulturne tradicije – sve češće karakteriziranih u domaćoj i inozemnoj dnevno-političkoj, medijskoj i javnoj sceni i kao “autohtoni evropski muslimani” – nedovoljno je istražen, naročito u domenu konkretnih empirijskih pokazatelja, a u funkciji iznošenja tvrdnji, teorija i/ili ustanovljavanja trendova. U isto vrijeme, različite interpretacije određenih pitanja vezanih za ovu populaciju multipliciraju se na agendama različitih interesnih grupa, od stručne zainteresirane javnosti, preko nevladinog sektora, pripadnika drugih religijskih zajednica, naročito domaćih donosioca odluka, pa sve do političkih centara moći konkretnih evropskih i prekookeanskih država. Tekst će problematizirati pitanja “reislamizacije” nacionalnog, političkog i kulturnog identiteta u muslimanskom/bošnjačkom nacionalnom korpusu stoga što u konačnici jeste konstrukcija novog političkog identiteta.

Ključne reči: bosanskohercegovački muslimani, sekularizacija, desekularizacija, reislamizacija, nacionalni i konfesionalni identiteti, postkonfliktno društvo i društvo u tranziciji

Sergej Flere

CONSEQUENTIALITY IN THE RELIGION OF BOSNIAN MUSLIMS

Consequentiality is a dimension of religiousness indicating that the believer, in his day to day behavior is different from others, religion having a meaning for him, he being ready in his relationship to attain God's favor and striving towards salvation “to pay a price”. Consequentiality is related to an absence of hypocrisy in religiousness. It may be viewed as the “deeds” part of religiousness. Respondents were university undergraduate students (beside Bosnian

Muslims, Serbian Orthodox, Slovenian Catholics and US Protestants were surveyed). The survey was carried out in 2005. The results indicated that consequentiality, measured by 7 items was not a special component of religiousness, but factorially part of it. Bosnian Muslims appeared as most consequent ones, even when controlled by level of religiosity. US Protestants followed closely, leading/overcoming Bosnian Muslims as to the item on readiness to sacrifice one's life for one's religion.

Key Words: Bosnian Muslims, Religious Consequentiality, Religiousness, Sacrifice for Religious Motives

KONSEKVENTNOST RELIGIOZNOSTI BOSANSKIH MUSLIMANA

Konsekventnost je dimenzija religioznosti kojom se iskazuje da je vernik u svom ponašanju drugačiji od drugih, da vera njemu nešto znači, da je spreman u njeno ime i u svojoj veri prema Bogu nešto da učini, da "plati cenu" za naklonost Boga i za spasenje. Konsekventnost je povezana sa odsustvom hipokritičnosti u religioznosti. Može se posmatrati kao aspekt "dela" religioznosti. Ispitivani su studenti u četiri uzorka pripadnika vladajućih konfesija u pojedinim sredinama (pored bosanskih muslimana, takođe, američki protestanti, slovenački katolici i srpski pravoslavci). Ispitivanje je izvedeno 2005. Pokazalo se da konsekventnost, merena preko 7 takvih tvrdnji, nije posebna dimenzija religioznosti, već čini faktorsko jedinstvo sa religioznošću. Bosanski muslimani se iskazuju kao najkonsekventniji, čak i kad kontrolišemo nivo religioznosti. Američki protestanti slede i blizu su bosnakim muslimanima po religioznosti, a u pogledu jedne tvrdnje, spremnost na žrtvovanje života i prevazilaze bosanske muslimane. **Ključne reči:** bosanski muslimani, religiozna konsekventnost, religioznost, žrtvovanje iz religioznih motiva

Dragan Novaković

PROCESSES OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONAL CONSOLIDATION OF THE ISLAM RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY IN THE SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA

During the existence of Socialist Yugoslavia a unique hierarchically organized Islamic Community (IC) used to operate. It represented the strongest community of Islamists in personnel, material and organization in Europe. The achieved level of force and influence ensued from long standing, patient striving to reinforce internal organization by establishing the constitutions and other normative acts, and by organizing all domains of religious life in a proper way. Confronted with ideological command after the liberation, and materially weakened by confiscating a significant piece of property, it had rapidly established relations with the authority and during those processes had been losing certain attributes of autonomy and settling with the role of weaker partner. Using the permanent processes of liberalization and government's preference to lead the foreign affairs towards to Movement of non-aligned states, the IC gradually acquitted of imposed limitations and initiated the strong process of normative modernization and internal consolidation with the aim to redefine the existing policy and to adjust the religious life to new situation. The IC closely followed the period of state weakening, that was unprepared to find the solutions for more and more tensed national differences and to solve cumulated economic problems, trying to prepare itself the best for the period distinguished by the destruction of system that did not possess internal energy indispensable for democratization and transformation in a peaceful way. Sharing the destiny of joint state which, in the moment when it was the strongest, broke up into several independent states, with the organization that basically concurred with the borders of the new formed states. Those states were shaped after the war operations in which all those integrative factors that brought together the south Slovenian nations for more than seventy years came down.

Key Words: Islamic Community, Yugoslavia, Organization, State, Constitution, Council, Precedence, Supreme Magistrate

PROCESI UNUTRAŠNJE ORGANIZACIONE KONSOLIDACIJE ISLAMSKE VERSKE ZAJEDNICE U SOCIJALISTIČKOJ JUGOSLAVIJI

Tokom postojanja Socijalističke Jugoslavije delovala je jedinstvena i hijerarhijski uređena IZ, koja je predstavljala kadrovski, materijalno i organizaciono najsnažniju autohtonu zajednicu islamskih vernika u Evropi. Dostignuti nivo snage i uticaja proistekao je iz dugogodišnjih

strpljivih nastojanja da se donošenjem ustava i drugih normativnih akata učvrsti unutrašnja organizacija i na pravilan način uredi sve oblasti verskog života. Suočena posle oslobođenja sa ideološkom vlašću i materijalno oslabljena oduzimanjem značajnog dela vakufske imovine ubrzano je uredila odnose sa državom gubeći u tim procesima određene atribute samostalnosti i mireći se sa ulogom slabijeg partnera. Koristeći stalne procese liberalizacije i opredeljenje države da spoljnu politiku veže za Pokret nesvrstanih, IZ se postepeno oslobađala nametnutih ograničenja i pokrenula snažni proces normativnog osavremenjavanja i unutrašnje konsolidacije sa ciljem da se redefiniše dotadašnja politika i novim okolnostima prilagodi ukupni verski život. Period slabljenja države nepripremljene da nađe odgovore na sve zaoštrenije nacionalne protivurečnosti i rešava nagomilane ekonomske probleme, Islamska zajednica pažljivo je pratila nastojeći da se organizaciono što bolje pripremi za period obeležen rušenjem sistema koji nije posedovao unutrašnju energiju neophodnu da se demokratizuje i transformiše na miran način. Deleći sudbinu zajedničke države, raspala se u trenutku kada je bila najmoćnija na više nezavisnih zajednica, čija se organizacija u osnovi podudrala sa granicama novoformiranih država nastalih posle ratnih operacija u kojima su se urušili svi integrativni faktori oko kojih su se preko sedamdeset godina okupljali južnoslovenski narodi.

Ključne reči: Islamska zajednica, Jugoslavija, organizacija, država, ustavi, sabor, starešinstvo, vrhovni poglavar

Milan Vukomanović

**DERVISHES IN BELGRADE:
THE BELGRADE TEKKES, TARIQAS, SHAIKHS**

In our historical science, as well as in religious studies, it is less known that the Islamic mysticism (*tasawwuf*) found its foothold in Belgrade back in the 17th century, both in the practical activities of various dervish orders (*tariqas*) and their scholarly, literary, legal and philosophical heritage. Between 1521 and 1867, i.e. for three and a half centuries, dervishes lived in Belgrade, performed their central ritual – *dhikr*, studied great Sufi thinkers, wrote themselves mystical works and poetry, and inhabited one of the main city streets, labeled in the Austrian city plan of 1789 as *Derwisch Gassen* (Dervish Alley, now Višnjićeva Street).

It is not easy to trace all the formerly Belgrade *tekkes*, or describe their look and determine which *tariqas* they belonged to. Due to paucity of data related to this aspect of religious life in Belgrade in the given period, it is hard to unequivocally respond to all those questions. Thanks to the Turkish and Austrian city plans, censuses of the Muslims, official documents from various periods, and later research of our (art) historians, at least eight Belgrade *tekkes* could be localized with a reliable degree of precision. Furthermore, this article tackles the origin and identity of the Belgrade dervish orders, dealing, at the same time, with the scholarly heritage of the most reputable *shaikhs* from the Ottoman period.

Key Words: Dervishes, Tekke, Tariqa, Shaikh, Belgrade, Sufism

**DERVIŠI U BEOGRADU:
BEOGRADSKJE TEKIJE, TARIKATI, ŠEJHOVI**

U našoj istorijskoj nauci, ali i religiologiji, malo je poznato da je islamski misticizam (*tasawwuf*) u Beogradu našao pogodno tle još u 17. stoleću, kako u praktičnom delovanju raznih derviških redova, tarikata, tako i u njihovoj naučnoj, književnoj, pravnoj i filozofskoj ostavštini. U periodu od 1521-1867. godine, dakle, gotovo puna tri i po veka, derviši su živeli u Beogradu, redovno izvodili svoj centralni obred – *zikr*, izučavali dela velikih sufijskih mislilaca, sami pisali mistička dela i poeziju, te imali jednu od centralnih gradskih ulica koja se na austrijskom planu Beograda iz 1789. godine nazivala *Derwisch Gassen* (Derviška ulica, današnja Višnjićeva).

Nije lako utvrditi gde su se sve nalazile beogradske tekije, kako su izgledale, kojim redovima su pripadale. S obzirom na manjkavost podataka koji se tiču baš tog aspekta religijskog života u Beogradu u spomenutom periodu, teško je pružiti nedvosmislene odgovore na sva ta pitanja. Zahvaljujući turskim i austrijskim planovima grada, popisima muslimana, defterima, beratima i vakufnamama iz različitih perioda, kao i docnijim istraživanjima istoričara i istoričara umetnosti, za bar osam beogradskih tekija se, s prilično pouzdanja, može odrediti tačna ili bar približna lokacija. Pored toga, u ovom radu se razmatra i poreklo i pripadnost beogradskih

derviških redova, kao i identitet i literarna ostavština najuglednijih šejhova u osmanskome periodu istorije ovoga grada.

Ključne reči: derviši, tekije, tarikhat, šejh, Beograd, sufizam

Dragoljub B. Đorđević
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TEKKIAS, TARIKATS AND SHEIKS OF NIŠ ROMAS

Roma's religious-confessional being is diverse. In Serbia, there is the greatest number of Orthodox Roma, followed by Muslim ones, while Protestant Roma are soon to prevail over Roman Catholic Roma. In Southeast Serbia – as well as in its center, Niš – in proportion to the rest of the state, there are many Muslim Roma. More precisely, there are a multitude of Muslim Roma in terms of confessional origin, or, in other words, those who have a vague memory their predecessors as active members of the Islamic community. Nonetheless, there are such Roma – a tiny minority, though – who are loyal to “the tradition of their fathers and forefathers”. Among them, dervishes are certainly the ones that spark sociological interest the most. Therefore, the authors of the report make a documentary research on two Romani tekiyas in Niš. One of them is located in the Cattle Square, and it belongs to the kadirija tarikhat headed by shehit Ljatifi Muharem; the other one is in Belgrade Quarter, and it gathers dervishes of the Rufai order, headed by shehit Slobodan-Dane Emini.

Key Words: Tekiya, Tarikhat, Shehit, Muslim Roma, Niš

TEKIJE, TARIKATI I ŠEJHOVI NIŠKIH ROMA

Religijsko-konfesionalno biće Roma je raznovrsno. U Srbiji je najviše Roma pravoslavaca, pa onda slede muslimani, dok će vrlo brzo protestanti nadvladati Rome rimokatolike. U jugoistočnoj Srbiji – kao i u Nišu, njenom centru – spram ostatka države, brojni su Romi pripadnici islama. Tačnije, mnogo je Roma muslimana po konfesionalnom poreklu, onih koji se jedva sećaju da su im stari bili aktivni članovi islamske zajednice. Ali ima i takvih Roma – zaista u golemoj manjini – koji su verni “tradiciji očeva i dedova”. Među njima su derviši, svakako, sociološki najzanimljiviji. Zato autori u referatu dokumentarno obrađuju dve romske tekije u Nišu. Jedna je smeštena u naselju Stočni trg, pripada tarikatu kadirija na čelu s šejhom Ljatifi Muharemom, druga je u Beogradmali, okuplja dervise reda rifajia na čelu s šejhom Slobodanom-Danetom Eminijem.

Ključne reči: tekija, tarikhat, šejh, Romi muslimani, Niš

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ANTI-PLAGUE EUROPEAN-OTTOMAN BORDER IN SERBIA IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY IN THE FOREIGN HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

The article displays the sanitary status transition of Serbia in the first half of the 19th, which quickly turned, from a plague-contaminated Ottoman quarantine area, into a modern state, capable to efficiently control its borders, in a sanitary way too, in a way to protect both itself and Europe.

In the 19th century, the main oriental threat to Europe was the import of plague. The main fear of the free Western Europe from the calamity, which let the Ottomans fully indifferent, because of dogmatic reason, was embodied into the centenal iron barrier type of quarantine between the civilizations. It was installed in midst Serbia, true border zone in between the Christianity and the Islam ruled worlds, for which reason it developed for centuries in isolation, as a European land quarantine area. Yet, free Serbia of the 19th century quickly showed its potentials to transform itself into an efficient state, as part of the European traditions ruled area. Yet said potentials of Serbia to integrate in Europe still fail to get a full expression, because the centennial oriental-occidental barrier in its lands, which firstly was of quarantine type, changes the shape and purpose in time, but still remained.

This article enlightens one problem of the Islamic dogma, which, implemented as traditional practice, transformed Serbia into the European anti-plague quarantine area with far reaching consequences.

Key Words: Serbia, Plague, Turkish Europe, Dogma of Islam, Quarantine, Cordon

PROTIVKUŽNA EVROPSKO-OSMANSKA GRANICA U SRBIJI U PRVOJ POLOVINI 19. VEKA U STRANOJ ISTORIOGRAFIJI O SVETU ISLAMA

Rad predstavlja tranziciju sanitarnog statusa Srbije u prvoj polovini 19. veka, koja se u sastavu osmanskog carstva od okuženog karantina brzo preobrazila u modernu državu, sposobnu da efikasno (sanitarno) zaštiti kako svoje granice tako i Evropu.

U 19. veku, osnovna istočnjačka opasnost po zapadni svet bio je unos kuge. Strah slobodne Evrope od pošasti, pred kojom su Osmanlije bili pasivni zbog svoje dogme, očitao se uspostavljanjem vekovne gvozdene barijere civilizacija u Srbiji. To je bila pogranična zona hrišćanstva i islama i zato se dugo razvijala kao evropski suvozemni protivkužni karantin. Srbija 19. veka je pokazala potencijal da se brzo preobrazi u efikasnu državu, saglasno pripadnosti prostoru evropske tradicije. Potencijali evropeizacije Srbije još uvek ne dolaze do izražaja, jer je vekovna barijera karantinskog tipa između Zapada i Istoka menjala namenu, ali je i opstajala.

Ovaj rad rasvetljava jedan problem dogme islama kao elementa tradicije, koji je pretvorio Srbiju u evropski vekovni kužni karantin, čime ju je posledično pogodio i unazadio.

Ključne riječi: Srbija, kuga, turska Evropa, dogma islama, karantin, kordon

Danijela Gavrilović

GENDER, RELIGION, FUNDAMENTALISM – THE CASE OF ISLAM

The gender dimension is always mentioned in discussions of fundamentalism. One of the starting points of fundamentalism is the relationship between the sexes, which changes in modern society and diverges from religious values. Islam is a religion most often mentioned in relation to the position of women. What it prescribes in this domain is widely viewed as inappropriate. The topic of the position of women in Islam is now a general one, and it is discussed in both science and quasi-science. This text aims to provide a deeper analysis of the issue, pointing that such a position of women is not exclusive to Islam only, that it is influenced by external trends in society, and thus oscillates in time and differs from one country to another.

Key Words: Gender, Religion, Fundamentalism, Islam

ROD, RELIGIJA, FUNDAMENTALIZAM – SLUČAJ ISLAMA

Rodna dimenzija je ona koja se uvek spominje u slučaju rasprava o fundamentalizmu. Fundamentalizam za svoje izvoriste, između ostalog, ima i odnos među polovima, koji se u savremenom društvu menja i odstupa od religijskih vrednosti. Islam je religija koja se najčešće spominje u vezi sa položajem žena koji je njome propisan i koji se smatra nepovoljnim.

Tema položaja žena u islamu je već opšte mesto i o njoj se raspravlja i naučno i kvazinaučno. Intencija ovog teksta jeste da problematizuje ovo pitanje ukazujući na to da ovakav položaj žena nije ekskluzivno prisutan samo u islamu, kao i da je on određen i spoljašnjim kretanjima u društvu, te oscilira u vremenu i različit je od zemlje do zemlje.

Ključne reči: rod, religija, fundamentalizam, islam

Dragana Stjepanović-Zaharijevski

“THE FEMALE” ELEMENT AND ITS INFLUENCE ON ISLAM

In this paper the author tries to question the role of a woman in a powerful, male-oriented Islam, preceded by female-oriented paganism. The working thesis is that the “female” element and its influence on Islam are *different* from the “male” ones.

The patriarchal interpretation of Islam, stretching over for centuries, signifies that the Islamic woman has been marginalized and pushed into the private sphere. In other words, in the Islamic religious papers and tradition the “female” element is assigned to the laws of Nature, and thus any promotion of the male-female equality principle is considered unnatural. The naturalness of the difference between the “male”-“female” element in the Islamic religious papers promotes the differences in their religious and social power, i.e. in the social and religious

division of labor, with the “male” element having its primacy. Thus, religious models are but the mechanisms for reproducing the gender ideology and defining the gender identity. The second part of the paper deals with phenomenon of women “outside the circle” – with those who dared to cross over the boarder of the established order of the private-public spheres, defining so the “female aspect” of the Islamic culture and civilization. Therefore the increasing patriarchy of the Islamic community – with all the privileges of a man in his private and public life – should be only viewed together with its increasing counterpart – the “Islamic feminism” that throws back a new light on the “female” influence on Islam.

Key Words: “Female” Element, “Female” Influence, Islamic Religious Papers, Islamic Feminism

“ŽENSKI” ELEMENT I “ŽENSKI” UTICAJ U ISLAMU

Ovaj rad je pokušaj preispitivanja uloge žena u snažnoj muškoj usmerenosti islama, kome je prethodilo prožensko paganstvo. Polazi se od teze da su “ženski” element i “ženski” uticaj u islamu naprosto *drugačiji* u odnosu na “muški” element i “muški” uticaj.

Viševjekovne patrijarhalne interpretacije islama upućuju na marginalizaciju žena i njihovu potisnutost u sferu privatnosti. Reč je o tome da islamska tradicija i religijski spisi primarno podvode “ženski” element pod zakone prirode tako da se smatra protivprirodnim promovisanje principa jednakopravnosti žena i muškaraca. Naglašavanjem prirodnih razlika “muškog” i “ženskog” elementa u islamskim religijskim spisima potenciraju se razlike u njihovoj duhovnoj i društvenoj moći, odnosno u društvenoj i duhovnoj podeli rada – pošto se primat daje jednom, najčešće “muškom” elementu. Stoga, religijski modeli jesu mehanizmi za reprodukciju ideologije roda i definisanja rodnog identiteta.

Drugi deo rada je posvećen fenomenu žena “izvan kruga”, koje su se usudile prelaziti pragove uspostavljenog poretka privatne i javne sfere delovanja, te na taj način definisale “ženski aspekt” islamske kulture i civilizacije. Otuda, uz rastući patrijarhalizam islamske zajednice sa povlasticama koje ima muškarac u privatnom i javnom životu, trebalo bi sagledavati i rastući “islamski feminizam” koji osvetljava “ženski” uticaj u islamu.

Ključne reči: “ženski” element, “ženski” uticaj, islamski religijski spisi, islamski feminizam

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