

EVANGELIZATION CONVERSION PROSELYTISM

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Dragan Todorović

FROM MISSIONARING TO PROSELYTISM (Conceptual Differentiation, Historical Survey and Indications of Future Perspectives)*

Introduction

Any consideration of the process of ethno-cultural separation or coming together of different religious and ethnic communities inevitably involves a complex scheme of evangelization, conversion and proselytism that has evidently been neglected in the domestic sociology of religion and even in theological disciplines. “A modern department store of religion and spirituality”, as E. Barker would call it, made the population of the Balkan societies in transition face religious pluralism, that is, the demand for peaceful co-existence of the traditional and the alternative religious structures. This encounter has actually launched a two-way process, namely, on one hand, there is diverse and controversial acceptance of religious innovations on the part of the believers (i. e., deeply devoted and traditional believers), and, on the other hand, the same ones are being transformed into objects of intensified influence of minority and, especially, new religions. Hence, in the whole whirlpool of the relations among religions of the minorities and minority historical and un-historical beliefs, traditional religions and new religious movements, a problem of evangelization, conversion and proselytism inevitably opens up.

The paper first discusses the understanding of the crucial concepts, namely, “missionaring”, “conversion” and “proselytism” in domestic and translated layman and theological literature. Further on, we follow a historical development and interrelations among the traditional religions as well as a chronology of differences in the religious worldviews in the Balkan societies from the Middle Ages till the very end of the twentieth century with a special reference to the territories of the “second” Yugoslavia. This is followed by making a map of the whole plurality of social and material reasons that favored further spreading of minority and new religions all over the Balkan religious field which was, up to that time, mostly pervaded with the traditional national churches. The paper ends with an analysis of the character of the small religious communities’ religious engagement at the Balkans in the first decade of the new millennium.

Missionaring/Evangelization

The concept of “missionaring” (lat. *missio*, errand) has its own *internal* and *external* meaning. The internal missionaring implies “the work of the church among its own believers for the sake of keeping and improving their religious and moral life” (Драшковић, 1982: 19); in its external sense it is understood as “an activity of the religious organizations whereby they spread their beliefs among followers of other religions in order to convert them to their religion (Mandić, 1969: 315), “activities of

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representatives of a religious community directed to winning over members of other religion" (Cvitković, 1991: 190), "a movement or action for converting infidel, usually non-Christian, backward peoples into Christianity" (Драшковић, 1982: 20) or "a systematic effort to expand Christianity so as to captivate non-Christian peoples by teaching, preaching and social activity" (*Енциклопедија живих религија /Dictionary of Living Religions/*, 1990: 459). The mission is "activity of some religious community" while the missionary is "a person carrying out a religious mission among followers of other religions" (Cvitković, 1991: 189-190).

And evangelization in a narrow sense means giving instructions about "the principles and ideas of the Gospels" (Cvitković, 1991: 97) while in its wider meaning it implies "activities of some Christian community among people; conversion to Christianity" (Cvitković, 1991:97), that is, "the process by which the members of a certain nation, namely those that are colonization target, are converted to one of the Christian religions" (Mandić, 1969: 162).

The beginnings of the Christian missioning are related to the personage and deeds of Jesus Christ, that is, missionary journeys and missionary sermon of his disciples and Apostle Paul all over Asia Minor, Greece and Palestine (around 45-58). His message was focused upon the birth of new humanity thanks to the redeeming act of Jesus Christ, crucified and resurrected (Dap. 17, 16-34; 1. Corinthians, 1, 18-31; Galatians, 2, 15-3, 14). Early in the second century Christianity reached Britain in the north and the Persian Gulf in the east while the Roman Empire becomes Christian in the fifth century. It reached Slavic peoples in the 9th and 10th centuries while between the 7th and 12th centuries it expanded to Germany and Scandinavia. The Islam campaign and the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in the year of 1453 caused the center of the Roman Catholic mission to cross the Atlantic Ocean: the Spanish got to Central and South America, Portugal reached Brazil while the English and French reached North America. At the same time, the Portuguese reached the Far East thus laying the foundation for further mission spread across Asia. In the seventeenth century the first Protestant missionary programs developed in India as well as in China in early 19th century (*Енциклопедија живих религија /Dictionary of Living Religions/*, 1990: 459-460).

The genuine Christian missionary activity in Asia started as late as the nineteenth century. It was especially forwarded by the Protestant spirit eager to promote trade activities in the New World together with the spread of education as a means of diverting people from idolatry and superstition. The sermons of the Christian Protestant missionaries among the enlightened layers of the mainstream religious traditions of Asia did not give any significant results mainly due to the fear of rejecting the former religious confessions while they did have impact on lower social classes and tribal cultures.¹ Following the footsteps of the Protestant missions, the Roman Catholic ones also developed. They set up, among other things, missionary activities and, in addition to religious orders, especially organized widest layer of religious population (for instance, the Society for Expansion of Faith founded in Lyon in 1822). It was also noted that the Orthodox Church, in the mid-nineteenth century, also developed missionary activity, most of all in the Altai Mountains in Central Siberia, in Alaska (that belonged to Russia till 1864) and in Japan.

¹ T. Ling (1990: 419) presents statistical data of the German Rheine mission in the region of Batak at Sumatra: "After the first twenty years of missionary activity, up to 1881, the result was 7,500 converts; in the next twenty years it became a mass movement with an inflow of 103,000 of converted natives. Since the Protestant Christian was focused on the conversion of individuals as well as their introduction into the Church as *individuals*, on principle one for one, such mass movements gave birth to the problems for whose solution Protestantism was not validly equipped".

Conversion

Any analysis of the process of ethno-cultural separation or coming together of different religious and ethnic communities inevitably involves the phenomenon of *conversion*. So far the research of the past and the culture in the Balkan areas, consciously or unconsciously, has tended to overlook this issue.

In the *Dictionary of Serbo-Croatian Literary Language* (1982: 962-963) *to convert* is defined as “to turn into, change into something else, give a completely new form to something... to turn oneself into, to change into somebody else, to take on a completely new shape”. *Conversion* is a noun derived from the verb *to convert* and it implies both one’s own conversion and that of making others convert.

In *Jewish religion*, this word is used only for the way in which a person born as a non-Jew becomes a Jew. It has the same meaning as “to become a proselyte or a newly-converted.”

W. James (1990: 129) gives a psychological definition of the specific experience that most often happens to an individual only once in his lifetime having in view, primarily, the experience in the Protestant Christianity since the late eighteenth till the first half of the twentieth century: “To convert, to be reborn, to accept Grace, to experience religion, to gain security; all these are expressions denoting a process, gradual or sudden, by which the conscious becomes healthy, superior and happy as a consequence of the firm adherence to religious realities”.

According to I. Cvitković (1991), *the convert* is “the one who has undergone conversion, that is, passed from one religion to another” (p. 155) while *conversion* is “conscious abandonment of one religious belief and acceptance of another” (p. 155).

For P. Tilich (1988: 105-106) the term “conversion” has connotations that make it hardly usable: “It may signify awakening from the state in which ultimate care is lacking (or it is hidden) and the transition of the awakened consciousness in it. If this is conversion, then every spiritual experience is one of conversion. Conversion also means substitution of a set of beliefs by another one. Conversion in that sense has no ultimate value. It may though it does not have to happen. It is important only if the experience of the ultimate faith, in the new belief, is better preserved in the old belief. If this happens, conversion is of great importance...”.

In *Dictionary of Living Religions* (1990: 555, 583) conversion is defined as “willing abandonment of one way of life or religious system for the sake of another”, that is, it often implies “an open change of affiliation or adherence that goes either from *the lack of faith to some faith* or from *the old faith to the new one*”.

A similar definition of conversion can be also found in Đ. Šušnjić’s works (1998: 446): “Conversion is abandonment of one religious view of the world (which includes learning, experience, rituals, etc.) and acceptance of some other: man is awakened for some other faith in intellectual, emotional and practical sense so that his past religious life seems strange like someone else’s for he has just ‘found himself’, ‘discovered his true self’ or ‘experienced rebirth’. Conversion, therefore, assumes renunciation of the old and acceptance of the new attitude to life: it is either transition from faith to unfaith or transition from the old faith into the new one as both of them are expressed and manifested in official religious systems”.

Z. Kuburić (2003: 403) considers conversion as a progressive and interactive process of man’s adaptation to the life which is in accordance with God’s will: “The religious systems imply the need for some sort of reorientation from the life in disbelief towards the life in faith or from the immature to the mature religious life. Within the religious Judeo-Christian it means to turn away from what is evil and turn to God. Of all the words used for expressing the concept of conversion, the most often used is the Jewish verb *schub* or changing the path, returning. In Greek the

verb *epistrephein* is used for expressing 'return to God.' The verb *metanoein* expressed an inner turn".

The phenomenon of conversion – including one's own conversion, conversion of others and other above-mentioned meanings – can be approached from many aspects, namely, historical, anthropological, sociological, psychological, theological and the like. From the socio-cultural standpoint it is possible to distinguish: 1. conversion from atheism to life in faith, 2. conversions within the same religious tradition (for example, within Christianity), 3. conversion from different religious traditions (for instance, from Christianity to Islam and *vice versa*) and 4. conversion to fundamentalist "holes" and new religious movements.²

The search for the spiritual *self* and the achievement of the true, religiously-grounded personality are the decisive factors that make a community member opt for a new way of believing, thinking and living. Concerning this, we can distinguish between *intracultural* and *intercultural* conversion. Intracultural conversion assumes that a person born within a certain religious tradition as a non-believer becomes a believer or when conversion takes place within the same religious system, for instance, when an Orthodox believer converts into a Protestant, or when a Roman Catholic turns into an Orthodox, etc. No radical change of the worldview takes place since there is no change of the traditional cultural pattern. In the case of intercultural conversion – or attempts of the contemporary West Christian missions all over the world or conversion of a Christian into Islam – fundamental changes in the cognitive emotional and ideological life of an individual take place; moreover, there is an unavoidable obligation to adjust oneself to the faith whose roots are in some other radically different culture.

The act of abandoning the former religious view of the world and accepting some other one is usually marked by some ritual acts (ritual washing, circumcision, pilgrimage, prayer, taking Communion, baptism, etc.) and that is how the convert gets an official confirmation that he has converted. Likewise, he promises in public that in the future he would respect symbols, values and norms of the newly accepted faith.

However, there still remains an ambiguity regarding the possibility of differentiating the genuine conversion from the false one. The one closest to the truth represents the view that the decision about abandoning one religious world view and accepting some other one is made after a long-term contact with the members of some other faith and gradual learning about its doctrine, rituals, symbols, norms and institutions.³

Apart from this gradual conversion, there is also the possibility of sudden conversion, that is, an instantaneous break-up with the old way of belief. Yet, it is hard to find someone whose disappointment in his faith is so great that any other one seems better to him without his having any previous contact with the faith to which he is converting. The convert either returns to his old faith quickly or just performs religious rites of the new one without any deeper religious experience or


² Z. Kuburić (2003: 403) differentiates between: a) individual and collective conversions according to the number of participants, b) with respect to conversion act duration, fast and efficient conversions unlike those that last for a long time and are almost unnoticeable, c) with respect to freedom of choice – voluntary and compulsory conversions, and, d) according to duration – lasting and temporary conversions, etc.

³ "His decision surprised his surroundings and sometimes even himself (to the extent that the process went along unconscious pathways). For his surroundings he changed all of a sudden but, as we can see, for such a fundamental change to take place it needed to be preceded by gradual depositing of small experiences and partial findings whose total sum, under certain circumstances, brought about a radical change of the overall view of the world and in the way of life congenial to it" (Šušnjić, 1998: 447)

From Missionaring to Proselytism

search for the sacred; though, by the outside manifestations, he can still perform his religious duties very dutifully, even better than other members of the same faith. What we do witness here is *cultural alienation* that only confirms the thesis that lasting conversions cannot be a fruit of a change imposed by force.

For Tippett, the act of conversion is a constituent part of some longitudinal process whose former stages can be tracked down:⁴



For Lofland and Stark conversion is “a process which comprises all previous affinities, degrees or phases” (Hamilton, 2003: 430). In their studies of the Church of Unification or, more precisely, a sect better known as “Moonies” at the onset of its expansion in the USA, they defined the model consisting of seven phases according to which every convert has to: 1) experience permanent tension, 2) express willingness to solve problems within the religious perspective, 3) defines himself as a religious seeker, 4) finds himself at some turning point of his life, 5) enters into affective (emotional) relations with the cult members, 6) neutralizes and breaks the remaining connections outside the cult, and 7) establishes an intensive interaction with the other members.

Later studies carried out by Greil and Rudy proved that only two aspects of the Lofland and Stark model – namely, establishment of emotional ties and an intensive interaction (no matter if it is a face-to-face interaction or through communication network and media) – are universally or almost universally applicable. Yet, they agree in their estimate that “acceptance of some teaching is a gradual process that is realized only as a result of the devotion to one organization or group”, that is, that “conversion is not something that simply happens to people but, instead, they must be actively engaged in its realization” (Ibid., p. 433).

Proselytism

Proselytism (gr. *prosēlytos* = ardor, enthusiasm with newly-accepted faith – from *pros-ēlitos* = one who has passed into another faith, a convert) denotes “at-

⁴ “At the beginning there is a period in the person is minimally aware that he lives in an atmosphere in which religious experiences are taking place. After this period there comes a moment of revelation in which the person is consciously focused upon those who undergo a religious experience. This is followed by the decision-making period during which the person for the first time takes into consideration the possibility that he himself might have such an experience. This brings about the moment of encounter in which the person undergoes conversion... Tippett’s later period refer to the religious experiences undergone after the conversion. First there is a period of joining in during which the person, together with others, joins the community of learning, training and discipline. This is usually followed by a period of confirmation when the new convert undergoes “a rite of passage” that confirms him as a member of the religious body with all the rights and that he able to experience religion in all its depth. Finally, there is a period of maturity during which the person develops and grows while living in the religious community. In this period the religious experience more and more takes on a stylized, ritualistic and traditional character” (*Енциклопедија живих религија / Dictionary of Living Religions*, 1990: 584).

tempts to collect as many followers of new faith as possible and it is predominantly related to Christianity and Islam” (Тодоровић, 2003б: 406). It is also defined as “propaganda for the sake of converting to one’s own religion followers of other religious teachings” while the proselyte is defined as a “person who has passed from one religious community into another and who tries to get as many new adherents as possible” (Cvitković, 1991: 227-228).

For O. Mandić (1969: 396) the proselyte is “an evangelical name for the one who is not a Jew but who has converted to Jewish religion... Later on, the proselyte came to refer to anyone who has just converted to some religion”.

At the moment when one religious system is abandoned for the sake of another, the prescribed rituals (baptism, circumcision, pilgrimage) all at once announce the conversion and offer psychological support to the convert. Those subject to proselytism are expected to renounce the traditional cultural model and to accept the new one (for instance, activities of Western Christian missions in South America). One of the reactions to the radical requests may be acceptance of the ceremonies and rituals of the new faith without more significant adjustment regarding the worldview of the convert in faith. Imposing themselves by force, the missions under the sign of Christ or Mohammed turned out to be lacking life-generating aspect since they were not accompanied with a willing and all-inclusive inner conversion of the newly converted.

After the Christianization of the South Slavic peoples was completed, the first conversions of individuals, groups and large segments of the ethnos to other religions or confessions at the Balkans were related to the process of Islamization at the Balkan Peninsula up to the mid-fifteenth century. The process which started with the first Turkish conquests in Thracia spread along with the Ottoman expansion and finally caught all the Christian countries that came under Ottoman rule. Islamization in the sixteenth century was especially strong in Bosnia and Serbia and it led to mass conversion, first of all, of urban Christian population to Islam.

On principle, conversion to Islam was based upon free will of people while the element of compulsion stayed behind. An organized and adamant missionary work on propagating the new faith assumed declarative and formal character of the conversion to Islam.⁵ In fact, however, this was proselytism supported with the following processes: “weakening of respective Christian institutions and hindrance of their work, giving full civil rights to new Muslims as well as material privileges and a set of benefits stemming from acceptance of the faith of the ruling class and the state” (Вашић, 1998: 54-55).

Yet, not rarely did the “new” Muslims try to preserve their ties with the old faith. The most drastic example of the preservation of faith was *crypto-Christianity* (Crypto-Orthodox and Crypto-Catholics) or *bireligioisty*.⁶ Among the converts a

⁵ “It was enough for the Christian to say the learnt formula of *shehadet* stating: *‘Ešhedu en la ilahe illallah ve ešhedu enne Muhammedun abduhu ve resuluhu’*, meaning, ‘I confirm that there is no other god except for Allah and that Mohammed is his slave and emissary’. Christians were very often talked by their Islamized relatives and neighbors into saying *shehadet* so that they could be immediately proclaimed Muslims. The refusal was considered as an offence to the faith and was cruelly punished by law” (Вашић, 1998: 59).

⁶ One of our best-known historians-Turkologian, Olga Zirojević (2003: 7), gives a whole sceptor of names from different Balkan countries: “... Albanian synonym for bireligiosity is *‘laramane’* which means “colorful, of different colors” (*di vari colori*)... Bireligiosity (of two faiths, colorful - domestic, Slavic name; Greek *dipistia* and *patsali*) was also registered in Macedonia, Kosovo, in South Serbia, Montenegro, Herzegovina, Bosnia, Bulgaria. There were also at the Hellespont, in Trapezunt (*stavrioti*), in Greece, Dodekanez, Mitilena, Crete, and especially at Cyprus where they were called *linovamvak*” (meaning linen and cotton – between Christian and Muslims in faith, just like clothes) or *lardokophtedi* (since they were pig-eaters), *mesokertedi* (Italian. *mezzo quarto* – fifty-fifty), that is, *mesi* (*paramesi*), *patsali*, *apostoliki*, as well as *Valahads* (in Greek Macedonia) who, unlike other Crypto-Christians, did not hide themselves.”

whole set of Christian remains survived, namely, respect for churches and monasteries, acceptance of the cross and baptism, celebration of family patron saint holiday, of Christmas, Easter and St. George's Day as well as celebrations of Holy Apostles and dedication of their tombs as cult places, preservation of old customs from the life cycle, etc. those who still adhered to the Christian customs and holidays were regarded by Islam – as the most influential monotheistic religion – as infidels liable to severe punishment. The converts were publicly condemned by Pope Benedict XIV at the first Albanian Council (1744).

Moreover, even the ecumenical dialogue⁷ between the Orthodox and the Roman Catholics is pregnant with objections to Rome for its proselytic and unionist pretensions. This refers to over ten million members of Uniate, Greek-Catholic churches that preach the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church and accept the Pope primacy while preserving Orthodox rituals and organization.

Christianity and Islam through History

The Roman Catholic religion rightfully regarded itself as a system that gathers together the most diverse elements of human religious and cultural life. Its roots are in the Old Testament that unites the ritual and the moral types of faith, Hellenistic mystery religions, individual mysticism, classical Greek humanism and scientific methods of late classical times. Finally, it is founded most immediately on the New Testament that comprises diverse types and represents a unity of ethical and mystic elements.

The primary assumptions of the West European Christian belief comprise the idea that the world is ruled by one single all-mighty divine being that created all that exists *ex nihilo*; mankind is for ever in a state of rebellion against this all-mighty divinity and hence it deserves eternal suffering; filled with compassion for the weaknesses of those it created, the divinity is ready to offer to humanity another chance only if it accepts the announcement of forgiveness performed in words and by death, by resurrection and ascension of man but also of God and man Jesus; God's faith in man can be regained through holy sacraments of the institutional Church (baptism, chrism, Communion, confession, ordaining, wedding and consecration) and in no other way whatsoever; depending on whether they have received or rejected God's Mercy available through the clergy service of the Church, people will be either blessed to enjoy in the eternal bliss of The Paradise or sentenced to suffer eternal pains in Hell (along with the third alternative – Purgatory – where there was still some hope left to get to Paradise). In other words, this is a specific *religious mould* within which man is not capable of any other good whatsoever apart from God's

⁷ "Ecumenism (Greek, *oikoumene* from *ikos* = home, house; today 'Universe' or 'all the settled world', all the world system, cosmos – harmony, agreement, order) represents a movement for coming closer of all the Christian churches that came into being in the twentieth century. The secular bases of ecumenism are comprised within a universal aspiration of all people to come together and to try to find together solutions of accumulated social problems. Its religious foundations lie in the understanding of the utter senselessness of any controversy among some churches and of the need for common engagement in the search for unity and renewal (of the Body of Christ). The Orthodox authors usually take the beginnings of ecumenism to have been in 1902 while the Protestant authors relate it to the World Missionary Conference held in Edinburg in 1910. The very term "ecumenism" was more precisely determined as inter-Christian collaboration and dialogue for the sake of achieving full-fledged unity of the Church at the Oxford Conference on Faith and Order in 1937. A visible sign of the ecumenical movement and the church instrument for cherishing the pathway to Christian unity is the World Council of Churches (WCC) with about 330 member churches and its seat in Geneva. The founding assembly of the SSC was in Amsterdam in 1948 attended by 351 delegates from 146 churches including 51 Orthodox ones. So far six more assemblies were held, namely in Evanston (USA) 1954, New Delhi 1961, Uppsala 1968, Nairobi 1975, Vancouver 1982 and Canberra 1991" (Тодоровић, 2003a: 388).

Grace that is accessible to him through mediation of the sacramental system of the Church.

The first conflicts between the churches of the Latin West and the Greek East arose due to the efforts of Emperor Leo III the Iconoclast to persuade the church in Italy his belief that Islam is evil sent by god as a punishment for idolatric use of figures in the Christian Church. That is why, in 731, he was anatemized by Pope Gregory III. Further worsening of the relationship between Rome and Byzantium came about when the papal Church was criticized for many things that the East considered as deviations from the Christian principles such as the concept of The Purgatory, compulsory celibacy of the clergy, denying the rights of the clergy to chrisem the baptized, etc. The final separation happened when the Eastern Church objected to Pope for adding, without consulting anyone, the word *Filioque* to the Nikeian symbol of faith in order to point out that the Holy Ghost comes from (God) Father and *Son*. That is why, in 1054, Papal Nuncio Cardinal Humbert left at the altar of St. Sofia a letter in which the Patriarch of Constantinople and all the like-minded persons are excommunicated from the Church. Four centuries later, before Constantinople fell into the hands of Islam in 1453, the negotiations started again concerning possible help from the West while the four publicly declared points that the two churches disagreed about were Pope's right to ultimate power, addition of the word *Filioque* to the symbol of faith, teaching about the purgatory and the question of using yeast or yeast-less bread at the Holy Communion.

Apart from these questions, the differences were also present in some other issues as well, namely, an essential trait of the Western Christian life is man's *justification* by faith and good deeds while in the East this is his *godlike aspect*; the Western Christian Church stresses man's *Original Sin* while the Eastern Church puts an emphasis upon man's *potential* goodness; western theology tends to dualism of matter and spirit (St. Augustine) while the East holds on to the idea of the unity of matter and spirit or at least their mutual dependence; in the West of the greatest importance is to hold on to the upright norms while in the East the genuine faith ("Orthodox" in the sense of "genuine") comprises both proper religious service and an honest experience of it. The Western Church stresses the idea of Christ as a *victim*, of making a sacrifice to God that would revoke human sin while in the East a much greater stress is placed on the idea of Christ *Triumphant* over the forces of evil. The Western Church finds it congenial to have a monarchic authoritarian system with the recognized papacy while in the East the power belongs to the overall community of believers without any authoritarian individual that would be considered as Christ's monarch on Earth.

The signs of dissatisfaction with the Pope's monopolistic Orthodoxy were continually manifested between the twelfth and the fifteenth centuries in the form of religious ideas and procedures as well as renegade movements (Waldensians, Begine, Bogard, Amori, mysticism of David Dinan and Heinrich Eckhardt, Occamists, etc.)⁸ despite Pope's anatemas and rigorous persecution by the Inquisition. Gradually the importance of the holy secrets eroded while the sacramental clerical system of the Papal Christianity was being refuted; finally, all this erupted in Luther's protest against the abuse of the clerical vocation for the sake of selling absolutions. The Christian religious communities that originated from an immense movement of the *Reformation* in the fifteenth century Europe objected to the Roman Catholic Church its exclusion of prophetic self-criticism with the help of the authoritarian system of the Church as well as the growth of the ritual elements of faith at the expense of

⁸ More about it in: Ling, 1990: 333-339.

moral and personal. In other words, the “Protestant faith in an un-mediated, face-to-face encounter with God creates more independent individualities than the Catholic faith and its clerical mediation in the relation between God and man” (Tilich, 1988: 100).

The philosophy of Protestantism, in its simplest form, stressed that men existed for the sake of God; some of them were saved while others damned while the guarantee of salvation could be found in the success which accompanied one’s commitment to his secular vocation. What was encouraged was a serious use of time and means whose spending on this world’s pleasure was anathematized. With its *moralistic individualism*, the Protestant teaching justified the fact that the rich people were becoming richer by emphasizing their serious commitment to their duties and responsibilities, their hard work, moderation and savings; on the other hand, the poverty of the poor was explained as idleness, moral corruption and a vicious way of life. The above-described doctrine especially favored the emergence of modern rational capitalism in the nineteenth century. That is why Protestantism ensured for itself an entirely specific role in the universal process of rationalization of the form of social organization and management in all the domains of social life; besides it established itself as a powerful and attractive alternative religious system in comparison with the Papal pattern of religious faith and practice in the West.

Lutheranism and *Calvinism* mostly established themselves as middle-class religions. As religious movements capable of representing the so-called “disinherited classes” of their time (peasantry, workers, underpaid craftsmen, seasonal workers in cities) there came into being *Anabaptists* in the sixteenth century and *Quakers* in the seventeenth century but even these movements, in the eighteenth century, increasingly became religions of honest, sober and caring traders and businessmen. The emotional needs for the religion of salvation of the widest social layers were satisfied by *early Methodism* thus marking a revolution in the religious life and ethos of the eighteenth century England. The Methodism of John Wesley, an otherwise ordained priest of the Anglican Church, stressed the importance of the reality of *salvation* that was done by Christ for the sake of man, namely, the salvation accessible to all without any restraints, the salvation as an objective fact as well as the possibilities of arriving at a subjective or personal belief into salvation by emotional means. Its impact continued in the following century in the Anglo-Saxon world inspiring its mostly working class membership with the idea of holiness as an achievable religious goal thus shaping its moral and social position. According to the numerous interpretations, the Methodist ideas worked as a safety-valve that eased off the revolutionary tensions of the English working class movement while the experience of the family community and collective prayers is regarded as a precursor of trade union organization.

However, the history of the Christian religion in the first half of the nineteenth century on the European continent and in England was characterized by the movement known as *evangelicalism* with the following traits: it is distinguished by “a powerful emphasis on the secular rather than on the spiritual..., its care for uprooting social injustice such as slavery, its care for education and, above all, its respect for the Christian Bible as an inspired word of God and measure of universal truth” (Ling, 1990: 406). Evangelicalism was most strongly expressed in America where it took on the form peculiar for socially lower layers that is usually known as “revivalism”. It is a movement dealing with the issues of individual conversion and salvation whose roots are in English Puritanism and European Pietism. In America the Puritan and the Pietan influences were felt in the colonial period while after the American Revolution the Methodists became the strongest advocates of this drift.

Apart from the South and some parts of the West, revivalism experienced, after the First World War, a drastic decline and it almost became identified with conservative Protestantism.

An inter-religion dialogue between Christianity and Islam took place as early as in Byzantium though a long time before its official downfall. M. Vukomanović (2003: 27) states that as early as in the eighth century the Christian defenders proclaimed the *Koran* an untrue book while considering Mohammed a false prophet, namely, “the convert to the new religion was, in fact, obliged to anatemize Mohammed, all of His relatives by names as well as all the *haifas* till Jazid (680-83). Other anatemases were directed against the *Koran*, teaching about Paradise, polygamy and predestination”. The central theological problem was consistent monotheism of the Muslims, namely, the one that could not reconcile with the Christian concept of the Holy Trinity. Likewise, what was criticized was Muslim polygamy, the teaching about Paradise as a place of joy and pleasure and the belief in predestination, which was so unlike the Christian teaching about free will. On the other hand, Islam recognized to Judaism and Christianity the character of authentic revelations but it also launched a controversy against the religious arts, iconography and the Gospels as second-hand reports instead of being treated as direct announcement of God’s Word. Some attempts to improve the relations between the two mainstream religions were recorded as late as between the two world wars but they weakened after the revolution in Iran in 1979 and Islam revivalism. After the events of September 11, 2001, the question remains open if in the new millenium the relationship between the West and Islam would develop in the light of Huntington’s projection of irreconcilable differences or as a relationship that would give birth to a completely new quality, as a direct expression of mutual influence and dialogue.

Serbian Orthodox Church, Roman Catholic Church, Islam Religious Community, Protestant Religious Communities and “New” Religious Movements at the Balkans and on the Territory of Former Yugoslav Republics

With the blessing of Nikeian Emperor and Patriarch, the Serbian autocephalous archbishopric was established in 1219 while its first Archbishop was Sava Nemanjić. The elevation of the Serbian archbishopric to the level of the Patriarchate took place in 1346 which was, after a period of open disagreement, officially recognized by the ecumenical Patriarch in 1375. Byzantium made a concession to the Patriarchate of Peć due to the increased danger spreading across the Balkan region of being conquered by the Turks. Thus, harmony was established between the Serbian medieval Church and state, namely, in the canonical-legal domain, concerning the issues of dogma and liturgy, the church organs were independent in their decision-making while the church-political, social and administrative matters that were of equal importance for the Church and the state were discussed and decided upon by the state assembly. This state lasted until the onset of the Osmanli-Turkish rule at the Balkans.

What it brought about was first extinction followed by renewal of the Patriarchate (1557) as an expression of the territorial pretensions of Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent towards Hungary. A changed attitude toward the Serbian ecclesiastical organization brought to the throne Makarije Sokolović while its legal position was constituted by the Hatisherif. A church-layman council of the Patriarchate of Peć was constituted while the ecclesiastical self-rule communities were set up though all of them subordinated to the centralized rule. Due to some counter-Turks foreign policy combinations and for the sake of preserving the Serbian national identity and

constituting the Serbian national being, the Church again lost the confidence of the Turkish state, which led to its new abolition in 1766. The Sultan Berat (decree) forbid its renewal while its institutions were taken over by the Ecumenical Church. Despite numerous migrations and adjustments to turbulent international developments, the church-cultural and rural-poetic language was used to build upon the ornaments of the Serbian national tradition in the eighteenth century just as the idea of the right to the future was preserved.

On the wings of the national liberation zeal of the First Serbian Insurrection in 1809 Archimandrite Melentije Stefanović was elected as the Metropolitan while, a year later, in Belgrade, the first theological school was founded financed by the state. Prince Miloš Obrenović used his influence with the Patriarch of Constantinople in 1815 to ordain Archimandrite Melentije Nikšić as Bishop of Šabac. By the Sultan Hatisherif dating 1830 Serbia became a vassal principedom within Turkey; on the basis of the same document, the Concordat was concluded between Serbia and the Patriarchate of Constantinople by which the Orthodox Church obtained the characteristics of an autonomous body thus achieving the status of a state church. The already-mentioned pan-Hellenism of the Ecumenical Patriarchate as well as pan-Bulgarism of the established Bulgarian Exarhat in 1870 as well as the first indications of the Macedonian population that, due to more than evident Bulgarian assimilating tendencies, it should get its own church moved the Serbian state and church to bring up once again the question of renewal of the Patriarchate of Peć. The things were considerably improved by the international recognition of the independence of Serbia at the Congress in Berlin in 1878. Until the Yugoslav state unity on December 1 1918 the Orthodox dioceses outside Serbia continued their educational, cultural and national activities despite the efforts on the part of the Ecumenical, Habsburg and Ottoman rules to dissolve the national and religious identity of Serbs in the region.

The Declaration of Corfu in 1917 announced the intention of the Yugoslav authorities to make official all the religions (Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Islam) thereby the Serbian Orthodox Church would lose its status of the state church. This happened soon after the foundation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians (or, from 1929, Kingdom of Yugoslavia) by uniting all former local (autocephalous and autonomous) Serbian Orthodox Churches into the Autocephalous United Orthodox Serbian Church of the Kingdom of SCS. Yet, despite all this, the Serbian Orthodox Church in the following period completed its organizational build-up firstly by issuing a temporary act on the Serbian Patriarchate in 1920 followed by the Act on the Serbian Orthodox Church (1929) and the Constitution of the Serbian Orthodox Church (1931).⁹ Its jurisdiction extended to include certain parishes and bishoprics in the Diaspora while, in 1920, the Orthodox Theological Faculty was founded. On the turbulent scenes of social and political troubles in the thirties until the fall of the pro-pact-with-Germany policy of the last Yugoslav government, the Serbian Orthodox Church mostly kept its neutrality but not always. It first expressed its lack of sympathy for the foundation of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia followed by the legal confirmation of the Concordat with the Vatican signed in 1935 by M. Stojadinović's and, finally, it allied with the forces of the *coup d'etat*, namely those who op-

⁹ "It is upon these legislative acts that a unified and centralized system of the ecclesiastical rule and government was founded. Its essential elements are : Patriarch – ultimate ruler, Holy Archbishop Council - highest collective authority, Holy Archbishop Synod - highest collective executive body, High Church Court and Patriarchate Council. The bishoprics are headed by bishops. The church municipalities consisting of one or more parishes are basic units of the system. Within its domain there are other bodies and organs with assisting administration and a spiritual role or with self-rule jurisdiction" (Mirković, 1988: 356).

posed the country's joining the Tripartite Pact; hence it suffered the consequences of the fascist invasion during the Second World War.

Mass Christianization of Slovenians was completed by the early eighth century while that of Croats was done between the seventh and the ninth centuries. After this, these peoples fell into many centuries of dependence on the state of the Franks that they would manage to get out of only after the constitution of the Kingdom of Serbs, Slovenians and Croats in 1918. With the extinction of the national dynasty in 1102 the Metropolitanate of Split became dependent on new Hungarian lords while the coastal regions were under jurisdiction of Venice. The Bosnian bishopric also abandoned its original seat in Sarajevo and moved to Đakovo thus surrendering to the aspirations of Hungary. The Bishopric of Zagreb was founded by separating a part of the Split Metropolitanate territory thus finally breaking the connection between the North and the South while the ecclesiastical and political seat of Croatia moved from the coast to Zagreb. Around the mid-tenth century in Dubrovnik an independent arch-bishopric was established with its sufragans in Kotor and Trebinje but not for long. The seat in Bar was likewise raised to the level of archbishopric with jurisdiction over the Latin bishopric in Herzegovina, Bosnia, Serbia and Albania. A number of bishoprics exist in the region of Duklja, that is, Zeta. The consequences of the schism between Byzantium and Rome were not so evident as in some other European countries.

Fundamental changes took place with the Turks' intrusion into the Balkans. Catholic bishoprics, both continental and coastal, remained empty while the bishops, appointed by Vienna and Venetian courts managed them from the West. The Catholic population migrated to the border and overseas regions while the Orthodox population formed military frontier areas as the last defense belt of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In the countryside there were colonies of Dubrovnik merchants that survived as well as, thanks to special Turkish legislature, larger Catholic mining communities.

The renewal of the Roman Catholic Church started in late seventeenth century with further weakening of the Ottoman Empire. The bishoprics of Zagreb, Srem, Bosnia and Dalmatia were restored while the edict issued by Pope Leo XII established Metropolitanates of Zadar, Gorica and Vrhbosanska. At the very end of the nineteenth century there were only about ten thousand Catholics living in Serbia.

Since the Vatican regulated its relations with individual states by special international agreements or Concordats, the position of the Bar bishopric and Catholic population in Montenegro was settled as early as 1886. The negotiations with Serbia started immediately after the Congress of Berlin and they ended on June 24 1914 thus enabling the legal annulment of the Austro-Hungarian Protectorate over Roman Catholic in the independent Serbian state as well as the restoration of Belgrade bishopric (that developed into an arch-bishopric) and the formation of a new bishopric of Skopje. Despite all this, the Holy Seat opposed, till the very last moment, the establishment of the common Yugoslav state headed by Serbia and Orthodox faith though it was forced to do that by the changed political circumstances and the final collapse of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

The position of the Catholic Church in the new state was made twice as difficult: on one hand, there was a continual reserve of the Vatican toward the official authorities (though it exchanged, in 1920, international emissaries with the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians) and, on the other hand, there were internal crises induced by "the agrarian reform and compensation of the damage done to the church estates, the Institute of St. Hieronimo in Rome, the use of the Old Slavic liturgy and Glagolitic, the religious instructions in schools and religious upbringing of

the youth, the ecclesiastical-administrative partition of those parts of the bishoprics on the Yugoslav territory whose ordinaria were located in other states, etc.” (Unković, 1988: 374).

On the eve of the first Yugoslav community, the state politics of the Catholic Church took on pro-fascist political orientation; separatist tendencies and clericalism grew stronger so that it is no wonder that the Archbishop of Zagreb Alojz Stepinac officially supported the Quisling Independent State of Croatia.¹⁰ The Catholic clergy and press were joined in their affirmation of the pro-fascist spirit by the papers of all sorts of Catholic organizations whose membership comprised adult activists and Catholic youth. The cruelties done by the *ustashas* in the camps all over the Independent State of Croatia to Serbs, Romas, Jews and communists of all nationalities were never condemned while, regarding forceful conversion of Orthodox population into Catholicism, a special body headed by Archbishop Stepinac was formed. Exceptions from the rule included Christian socialists in Slovenia, rare leaders from the highest Church authorities and individual examples of Catholic clergy's engagement in the national liberation movement.

By the Osmanli conquests from the late fourteenth till the late sixteenth century at the Balkans *Islam* established itself as the youngest proclaimed universal monotheist religion of Near East origin. One of its best connoisseurs from the region, D. Tanasković (1988: 381), states that “Balkan Muslims belonged to a united and centralized community of the Osmanli Empire and preached Sunniti Islam of Hanefit (traditional) ritual which, by nature, remained peculiar for the Muslims in Yugoslavia in the post-Osmanli period”.

After the retreat of the Osmanli troops from Europe at the end of the seventeenth and in early eighteenth century, the Muslim population from Dalmatia, Lika, Slavonija and Vojvodina moved to Bosnia and Serbia. Again, it left Serbia during the successive stages of its liberation in the period from 1793 to 1867; it is recorded that at the time of the Congress of Berlin, in 1878, there were only some ten thousands. The decree of Mihailo Obrenović dating 1868 officially proclaimed the freedom of worshipping Islam and the Bairakli mosque was put into use. By the Constitutional regulations from 1869 the system of the Islam community in Serbia was established; at its head there was a religious leader, Mufti, whose seat was in Niš and whose appointment was confirmed by the Sheih-ul-islam of Istanbul, the ultimate religious-legal authority of the Osmanli Empire. The Ordinance regulating the ordering of the liberated territories (1913) set up many regional Muftis whose first-grade Sheriat jurisdiction included affairs from the domain of family and hereditary legislature. The state of Montenegro undertook the same actions by its Constitution dating 1905, which stated that Podgorica was the seat of Montenegro Mufti and which guaranteed to Muslims the freedom of undisturbed religious worship. The most compact Slavic Islam community lived in Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite its temporary annexation by the Catholic Austria after 1878. By bringing about the *Statute on the Autonomous Government of Islam Religious and Vacouf Mearif Affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina* in 1909 the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina freed themselves from a too strong state influence and determined their right to manage independently their religious affairs, Islam schooling and vacouf property. Already in 1915 there were 1,200 traditional Islam elementary schools and 32 secondary schools or medreses. The equality of Islam with the other religions was confirmed in Slovenia and Dalmatia in 1912 and in Croatia and Slovenia in 1916.

¹⁰ “... that more than 200 Catholic priests, 11 of them being bishops and archbishops, were decorated with high-ranking *ustasha* medals” (Unković, 1988: 376).

The legal status and the internal organization of the Islam religious community in the Kingdom of SCS were founded on the Constitutional principle of the freedom of faith and consciousness as well as of the equality of all the accepted faiths. The organizational unity was established on January 31 1930 by issuing the Act on Islam Religious Community and accompanying regulations including the Constitution of the Islam Religious Community,¹¹ that is, by subjecting all the Yugoslav Muslims under the spiritual authority of the Reis-ul-ulema whose seat as well as that of the High Islam Authorities was transferred to Belgrade. By the new law dating 1936 the seat of the Reis-ul-ulema moved to Sarajevo while all the Muftis were abolished; the basic units were still Dzemats headed by Imams. In addition to a widely spread network of theological institutes, the Islam Religious Community has also involved in rich publishing activity. The future inter-national and inter-confessional relationships with Serbian and other peoples in Yugoslavia were considerably determined by the role that the Islam Religious Community played in war conflicts.

Along with Luther's translation of the *Bible* from Latin into German in early sixteenth century, similar steps were undertaken by Primož Trubar who, in this way, built foundations for Protestantism among the gentry and upper social layers in Slovenia. The same religion was advocated for in Croatia by Croatian Governor Petar Erdedi while in the coastal area and Istria the same was done by a close associate of Luther's, Marija Franković whose penname was Vlačić Ilirik. All of them were, however, under a strong influence of the Counter-Reformation by which the Catholic Church defended itself from the intrusion of "other-way Christians" (Lutherans, Calvinists, Baptists, Methodists, Adventists, Nazarenes and others). The second wave of Protestantization of Slovenia and Croatia came with the spread of religious tolerance, more precisely, with the activities of "Joseph II who proclaimed his 'Patent of Tolerance' in 1781 when the equality of all the confessions in the Empire was recognized" (Branković, 1996: 145). The last wave fell somewhere between the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century when the Protestant ideas gradually reached as far as eastern and southern parts of the country, namely those that were, by that time, mostly engaged in the fights against the Islamization process. The first to come among the Serbs were Nazarenes followed by Baptists and Adventists. Meeting with the natural resistance on the part of the Orthodox and Catholic churches, Seventh day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Pentecostals, Methodists and others had also conflicts with the state authorities that forbid and prosecuted them. In particular their position got worse in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia since the St. Vitus Constitution did not allow them to be filed either among "adopted" or "recognized" religious communities.

* * *

Once the Second World War ended, regarding the attitude toward the religious communities, the party and state elite on the territory of the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) had three targets, namely, "to restrain the influence of religion and activities of religious communities in the society, to control their activities and to exert pressure upon the leading representatives of the religious communities in the sense of their loyalty to the state organs" (Radić, 2003: 120). The openly expressed ambitions were to keep the religious activities within the constraints of merely performing religious rituals and to suppress them to the periphery of social developments.

¹¹ More about in in Новаковић, 2003: 457-462.

In order to realize the above-mentioned goals very concrete state measures were undertaken such as: expropriation and nationalization of all church property, revalorization of church fond, prohibition of collecting contribution for religious needs, transfer of marriages and birth registries into state jurisdiction, suppression of religious schools, restrictions of religious instructions, seizure of printing firms and control of religious media, prohibition of religious holidays, spread of atheist literature, etc. Any resistance to the execution of the political will was sanctioned by bringing to trial the representatives of the hierarchy¹² as well as abolition or strict regulation of state endowments and interruption of communication. Various forms of the pressure from the inside were also applied such as interventions with some members of the church hierarchy, direct interference in the election of bishops or patriarch or the formation of local priests' societies,¹³ and the like.

The Serbian Orthodox Church, autocephalous and independent, has always been, in its history, closely related to the official authorities, materially more dependent and considerably more sensitive to the state pressure; that is why the above-mentioned measures had more tragic consequences for it than for either the Roman Catholic Church or the Islam Religious Community. Until the issuing of the Clergy Social Insurance Ordinance in 1952 it was left in poverty. In the same year the Orthodox Theological Faculty was separated from the University of Belgrade. Though it increased, in fact, the number of its bishoprics, the American-Canadian eparchy was divided into three separate eparchies as a consequence of straightforward objections of former Bishop Dionisije Milivojević to the support given to the formation of the Macedonian Orthodox Church.¹⁴ For the Serbian Orthodox Church as a religious institution its identification with the national mission, that is, accusations of *ethno-philetism*, also had negative connotations.

Neither was the Roman Catholic Church favored or spared by the state authorities partly because of its infamous role in the fight against fascism. It was asked to acknowledge the social and political of the new Yugoslavia, the separation of the church from the state, the ceasing of enemy propaganda and aid to *ustasha* emigration, non-interference into the internal affairs of the state, identification of the territories of the border bishoprics with the state borders, the ceasing of the procedure for the beautification of Stepinac, etc. There was even an official break-up of the relationship between the two states in 1952. The changes in the Vatican after the death of Pope Pius XII and a more open approach on the Yugoslav side brought about the signing of the 1960 Protocol by which the Vatican got the jurisdiction over the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia in the spiritual matters. The government became more benevolent to the Church activities while the first inter-religious meetings with the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious communities were organized. Unlike the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church managed, in the second half of the twentieth century, to consolidate its forces considerably in its con-

¹² The trials of Alojz Stepinc, Bishop Varnava in Sarajevo 1948 or Metropolitan Arsenije in Podgorica in 1954.

¹³ Created by the state authorities, on March 3 1949, the *Union of the Orthodox Priests' Associations in the SFRY* came into being. Though it gathered together some 80% of the overall number of Orthodox priests in the country, due to its powerful Catholic hierarchy the same association of Catholic priests was one of most poorly organized.

¹⁴ Justifying the formation of the MOC (according to the formula: state, language, church) by the strengthening of the Macedonian factor due to incessant territorial pretensions of the neighboring countries, the state openly exerted pressure upon the Patriarchate to acknowledge autonomy of the Macedonian Orthodox Church which it finally did by accepting its Constitution brought about at the synod of both the Church and the people in Ohrid in 1958. And while the Serbian Orthodox Church cherished hopes that the problem was thus solved, in Macedonia this was regarded only as a step toward the autocephalous status, which was formally proclaimed at the synod in Ohrid in 1967.

flict with “militant atheism”. The reasons for this are rather in its structure, ways of functioning, possibilities of adjustment and international circumstances in which the role of the Vatican was not negligible. The material resources of the Roman Catholic Church coming from abroad were in time identified with those received by all the other religious communities.¹⁵

After the victory of the democratic socialist revolution and issuing of the Act on Legal Position of Religious Communities (1953), the position of the Islam Religious Communities objectively improved in the old Yugoslavia though the government authorities, just like in the case of the SOC and RCC, tried to achieve a decisive influence on organization, election of leaders and property management. Already in 1947 the Constitution of the Islam Religious Community was adopted by which the highest regulation issuing organ on the territory of the Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia became the High Vacouf Synod that brought about the Constitution of the Community, elected Reis-ul-ulemas and four members of the High Religious Leadership. The religious-executive organs were Dzemat Board, Representation of Vacouf, Ulema Medjlis and High Religious Leadership headed by the Reis-ul-ulema. By the last change of the Constitution in 1969 the three-part title was modified and shortened into the Islam Community (IC). In the post-war period there were almost 900 mosques and masjids built or reconstructed, the religious instructions were organized for the youngest in accordance with the Constitutional and legal provisions. In the year of 1977 the Islam Theological Faculty in Sarajevo was founded while an opportunity was offered to a number of students to do their schooling all over the Islamic world, primarily at the Al Azhar University in Cairo.

The Protestant religious communities in post-war Yugoslavia can be regarded as branches of the Protestant churches in Europe and the USA. The Act on Legal Position of Religious Communities also regulated the position of the Religious Community of Jehovah’s Witnesses, of the Christian Pentecostal Church, the Christian Evangelist-Methodist Church and other churches of the “third branch” of Christianity that are having either their official name or are known as Protestant religious communities. In sociology they are also called “small religious communities” though the expression familiar among the laymen is utterly wrong, namely the “sects”. A great variety of teachings – though all of them referring to one single Holy Scripture – a variety of organizational and management forms from democratic to autocratic ones as well as different attitudes toward some social requirements and other religious communities (though all of them are classified into the same religious framework, even today most of them seem to be having no inter-relations at all or cooperation) – all these things were some of the motives for getting to know better the Protestant communities and for studying them. What makes them especially interesting for studies is their relatedness with the mother communities abroad, that is, with international religious organizations such the Ecumenical World Council, the European Conference of Churches, the World Lutheran Federation and the like. In the teachings of some of these Protestant churches there were important resources for certain problems with the state since these segments of their teachings brought about respective legal sanctions. These are issues like absence from work or school, refusal of arm-carrying during the military service, an aggressive missionary work in the recruitment of new believers, issues regarding the building of religious objects, transformation of the residential space into public (business) premises and some

¹⁵ R. Radić (2003: 137) states that the Catholic Church at the celebration of the Lady of Sinj in Sinj in 1965 there were more than 50,000 people while only a week ago at the celebration of the traditional secular annual *alka* contest attended by the President of the Republic there were only 8,000 to 10,000 people.

other items in the religious teachings or activities of Protestant communities.¹⁶ According to the 1991 Population Census, the number of Protestants was slightly greater than 1%¹⁷ while the largest of the churches are evangelistic and the Reformist Christian Church having their own official associations (Association of the Slovak Evangelistic Clergy and the Association of the Clergy of the Reformist Christian Church).

An equal place in the confessional panorama of the Yugoslav space, former and especially present, is reserved for the so-called “new” religious movements.¹⁸ In the beginning organized as unconventional forms of expressing individual religious views, they very swiftly developed into doctrinaire systems subjected to the will of the leader and his closest associates. Looking from the sociological perspective, they are most often *cults* as the lowest form of religious organization. Each of them has the following ideal-type characteristics: “1. a charismatic leader, 2. strict hierarchy of relationship, 3. total separation from the society, 4. total separation from the family, 5. a small number of members, 6. most often young people as believers, 7. property and work for the leader, 8. manipulative means and programming techniques, 9. economic, psychic (sexual) use of members, and, 10. existence on the verge of legitimacy (on the brink of crime)” (Đorđević, 1998: 12). In Serbia and Montenegro the following movements are active: Ordo Templi Orientalis, Aum Shinrikyo, Rosicrucians, God's Children, Bahaian and Computer sects, Peoples' Temple, Weiko Group, Hare Krishna, Scientological and Unification Churches, and etc.¹⁹ Some cults do not hesitate to take to inhuman, destructive and criminal behavior which, in its turn, causes publicly organized anti-cult movements which try to unmask the detrimental activities of the cults though even sometimes they themselves exaggerate that rightfully deserve appropriate social criticism.

Why Do People Turn to “Small Religious Communities” and “New” Religious Movements?

In their self-critical reference to the inclination of the great historical churches to bury their original religious messages under diverse non-religious elements, rituals and duties, that is, to disguise it into theological expressions and symbols that are hardly comprehensible to modern man, both the Orthodox and the Roman Catholic theologians openly reveal the reasons of joining various movements of “underground Christianity”. The attraction of these movements lies in the fact that “their religiosity is spontaneous while the religious expression is pure and understandable”, that is, they “offer such forms of collective participation in which it is possible to experience warm human closeness, tranquility and peace of mind” (Коларих, 1987: 94). Their existence is not denied; instead, it is interpreted as an expression of “inner turbulence in the ever living organism of the Church”. They are not discarded for their moral, cultural, humane, philanthropic and other values but their religious-doctrinaire character is experienced only as “man's natural psychological aspiration to God carried out through spotless organization and iron formal discipline” (Калезић, 1987: 89-91).

¹⁶ At the Chair for Sociology of the Faculty of Philosophy in Novi Sad this autumn there will be a ph. dissertation defended by Tomislav Branković, MA, dealing with the position and activities of the Protestant religious communities in Yugoslavia between 1945 and 1991.

¹⁷ Z. Kuburić (1997: 105) states that “at the Balkans in 1995 there were only 2% of Protestant population”.

¹⁸ “Disappointed with the civilization he came from... Western man turns to some new solutions such as messianic sects, millenium movements, salvation sects, pseudo-Christian or pseudo-Oriental and, most often, pseudo-religious groups and movements” (Đurić, 1988: 411).

¹⁹ It is evident that the wave of new faiths is not limited to the Judeo-Christian tradition; instead, it relies on Buddhist, Muslim, Shinto and pagan sources or even psychoanalytic ideas of Freud and Yung, political ideologies, science fiction and UFO-logy.

In the opinion of distinguished Catholic theologian A. Kopilović (2003: 146-147), while the West is overwhelmed with “new’ offers that are, in fact, of Christian inspiration with somewhat adjusted mentality of the modern seeker or even accommodate the mentality of the European way of life”, in the European East numerous non-traditional religious organizations are, among other things, approached out of protest against the ideology of ‘scientific’ materialism. We are referring here to an uneducated and spiritually hungry individual who does not substitute the existing religious adherence with a new alternative but, instead, he converts from the state of atheist lack of faith into one of so many options at the newly created religious market. In the newly-created social circumstances in the countries of this region large religious communities have mostly devoted themselves to make up for many decades of deterioration especially in the material sense; less are they devoted to the genuine spiritual renewal of their flock. The emptiness in the human soul has been in a much more skillful way filled, with their teachings, by no one else but religious organization of Protestant orientation.

The Roman Catholics distinguish three types of Christian communities. *The Church* implies, in addition to the Catholic, Orthodox and Old Eastern faiths of Nestorians, Jacobites, Armenians, Copti and Ethiopians, the religious communities founded at the time of the Reformation: Lutheran, Evangelistic, Reformed (Calvinist) Church, Old Catholics as well as some Christian communities that came into being by breaking away from the Anglican Church such as Episcopalian and Presbyterian. *The Free Church* assumes those Christian communities that consider any connection with the state as a hindrance to their religious development and thus they discard any church organization on the national or territorial basis such as Baptists, Methodists, Pentecostals, Congregationalists or Independents. *Sects* are small church communities of the Protestant type that tend to the spiritualist understanding of the Church, that tend to individualism and elitism such as Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Mormons.

Sociologically speaking, “small religious communities” are an offspring of the dissatisfaction with the modern society as well as with the manifest shortcomings of the mainstream churches. A whole series of reasons that encourage the conversion of the Orthodox, Catholics and Islam believers to Protestantism can be summed up in three groups, namely, *religious*, *social* and *material*. Leaving aside the first ones that are never fully known to the majority of common believers, the social and material aspects most often become predominant when it comes to decision-making. “Small religious communities” 1) are very-well organized communities on local level, 2) have elaborated mechanisms of integration and involvement of their members into the life and activities of the church, 3) are a-national and advocate for equality and brotherhood, 4) refuse socio-political engagement, 5) base their common life on strict adherence to a smaller or greater number of written and unwritten rules, 6) have a developed endowment system and sponsorship, 7) take care about daily practical needs of their members (sick and old people care, children care, education of the youngest, encounters and travels, jobs), and, 8) propagate a healthy way of living (insist upon abstaining from alcohol, tobacco, harmful drugs, coffee), etc.²⁰

On the other hand, what is understandable also is animosity of the mainstream institutionalized religious communities towards all new religious movements especially when it comes to mind that the latter ones, with their active ritual. their lack of the classical clerical hierarchy and the appearance of the individual's in-

²⁰ More about it in Ђорђевић, 1987: 145-148.

volvement in the religious developments, attract a considerable number of young people otherwise former members of the traditional churches.

What is common to all objections made both by the mainstream religion clergy and the laymen from the surroundings refers to the ways of acceptance of new members. Namely, they are objected to because *conversion does not appear to be an act of free will but a result of manipulation, seduction and compulsion*. The converts lose their spiritual independence, ability for critical reasoning and free choice. Thus, they become victims of brain control, brain washing, hypnosis, social isolation and limited physical freedom. In his scrupulous analysis of the sociological research of the new religious movements from the English-speaking regions, M. Hamilton (2003: 425-443) presents an attitude that there is not enough empirical evidence to support this thesis. It is, in his opinion, rather odium of open hostility and anti-cult orientation of the whole social community. The reaction of an individual to an active, intense and suggestive approach of the religious groups and movements does not have to mean automatically seduction; neither does the very act of joining the group have to mean an unconditional conviction into beliefs and values. It can only mean agreement with beliefs and values without their confirmation in life. The “brain-washing” thesis as an explanation of someone’s permanent membership in the movement is very often used by *de-programmers*. These are the people who materially benefit from the unfortunate families of a number of former members. Thus, what is being ignored here are clear statistical indicators showing that the highest percentages of the “recruited” ones are perfectly capable of resisting the proselytic attempts of the movement members. In addition, it is not only the movement but the very personality of the convert (his hopes, fears, expectations and past experience) that must be taken into account in the attempts to figure out the reasons why someone has joined the movement.

E. Barker thinks that the reasons for which people join a movement or remain attached to it are different with respect to what an individual might be looking for as well as to what the given movement can offer him. Those who join in probably believe that they are having a certain positive benefit from their membership regardless of whether it is a feeling of developing a profound relation with God, or better working efficiency, or improvement of the general health state or more qualitative friendly relations within the community of alike-minded persons-believers, or apparent safety or a challenge that the movement is offering.

There are enormous differences among the movements in particular domains of beliefs and practice; that is why it must be avoided to make errors of proclaiming some movement's characteristics as universally valid for all others. Some movements advocate for adjustment to the world (Neo-Pentecostalism, the Charismatic Renewal Movement, some non-Christian groups and western variants of Nichiren Shoshu Buddhism), others plead for confirmation of the world (Human-potential Movement) while others are ardent advocates for the rejection of the world (Unification Church). Each of them offers different Utopian, millenium, revolutionary or reforming enterprises in the realization of the given targets and objectives. In all this, some of them do not, indeed, restrain themselves from criminal activities, disturbances of people’s mental health by the use of opiates or physical violence (for which they have to be openly stigmatized and suppressed); yet, not all that is offered by the “new” religious movements should be negatively assessed. That is why E. Barker wisely concludes that we have to acknowledge the rights of every individual while checking, at the same time, that they are not reducing the rights of others.²¹

²¹ The editorial efforts of Prof. Dr Dragoljub B. Đorđević from the Mechanical Engineering Faculty and the translation efforts of Prof. Dr Dragana R. Mašović from the Faculty of Philosophy of Niš should result in

On Evangelization, Conversion and Proselytism at the Balkans Today

It is true that pluralist societies ensure choice making in the religious matters. In the liberal societies the citizens are free to be religious and atheists (apostasy), secularists and atheists, to belong to one religious community and question the doctrine of their church (heresy), to convert completely or win over new believers to their own church.

The observations made by the geographer of religion that the “Balkan region is the most complex border area in Europe since it is the territory where Roman Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Islam meet” (Šećibović, 2001: 107) are still valid in the first years of the twenty-first century though the situation has somewhat changed. The “old” wounds are healed;²² the centuries-old controversies of the traditional and respected religions (Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism, Islam) in the Balkan societies have become quite and, finally, the regional entities in which particular religious systems are prevailing have been differentiated. However, a new trend – unsurpressable *conversion* to numerous Protestant religious communities encouraged by the modernization processes in mostly post-socialist Balkan societies – has again launched disputes about missionaring, conversion and proselytism. The traditional, as a rule, national faiths have joined their forces into a unified anti-cult front to condemn the activities of the alternative Christian faiths upon the disintegration of the mono-confessional identity. Is the panic justified?

We hold the following opinion:

1) It is *evangelization* when it is done among non-believers, very often spiritually “hungry” people who remained, under the burden of many decades of anti-religious and communist socialization, deprived of religious education and education about religion,

2) It is *conversion* when converts come from the layers of “cool” traditional believers whose religiosity exhausts itself in the ritual practicing of a few religious rituals of the ancestors’ religion (baptism, wedding, funeral, customs),

3) It is *proselytism* when it comes to the “*buying of souls*” among ardent believers of the traditional religions whose knowledge of their own religious tradition and ritual is regularly accompanied with a well-developed awareness about the basic axioms of faith, familiarity with the basic theses of the sacred books as well as the knowledge of the of the spiritual concepts for exploring the transcendent.

“The guilty party” for the occurrence of the first two processes is the clergy of the traditional religions, unaccustomed to the demands of the changed social environment. In their persistent traditional understanding of their role, they have neglected the importance of *practical theology* and *pastoral service*. The emptied place in satisfying diverse social services (free literature and foreign language courses, organized travels abroad, ensured employment, charity activities and the like) was taken by small religious communities while using, at the same time, strong financial support and benefits offered by the new technologies and means of mass communication.

This, however, does not free them of any responsibility for proselytism, which is, by no means, the most unfavored way of expanding religious population. Though intensive missionaring is a dogmatic requirement of the majority of the

the Serbian edition of Eileen Barker’s book on the “New Religious Movements”. The given paraphrase is of the Serbian translation of the chapter comprising the concluding remarks.

²² The Roman Catholic Church more and more rejects Uniatism as a method of achieving the all-inclusive Christian unity while the “Turkization” is just remembered in the historiographic writings from the turbulent events in the past century.

Protestant churches, it is counterproductive to encourage the membership to apply force in trying to win over as many new members as possible even when they are already declared members of some other faith. In this way, it is additionally contributed to the generalizations of the already-rooted prejudices about them as “dangerous and destructive sects and cults” instead of as alternative faiths contributing to the richness of a nation’s culture. The peculiarity of the Balkan present day situation is spread of the Protestant worldview into the Roma ethnos.²³ To start dealing with the issue is of importance since further stratification of the Roma confessional being in a specific way makes more complex the process of building up their national and cultural identity.²⁴

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²³ In the South of Serbia, on the territory until recently almost “untouchable” for the Protestants, we are witnessing the formation and constant increase of purely Roma Protestant churches. We stress *the Protestant Evangelical Church in Leskovac* headed by the young priest Selim Alijević who, after completing the Biblical Studies in England, took over the spiritual care of his compatriots. More about it in Kurtić, 2003.

²⁴ More detailed in: Todorović, 2002; Ђорђевић и Тодоровић, 2003; Ђорђевић, 2003, 2004а, 2004б.

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RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN MODERN SOCIETY

Religious conflicts are as old as the human race. Religious fundamentalism, which has a relatively short history, has unfortunately made us face devastating consequences, which offer a cataclysmic image of the modern world. Since the beginning of the new millennium, religious ideology has (all too) obviously reappeared on the political scene, in a perhaps unusual, but certainly horrifying way. In these areas we bore the ravaging consequences of religious ideologies in the final decade of the twentieth century.

The basic issue in this paper is the following: what has in the social and cultural changes usually termed "modernization" caused a good grounds for the growth of religious fundamentalism and religious conflicts?

When discussing modern society we primarily have in mind global society at the present moment, since broader generalizations on modern society are not very fruitful. We cannot agree on the issue when modernization starts, or which elements should be taken to be traits of modern society. The thesis that all countries must culturally and socially attain the modern phase by overcoming the premodern phase as seen in occidental tradition has also been questioned. Elements of modernity reach different parts of the world in different times. Warnings come to us from expert circles that a distinction should be made between the idea of modernity and the effects of modernity. This statement may sound familiar to people from these areas. We have already paid the high price of living with effects of some ideas.

In writing about religion and the modern age Linda Woodhead (2002) notices a few characteristics of the modern era relevant to global religious situation:

- The West (Europe and America) became leading economic, technological, and perhaps cultural forces only after 1800, whereas before that other civilizations, including Chinese and Islamic had been more advanced culturally and politically.

- Modernization is not related solely to the West, and it can and does take place in "non-western" cultures too, often without a stimulus from the West

- Modernization can be a process evolving within a society, but it can also be "imported" from the outside, often by means of colonial conquer, or it can be a combination of the two processes

- Western experience of modernity and modernization cannot be used as a definite evolution and development model applicable to all cultures and societies.

This analysis points to unequal growth of modernity in the East and the West, which reflects upon religious situation as a particular challenge to eastern traditions.

Instead of defining the conception of modern society, it might be better to point to the processes occurring within it in different parts of the world, which can very roughly be taken as characteristics of this stadium in the growth of global society. A more thorough analysis of the relation between modern society and religious conflicts escalation would require the identification of relations stemming from each aspect (the relation of nation state and religion, the change of gender roles and religion, etc.) Relevant conclusions can originate from particular empirical studies, rather than theoretical treatises. We shall however point out a number of traits or processes occurring in modern society, which account for the possible starting points of religious conflicts.

1. The domination of the nation state – there are almost no religions which are not deeply influenced by the development of nation states. The relationship between the religious and the ethical, later on the national, is hardly new. What is new is the development of the secular nation state with the apparatus able to control social and political life. The nation state has become the unit of global social organization. The relationship of religions and nation states varies (this is a very broad topic which we cannot cover here). For the purpose of this paper we can make a very broad distinction into western and eastern tradition, although this division is indeed very rough.

2. Rationalism is usually related to the socioeconomic sphere of society. The organization of society on a rational basis is observable in rational-bureaucratic institutions and organizations controlling social life. Not all societies have responded equally to rationalization and not all religions have gladly accepted this social life model. Many religions would indeed accept technical advances coming from modern society, but not this principle of social integration. Rationalism favours universalism, a singular idea on human nature and moral rules, a “categorical imperative” which would regulate all kinds of behaviour in society. A major function of religion has always been to point to differences and draw borders. These borders are often ethnic, sometimes they match state borders, and sometimes they cut in half the borders of political entities, which opens up the way for religious conflicts (some forms of pan-Islamic, and also Christian approaches to this problem).

Religion plays a major role in drawing borders between the genders. Universalist tendencies in modern culture are trying to cancel these borders. This is a serious challenge for religious traditions which feel threatened. A characteristic defining any religious conservatism and fundamentalism – Christian, Islamic, or Hebrew is their insistence on the inequality of the sexes, their allocating to women functions within the family only.

Modernization eats into tradition. The authority of the past, the authority of church elite, of religious institutions and practice, even the authority of God, are jeopardized. Detraditionalization and resorting to oneself are a challenge for traditional religious forms which believe they still have the right to run other people's lives.

One of primary characteristics of modern society is secularization. Many of the founding fathers of the sociology of religion think that secularization is an inevitable aspect of modernization. Although secularization has had a serious impact on West Europe and America (Steve Bruce, 2002), its merit is still limited since it has not influenced all parts of the world equally. Additionally, the revitalization of old traditions and the emergence of new religious forms also point to the limited effects of secularization.

The topic of globalization and religion is indeed present in professional disputes. The most important conclusions we find in the papers of Roland Robertson and Peter Berger. Globalization is the process of transferring modernization outside national borders. Premodern societies become integrated by means of the strong link between moral norms, group belonging, and religion. Such societies have difficulty in resolving the tradition-modernity relation, and so become the venue of severe religious clashes. Religion in the modern world has a twofold role: it defines, reproduces, and redefines borders, especially between ethnic groups and religious communities, and it also overcomes borders between people, on the basis of its universal principles. By focusing on borders religion strengthens conflicts in which cultural pluralism becomes a real clash on how to govern a society, which authority to obey, how to live. Globalization does not make borders wider, it redefines borders, a process in which religion plays an important role.

The realm of religion is perhaps the most fruitful field where ideas on modernity are being tested. Religion operates between the need to be universal and the need to set up borders. Some theoreticians take it that the modern world is best described in terms of its being divided into various cultural areas, each reflecting separate religious identities. In theory theses of the end of history and conflict of civilizations also appear. After the fall of socialism, there has been remade room for giving new life to Christian and Muslim ideologies in these areas. Religion has become a powerful weapon in the hands of politicians.

Although the accepted opinion goes that religions are not conflictive, they have often functioned as components of otherwise ethnic or national conflicts. It is of crucial importance to understand that fundamentalist tendencies are not related to one religion only. Rather, such elements can be found in any religion in all parts of the world. Fundamentalism is not a trademark of any creed, any nation, state, religion, or economic and political growth level. Some claim that religious fundamentalism occurs in the ages of social change, as a reaction to such changes (Bussutil, 2003). This author believes that such a remark can lay foundations to religious conflict resolution policy, or at least to the anticipation of such conflicts. Conditions causing religious classes and fundamentalist trends can be caused by internal or external developmental processes, for instance by the pressure of globalization, real or only "sensed", by the changes in political power relations, by demographic changes. The key event in all these changes is the fact they are rapid and they destroy *status quo*. Static societies do not produce fundamentalist tendencies resulting in religious conflicts. Changes of the conditions of social existence are viewed by members of religious communities as a challenge to their own religious values. Such people can start feeling unequal, excluded, manipulated, exploited, or degraded. Their reaction consists in trying to unite on their specific religious learning, to renew ideas from the past in order to strengthen their position in the present. They clearly detach themselves from others in order to protect their own interests. Others are seen as at least different, perhaps opposed to us, perhaps even evil. Within any religion, fundamentalists insist on the specific nature of their own religious teaching, which thus deserves a special treatment by the state and by society (the chosen nation concept). In the real world of modern society such tendencies are manifested as a wish to enforce such a status in the whole of society. In order to fulfill their goals, these people ally with political power. On the other hand, the secular realm, politics before all, uses these trends in order to strengthen its own positions, supporting its own manipulation with the strong religious identification of its people. Religious conflicts and fundamentalist tendencies can occur only in people who take religion and its role in their own life very seriously, no matter how hypocritical this statement may sound. In secular societies, where religion is not so relevant to the life of people and the legitimization of political order, these tendencies cannot peak. Certain groups may pinpoint religion as the crucial factor of their social identity, which can give rise to a significant political force, even when such groups are very small. This is a consequence of the nature of modern society – low integration levels, where a small but well-integrated group can reach politically relevant positions. Such a group of people can define a policy to which broad population is responsive, especially if this policy manipulates the ethnic sentiments of the population.

All this suggests that the basic problem of modern society is intolerance of differences. Multicultural or multiconfessional communities have to tolerate numerous beliefs and behaviour patterns. Religious sentiments in the private sphere need to be tolerated and respected. In order for this to come true, we need to recognize the common nature of the human race and respect our common values, regardless of the differences.

We pointed out the intolerance of differences as an important aspect of social and religious conflicts in modern society. There is another problem related to religion as a form of people's relation to the world. This is the pretension of multi-fold groups of people to the same locations as a part of their own identification core. For example, the problem of Kosovo stems from its being the mythical fatherland of the Serbian people and the factual fatherland of the Albanian people. Both communities lay legitimate claims on the respective elements of their being. This problem is a universal one (e.g. Palestinians and Israelis) and it is not easy to offer some guidelines for its solution.

It is very difficult to define a social conflict as a religious conflict, since conflicts are caused by a combination of factors – ethnic, economic, political. As I. Cvitkovic points out (Cvitkovic, 2004), religious divisions are often the grounds of all conflicts. If religious conflicts are becoming a common practice in modern society, one gets an impression that being a fundamentalist indeed means being modern. Once we understand that the core of modern society gives rise to religious conflicts, the crucial question emerges of how to prevent religious violence. Each society is facing this problem by itself. An important dilemma is how to face a religious practice which may cause a future conflict (fundamentalists, for instance). Society must pluck up courage to fight such ideas, rather than the rights of such ideas to exist. There is also the issue of religious freedoms and possibilities to observe negative tendencies within a religious practice which do not need to be explicitly manifested, but rather hidden under other layers (tradition preservation, ethnic identity, the purity of faith, etc.).

Although this might sound a bit familiar, we will still emphasize that one of the paths for preventing religious conflicts in a society, more precisely those conflicts for which religious identification is the basis or an added element, is to distinguish clearly between religious and secular social power. The more religious authorities are related to the secular and state spheres, the harder it is to control fundamentalist tendencies within each religion.

Those viewing the modernization of society as a “better future” consider religious fundamentalism causing religious conflicts as reactionary. However, there are different readings of the story. The question is who will be the victor to tell it. We must understand that the basics behind the story are not simple – modernity as opposed to reactionarism. Rather, in this tale we are all involved.

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Ivan Cvitković

RELATIONS BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS (The Case of Balkan)

I

At the Balkan's territory there are three cultural circles that convenes and reciprocally permeate: dominating West-European (developed under the influence of Roman-Catholicism), East-European (created under the influence of Orthodoxy), and Oriental (developed under the influence of Islam).

Alongside with mentioned, the territorial spreading of certain religion and confession has been coinciding with territorial spreading of corresponding nation. Certainly, there are no strict and "sharp" borders.

Despite the fact religions are universal (Christianity and Islam), within these kind of conditions (of territorial coincidence), these are conceived as national religions (Islam – Bosniaks; Roman-Catholicism – Croats; Orthodoxy – Serbs).

In such a way religion (Christianity and Islam) and confession (Roman-Catholic, Orthodox and Islamic) emerges as stabilizing factor of nation, or has that function. Many of national community's actions have been justified by religion. It can absorb religion itself so that confession starts to deal mostly with nation and "forgetting" the religion. By that confession becomes national community too. These essentially political institutionalizing of religion can be a way towards totalitarian ideology as well as the end of religion's freedom.

When religion and confession are located in the bordering space, where touching "other" ("third") religion and confession, the religious and confessional charge is created among religious' followers and confession's members – religion's function is to be a "rampart", "protection" from "other" (once from Christianity, second time from Islam).

Whether in such a way, at the Balkan's part of European territory, non-contemporary development of religious consciousness is unfolding, the one that goes along the mutual Christian-Islamic negation. The form of religious consciousness that is developed is one that stands out from Islamic awareness, and *vice versa*. Certainly, it leads toward the strengthening of religious oppositions that can be one of the causes for ethnic conflicts (*Nulla discordia maior quam quae a religione fit* – There are no greater discord then one caused by religion).

Recently, more and more it has been pointing out the importance of the issue concerning the relation between Christianity and Islam, between Christians and Muslims. Accordingly, during July of 1990, Dr. Franc Perko, Belgrade Archbishop of that time, stated that Christianity, beside practical materialism, has the Islam as enemy¹. Interestingly, but such a statement has not been made by any bishop that are in contact with Islam on daily basis (e.g. bishops from Bosnia and Herzegovina). Military confrontations of Christians and Muslims had dangerous consequences in creation of Western's image about Islam and Muslims (and *vice versa*). "Anti-Islamists" emphasising that Islam has been brought in Europe by those who hold a sword in one and Koran in other hand. But, whether the same argument can be

¹ See: "Start", 23 of July 1990.

heard among the Muslims: in many countries, by colonial conquerors, Christianity came by those who hold a sword in one and Bible in other hand. Still, that is a history and we should leave it to historians. Let us turn towards the present and future time. The method of taking into consideration only extreme cases from the history of Muslims or Christians is absolutely unacceptable. Otherwise, within this Century the practice of preceding one will continue: eviction and destruction of human beings only due the fact they belong to different religious culture.

II

What is the relation of Christians in Europe towards Islam and Muslims?

Let us first overview what is the relationship between these two religions. It is known that each religion holds its "rightness". There are several places in the Old Testament as well as in Koran where one can find religious exclusiveness. Despite it, it should be stated although it might appear as contradiction, that Islam, at the level of doctrine, acknowledges and tolerates Judaism and Christianity as religions of the Book, as two monotheistic religions. Koran acknowledges Moses' Torah, David's Psalms and Jesus' Gospel, as well as other holy books, including "Jews and Christians" (II, 62). It also acknowledges that true Books have been revealed before (XII, 111). Tolerance, "openness", as often emphasized as a virtue of Muslims' mentality, is based in Islam on its monotheistic tenets – close to Muslims are people of the Book (Jews and Christians). However, in Koran there is nothing about Buddha, neither about founders of Brahmanism – Vedas. "We believe in Allah and that which is revealed unto us and that which was revealed unto Abraham and Ishmael and Isaac and Jacob and the tribes, and that which was vouchsafed unto Moses and Jesus and the prophets from their Lord. We make no distinction between any of them, and unto Him we have surrendered." (II, 139 III, 83). Muhammad is no more than a messenger: many were the messenger that passed away before him (III, 144). And Jesus the son of Mary "is the Messenger of Allah" (IV, 157) - one of the carriers of revelation. Thus, Jesus whose divine characteristics have been denied still has certain sociological characteristics: he was made by Immaculate Conception, he had power to make miracles, and he resurrected. He is a founder of one out of three great world religions that has a common characteristic – their followers are Adam's descendant. Third Koran's chapter speaks about Jesus too (III, 45). On one or another way, Jesus is mentioned in Koran in fifteen chapters, and 23 verses are dedicated to him. However, to the followers of Islam has been sent a word: "Never will the Jews or the Christians be satisfied with thee unless thou follow their form of religion. Say: 'The Guidance of Allah, -that is the (only) Guidance.'" (II, 120) That kind of the attitude almost passing into open intolerance: "O ye who believe! take not the Jews and the Christians for your friends and protectors: They are but friends and protectors to each other. And he amongst you that turns to them (for friendship) is of them." We can see how it is not correct that Koran "without any crookedness (therein)". (XXXIX, 28) Certainly there are contradictions, same as there are in other written religious authorities. It clearly comes from mentioned facts. Tolerance and intolerance are shifting. "I have submitted my whole self to Allah and so have those who follow me.' And say to the People of the Book and to those who are unlearned: 'Do ye (also) submit yourselves?' If they do, they are in right guidance..." (III, 20) And opposite to that: "Unto you your religion, and unto me my religion" (CIX, 6). Isn't that Old Testament appealing for intolerance when it is requested: "But ye shall destroy their altars..." (Exodus, 34:13) "For thou shalt worship no other god" (Exodus, 34:14). Lord is "a jealous God" (Exodus, 34:14). Talmud naming members of other beliefs as "stars bowing".

We mentioned that Koran acknowledging Christians as followers of the Book, but in the same time, as a distinct monotheistic religion, it criticize Christianity in dogmatic way: "Say not 'Trinity': desist: it will be better for you: for Allah is one Allah" (IV, 171)

Mohammed succeeded in organizing society in Medina where beside Muslims lived Jews and Christians. But whether Koran is giving a preference to Christianity over the Judaism? Both of them are followers of the Book. Still, "strongest among men in enmity to the believers wilt thou find the Jews... and nearest among them in love to the believers wilt thou find those who say, 'We are Christians'" (V, 82). We could say that Islam cherishing the model full of similarities with Christianity. The differences are something that does not originating so much from Prophet as it is a case with his "non-authentic" followers. As a matter a fact, in this case we are faced with classical model of following relationships: Existing religion does not accept the new one (Judaism does not accept the Christianity, Christianity does not accept the Islam), while new religion, in order to survive and protect itself, becoming more tolerant towards followers of "old" religion, and recognize and valorise number of values and models (Christianity from Judaism, Islam from both, etc.). Circumstances of politics, not of dogma, caused that in latter Islamic practice Jews enjoyed better "minority" status then a Christians. Both enjoyed a freedom of beliefs if obeyed and paid a head tax. However, after Mohammad death, it has been forbidden for Jews to residing in Arabia.

Christians has a quite a reasons for tolerant relationship towards a followers of Judaism. Christ and Apostles origins are Jewish one. Jews presented to Christians the Old Testament. Thus, common inheritance brings closer a Christians and Jews. The Second Vatican Council supplied with apostrophe relation between the Church and Israel's people. It also took a tolerant position towards Powers since "decision on salvation" encompassed Muslims too, who "invoking Creator", and "profess the Abraham's belief, prays while bowing to our only, merciful God, Who will judge during the Judgement Day". In the document about relation of Church and non-Christian religions it is emphasize that "Church with respect looks at Muslims"; "Having that during a centuries there were frequent conflicts and hostilities between Christians and Muslims, Holy Synod invites all to forgot what happened, and that sincerely work out towards mutual understanding, while jointly protect social justice, moral goods, peace and freedom of all individuals".

Historically viewed, Christians lived for a long period in ignorance when the Islam is into question, and its Prophet's sermon, and himself are understood as something utmost negative. Mohammed is presented as "swindler and fortune hunter", and Islam as "heresy originating from Christianity". Till Second Vatican Council studies on Islam were burden with anti-Islamic prejudices (many unfortunately in the period after the Council, too). There were too little "couriers of new approach to Islam" as it was Nikola Kuzanski – dreamer of utopia about peace between all religions – as Adnan Silajdzic in his book "Islam in discovery of Christian Europe" entitled Kuzanski.

So, how Christians in Europe and Balkan behaved, and does behave, towards people who belongs to Islam? They objects due the fact that "renaissance" of Muslims is permitted in parts of Europe. The thesis of Christians' extremists is following: Muslims in Europe are nothing but the "unenlightened" Europeans, "unenlightened" by Islam. They recognized in Islam one of the greater enemy of western (Christian) world! Therefore they do the maximum in pointing to the "negative" sides of Islam, and to everything and all related to Islam. Generations had been up-bringing by the literature explaining the hard life of Christians under the Ottoman's

authority, as well as about forced Islamization, all that might contribute to repulsiveness towards Islam and Muslims. According to that standpoint, Islam arrived in Europe as religion of foreigners, religion of oppressors. That image of Islam remained present in consciousness of many generations – till present time. Due to limited knowledge about Islam - (although it is, in some cases, religion of their first neighbours) – within Christians' political attitude specific approach to Islam that has been inveterate is that Islam is kind of fanatical, suffering, “dull-witted” religion. And that notion has been built partly through an old theological theory, and latter on, through literature and political publicist writings.

Number of authors, namely those of oriental non-Islamic (rather to say anti-Islamic) orientation worked and working hard to create awareness among Christians (Roman-Catholic and Orthodox) about Islam as extremely negative (!) religion: according to these authors, Islamic way of living has nothing in common with European civilization; followers of Islam are presented as converts, “turn Turks”; Islam leads into segregation by prohibiting alcohol (and what about other religions that prohibits alcohol as well?), specific sort of meat (but very same restrictions are present in other religions, including Christian communities, as in some Protestant sects); it criticizes and prohibits bi-religious marriages (but whether the other religions, including Christianity, are in favour of bi-religious marriages?), etc.

There were not so many persons as Goethe and Lessing who does not see the enemies among Muslims. Among the Christians prejudices are still present when it comes to demographic migrations among Muslims, prejudices about incompatibility of Islam and democracy (while forgetting Christians' support to many non-democratic regimes from 20th Century), about Islam as source of contemporary terrorism. Within many, predominantly Christian settings, Muslims are faced with obstacles while trying to obtain permissions for building the mosques. I am aware that counter-argument can be that Christians are faced with same problems in some Islamic countries². But, that is not sufficient argument to prevent me, as a non-Muslim, to take a side for Muslim rights to building its place for praying, the right that has everyone else.

On other side, West is perceived as threat to Islam. It has been said that Western society entered into post-Christian period which can be seen in decreasing participation in rituals, increasing secularisation, and emergence of new religious movements, etc. But, isn't it a case that Pope John Paul II called for defence against West' “viruses” as secularisation, hedonistic consumerism, practical materialism, and formal atheism are, etc.? Why there are mutual understanding of existing threats among Christians and Muslims? Whether the roots of these attitudes can be traced from the period of Ottoman's conquests and Crusade wars? Or, the cause is with the competing nature of Islam and Christianity at the world religious market – both religions tends to become, one could name it using today's jargon – global religions.

It could be concluded that attitude of Christians towards Islam and Muslims has been evolves from the ignorance, through arrogance, till tolerance. But this does not mean that, at the beginning of 21st Century, there are no prejudices, anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim hysteria, in particular after terrorists' attacks on New York and Washington, on 11 of September 2001.

² S. H. Nasr in his writings emphasizing that in today's Iran there are more churches than there are mosques in complete West World.

III

Prior to addressing the issue of Muslims attitude towards Europe and Christians, let us make an overview of situation among Muslims and Islam, in Balkan. What are its sociological-political characteristics?

In certain Balkan's countries Islam enjoyed not only status of tradition, but status of national law, as well as national identity too. Expressed willingness for identity affirmation based on religion is very strong. Islam has been taken more and more as indicator of national and cultural identification. It started to symbolize not only membership to particular culture, but national community too. Islam becomes a symbol of separate life in relation to neighbouring one (Christian's). It appears as "national religion" disdained and persecuted by "others" (Islam's followers has been expelled, their mosques destroyed, etc.). Through defence of Islam and Islamic values there is intention, as a matter a fact, to defence national identity.

In such circumstances, couple of models of attitudes towards Europe and Christians' tradition has been crystallised among Muslims, and some of those includes extreme standpoints:

Model emphasizing that Europe and European Christians recognize Islam and Muslims as a foreign body in its organism, and therefore that cause its negative attitudes. Indeed, it seems that Europe and its Christians has duped on media's propagandas about dangers for themselves coming from Islamic fundamentalism. On other side are extremists among Muslims which looks at Europe as "devastated by oblivion and lack of consciousness about transcendent". It has been objected the reduction of religion to that kind of Europe. Bu its support to Roman-Catholicism and Orthodoxy Europe sustaining "bulwark of Christianity" preventing Islam to penetrate. There are Europe-centric prejudice on Islam and Muslims and therefore there are favourable approaches towards anti-Muslims movements. That's why there are sharp reactions in relation to Europe: "We must reject European garbage, alcohol, narcotics, prostitution..."³ Certain Muslim intellectuals holds opinion that Western, Christians' civilisation delivers "pathological creation" of European spirit and civilization such is inquisition, fascism and bolshevism.

Another model is much more tolerant. This model advocating discourse in which there are no conversation about foreign body in Europe's organism, but about people(s) who are able to, by its tradition and culture, enrich the European' cultural milieu. Persons that advocate for this model in a same time support the dialog, coexistence and tolerance between Christians and Muslims -- members of common Abrahams' heritage.

IV

At the end of 20th and beginning of 21st Century more and more had been actualized, and has been actualize, the question of relationship between "Christianity and Islam". Of course, it is correct to say relationship between Christians and Muslims, rather than "Christianity and Islam" – simply because subjects of relationship cannot be Christianity and Islam as religions, but their followers, Christians and Muslims. What contributes to such interest for relation between members of two Abraham's, universal, revealed religions - Religions of the Book as it is common way to name those?

³ Reisu-l-ulema Dr. Mustafa Ceric, see: "Oslobodjenje", 5 of October, 1994.

1. Strengthening of political role of Islam since the Iranian revolution of Imam Khomeini (1979.); as well as strengthening the role of Islam in determination of ethnical identities of one group of people, or preservation of ethnical identity of others (e.g. immigrant groups). Also, Islam is religion with highest rate of new followers in 20th Century.
2. Increasing number of Islam' followers on the continents that are *a priori* considerate as Christian' one. Islam emerged as a new element of European culture. Traditional understanding in Balkan that Islam is "west border" or "border of penetration" in Europe simply does not stands. In many European countries there are more Muslims then in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Balkan. There are close to two million Muslims in Great Britain, around five million in France, and approximately three million in Germany. Two third of immigrants in Europe are Muslims. Currently in European Union live more then 20 million Muslims. Therefore in some "Christian's" communities new religious identity appeared and that identity sometimes were not understood and accepted (problems with permissions for building the mosques, wearing the kerchiefs...) There are analogy in "Islamic world" – non-understanding and non-acceptance of Christian' identity.
3. Relation Christians-Muslims becomes more actual also due to extremists (among both groups) who used religion (and Christianity and Islam) for its extreme political and sometimes, terrorist actions. Extremists try to sow the fear among Christians, as well as among Muslims, based on danger from "others" to their own identity. And only those who are week in beliefs and by week religious identity can accept and spread that kind of attitudes.
4. Exclusiveness of Christians and Muslims! Christians looks at Islam and Muslims from its own experience and perspective. On other side, Muslims does the same. But experiences and perspectives of Christians and Muslims are obviously different, so judgements are different too. Christians' extremists portraying Muslims' world as "primitive", as well as brake for scientific development. And it is known that Arabs translated works of Aristotle, Hypocrite, in 9th Century... Arabs contributed to development of chemistry, optics, trigonometry, numbers system, medieval philosophy.... But who is interested in that!?

What is the future of Muslims-Christians relations in Balkan and Europe? Not so small number of sociologist thinks that religiously, ethnically, and culturally heterogeneous societies create more conditions for conflicts. Conflicts emerging within societies of mentioned characteristics lead members of the groups (religious, ethnical, cultural) into situation of frustration, with number of disorders in behaviours, all that was present in Bosnian-Herzegovinian war 1991-1995.

Out of this kind of understandings it appears that only stable states are those nationally homogenous, and mono-confessional one. That consciousness is further on transferred to the micro community (it is more safely to live in ethnically homogeneous and mono-confessional settings) that during the war have had following epilogue – ethnical cleansing. That epilogue is even harder if war happening in settings where four cultures meets (West-European, Bezants, Islamic and Jewish, out of those first three in particularly important during the war).

How much religions and confessions contributing to social conflicts? As illustration one can use the Islam and case of Bosnia, relation between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, Bulgarians and Turkish minority in Bulgaria, Armenian and Azeri, Russians and Muslims in Central Asia. Conflict between Muslims and Hindus (Pakistan and India)! Christians and Muslim in Lebanon! Others have different

opinion about mentioned events: “Afghanistan, Kashmir, Somalia, Bosnia ... Not all are aware in Islamic world that there is systematic war against Muslims. Complete educational system in Islamic world should be reconstructed in order to connect awareness about own country and awareness about Islamic civilization in total...”⁴ Mentioned conflicted situations various authors used for various theses. First group (mostly those of pro-Islamic orientation) use these as examples of Christians’ Europe fights against Islam and Muslims. Second group (mostly of non-Islamic, but anti-Islamic orientation too) use very same cases in order to illustrate processes that ending in clash of civilizations caused by “aggressive” Islam. We can only ask whether the future war, as K. Popper stated, will be the war of civilizations.

“Theories of conspiracy”, “conspiracy against us” inevitably end in violence and crime. If one goes astray, and commits the act of terrorism, considering that as an action “in favour” of its own religion (no matter is it in the name of Christianity, Islam...) there is no justification for accusation of millions who declare themselves as members of that very religion. Accordingly, there is no justification for absence of screams by millions of religious followers that should state: There were enough of false prophets and false defenders of religion! Do not bespatter reputation of religion by your terrorism and violence!

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⁴ Seyyed Hossein Nasr, interview in “Avaz”, Sarajevo, 15. September 1994, p. 10.

EVANGELIZATION AND PROSELYTISM IN THE ORTHODOX CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY

The Notion of Evangelization

The Lord Jesus Christ often addresses the Father as The One who sent him. The Son of God is the unique apostle, the anointed one sent by God the Father in order to save the world. With his legation, He testifies to the relationship of love towards the Father. The reason of the legation, salvation of the world, is the Father's will with which the Son constantly agrees, with divine love.

Throughout the centuries, the evangelization of the Church has been representing an organic continuation of Christ's legation in the world. Christ himself sends his followers to sermons and stresses that he is doing so in the way his Father is sending him. Their legation is identical to his, in respect to both essence and efficiency. He gives guidelines to legated followers by pointing out the principal and key importance of evangelization. This act of legation in the world concerns all of Christ's followers irrespective of their generation.

Ethical Foundations of the Orthodox Evangelization

Evangelization is Orthodox if it represents true and credible participation in the legation of the Son from the Father in the Holy Spirit. The possibility of such participation is given to people through the liturgy and ascetical life of the Church. Like the Body of Christ and the fullness of the Holy Spirit, the Church is the only real subject of Orthodox evangelization, based on the gracious synergy /*synergeia*/ of God and mankind. More than a literal acceptance of dogmatic words, of nominal membership to the Church's community or the following of canonical regulations, this synergy enables a real life applicability of the truth revealed by the God. The Orthodox evangelization is not a human project, idea or accomplishment, but is a life long participation in God's plan for salvation.

The responsibility of the legation in the world is an organic part of the relationship of love towards the God. The life of the Church in Christ is the way of people's existence complying with the Father's will. Christ loves us just like the Father loves him and invites us to stay in his love. The will of the heavenly Father is for the entire world to be saved and to comprehend the knowledge of the truth. Evangelization is service which contributes to the fulfilment of the Father's will and thus is a direct expression of love in which the Church lives. Christ's relationship of love towards the world cannot be separated from the relationship of love towards the Father. This is why Christ sent us out into the world, just like his Father sent him to the world.

Dogmatic Foundations of the Orthodox Evangelization

The very fact of Christ's incarnation gives his followers the imperative of being in the world. With their evangelization they are enabling Christ to reach all people, fulfilling God's plan of salvation. By personal and life long witnessing of God's love towards people in the world, they declare their own Christian identity.

However, the identity of the Church – a community of Christians – does not emanate from their relationship with the world, just as any human activity does not

influence the Church in any way. The specific characteristic of the Church is its eschatological orientation, its direction towards the future event of Christ's second coming and the arrival of God's Kingdom. Christian activism as an historical activity of the Church, without the eschatological dimension, which roots from the ideas of Augustinian theology, does not represent Orthodox evangelization. This is why the eschatological orientation is crucial with regard to the Orthodox understanding of the Christian legation. The true accomplishment of God's plan should be viewed in the eschatological sense, in which evangelization differs from proselytism, while the Church differs from the historical mission of utopian influences on the world.

The synergy of God and mankind, which lies at the foundation of the Church's life and thus its evangelization too, should be understood reciprocally – in the fullness of the participation by both God and mankind. Legation of the Church is a deed of the Holy Spirit, of the liturgical fullness of its gifts, but that deed should be viewed in its widest, universal sense. Production or creation of God's Kingdom in the world is neither needed nor possible, but it is necessary to sacramentally point it out every day, by preaching Christ and testifying to his resurrection.

Anastasié Gianoulatos, one of the greatest experts and theologians of Orthodox missionary work, insists on understanding evangelization in the framework of liturgical eschatology. He notices that, in the XX Century, the interests of the entire Christian world were directed towards eschatological questions. However, the general shortcoming of many theories lay in historical abstractions, in not seeing the real life problems and real spiritual needs of mankind. This is why the Christianity of the XX Century did not manage to overcome the separation between the activity of missionary preaching and the theory of the eschatological understanding of history. In Gianoulatos's opinion, the Orthodox tradition gives the possibility for a living liturgical eschatology. That would be a functional eschatology, a dynamic reality that is created by the history of salvation in the life of the Church and which corresponds with the way of thinking of the theology of deification. In the present time, it can guarantee correct theological understanding of the Orthodox evangelization and its differentiation from proselytism.

The Issue of Evangelization Method

In Orthodox evangelization the method of its practice is crucially important. According to Orthodox Christian ethics, the good which is not done in a good way is not good. That means that it is not enough simply to know the truth. It is necessary for the truth to be witnessed through a correct approach and the correct attitude of mankind towards it.

The method of evangelization concerns the way of handing down mysteries of faith and life preached by Christ. He is as such inseparable from the truth itself. The root of the Greek word *method* lies in the notion of 'a way'. A way that leads towards the truth is adapting to it and gains true freedom from it. Unlike that, secular methods lead into intrusion and passive acceptance of the truth. They come from men's effort, independent from a relationship with God.

In the New Testament, Christ is described not only as the Truth and the Life, but also as the Way of truth and life. His entire life among people speaks about it, as well as his work, perfected by the blissful effect of the Holy Spirit. Christ is named as *the faithful witness* and his entire work bears witness to God. It is identical to the gospel, that is, revelation of the truth about the salvation of mankind. In its personal testimony about God the Father, Christ declares his identity as the Son of God.

The Apostles are Christ's witnesses before the people. According to the Holy Bible, they testified to Jesus' resurrection, and kept on doing so until the end – with

their lives and deaths. Their example shows that personal and lifelong testimony is the only method of serving in the Church.

In the history of the Church, the importance of witnessing by giving one's life is equal to witnessing by consciousness. Christian accomplishment was the main and starting method of the evangelization. It is first important to be and then to do, while human acts come from human beings. The advantage of ontology over deontology is accepted here, as well as the advantage of existential state over moral demands and the needs of action. Indication and testimony in Orthodox evangelization have advantages over discussion and proving.

In any case, evangelization as testimony about somebody's salvation in Christ represents a declaration of their Christian identity. By perfecting evangelization, Christians testify about something which is experienced and lived. Before all, they testify about love, since it was written that Christ's followers would recognize each other if they would carry Christ's love among them.

The initial, bigger evangelizations in the world were realized by the Church's liturgy. That means that testifying by the Church's being precedes preaching itself. That is announcement of the future Kingdom, but also of God's future Judgement. Evangelization is successful only if it comes from personal experience. This is why God appoints men as missionaries, since every man knows the weakness and strength of human nature. Evangelists can always show compassionate love towards people. Life's accomplishment and gratitude represent to God Christians' higher motives of working on personal salvation. They shine and are directly transmitted in their evangelization.

The innovations that Christianity brought into the classical heroism were humility, humbleness of mind and meekness as God's gifts. Christians testify about love and suffering towards enemies. Their evangelization is not challenging anybody who thinks or behaves differently. It is performed with the wisdom of serpents and the harmlessness of doves, in the gift of reasoning and differentiating spirits, with gentleness of words and the strength of reason.

The other side of evangelization is to be found in the creation of communal spirit. It is not enough to create mature personalities – it is necessary for them to be connected by love into the perfection of the God-human communion. Personality and communion are mutually preferred and conditioned. A free person is responsible for participation in the communion, whereas a stable communion is characterized by fully independent persons. The Church, as a communion of people in Christ, represents a declaration of the living picture of the Holy Trinity and the way of adaptation of men for God.

Relationship Between the Church and the World

Evangelization, which is performed by the Church, often proves to be a paradoxical task. It is necessary to preserve activities of testifying about Christ to the world and in that activity to create space for an active presence of the Church. On the other hand, in that constant contact with the world, it is equally important to resist the temptations of secularization. It happens that Christians, while testifying about Christ and standing behind God's name, really testify about themselves. Their faith is shaped ideologically, on the basis of an advance acceptance of secular values. Secularism, the heresy of our times, in fact represents idolatry */eidololatreia/* of Christians that disables real evangelization in the world. However, deviation and fear of secularization is threatening to block any missionary activity of the Church.

This negative perspective of the relationship between the Church and the world came from conflict between the Church and state on legal grounds, and it is a

characteristic of the western, Augustine tradition. By that, the indigenous eschatology of the Christian religion, which views the relationship between God and the world with respect to the reality of God's Kingdom, has been disturbed. The belief that the world is an autonomous being, limited by reason, knowledge and action took western Christianity into a non-Christian and non-eschatological dichotomy of the natural and the supernatural.

The Church dogmatically settled accounts with these mistakes in the time of the 'palamistic' disputes during the XIV Century. Unfortunately, later events in the history of eastern Christianity brought about a practical acceptance of the consequences of 'tomistic' theology. Today, one can write about romantic Orthodoxy, even about a formal Orthodox religiosity as unconscious justification of people's idolatry. It is shown that for the true existence of the Church in the world there has to be freedom, not only the external one (from the state structures and authorities), but also the internal one (from the spiritual slavery to their values).

Alexander Schmemman showed that the lost of the eschatological dimension is not only a problem for heterodox Christian traditions, based on Augustine's ideas. The Orthodox Church also turns to the ideal of perfection, as well as to the strengthening of the non-historical Christian conscience. Post-Byzantine life of the so-called Orthodox cultures in an unreal, imaginary and thus static world and civilization equally testifies about distortion of the authentic, early Christian eschatology. While the theory in the Orthodox Church stays the same, its practical application is changing. The same missionary impulse separated from the real sense and meaning of the Church, becomes a trigger for the secularization of contemporary Orthodoxy. Just like nobody needs sacral states and societies, secularized spiritualism loses its function and reason for existence.

Many confessions in the world base their evangelizations on the Christian love towards people. The question of origin, quality and reach of love that motivate them for evangelization should be posed. It seems that Biblical prophets, as well as the forefathers and teachers of early Christianity, did not stress personal love as the source of their missionary attempts. For them, the world was above all the object of the God's love, and their presence in the world was just an organic element of faith and active service to God. This prophetic approach to viewing the world with God's eyes represented the deepest and the most reliable basis for the love of mankind, built on coactions with God.

Only on that basis is it possible to bear the stress of confronting the reality of the world. Prophetic love towards the world should mean acceptance and introduction of that world to new life, through a new attitude towards God and the Church. The world has its own problems and goes through the drama of its own spiritual search, while posing open questions in its own language. The sacral history of salvation often describes strong attitudes of people in the world, resistance that also includes attacks on those who prophetically testify about Christ.

The world is a corporative Neighbour to Christians, consisting of living people, from whom it definitely differs; it is the Other in full sense of the word. The Orthodox Christians, inspired by prophetic spirit, fulfil Christ's new commandment of love by completely stepping into the world and representing it in prayers in front of God. That is the only way for them to fulfil their responsibility of testimony about Christ and his Gospel.

Just like the Church conquers temptations, secularized phenomena in the life of the Church will be faced with defeat and shame. Every historical defeat of Christianity was in fact a defeat of idolatrous Christian generations and groups. It can be written about ideologies of the so-called Christian world, which represent the

constant shadow of the church enlightenment. Generations of Christians, that are liable to secularization, react to the challenges of contemporary times by closing and escaping into their own imaginary worlds. They are neglecting the responsibility of legation by reducing faith to ideological positions and by entering conflicts with other ideologies in the world. By doing this, they create closed social groups from their church communions, in which righteous self-satisfaction, triumphal spirits and arrogance towards the world prevail.

In contrast, prophetic service of Orthodox Christians should prepare the Church's communion for the effort of love towards the world. The prophetic character of Church evangelization is reflected in wide ascetic acts that comprehend even those spiritual disposals as: fear of God, calmness and attention during meetings with all people in the world.

The Notion of Proselytism

Proselytism is a social phenomenon of conversion of people from one religion to another that has been forbidden by the state and condemned by society as a custom that opposes rights and freedoms of men as well as limiting the freedom of consciousness. Having in mind the missionary responsibility of Christians, the question of differentiation between the real Christian evangelization and proselytism is very important.

Proselytism starts when other means than the Gospel are being used for gaining followers. The goal of proselytism is unique: to bring new admirers into a specific religious community. The use of any means is allowed and justified by the goal itself. Such an approach is in opposition to the dignity of human personality and the Gospel.

The Orthodox notion of evangelisation does not only refer to the goal of testifying to the Gospel, but also to the corresponding means of Gospel which are inseparable from that goal. The Orthodox mission is testimony about Christ's legation, firstly in the method itself, which is typical for it. It consists of giving the fullness of the spiritual wealth we received and in leaving the others to freely decide if they will accept it or not. Conveying to the others the Gospel tradition in its purity and fullness, whilst remaining free from the desire to convert anybody, is the sign of true love and respect towards people. Giving one's own testimony does not mean imposing it on anyone's freedom, which is the basic condition for somebody's real unification and real participation in the life of church communion.

Differentiation between evangelization and proselytism can be reached by analysing man's internal mood, motives and goals. In the legal sense, proselytism is characterized by subjective elements of injustice, among which the most important are: fraud and gross negligence. Proselytism is usually reflected in transmitting personal ideas, opinions and experience, which are destructive. Christ in the Gospel accuses the Pharisees that they travel over land and sea to win one proselyte and when he is won they make him twice as much a son of hell as they are. The general motive of proselytism is: make the other what you are.

Contrary to this is the intention to help, to give strength and support to people. The Gospel represents support of the highest order, which presupposes freedom of personality and non-subjugation of others to oneself. Christ's refusal to use violent means, even when he was tempted by the fact that it would have been more efficacious, shows that the essence of life in accordance with the Gospel consists of free and responsible acceptance of his message.

Every person that was freely unified with the Church carries the responsibility for it. The person has to consider in his heart the way in which his appeal will be

taken and expressed. Ways in which one can take part in the service of testimony are different. Everybody is invited to find an appropriate way in which their personal gifts will bring them the biggest and the cleanest contribution to the great divine plan of evangelisation.

The question of culture is one of the basic ones in the missionary theology. When Gospel encounters culture, three things happen. In one part culture has to be accepted, for example, in respect to language as the most general means of personal and collective expression. The second part has to be rejected – the one which does not comply with the Gospel, for example a custom like vendetta or a tradition like different variations of discrimination. There is the third part which should also be transformed, should be given some other meaning. Important historical example of such an act is the encounter of the Gospel with Greek culture, but also baptising of the Slavic people.

Today's theology refers to the importance of careful study of religions in the world and underlines that it is not correct to talk about primitivism of the others. Only our knowledge can be primitive, not the system of life values of other people. It is necessary to accept the fact of our own ignorance and be more modest in our attitude towards others, unlike some previous epochs dictated. It is important to accept the expressions of human feelings and life and not to judge easily or literally about their non-Orthodoxy. It is not Orthodox to be unclear, dishonest, to be against the will of God, which can be found even among the nominally Orthodox and among pagans. Respect towards cultures and towards dignity of the others – that is the principal Orthodox attitude. Whenever we forget about it, the results of our attempts are very poor.

Christian love towards enemies does not mean that one should accept the ways of thinking and living of those who oppose us. Christians respect individuals; they do not respect all of their ideas and all individual details in connection with those individuals. When love is in question, it is the love towards people and not towards other religious systems.

The Orthodox Church is today facing the two biggest theological problems. The first is a complex question of how we view other churches, while the second concerns the understanding of other religions. Orthodox Christians accept the fact that God thinks about the whole world and that He is interested in the salvation of the entire world, as well as that, in this way, He is present in other religions too. However, they as humans cannot know what the exact mode of that presence is. Their responsibility is to pray for others and to give them their testimony, but they cannot take over from God the authority over the final judgement and judge exactly in the same way in which He himself would judge those who do not belong to their religion. Orthodox Christians do not perceive themselves as polymaths and God's loudspeakers. On the contrary, they are aware of the fact that they do not know the secret of God in its wholeness and that they do not know everything about His unlimited love.

It is necessary to develop an understanding of other religions from the Orthodox point of view. This question has to be discussed from a 'triadological', not only a 'Christological', perspective. In some protestant circles it happens that the problem is analysed only from 'Christological' perspective. However, Orthodox Christians believe that God's Testament has always been spread on all other people, on the whole substance. They understand that the Holy Spirit acts in freedom which neither they nor the rest of the people can understand with their minds. Their attempt is to take part in the realization of that plan by blessing, and not to take it over, cancel it, or alter it in accordance with their ideas.

The Criteria of Differentiation

The true evangelisation refers exclusively to God's plan of salvation in time and unification with God in the eschaton. It influences the fulfilment of this plan by way of God's providence in the specific deeds of men. The peak of revelation of God's will happened in Christ's embodiment and revelation of his Gospel. Since then, the participation of men in the plan of salvation of the world has not been coincidence or a matter of circumstances.

Christians take part in God's act of salvation not in an autonomous way, in accordance with their personal, individual projects and abilities, but as the communion of Church. The new way of existence in unity with God comprehends also the act of evangelisation. It does not give exclusively or automatically positive results, but it means initiative and creative efforts of the Orthodox Christians.

The initiative of evangelisation in the wider sense includes also those who behave as usurpers, miracle workers, and those who act individually, even passively. In any case, missionary effort means God's leadership and men's contribution to the acts of providence. In respect to the efficiency of evangelisation, the cause should be looked for in God, while from men comes the motive and more. The crucial importance of evangelisation is reflected through its contribution to salvation and through the preparation of all men for an encounter and confrontation with God.

The blessing of the Holy Spirit is the first and the most important strength that moves Christians into evangelisation. It presupposes united acts of God and men, but it is also necessary to analyse the motive of men's existence. Missionary attempts can include a majority of different motives, from the highest (from obedience in fulfilling commandments) to the lowest ones (exhibitionism, ambition and selfishness). The New Testament states, in *The Acts of The Apostles*, examples of parallel missions done because of arrogance, fanaticism, even envy, to which the apostle Paul reacts in a tolerant manner. He allows those who perform evangelisation well-intentionally to continue with their work, but without full legation, as well as those who are not consolidated in their way of testimony.

The apostle Paul, in two places in his epistles, makes a distinction between possible motives of evangelisation. In Philippians 1:15-18, he stresses the good will of missionaries as opposite to the selfish ambition, while in Corinthians 1, 9:16-17, he differentiates testimony done willingly from that which is done against one's will. A unique, true motive of evangelisation is love, which connects the good will and the internal need. Examples of love can be found with apostles in front of synderion, Archdeacon Stefan or Apostle Paul. That is the internal instinct, which means more than bare obedience and effort to realise the project.

There are different theoretical formulations of the goal of evangelisation. In practice, one can find different limitations: only cultural programme, only philanthropic work, or only sermon. The main goal of the Orthodox evangelisation is the continuation of Christ's acts of redemption, the fulfilment of God's plan, or the return to God in the final, eschatological sense. This goal includes both the spiritual and physical nature of people, with their surrounding. It refers to man in his time and place and it concerns his natural and social surroundings. The New Testament's examples of evangelisation show wholeness of the goal, which is not limited to specific needs, but it includes also the material and social realms of man's life. Historical facts about the first Church talk about joint management of property, mercy and the abolition of social divisions. Conscious of the primacy of the soul and mutual connection of spirit and body, Christians have never separated physical needs of people as a goal in itself.

Conclusion

The notion of evangelisation was established on the ethnical and dogmatic grounds of the Christian approach. The question of the method of evangelisation depends on the principle of relationships between the Church and the world, which are considered in the frame of the discipline of missionary theology. The criteria of differentiation between the true Christian evangelisation and proselytism should be analysed on the bases of the questions of meaning and importance of evangelisation, its authentic motives and goals. This differentiation can be positively established if men's knowledge and analysis can reach the internal world of men's personal ideas and motivations.

Bojan Aleksov

PERCEPTIONS OF RELIGIOUS CONVERSION IN THE FORMATION OF THE SERBIAN NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Change of religion is undoubtedly one of the most unsettling and destabilising events in a society. It threatens the cohesion of a community and reactions to it are universally defensive, because it necessitates a change of balance between members of different faith communities. In the context of centuries-long religious segregation and firm identification between ethnic and religious identities—as has been the case in the Balkans—religious conversions have evoked a long history of distrust and intolerance that has been the topic of numerous studies. My focus here is on conscious efforts, undertaken mostly from the nineteenth century on by Serbian scholars and writers, of adoption, employment, and deepening of inherited religious divisions through the representation of religious conversions that happened in the past. Within the context of the traditional understanding of religious identity and religious conversion, historically speaking the most important cases of conversion among Orthodox Serbs were Islamisation, and (to a much smaller extent) Union with the Catholic Church.

What follows are the conclusions of the research I undertook over several years and whose results were published elsewhere.¹ My principal source material in studying the genesis and the dynamic of the representation of religious conversions and the factors and forces that shaped it has been the works of scholars, writers and historians whose position is well established in Serbian society. They were, or are, university professors, academicians, textbook authors, ministers, and ambassadors – all of them the chief protagonists of cultural production and public opinion formation. My study also examined the recasting and the exploitation of certain aspects of these representations that took place in the years preceding and during the most recent wars in former Yugoslavia. The survival of the mythologized view of religious conversion is striking, as it seems to defy the growing distance from the time of the events they refer to, the seemingly insignificant role of religion in modern society, and the fact that many of them had already been successfully demystified. And in Serbia, there have been studies that have provided alternative, non-nationalist modes of explanation.

Searching for explanation for the appearance and persistence of distorted views of religious conversions I started by elucidating the role religion had in the formation of the Serbian national consciousness, and showing that religious intolerance is one of its main features. In the course of the nineteenth century the

¹ “Adamant and Treacherous: Serbian Historians on Religious Conversions” in Pal Kolsto, ed. *Historical Myths in South Eastern Europe* (London: Hurst & Co., 2004), pp. 160-184 and in Serbian “Poturica gori od Turčina: Srpski istoričari o verskim preobraćanjima” in *Historijski mitovi na Balkanu* (Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju Sarajevo, 2003), pp. 225-258; “‘The Union’ as a Seed of Dissension between Serbs and Croats” in Hans-Christian Maner and Norbert Spannenberger, hg. *Konfessionelle Identität und nationale Engagement. Die griechisch-katholischen Kirchen in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (forthcoming); “Die Interpretation des religiösen Bekenntniswechsels bei der Herausbildung des serbischen Nationalbewusstseins” in *Jahrbücher für Geschichte und Kultur Südosteuropas*, Bd. 4, pp. 39-67 and in Serbian “Videnje verskih preobraćenja u formiranju srpske nacionalne svesti” in: *Helsinki sveske*, Vol. 18, 2003, pp. 5-39.

entire region saw the birth of nationalism, which gradually became the primary, unifying, and normative factor in the formation of the collective identity. In the process, nationalism took on numerous religious attributes while religion as such was relegated to a subordinate role. Scholars of nationalism have demonstrated that national consciousness is shaped through certain phases; national traditions are created and transformed through ample use of inherited religious content, values, and symbols. Existing beliefs and knowledge took on new forms, and even more important, gained a new, comprehensive, and teleological function in the formation of the national state. Although religion was repressed through modernisation efforts, secularisation, and eventually the atheist campaigns of the twentieth century, the nationalism of the Serbs and their neighbours had by then already been built on the historical memory and models that stemmed from and exploited religious divisions and intolerance of the past.

One aspect of nationalism used to build barriers and excite antagonism between modern nations is in the creation of the myth about religious conversions. Folk myths and folk tales offer rich material for the study of religious conversions as momentous events in the world at the time when religious identity was still of primary importance. Notwithstanding the importance of oral culture, however, I concentrated on those persons who have contributed to the creation of the Serbian national consciousness in writing. In this I follow Hobsbawm's observation that what makes up the main body of knowledge and ideology in a nation, state, or movement is not what is preserved in popular memory, but rather what is selected, written down, visualized, and made popular by those whose task is to do this.

The first written accounts on conversions to Islam among the South Slavs date from the early 19th century and were written by educated Serbs in Austria—that is, in a Muslim-free milieu. They had encountered Muslims when they travelled to Serbia where they perceived Muslims within the context of the revived hatred towards Islam that prevailed in Europe in the era of Romanticism. Their views had a tremendous impact on the views of an entire generation of Serbian writers and historians, most notably the celebrated poet Petar Petrović Njegoš and the Nobel-prize winning novelist Ivo Andrić. Njegoš's epic *Gorski vijenac* [The Mountain Wreath] created a national myth about the massacre of converts. Over time, the alleged but historically not recorded massacre of Islamised Serbs became solidly embedded in popular memory, since its artistic power and lively spirit make both readers and scholars experience the depicted event as reality.

Njegoš wrote his epic at a time when the liberation of the Serbs from their conquerors was glorified in the national-romantic interpretation as the peak of their historical path. His poetry however, was taught as an ideal; no distinction was made between the universal validity of his artistic achievement and the historically conditional, and political aspects of his epic. Other Serbian romantic poets also contributed to the Serbian view of Turks as *Erbfeind*, and exacerbated popular resentment, which, according to one of their contemporaries, transformed popular spite towards the Muslims into 'a principled hatred'. Their writings made a tremendous impact on the popular consciousness, and were literally canonised, as it were, when used as themes on church fresco painting. School primers and other textbooks offer explicit examples of how the works of Njegoš and Andrić, along with the folk epic sources they built upon, have been exploited by the nationalist propaganda.

Andrić's views on Islamisation stemmed from a theory that suggested that Bosnian Muslims were descendant of the medieval Bogomils. This thesis originated in the efforts of Austro-Hungarian historians to legitimise the existence of a separate Bosnian nation. By splitting the population in this way they hoped to blunt the edge

of Serbian and Croat aspirations to Bosnia and Herzegovina and make easier its occupation by the Hapsburg monarchy after 1878. Serbian and Croat historians in their turn accepted the thesis, not wanting to recognise that their fellow nationals had converted to Islam, or preferring to attribute the conversions to so-called Bosnian Bogomils, who, despite their Slavic descent, yielded to the new faith as incomplete and immature members of the community, church, and nation.

The first local attempts of to give a scholarly aura to commonly held views on conversions are those of Jovan Cvijić. Though a geographer by education his works included ethnographic observations of the Balkan people, which tremendously influenced the works of later historians and ethnologists. Cvijić was mostly interested in the impact of conversion on the formation of identity, and claimed that conversions intensified religious feelings and jealousy. Cvijić believed that conversion increased aggressiveness in what he called the Dinaric type of man, prevalent among South Slavs. Though without any scientific evidence, the thesis of the destructive conduct of converts, notably in the shape of feelings of shame, rooted in popular myth, and gained popularity through literature, science, and historiography.

Cvijić and his disciples were the first to conduct field research and try to support their claims with material they collected. Their research, however, was undertaken in the typical manner of mapping the nation. They focused on Kosovo and Macedonia, the only areas where in the beginning of the twentieth century Serbian expansion was possible. The Muslim population was very large in these areas, and their origin had to be explained in a way that justified Serbian claims to the land—hence the abundance in these works of mythologized interpretations on Islamisation. The information used was for the most part collected from local Christians or from older Serbian and other Christian sources. Despite the one-sided nature of the information in these works, they include numerous quotations, and thus convey a scholarly impression. Providing many examples and especially figures, the authors attempt to tilt the scale of evidence enough to justify their preconceived judgment and persuade their readers. Folk sayings and songs and verses from Njegoš's epic are incorporated into the narrative as illustrations with no real differentiation between 'real' and 'imaginary' facts.

Discursive strategies to delineate the national space depended on such notions as 'religious syncretism' and 'crypto-Christianity' to prove the Serbian origin and 'real nature' of the 'converts' to and members of other faiths. Shrines, festivals, and practices that were common to all faiths were cited as crucial proof of the real religion of those observed. In fact most of these practices simply testified to the richness of popular culture in the premodern world. But instead of seeking to uncover the multiple identities of those who converted long ago, the scholars sought to determine how genuine the conversions were; then, believing that conversion is untenable and alien, reconvert them. With the preconceived notion that their ancestors could not possibly convert, abandoning the identity that was so dear to them, the Serbian scholars furnished numerous proofs that the conversions had been temporary, partial, or tendentious. These works also frequently dated the 'conversions' to very recent times, just before the time of the observation, which implied the possibility of bringing the converts back into the fold.

The works of these historians and ethnographers, while scholarly obsolete and politically biased in their aim to justify Serbian expansionism, have nevertheless been revived almost a century later, and many of them went to a second edition in the 1990s. Serbian historians who praised them and advocated their reprinting in the 1990s treated them as if they were almost primary sources because of their archaic style and alleged proximity to events they described.

The generation of Cvijić's disciples in the interwar period also introduced an entirely new study, *characterology*. In the context of this paper, characterology is the analysis of new character traits shared by converts in addition to the ingrained notions of cowardliness and hatred of former conationals. All the good traits of Muslims were ascribed to the 'Serbian basis' of their character, whereas the negative ones were Non-Slavic, developed under the influence of Islam. These included vanity, wastefulness, lasciviousness, sensuality, rooted mysticism, and fatalism. This description is strikingly reminiscent of the models and images created much earlier in the West in the ideological construction which Said called *orientalism*.

In interwar Serbian historiography a division arose between those who accepted 'the Bogomil theory' and those who maintained that the Bogomils were in fact Orthodox Serbs. The assumption that prevailed however, was that Orthodox Serbs had a continual, uninterrupted religious adherence to their church and could not have committed apostasy and that only Bogomils were Islamised. Belief in and advocacy of solid and unbreakable ties between Serbhood and Orthodoxy and their mutual common interests became particularly manifest as the interethnic and interreligious tensions in the country rose and the mythologized version of Islamisation found new uses. Since the end of the eighteenth century a significant segment of the intelligentsia had been militantly secular, and a conflict between the church and the intelligentsia was increasingly perceived as destructive both for the church and the nation. Under these circumstances, the myth of dissension through conversion gained increasing relevance and was used to illustrate both modern atheism and antinationalism. This attitude was revived half a century later, when the ethnic tensions of the 1980s threatened the existence of another Yugoslavia, this time in a socialist guise, and in this new incarnation it continues to hold sway.

Almost none of the works dealing with Islamisation in Serbian historiography use Ottoman sources (because of the language barrier). Islamisation is seen as both the cause of and a synonym for the Albanization of Kosovo and Metohija. More effort is invested in the refutation of the Bogomil theory and the myths of the origins of the present-day Bošnjaks than in any research aimed at explaining the delicacy of the numerous layers of the process of Islamisation. The dominant characterisation of the conduct of the Serbian clergy as 'patriotic' conflicts with the not-so-positive picture painted by foreign historians. In the same vein, forced 're-conversion' of Muslims from the nineteenth century on are wholly disregarded. Foreign interpretations, which perceive the process of Islamisation in Bosnia and in the Balkans in a broader perspective, are disregarded. Comparison with other regions where substantial Islamisation has occurred is lacking. Overlooking all these factors Serbian historiography still relies on mythologized notions of blood tribute (*devshirme*) and coercion as major tools of Islamisation. Though they rest on the thesis of the forced nature of conversions, no study explains what is meant by 'coercion' and what effect it may have after several generations (not to say centuries). There are no studies that deal comprehensively with the issue of the Turkish legacy in Serbia and the age-old interaction between the Islamised and other Muslim peoples, although we know that this enormous religious and cultural exchange contributed to the formation of a specific Muslim identity in the Balkans.

In my reading, the persistence of two mythologized causes for conversion in Serbian historiography stems from a methodology, which depicts all phenomena, including religious conversions, as linked to the national past. In a teleological way, within the context of the ongoing struggle for survival and resistance, occupation and religious conversion are collapsed into one act. The past is viewed in light of the division into occupiers and subjugated and the nation is seen as the principal pro-

tagonist of historical developments. History is viewed from the perspective of the Christian symbolism of suffering and sacrifice, and translated into a story of unique martyrdom, popular resistance, and the heroism of Serbian leaders. The nationalist discourse that dominates Serbian history writing has tended to deny the kind of historical change of which religious conversion is a perfect example, or they have insisted on the ultimate irrelevance of these changes. The typical antihistorical feature of the religious discourse was enriched with an empiricist 'scientific' search for 'facts' by historians and ethnologists. Insisting that they were detailing 'hard facts', these narratives were, in the manner of myths, arranged with the logic of the imaginary—namely ideological purposes and imperatives. Furthermore, the secular background of most writers prompted them to see conversion exclusively as a change of identification without any regard for the subjective beliefs of the people themselves. In this way they reduced religion to a mode of social and political organization.

Symptomatically, the Serbian historiographic production on the religious conversions gained ground as an integral part of the nationalist campaign prior to the outbreak of World War II and on the eve of the recent wars. The nationalist campaign not only intensified old prejudices and stereotypes about conversions, but also produced new ones. A veritable flood of press articles spreading hatred depicted Muslims as an imminent danger. The revived anti-Muslim position shares many of the notions of contemporary orientalism, such as an emphasis on the alleged foreign, Asian, or African descent of the Bosnian Muslims, their alleged racial characteristics, and, notably, their oriental sensuality, weak character, and fickleness. The dominant allusion is to a great threat posed, in the shape of Radical Islam, to European civilisation as embodied by Serbs, and great emphasis is placed on connections between Bosnian Muslims and Libya and Iraq.

To conclude this overview, let me situate the dominant views on religious conversions in the Serbian context within the so-called clusters of national myths, elucidated as playing important roles in defining a national discourse. By de-emphasising or explicitly denying any cultural or other common trait with a convert they give a perfect example of a *sui generis* myth. However, in a different interpretation of conversion, it is suggested that the act of conversion does not constitute a major change at all, and all those who converted are essentially Serbian, albeit with no say. Equally suitable is the *antemurale* myth, one of the most influential among Serbian myths, the one of redemption and suffering evident in the much-researched Kosovo myth. Islamisation is evidence of the sorrowful history and also a justification for the special rights and mission of unconverted Serbs, and these rights have been invoked several times over the last two centuries. In brief, the Serbs have allegedly suffered for centuries from an aggressive conversion campaign; the world should recognise this and acknowledge their present moral and cultural superiority as well as their right to expansion. Finally, mythologized perceptions of the religious conversions are an important part of the myths of ethnogenesis and antiquity as well as myths of kinship and shared descent. Depending on the interpretation or the political project behind them, different views on religious conversion are called up to prove the right to a contested territory, as in the case of the Albanians, or to deny exclusive nationhood or rights to the Bošnjaks or the Croats for that matter—since they are nothing but converted Serbs.

Furthermore, the dominant narrative about religious conversions in the Serbian case has acquired the significance of a paradigm, building a framework of reference that has been used for all kinds of dissension and opposition to the 'national imperative'. It was also essential in the construction of stereotypes of the converts' character, and these stereotypes were later extended to include entire 'converted' nations. Stereotypes and myths about religious conversions were in the Serbian case crucial in constructing the image of neighbouring peoples as renegades, dissidents, and cowards, with all the detrimental consequences that followed.

Bogdan Đurović

**CANONIC DISPUTES OR CLERICAL-POLITICAL
PROSELYTISM: RELATIONS BETWEEN SERBIAN,
MACEDONIAN AND MONTENEGRIN
ORTHODOX CHURCHES**

The very title offered points to the author's attempt that this discussion be guided by real-sociological facts, rather than led in the domain of clerical or political aspirations. Naturally, this does not deny the fact that there is a significant influence of those domains on the progression and outcome of such conflicts. If we should agree with Ernst Benz, a major Orthodoxy researcher, that two out of four most serious weaknesses of Orthodoxy are phyletism (nationalism) and a tendency to create a state church, the conflicts between the Serbian Orthodox Church on one hand, and the Macedonian and Montenegrin Orthodox Churches on the other, will become much clearer.

In the history of Orthodoxy national-clerical consciousness has always been pronounced. Whenever there were (are) favourable preconditions, this kind of reasoning would set up obstacles, vouching against the ecumenic communion of all Christian churches.¹ Even within Orthodoxy, national consciousness has always been stronger than its Orthodox-ecumenic counterpart. This enclosure and overt emphasis put on national and clerical often causes misunderstanding and conflicts. Therefore, so far in history, Orthodox churches have not been up to their Christian task in times of interethnic and interstate conflicts, even in the cases where clashes involved Orthodox peoples (i.e. states). A very pronounced tendency to equate the ethnic and the confessional has served as an identifier of being different, whenever other identity-related differences (language, origin, culture, and, up to a point, history) did not exist. "Among the most serious guilts of this Orthodox national scatteration is the fact that, for instance, in the national rows of Balkanite peoples the Orthodox church has rarely shown itself to be a source of unity and binding, which would be strong enough to prevent the many instances of attempts to solve conflicts in blood."²

From the historical perspective, Orthodox churches have played a major role in the national liberation movements, in the creation or renewal of states. However, they have used these merits very craftily, attempting to directly interfere with state affairs, even after such processes had been completed. Naturally, one needs to point out that there is no unanimous opinion among Orthodox theologians on the church/state relationship. The more influential and numerous among them support the "balance theory" – that of "harmony", "symphony" between the church and the state. What one may conclude based on historical facts related to the Eastern Church is that such attempts have resulted in imbalance, at the expense of the church. In other words, in such cases, instead of "harmony" we always witnessed Caesaropapism. Moreover, for this discussion of quite some importance is the "ideologi-

¹ Some dignitaries of the Serbian Orthodox Church have been trying to reduce this gap lately. However, the majority still opposes the tendency. (The statement of Archbishop of Bačka Irinej Bulović on relations with the Roman Catholic Church).

² Ernst Benz, *Ibid*, p. 191.

cal” shout: one people, one church, one state. Proponents of this thesis, theologians and laymen alike, are in effect narrowing down not only overall Christian, but also ecumenic Orthodox domain, and are thus, consciously or not, pushing Orthodoxy into becoming a national religion (akin to Judaism). A lesser number of Orthodox scholars, allowing for the values of modern times – church/state separation, parliamentarism, respect of human rights, etc. – believe that, precisely due to negative outcomes mentioned, the church should have absolute autonomy from the state, and the other way round. Naturally, by this they do not deny the church the right to participate in public life – in effect, they want from the church to participate in public matters in the same way as other *public institutions* do.³

Relations Between the Serbian and the Macedonian Orthodox Churches

Up until the acknowledgement of Macedonia in 1991, the Serbian Orthodox Church had denied autocephaly to the Macedonian Orthodox Church, declared in 1967, mostly by the statehood argument – if there is no separate country, there is no autocephalous, autonomous church. This thesis was always followed by the canonic argument, applicable today as well – the Macedonian Church did not follow the procedure for becoming autocephalous, i.e. it did not ask for permission of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other sister churches, which makes this church schismatic and heretic. The latent background of these arguments has always been state-nationalistic, based on the historical period in which Macedonia used to be Southern Serbia,⁴ although this argument has never been publicly appealed to by the Serbian Church officials. Especially prominent in attacks coming from the Serbian side is the ideological disqualification of the adversary – the demand for independence of the Macedonian Church originally came upon an order of the Yugoslav communist regime, i.e. Josip Broz.⁵ On the other hand, some involvement of Serbian Church's diplomacy cannot be overlooked here. Actually, in the statements of the Serbian Orthodox Church it is often pointed out the Serbian Church has never *a priori* rejected the prospect of *possible* autocephaly of Ohrid Archbishopric, but first the canonic irregularity of 1967 needs to be rectified. However, when clashes become more acute – as it happened early this year (2004) after the arrest of metropolitan Jovan, the language of diplomacy gives way to anathematization and insults. On that line, the “so-called” Macedonian Orthodox Church ordered the arrest of the metropolitan, and thus sacrificed the entire Macedonian people and state for the sake of seven spiritual invalids sitting in the schismatic synod of the Macedonian Orthodox

³ “We know of two attempts, one of them in the West that ended tragically, that the state be turned into a church. In the East things seem reversed – there has been a tendency to turn the church itself into a state. This ideal of the church/state relations, their symphony, has, I think, been a theoretic construct, perhaps an idealistic image of the relationship between the church and the state, or their symphony, which has rarely or never functioned in practice.” Radovan Bigović, “Democracy and Orthodoxy”, In: Church, State, and Civil Society, Centre for Democracy, Belgrade, 2000, pp. 42.

⁴ One should recall numerous cries from the speaker's platform of the Serbian Parliament in early nineties, vouching for the annexation of South Serbia to the fatherland. Luckily for Macedonians and Macedonia, Milošević's war machinery was at the time busy in the western and central territories of the former socialist Yugoslavia.

⁵ “Since October 1958 – when the gathering of people and church took place in Ohrid, where it was decided that 'the old Macedonian-Ohrid Archbishopric should be renewed', such that its borders match the borders of the Republic of Macedonia, all the way to the decoration given by Josip Broz Tito to the metropolitan Dositej who, having breached the canons of the Orthodox Church and the archbishopric vow, declared unilateral and full independence of the church in this Yugoslav republic in 1967 – politics has been the instigator of clashes, rather than reconciliation.” Statement of the Information Department of the Serbian Orthodox Church of 16 January 2003, <http://www.spc.org.yu>

Church.⁶ In addition, the Serbian Church, fully forgetting that it will need to have good relations with the state of Macedonia in the future, compares the political climate in Macedonia with Stalinism and Hitlerism.⁷ On top of all that, the attack on Macedonian authorities is equated with the persecution of Christians in the first centuries of Christianity which, indirectly, leads one to conclude that only believers of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Macedonia are Christians. According to the 1994 census, Serbs amount to 2% of the total population in Macedonia (Macedonians 67%, Albanians 23%). As the Macedonian Orthodox Church has in the last decades participated in strengthening the indigenous Macedonian identity, it is realistic to assume that most of these people identify themselves as members of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. Hence the question, what interest does the Serbian Orthodox Church have to further intensify the conflict?

The canonic rift could relatively quickly be solved by calling a synod with the participation of both sides, which would make the autocephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox Church official. In that case, everything depends on the good will of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The problem is most likely in the structure of the Serbian Church's hierarchy, which conservatively sticks to the rights it used to have in Macedonia ("South Serbia") and which does not acknowledge (or at least doubt there is) the Macedonian people and language, thus failing to face the reality of the significantly different geostrategic and state-political situation in the Balkans today. The present hierarchy of the Serbian Orthodox Church fails or refuses to see today that it is indeed attempting to postpone that which cannot be postponed – the acknowledgement of the autocephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, upon mediation of Russian and Ecumenic Patriarchies. Such a development will of course be additionally boosted by political pressures of the international community, and also of political and intellectual elite in Serbia. Naturally, further delay is possible if right-wing options win power in Serbia. Such an option would continue this decade long practice of questioning Macedonian independence, which is by the way the common practice with Greek and Bulgarian states and churches alike.

Naturally, the arguments of ethnophyletism and state-political discourse are present on the Macedonian side, too. Historical arguments are, however, well grounded – the Ohrid Archbishopric had been autocephalous for centuries, and, like its Peć counterpart, this was annulled by the sultan in 18th century. After church and people's synods in 1950's, it was again declared autocephalous in 1967 (under the name Macedonian Orthodox Church). One people, one state, one church is in this case also a major argument, which cannot be much questioned. If weaknesses of Orthodoxy are present in all Orthodox churches, why should one deny the Macedonian Church such weaknesses? The positions of Macedonian bishops are on this matter very clear. Russians, Bulgarians, Romanians, and Serbs are peoples, they have their own states, and also autocephalous churches. In most cases, autocephaly has not been automatically accepted – decades were needed to accept the new condition by sister churches and the Ecumenic Patriarchy (Greece, Bulgaria, Romania). Thus, Macedonians are ready for patience. Macedonian bishops, and the World Macedonian Congress, remind us that the Serbian Orthodox Church (led by Patriarch Ger-

⁶ "We know that the common folk puts aside even the last denar [Macedonian currency] of their laborer's salaries in the temples, which are then turned into the private business enterprise of the schismatic Macedonian bishopric. They use the funds to be driven in expensive cars, to live in a grand style, and to dispel diaspora, thus demonstrating genuine anti-Macedonianism." Statement of the Orthodox Ohrid Archbishopric of 14 January 2004, <http://www.spc.org.yu>

⁷ "Since the times of Stalin, Hitler, and Khrushchev, and in our area since early Titoism, nothing of this kind has ever occurred in Europe." Statement of the Information Department of the Serbian Orthodox Church of 21 February 2004, <http://www.spc.org.yu>

man) reached a decision in 1959 which acknowledges the independence of the Ohrid Archbishopric in the image of the Macedonian Orthodox Church.⁸ However, clashes would not have heated up so much had the Serbian Orthodox Church not taken drastic steps, which in turn caused drastic and hasty reaction. As it happened, the Serbian Orthodox Church reinstated the autonomous Ohrid Archbishopric (within the Serbian Church) and ordained three Macedonian bishops, indirectly showing that in Macedonia there is only one church – Serbian Orthodox, which the Serbian Church explicitly asserted in the statements to follow. The ideological argument was renewed – that of the Macedonian Church being a communist product, thus schismatic and heretic. In addition, it was added that the clergy and believers found themselves in the schismatic position too, pressured by the state authorities. The Macedonian Church replied to this attack by forbidding the service to the bishops of the Serbian Church in all churches and monasteries in Macedonia. It also forbade Serbian priests to cross the Macedonian border in mantles. However, upon the arrest of metropolitan Jovan and his conviction on grounds of spreading interethnic and religious intolerance, Macedonian authorities seem to have crossed the line of good taste and neglected the principle of church/state separation. This hasty and inappropriate reaction was most likely a consequence of the fragile ground on which the Macedonian state, church, and ethnic identity are standing. Such a reaction can perhaps be understood, but not justified. It is obvious that Macedonian authorities have the Macedonian Orthodox Church as a loyal assistant – one that helps build state sovereignty, strengthen the Macedonian identity, and vice versa.⁹ However, such instances of blending the secular and the clerical often result in pressures, even outright blackmail, which is beneficial to neither side. Still, stubbornness, lack of wisdom, intolerance, and hasty moves on both sides, Serbian in particular, can lead to the expansion of these clashes to interstate and interethnic conflicts which, one would agree, is in neither side's interest.

Relations Between the Serbian and Montenegrin Orthodox Churches

These relations are much more complex than the ones with the Macedonian Church. Apart from canonic, state-political, and historical – culturological and national relations are involved here. Historical and canonic arguments seem to be undeniable (so that even some Serbian theologians used to acknowledge them). Formal autocephaly (although without thomos) was allowed to the Montenegrin Orthodox Church in 18th and 19th centuries. It was accepted as independent by most churches, including the Russian Church, Ecumenic Patriarchy, and the Serbian Orthodox Church. Contrary to canons, by a royal decree, regent Aleksandar cancelled this autocephaly in 1920, and attached the Montenegrin Church to the Serbian Patriarchy. Decades after this, in early nineties, there was formed a Committee for the restoration of the autocephaly of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church, an act formally conducted in 1993. Hence the question – why would the Montenegrin Church re-

⁸ “Upon the authority of Tomosot III, and the decision of the Archbishopric Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church of 1959, upon the acknowledgement of the independence (autocephaly) of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, in July the same year, a delegation of the Serbian Orthodox Church, led by Patriarch Mr. German, paid a visit to the Macedonian Orthodox Church”. The reply of the president of World Macedonian Congress (Todor Petrov) to Metropolitan Jovan, 30 June 2002, <http://www.makedonija>

⁹ “In the Constitution of Macedonia, the Macedonian Orthodox Church was equated with other churches based on the Ohrid Accord, signed after the war of 2001. The leadership of the Macedonian Church took this bitterly. The head of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, Archbishop Stefan even threatened to curse (anathematize) members of parliament voting for such a constitutional amendment.” Dragan Nikolić, “Fear of Dangerous Scenarios”, *Danas Daily*, 17-18 January 2004.

quest autocephaly, since it had never been formally cancelled? The second problem stems from the state and legal position of Montenegro. As pointed out above, a major argument for the independence of the church is the existence of a separate nation and state. No historians deny that the Montenegrin state had existed by the moment of its accession to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. However, at that time and today, disputes have been conducted on whether Montenegrins are a separate people or “Serbs of the highlands”. Therefore the argument of the Serbian Orthodox Church and a large portion of the Serbian intellectual and political elite is that calls for a separate state and in particular a separate church are pointless. In this discussion, one should not forget that Montenegrins themselves are divided on the issue. Attacks on the Montenegrin Orthodox Church are sometimes stronger by the Serbo-Montenegrins than by the Serbian Orthodox Church. Not rarely does one hear that “the Montenegrin Orthodox Church is a police-, party-led, tribal interest group, a sect made up of communists and atheists.”¹⁰ In this situation, the indicator of vouching for the Montenegrin Church's autocephaly is the position of Montenegrins on their own independent state. It is reasonable to suppose that those in favour of independent Montenegro will also vote for an independent Montenegrin Church. A particular problem is the attitude to language – does the service in the same language mean the same church? This argument, coming from the proponents of the church/state unity is indeed a false argument. Still, it is often given importance. Apart from the well-known cry “one people, one state, one church”, another shout comes to the scene here – “one language”. Indirectly, this leads to nationalistic and fastidious interpretations of confessional and ethnic structures – all Serbs are Orthodox, all Boshniaks are Muslims, all Croats are Catholics... So far, the position of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church has been very unfavourable,¹¹ which has been supported by the rather undefined attitude of the Montenegrin political establishment. For reasons of daily pragmatic politics, and the sharp division between Montenegrin population in terms of independence and separate Montenegrin ethnic identity, most often the option of the Serbian Orthodox Church is favoured.¹² One should expect that a stronger support to the concept of Montenegrin Church autocephaly will be seen when the elite unequivocally vouching for independence starts dominating in Montenegro. Therefore, for the time being, the resolution of this conflict and the improvement of the position of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church are not likely, since in Montenegro there is a strong pro-Serbian aggregation of three elites: political, intellectual, and clerical. However, as always, time will show that igniting conflicts, creating rifts and intolerance, and taking up quasi-imperial enterprises always returns as boomerang to the inspirers of such acts.

¹⁰ Statement of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church, Cetinje, 23 August 2000. <http://www.montenet.org>

¹¹ “Priests of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church do most of their service in the open, since the Serbian Church refuses to give them back the temples it had once annexed. (Since 1920, 650 churches, monasteries, and estates have been taken from the Montenegrin Orthodox Church – rem. B. Đ.). The state financially aids Serbian and Catholic Churches and the Islamic community, but not the Montenegrin Church.” Veseljko Koprivica, “Under the Sign of Dualism”, AIM Podgorica, <http://www.aimpress>

¹² “Although they are legally Ministers of all confessions, Ministers of Faith in the Montenegrin Government have never acknowledged the Montenegrin Church. Even the coordinator for issues of faith, and also Prime Minister, Vujanović, publicly states that for him the Serbian Orthodox Church is the only canonic church in Montenegro.” *Ibid*, <http://www.aimpress>

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Mirko Vid Mlakar

REMARKS ABOUT CATHOLICS OF THE BYZANTINE RITE

Getting along in a “labyrinth of church services in the East and West” (H. A. J. Wegman) can make it easier for us to present schematically the liturgical families, namely: the Syrian-Antiochian, the Maronite, the Byzantine and the Armenian rites all belong to the West Syrian type of the *Antiochian group* that also comprises the East Syrian type (the Nestorian, the Chaldean and the Malabarite rites) while the *Alexandrine group* includes, in addition to the Coptic and the Ethiopian rites, the following Western liturgies: Roman, Ambrosian, Mozarabic or West Gothic, Gaelic and Celtic (A. Adam, *Introduction to Catholic Liturgy*, 35). Already the names themselves of the groups in the above presented scheme give some indication about the influence of the great church seats in the first years of Christianity, namely, in Antioch as the capital of the province of Syria the liturgy came into being that is also known as the Jacob’s one while in the Alexandrine Patriarchate we first find the so-called Mark’s liturgy. The most widely spread is the Byzantine liturgy due to the fact that the Byzantine (Constantinople) Patriarch, because of his connections with the imperial court, achieved primacy among the patriarchs in the East, in the cradle of Christianity.

The Catholic Church is not only Roman Catholic as it is often referred to. The fact is that Rome is the seat of the Catholic Pope but the rite is not only Roman. “The liturgical legacies or rites that are now being used in the Church are: the Latin rites (primarily the Roman ones but also the rites of some local Churches such as Ambrosian or some monastic orders) and the Byzantine rites as well as the Alexandrine or Coptic, the Syrian, the Armenian, the Maronite and the Chaldean (*Catechism*, 321). Further on, in Paragraph 1203 of the Catechism, the expression *Sacro-sanctum concilium* is quoted (namely, the expression that the Constitution on the Holy Liturgy, 1963, starts with as the accepted decree of the Second Vatican Council): “The Holy Council, faithfully following the legacy states: the Holy Mother Church considers as equal and equally honorable all the legally acknowledged rites and it thus wishes to go on preserving them and cherishing them in every possible way.” The Council does not only speak about liturgies but it takes the rites in the full-fledged sense as church communities with their spiritual heritage from institutions to art (Lacko in: Perić R., Lacko M., *Decree on...*, 232). According to the mentioned and other documents the rites are equal, only the Latin one is already *more equal* due to its being so widely spread. Namely, the members of all the Eastern Catholic communities make up only slightly more than one percent of all the Catholics.

Under the State Patronage

No Eastern rite or Church is entirely Catholic; all of them are partial so that they exist *side by side* like, for instance, the two Monophysite¹ churches, the Coptic and the Ethiopian Churches in addition to the minorities with the same liturgy and

¹ Monophysites teach that there is only divine *physis* in Christ, that is, they reject the teaching maintaining the existence of two distinct natures in Christ, namely, divine and human, as pronounced in 451 by the Council in Chalcedon.

the same language but united with the Holy Seat. Of all the members of the Byzantine rite the largest majority is Orthodox (in 18 autocephalous and autonomous churches) although it also includes “catholicized” believers, from Arabian to Slavic Greek Catholics.

In the late seventies the number of the members of the free Eastern Catholic Churches was 7,540,000; to this number we should add those who remained loyal to Rome in those Eastern European countries in which the Catholics of the Byzantine rites were officially non-existent. Before the socialist abolition there were 5,650,000 of them, including 3,590,000 Ukrainians (Lacko M, *Decree on...*, 235-236).

The unions were, as a rule, set up by means of civil authorities. It is misleading to regard states only as confessional (Catholic) while overlooking *ragion di stato* as well. More concretely, Austria, though Vatican protector, has been deviating, for quite a long time, from the Uniate politics for military reasons (it needs Orthodox as frontiersmen); yet, on the other hand, it forbids the building of Orthodox temples. Besides, after the migration led by Arsenije III Čarnojević (1690) that almost wiped off the union in Croatia, and while the Serbian metropolitans actually had the same status as in the Ottoman Empire (*millet-bashi*), that is, they were the leaders of a very specific religious-peoples’ state within the state, the former “Union subjected, however, Orthodox prelates to Catholic ones and the church dependence was accompanied with feudal one as well. That is why the Orthodox resistance against the Union also included the fight for preserving its independent position” (J. Turčinović, *Misionar Podunavlja*, 173) that also had its economic aspect.

Under the state patronage in Ukraine (in 1946) and in Romania (in 1948) the Byzantine Slavic rite communities were “re-united” with Orthodoxy.² After the democratic changes, however, one religious community regards the churches it did not build as its own since it has been having liturgies in them for 40 years while the descendents of those who built these churches gather for a mass in the city park. Of 1,560,000 Romanian Greek Catholics, thousands of them refused to “return” to Orthodoxy that their grandfathers repudiated as early as the seventeenth century and ended up in prison. In this way the Church was adjoined to the Orthodox one by decree, it survived in the catacombs thanks to the bishops who were ordained in secrecy after the “public” bishops (and soon Roman Catholic as well) had been arrested and later on died in prison or house imprisonment. With the collapse of socialism “350 priests prayed for admittance into the Ukraine Catholic Church of the Eastern rite, namely, those who up to that time served in the Russian Orthodox Church” (*Družina*, Ljubljana, February 12, 1990) that “stripped of rank Bishop of Žitomir and Ovruc, Jovan (Bondarčuk) who declared himself as a member of the illegal Uniate Church” (*Pravoslavlje*, Belgrade, December 1, 1989). The other side of the revival *medal* implies enforced appropriation of the churches and on these occasions there were dead as well (*NIN*, Belgrade, October 19, 1990).

Identity Conflicts at the Borders

In his sermon in the Cathedral of Križevac, on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of its renewal and dedication, Bishop Slavomir Mikloš described the Greek Catholic community as “living remains of the former great unity that in the course of the entire first Christian millenium gathered together Christians of various

² The initiator of the Lavov Council at which the Brest Litovsk Union (1596) was broken under the patronage of the Poles who took over Ukraine and Belorussia was Gavriilo (Gabriel) Kostelnik, a Greek Catholic from Vojvodina who converted to Orthodoxy. He was killed in 1948: according to the statement made by the former Russian Patriarch the murderer was sent by the Pope while the other side claimed that the KGB thus eliminated the key witness of the machinations at the pseudo-Council at Lavov.

rites and customs into a religious and church-administration unity, in the community of love presided over by Peter's descendent," that is, the Pope. Moreover, "the meaning of this bishopric and of this Cathedral is to testify that the breach is not a solution, that it is possible to live in the ecclesiastical unity in the full-fledged diversity of rites and other idiosyncratic traditions." Thus, "the bishopric of Križevac, by its own existence, permanently convinces the Orthodox world that the acceptance of unity with Rome does not imply its having to renounce its rites, its canon law,³ its spirituality, its theology, namely, all that it can preserve in the Roman unity. At the same time, this bishopric with this cathedral has always had to and still has to keep on persuading the Catholics of the Roman rite that it is really possible to be, in a unity with them, a genuine and rightful Catholic in the unity of faith and in relation with the Pope, while celebrating the Missal differently, making a cross differently, differently expressing one's ecclesiastically" (*Glas Koncila*, Zagreb, July 6, 1997).

Yet, the Orthodox believers are just stressing their tough resistance to "catholicizing" as an issue where politics gets intertwined with theological problems such as the one about the Pope's primacy or the debate about who is the one that preserves the purity of the Christian faith.⁴ For instance, in the late of 1989, that is, the year of Nicolae Ceausescu's downfall, after the "memorial service to the innocent yet tormented Romanian people", Bishop Sava (Vuković), Eparch of Šumadija and administrator of Temisoara, stressed, in Belgrade Cathedral, the role of (Serbian Orthodox) Metropolitan of Karlovac in fighting against the union in Erdelj that "threatened and led a part of our population away from the Orthodox Church and the same still happens today, at present; while the union itself with all its consequences represents the most serious wound on the body of the Orthodox Church and, likewise, the greatest shame on the body of those who are still doing the same today" (*Pravoslavlje*, February 1, 1990). In a letter to Lord Carrington, President of the International Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, the Serbian Patriarch Pavle (Stojčević) writes, among other things, that "those who have uniated for centuries and catholicized and in the Second World War even physically exterminated Serbs just because they were Serbs and Orthodox can no longer be trusted. This terrible truth should be understood by all those who were Yugoslavs up to now as well as by the civilized Europe" (*Pravoslavlje*, November 1, 1991).

Concerning "enforced catholicizing of Orthodox Serbs as carried out by the Catholic Church" at the time of (so-called) Independent State of Croatia, the Catholic view of the situation is utterly different: among other things, Orthodox people were thus saved by being offered an opportunity to hide themselves from *ustashas*. Both the parties have their own truth as well as scientific for the whole history. For instance, Archbishop Josip Uhač wrote *The Bishopric of Marča* (Zagreb, Glas koncila, 1997) while Dušan Kašić wrote *Resistance to the Union of Marča* (Belgrade, Pravoslavlje, 1986) reviewed by former Bishop of Marča, Danilo Krstić. "The Roman Church with its uniatic tendencies tried to compensate for what it lost in the Lutheran rebellion that refused to comply with Inquisition's burning and tortures" (*NIN*, October 10, 1990) while the other party stresses that "centuries-old penetration and pressure forced the greatest majority of the Eastern rite believers in our region to gather together in Serbian Orthodoxy" (*Glas Koncila*, October 28, 1990) so that a Croatian Greek Catholic priest says that the Byzantine-Slavic Catholics in the FR of Yugoslavia are "exposed to Orthodox proselytism" (*Panorama*, Zagreb, May 24, 1995).

³ The canon law (*Codex iuris canonici*) is not valid in the whole Catholic Church; there is also the Canon law of the Eastern Churches (*Codex canonum Ecclesiarum orientalium*).

⁴ Ecclesiastical and other views of the union of the Croatian and Serbian authors, see, among others, in Geert van Dartle, *Čirilometodska ideja i svetosavlje*, Zagreb, Kršćanska sadašnjost, 1984.

The burdening with the past, not only the real one but also the *built upon* one is understandable in the context of the identity conflicts on the borders with the Greek Catholics crossing the borders of the confessional identities and/or “jumping into” other national areas. This is often the case of the “conversion of the converted converts” as is clearly seen in the example of Kukushans (Bulgarians and Macedonians) who had, since 1859, several “unity crises”, that is, returns to Orthodoxy (K. Stojanov, *Povijesno-pravni razvoj...*, 28,31,51-54) while in Croatia some Greek Catholics Bishops were “only apparently united” (*Šematizam*, 174).

The theologian Josip Turčinović pointed out, “If in the days of Strossmayer the unionist situation was such as to make meaningful the slogan that ecumenism implies catholicization of the Orthodox, today it must be said that ecumenism means more radical catholicization of Catholics and more radical orthodoxisation of Orthodox so that they should become closer to each other” (*Kana*, Zagreb, 4/1986) especially if the social and political circumstances are in favor of it. However, if the Catholic Church rejects uniatism as a method of achieving unity it does not mean that it can reject “Uniates” as well. In the eyes of the Orthodox the Eastern Catholic communities are “colonies of the Roman Patriarchate on the territories of other patriarchates” and “Rome is ever more aware that the union as such is not the proper way of Christian unity for the future” (*GK*, May 24, 1987). Yet, the united churches that do not recognize the 1054 breach between the East and the West should be respected primarily as churches *sui generis* (of their own right) and they cannot integrate into others. Regarding the fact that Uniatism and proselytism are rejected, “what remains as the true and only way of establishing the original church unity is negotiation of Catholic and Orthodox hierarchies at various levels until the desired general council takes place” similar to that in Florence in 1439 after which the unity could not be sustained as it is written in the Editorial of the Croatian Archbishopric weekly (*GK*, July 29, 1990).

Croatian Dying Away and Macedonian Development

Bishop Simeon Vratanja became, in 1611, Bishop of Rašana (*Rascianorum*) of Greek rite in Croatia; to the bishopric of Križevac founded in 1777 Greek Catholics Russians in Bačka were adjoined just like Ukraine immigrants to Bosnia later on; finally, Bishop of Križevac has obtained, since 1923, jurisdiction over all eastern Catholic in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians. It is a personal bishopric (like military ordinariate): each Yugoslav Greek Catholic was under the bishop with the seat in Križevac (since 1966 in Zagreb), that is, it was connected to respective parish or *župa* (seven of them no longer existent). According to the *Šematizam* published in 1975, regarding the bishopric covering the whole territory of the SFR of Yugoslavia, there were 58,778 believers (2139 temporarily absent) gathered in 62 parishes or *župas* that made up 9 deaneries, namely, those of Stol, Žumberk, Slavonia, Vukovar, Srijem, Bačka, Banat, Bosnia and Macedonia. Bishop Mikloš, in an interview, states that “according to the 1996 Census, the bishopric has 48,920 believers, most of them being Russians and Ukraine, then Croats mostly from Žumberk and then Macedonians and some Romanians. The present number of priests is sufficient. There are 61 of them either active or retired” while there are about 110 Ukraine and Croat Basilian nuns (*GK*, June 29 1997). The believers come from even five “movements for unity”, namely, those from Croatia (Marča-Žumberk), Poland and Ukraine (Brest Litovsk), sub-Carpathian Russia (Užgorod), Erdelj (Alba Julija) and Macedonia (Kukush)⁵ (*Šematizam*, 176).

⁵ Kukush is a small town north of Thessaloniki in Aegean Macedonia (Greece).

In Croatia 12,300 Greek Catholics are gathered together in 22 parishes with some twenty active priests and some fifty nuns (*GK*, September 21, 1997). Due to their belonging to the “Yugoslav bishopric” not one single “ethnic group or nationality could develop its identity” which especially refers to Croatian Greek Catholics “whose basic rights have been consistently denied in the last hundred years, especially the Croatian national being in the church administration and education of the staff for the church service, all for the benefit of the dominant Russian group” as was written in the local paper *Glas Žumberka*. Even on the occasion of Miklović’s appointment as bishop (1983) Croatian priests “expressed their firm belief” that they would appoint a general vicar from Croatian clergy but this did not happen; it is not surprising in view of the fact that in the last hundred years the only Croatian appointed as bishop was Janko Šimrak (*Nedeljna Dalmacija*, Split, September 29, 1993). One prominent Greek Catholic priest who declares himself as a Croat did not want to comment upon “serious accusations” of nationality suppression but he stressed that the Croatian group of Greek Catholic tends, while respecting the tradition, to enliven the ritual with contemporary Croatian speech unlike the Russians who are still attached to the Old Slavic and under a stronger influence of the Ukraine Greek Catholic Church (*Danas Zagreb*, August 24, 1993).

In the late 2003 in Ruski Kostur an apostolic exarchate (bishopric) was established for Greek Catholics in Serbia and Montenegro and since the Eastern Catholics in Macedonia had already been entrusted to the care of Skopje Bishop,⁶ “the state of Yugoslavia was wiped off the map of the Catholic Church” as written by Živko Kustić, the most fruitful Croatian Catholic journalist otherwise a retired protopresbyter *stavrofor* (*Jutarnji list*, Zagreb, November 13, 2003). Therefore, the bishopric of Križevac was “narrowed” while the Metropolitan of Zagreb would remain unique for its having under the same roof the Roman Catholic and the Greek Catholic bishoprics, that is, Zagreb archbishops and *metropolitans* are at the same time Greek Catholic *mitropolitans*. The Bishop of Križevac is also a member of the Croatian Bishop Conference while for instance, in Ukraine there is the Ukraine Bishop Conference headed by the Latin Archbishop of Lavov as well as the Greek Catholic Synod headed by the High Archbishop of Lavov.

The long expected separation that would end the position of Croatian Greek Catholics as a convincing minority even in Croatia as well (where there are less than 8000 of them) would not, on the other hand, mean a way out of the demographic and staff crisis. The eparchic seminary exists since 1680 but who is going to attend it? The troubles of the minority are also visibly shown in the following lines from the semi-official church weekly, “The Greek Catholics within the Croatian ecclesiastical system are especially jeopardized in our time mostly because the Roman Catholic majority is so much uninformed about it that it even considers it as an expression of other religious confession and nationality” (*GK*, May 24, 1998). In other words, there is a widely spread popular belief that the “three-phase” ones,⁷ even when they feel like no one else but Croats are actually (*disguised*) Serbian Orthodox.

Unlike the Croatian one, a small community of Macedonians of the Byzantine-Slavic rite is developing; the majority of the priest junior staff comes from it. There were 46000 in 1974, then 5200 in 1977 and even as many as 5800 believers in 1989 while five parishes were served by six priests (K. Stojanov, *Povijesno-pravni*

⁶ Msgr. Joakin Herbut, since 1972 (also) apostolic visitator for Catholics of Eastern rite in Macedonia, Latin Bishop and baptized as a Greek Catholic himself.

⁷ A pejorative expression for those making a cross with three fingers. Otherwise, the Church in the West introduces the practice of making a cross with five fingers as late as in the 13th century.

razvoj..., 88).⁸ Maybe in Macedonia the Byzantine rite Catholics would not find themselves torn apart between the two opposing forces – just as the Ukraine ones were between the Poles (who even insisted on their turning to the Latin rites) and Russians (“russification”) or just like the Croatian believers found themselves torn between the desire to reject Roman Catholic national majority and, on the other hand, to bring accusations against the Serbian Orthodox liturgical majority. Instead, they have a chance to be freely “living remains of the former great unity” from the first millenium of Christianity hoping that the unity of the Christ Church would come about in the third millenium.

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⁸ Meanwhile Kiro Stojanov has become Assistant Bishop of Skopje while his brother Zoran, priest of the Apostolic Exarchate in Macedonia in 2003 also did his ph. d. on the theme of Macedonian Catholic of the Eastern rite. Their two sisters are eastern Catholic nuns.

Zorica Kuburić

IS CONVERSION RESULT OF CHURCH MISSIONARY WORK OR PROSELYTISM?

The process of conversion attracts attention of political and religious structures, and scientists as well. In its very essence, the conversion represents the internal turnover, the change of path, and emulating of God. That turning, directing of own thinking and behavior usually begins with the encounter of “the one who looks for a God” and “the one who knows God”. The spiritual communities originate from this process of interactive testimony.

The mission of Christian church was given at the very beginning with the words of Jesus, which reveal the power and task: “All authority has been given to me in heaven and on earth. Go therefore and make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all that I commanded you; and I am with you always, even to the end of the age”. (Matthew, 28: 18-20)

This community of Heaven and Earth, the community of God and every particular man, should be the essence of religion. That linking began with Jesus Christ, who carried in himself two natures and showed that the process of “to be followers of God” (Ephesians, 5:1) begins with the conversion. However, the guardians of the old paths don't even approve the turning back to the right road. Therefore, this process is followed by tensions, mistrust, prosecution, torturing, crucifying, stoning.

So it was in the centuries, from the collective to the individual conversion, from disbelief to faith, from faith to faith, from faith to disbelief, from disbelief in new faith. Whichever of those, the man was crucified between the heaven and the earth. The realm of Heaven and the realm of Earth gave him the possibility to ask one of them for help and survival.

As the context of our discussion takes place in Serbia, I want to highlight 3 significant periods of developing of Serbian national identity. Jerotic (1996) consider that in human nature there are 3 stratum of nature: pagan, Old Testament and New Testament kind of behaviors. The first characterize superstition and hedonism, second is connect with fear of God and legalism and third, Christian, is beginning of freedom and love. In the period before Saint Sava, the central place of Serbian pagan beliefs was given to the cult of ancestors. The Balkan, as a cradle of European Christianity, was cherishing the Christian culture in Greek and Latin centuries before the arriving of Serbs in this area. The Serbians tribes were against those changes (Popadic, 2002), first of all because of loyalty to their ancestors and their rituals. The class of “priests” resisted the most, for the Christianity endangered their status. In this period there was particular conversion in Christianity. At the point of arriving of brothers Kirilo and Metodije and creation of Slavic letter and translating of Holy Bible and books of religious service in Slavic language, the establishing of church among Slavs was possible. The disciples Kliment and Naum continued the missionary work and work on the establishing of national clergy. Climent taught more than 3.500 disciples the Holy Letter.

Popadić (2002:95) writes that the path from Rastko to Sava is similar to the path of Simon to Peter, from the lost son to the returnee to father, from the man who is without or against God to the man of God. He writes that it is the path of penitent

and radical change of mind and heart; the path of entire turning from selfishness, sins and the world to God. The turning to God - him alone and for him alone - is the first and basic step of authentically conversion. However, this includes the love for the God's belongings, and that is the Church, the world, and all those Jesus has died for.

In that way we are again on the path of conversion and establishing of another missionary from our own nation in Christian faith: Saint Sava who had the power to propose and begin the implementing of one new quality in one nation. This second period of Serbian people begins with the establishing of national and religious identity. Popadic considers *Krsna slava* as a clue for understanding the survival of Christian faith under the five centuries long Turkish enslaving, the Golgotha of Serbian wars and demagogy of atheist Yugoslavia. As Jews saved the Saturday and the Saturday saved the Jews, Serbs have defended their religious and national identity celebrating *Krsna slava*. However, that union of religious and national identity seems to end in some new processes of conversion in the third phase of Serbian national identity. The Protestantism arrived from Europe directly after its appearance. However, the Protestantism itself has carried national features in Serbia until the appearance of Nazarenes who started first to convert the Serbs into new faith. Baptist, also, spread a new faith between Serb, but they have problem with might authority in that time, court, and stay afraid in thinking, that it is not a time for a Serbs for preaching (Max Ludewig, Form Serbs capital town, 1910). Today, the most numerous protestant communities among Serbs are the Christian Adventist Church.

After the hundred years of missionary work in Serbia and Montenegro, the Christian Adventist Church is founded as the most numerous religious communities, which is not established on the national base. Well, according to census from the year 2002., 20.000 of inhabitants declared to belong to one of different sorts of Adventism. Adventist said that there are from 12.000 believers who are written as a members in church books, they are adulta and baptism, to over 150.000 believers, theirs family and those who considers oneself as an adventist (Šušljic, 2004). The main stream of Adventism, which originates from the year 1884. where Ellen White was present, until the today's independent churches which compete in purity of life and stricktness in holding on to the Bible's principles, has the character of religious movement based on missionary activities.

Milan Šušljic (2004) write about names, dates and methods of work in process of conversion Serbs into Adventist. Dragoljub Djordjevic (1990) as sociology has written about the reasons for conversion of Orthodox in Adventism. In this work we will pay attention only on the growth of the church that is to say on the missionary activities and baptism of believers who have, therefore, become the members of church in Belgrade and Zemun in last 100 years.

Branko Bjelajac (2003) has written about the begining of Adventism in Belgrade, giving the historical data about the Max Ludvig, who has graduated at the missionary school in Friedensau (Germany) and has come to Belgrade to spread the advent news in the Kingdom of Serbia. Officially, the first Adventist group in Belgrade was founded on December 15, 1909. However, the newspaper Politika from September 12, 1923 cites that they began to work in the Kingdom of Serbia in the year 1905. According to Milan Šušljicu (2004) we can conclude that the bote assertion is true. First believer from Serbia was from Belgrade and he meet with adventism in Hungaria. His name is Gligoriје-Gliša Petrović.

Bjelajac cites that the Belgrade Orthodox priest, archpriest Ljubomir Mitrović attended some Adventist's meetings during the year 1911, wrote his impressions and published the booklet "Religious wanderers" (*Verske litalice*). He received the direc-

tive from Belgrade prota, no from archpriest government. In that way were given the names of people who were on the way of conversion and of those who were talked out of conversion. It is interesting that the Adventists were acknowledged religious community according to the decision of Ministry of confessions from September 30, 1922, which allowed them to freely express their beliefs. However, the following minister withdrew that permission (Bjelajac, 2003:193).

So, typical example of spreading of new faith among Serbs can be observed in development of Adventism in Serbia. In the last 100 years, 3.500 believers were baptized in the local church in Belgrade. When we divide the number of believers who joined through baptism, voting or withdrawing, we can conclude that the Belgrade church gained more than 35 believers yearly. Toward Šušljčić 1904. in Belgrade there came Peter Todor in Veliki Bečkerek (today Zrenjanin). Jet, next year there were group of people for baptism and one was from Belgrade. 1909 – 4 believers in Belgrade; 1910 – 12; 1911 – 15; 1912 – 13; 1913 – 19; 1914 – 23; 1915 – 23; 1916 – 23; 1917 – 30. As a church synod, it always had a considerable number of believers and influenced the other churches. For easier data processing, we will direct our attention to the development of Adventists in Zemun, aldw they are in the shadow of Belgrade. In Zemun there were 1910 -7 believers; 1911 – 11; 1912 – 13; 1913 – 13 (Šušljčić, 2004).

The Local Church in Zemun

The Christian Adventist Church and its missioanary activities in Zemun are preasent from the year 1933. The church in Zemun has been changing its location and streets. For the longest period it was located in Oracka Street, from the year 1966. godine. Before that, it was located in Tosin Bunar, Davidovici, Novogradska and Janka Lisjaka Street. The total number of believers who are registered in the church book for 70 years is 621- 68% of women and 32% of men. In that period the preachers have changed, according the custom of HAC to move its preachers after couple of years. 18 preachers and 3 clerks have worked in Zemun in the period from chruch's foundation until 2004. (70 years). In average, they were replaced after 4 years. It appaers that the replacement of preacher in one place is mostly connected with changes on the level of district, which takes place after 3 years, while the union board is elected after 5 years. The southern district (JCO located in Nis), where Zemun County belongs, has until now 14 presidents. In that way, the life and work of preachers in one local community depend on the leading structures at most, but also on the personality of preachers and his capability to answer the needs of his profession, good cooperation with the administration from district and union, with believers in the church, especially the board and leading persons, as well as with social environment where missionary activities take place. The success of one preacher is measured by the number of baptized souls.

The formation of local church and its organization precede the organization of missions and more and more complex organization on the level of district. The local church is lead by the church board, which is lead by a head of church. The church is organized every year and gives possibility to change or reelect people. According to the insight into life and work of several local churches, we can conclude that the most unstable structure is on the level of local churches, which is reorganized by believers who come to the church regularly and the believers baptized recently. The professional workers in church have three working places. The work of pastor or priest in the county is directly connected with work in the field and with believers. The administrative duties are elective and more stable and change rarely. The union's clerks spend the longest period on the same work place and have the greatest power.

EVANGELIZATION, CONVERSION, PROSELYTISM

The spreading of Adventism in these areas is systematic. The public campaigns – so called *evangelizations* are organized every year and their goal is to inform the people about the forthcoming arrival of Christ to this world and about the ways to prepare oneself for the salvation of sins and evil in this world. Now, it is more and more common that after the lectures in public halls, the group which has stayed the longest period and has further interests in religious topics and accepting the way of life required in religious teaching, becomes the new church.

The found and clear horizons, the conscious about the own role and place in this world in the process of salvation, motivate the believers very much to engage themselves in the matters of salvation of the close ones, who are invited enthusiastically to come and hear the truth. The truth is powerful and it is sufficient to surrender and enter to the community, which is afterwards demystified with the regular contacts with believers who are not saints but long to be. According to the researches (Dadly, 1995), every second born as Adventist believer leaves the community, mostly the young people who search for the freedom to choose marital partner or profession that does not fit in the believer's life, or fail to answer the standards of behavior and become disappointed with themselves or other believers. So it happens that they leave the community, but enriched with a new experience, which often brings them back to church after the life without God, in the period of retiring, divorce or similar losses. After defiance comes remorse, which brings back to complete devotion to God, which cannot be removed, just as first love which was missed because of curiosity or unpreparedness for complete surrender but now found again.

Two sorts of believers in Christian churches are described in the words of Jesus Christ about the lost son (Luke, 15: 11-32). One is believer from birth and unsatisfied for being treated as the second who wanted to find heaviness outside father's home. These returnees are often privileged because father's love is ready to forgive. As it happens in family that there is a jealousy among children, so it happens between believers in church and makes human relations difficult. Newcomers and natives find their place in every church between love, jealousy and cooperation and make the dynamics of religious life richer and more complicated.

From 1933 to 2003, the total number of baptized believers is 621. From that number, 73 believers are excluded which represents 12% of the baptized. It is according to Matthew 18, 15-18. At the beginning, the exclusions were much more numerous, whereas in the last 10 years even those who don't come to the church are excluded rarely. The most often reason of exclusion, according to the notes in church book, is the violation of certain commandments or unchristian life in general:

34% - unchristian life

27%- violation of the fourth commandment – Saturday.

11%- law's violation

10% violation of Christian norms

7% of believers are excluded because of 7th commandment – they live in cohabitation or have left marital partner.

5% of believers went to another religious community (Jehovah' witnesses, Baptists)

3% were excluded on their personal request

2% for drinking

1% for violence

In the last 50 years, 370 believers were baptized, while 71 came from another Adventist church, which means that 441 believers came in whole. In average, 9 believers came to church in Zemun yearly. At the same time, 218 believers went to live in one other town or state (50% of believers moved), and it is known that 41% be-

Is Conversion Result of Church Missionary Work or Proselytism?

lievers went abroad (we can conclude that 20% of those who move go abroad). Australia is country where the most Adventists from church in Zemun moved to (15), followed by Germany (13), USA (6), France (3), England (2) and Bulgaria (1). We can conclude that 10% of total number of believers goes abroad.

We should compare what percentage in general population went abroad in the last 50 years in order to realize whether the type of western Christian is suitable for going to the West. According to the Federal Bureau of Statistics, the percentage of people who temporarily work in foreign countries is 6% in Central Serbia; the highest is in Branicevo district (23%), than in Bor district (16%) and Pomoravski district (14%), yet the percentage of this population in 22 municipalities is between 10 and 40%.

Based on these data, we can conclude that church life is very active and fluctuation of believers very high. Every year, the number of those who come is higher than the number of those who leave. First of all, one becomes the church member by baptizing, by voting if one cannot be baptized or withdrawing, if one is baptized in some other Adventist church. Local church can be abandoned in different ways, yet the files about the believers are always kept, as long as he is loyal to the God's and church laws and norms and come to church. In case that believer from any reason, except illness or old age, ceases to come to the church or violate some of important commandments or standards adopted by church, he's been excluded from church. According to our research, approximately 9 believers are baptized yearly. The least number of baptizing was in 1958 and 1969 when only 1 believer was baptized. The highest number of baptized was in 1994 (3 believers). The fruitful years for the believers' souls were 1951, when 20 new believers were baptized, 1963 (16) and 1964 (11).

If we look in decades, for the church good period was from 1990 to 1999, the period of Yugoslav crisis when 120 believers were baptized in the local church in Zemun. In average, in every ten years the church increases for 74 new believers. However, after 2000.th there is less new believers. This is one way of missionary activities, where the new believers join the old ones, also in the active participating in church life.

Dobanovci

The Zemun County has several churches in villages, of those the church Dobanovci is still functioning. In this village church, there are 137 believers who are noted from 1934 to 1999. These days, 19 believers are filed as active. From that number, 40 believers are excluded, most often because of violation of 4th commandment, unchristian life, quarrels, alcohol, apostasy, their marriage to the secular world. These data show that 30% of believers were excluded in this church and that more have left than remained to be a member permanently. The reason we can find in problems of religiosity and free Sabbath in communist time.

Bečmen

The church in Becmen registers 80 believers who were baptized in the period from 1933 to 1988, when the group in Becmen stopped to function. The believers who remained go to the church in Dobanovci. 40 believers moved to other places. 28% of believers who moved went abroad to Canada, Germany, Australia and Austria.

Surčin

The local church in Surcin began with work in the year 1969, and closed 1989. In the whole, 24 believers are registered, 4 excluded because of violation of 4th commandment and violation of health's norms. One half of believers moved to other churches, and in the church book the names are crossed out.

It is interesting to see what the educational structure of believers of this church is. Who are the people who are asking for the meaning of life and who are ready to change their identity and something in their lives? According to the information I've got interviewing the believers who were present on the services I've visited, the greatest number of believers is young people, mostly students who come from different parts of Serbia and Montenegro and found in the church second family, community and spiritual orientation.

Conclusion

The total number of believers in Zemun County, registered in church books, is 939. The holder of religious life is district church in Zemun, which is the oldest and the most numerous. About 70% of believers are women and 30% are men. In the structure of ruling the relation is reverse. On the all leading positions are men, who are also elected by women. In one district, the preacher has the opportunity to spend 4 years and to contribute by baptizing or accepting of approximately 14 new members yearly on the level of the entire district and 9 in the greatest church. The greater the church, the higher is the number of new believers.

Besides baptizing, the ordained preacher performs the rituals of marriage, which represents the most beautiful part of his work, consecration of small babies on request of their parents for acceptance of blessing. The ritual, which does not depend on the number of believers, is the ritual of Lord's Dinner, which is performed 4 times a year at the end of every three-month period. Believers take Communion with unleavened bread and nonalcoholic wine, which are the symbols of Jesus' flesh and blood. The yeast and alcohol are the symbols of sins, and believers relieve themselves from sins through this ritual.

If we pose question about the influence of Adventist church on the young people in this area, we can perceive its influence in inducing to highest education. However, there is certain number of young people who find in religion different meaning which turns them from studying and forming of family. The excuse for giving up to take responsibility for family and gaining of material values of this world is the forthcoming arrival of Jesus and urgent need to preach Gospel to those who lose salvation for eternity. The signs of the last time, which are announced in Holy Bible, cause in every generation hope and fear and changing of system of values in some aspects, which directs their life in this world. The spirit of Protestant ethic, which was described very detailed by Max Weber, raise the standard and educational level of believers who accept it. The spirit of Protestantism is also present in migrations, which direct believers to the more developed countries, where they accomplish their world mission by hard work and earning for their lives and their church as well, which they support by donations, especially the church from their native country.

At the end, we can recognize the transitional processes which occur both in individual who is searching for sectional values of life, and in population that is integrated in community by religion. Growing out from it, on the path of individualization, independence and looking for own destiny, the new path and oneself are searched symbolic. In the group identity of Serbian people, the process of maturation has also brought to the estimation of own belonging of some individuals, who test their rights for own freedom. According to research (Kuburić, 1996), the highest

number of members of any religion remains loyal as long as the family rituals have sense in love and acceptance of their members. The feeling of acceptance makes children loyal to the family system of values. The rejected children as well as the anathematized nation seek the strongpoint in new values. The framework of religion's survival hides in the family unity, which is based on love.

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Dragoljub B. Đorđević

EVANGELIZATION, CONVERSION, PROSELYTISM: EXAMPLE OF ROMAS' PROTESTANTIZATION*

*The right to believe, to worship and witness
The right to change one's belief or religion
The right to join together and express one's belief*

Introduction

A few months ago, while setting up the premises for designing *the model for exploration, analysis and explanation of the phenomenon of Roma protestantization*, we took the following standing: “No more urgent task is there for the sociologists of religion than to study Romas' protestantization since this phenomenon is taking place just now and it is dynamic, in expansion and in turbulence; therefore, it should be studied before it stops, 'deadens' and 'petrifies', that is, before it becomes institutionalized and routine. There is no more fruitful task for the sociologists of religion than to study Romas' protestantization since this phenomenon is so complex and imbued with different meanings, so far-reaching and decisive, that it comprises in itself all that the sociology of religion should deal with”.¹ Aware of possible simplification, we introduced, for this occasion, the phrase *Roma protestantization* into the domestic sociology of religion and romology with the purpose to explain, in a simple way, a more recent process of Romas' entering small religious communities of Protestant affiliation. Here we would like to stress that the coined phrase is sufficiently appropriate for the occasion and that there is no point in wasting time on conceiving of some other.²

Now we are going to try to solve the riddle: “What is Romas' protestantization – is it evangelization, conversion or proselytism?” Or is it the sum of all these phenomena, up to a point?

Discussion

Romas have been involved in Protestantism since its very emergence. However, their more evident protestantization started in the 19th century while, in the West, it became more intense in the mid-sixties taking the form of mass conversion to various Pentecostal communities (Williams, 1991).³ Unlike in the West, at the Balkans or even in the entire Central and Eastern Europe, more manifest protestantization is of recent date. The Romas are traditionally in the Balkan region and in

* PREPARED AS A PART OF THE PROJECT “ROMANI PLACES OF CULT AND CULTURE OF DEATH”, WHICH RESEARCH TEAM UNDERTAKES FOR OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE (PROGRAM ROMA CULTURE IN CENTRAL&EASTERN EUROPE – Budapest).

¹ Key ideas of this paper are elaborated in the paper *On Serbian Roma Protestantization – Introductory Discussion* presented at the *III International Science Symposium of Romani Spiritual and Material Culture* (January 16-17 2004, Skopje, Republic of Macedonia) meanwhile published in the journal *Religion and Tolerance* (1/2004). I am thankful for their useful suggestions to my colleagues, Ilija Acevski from the Faculty of Philosophy, Skopje and Ružica Cacanaska from the Institute for Sociological and Political-legal Research, Skopje.

² Here I paraphrase Jose Samarague (2004:29) who suggested that we should use such phrases as “biting cold”, no matter for their loose connection, since they appeared as coupled together and they do appear to be appropriate enough so that there is no point in wasting time on conceiving new ones.

³ Let's have a quick look at another, even more recent report, from Thomas Dixon concerning the process:

Central and Eastern Europe followers of *Orthodox*, *Roman Catholicism* and *Islam*. This balance in their religious and confessional being that it took centuries to create has been, in the last dozen years, disturbed by their conversion to Protestant minority religious communities, again especially to the Pentecostal movement⁴ that gives now, at the beginning of the third millennium, surprising results.

On the territory of Serbia as well, the Romas, at the turn of the millennia, became adherents of Protestantism. They can be found among Jehovah's Witnesses, Baptists and Adventists,⁵ though the majority of them - and one cannot miss seeing the pattern here - are Pentecostal, mostly in Southeast Serbia (Đorđević, 2004a).

On principle, there are three forms of survival and growth of Protestant minority religious communities, namely, 1) self-reproduction of the believers, 2) conversion and taking over of the believers from the mainstream religions, and 3) missionary activities, conversion and taking over from the corpus of ethnic and religious minorities. The Romas are indeed a typical double minority, that is, an ethnic and religious one,⁶ and as such they are suitable for the religious-confessional corpus subjected to a) missionary work, that is, evangelization, 2) conversion, and 3) taking over, that is, proselytism. Protestantization is taking place in three ways and, after the initial intolerance towards their co-patriots of other religion and confession,⁷ it can affect the identity of the Romas just as it can lead to their integration and the loss of their religious minority status.⁸

"They have been despised, rejected and persecuted for centuries, but Europe's Gypsies are experiencing a revival unparalleled among other peoples in the region - and are taking the gospel to the nations through which they are scattered.

Although accurate statistics are hard to come by for both cultural and political reasons, widely held estimates put the number of born-again Gypsies in Europe at 500,000 to a million - out of a population of somewhere between 11 million and 38 million.

In France alone, Life & Light (L&L), a branch of the Assemblies of God, currently counts some 130,000 Gypsy believers - a third of the country's total Gypsy population. The movement has planted 210 Gypsy churches in France and trained more than 1,300 pastors. It has sent out missionaries to 40 countries and founded Bible schools in three.

In Spain, the first major L&L mission field, there are now 500 Gypsy churches with some 2,000 pastors, and 90,000 out of 600,000 Gypsies are baptized believers, according to the typically conservative estimates given by L&L itself. Spanish 'Gitano', or Gypsy, pastors say there are about 1 million Spanish Gypsies and a total number of believers varying between 100,000 and 500,000 or more.

L&L claims 7 percent, or 25,000 born-again Gypsies out of 300,000, in England, and 10 percent, or 1,000 out of 10,000, in Finland. Finnish Gypsy representatives report 25 percent evangelical believers. A recent hot spot has been the town of Leskovac in South Serbia, where the Gypsy branch of the Leskovac Pentecostal Church is growing explosively.

L&L president Jimmy Meier said that the Gypsy revival is '100 percent Assemblies of God in doctrine'. Answering the critics who claim that there is too much emotionalism and too little repentance among the Christian Gypsies, Meier said that 'biblical truth causes the Gypsy converts to change their lives completely. There is no more fighting, stealing and drinking'.

He said: 'We try to approach people with grace, not judging them prematurely. There have been many 'baptized sinners' among us who later on were truly converted.' But 'our love for nature, music and a life on the move does not change. We pray to keep our culture'...

Gypsy church leaders expect the revival to change the political and social status of the Gypsy people. 'Traditionally we have been many, but divided, and now God is uniting us as a people with the common goal of serving Him,' said May Bittel, a Swiss Gypsy who is an accredited Council of Europe expert for Gypsy issues. 'Also, the authorities cannot but acknowledge that the Christian Gypsies do not fit the stereotype of Gypsies being fighters, thieves and drunkards. The more Christian Gypsies, the stronger our position in our political battle for recognition as a nation in our own right.'

⁴ Željko Mardešić (2004:3-5) in our country and in Europe better known as Jakov Jukić, while interpreting the turning away from secularization to religionization of the world gives a prominent place to the Pentecostal movement. In his opinion, the growth and spread of *evangelical Pentecostalism* in the whole universe, next to Islamic radicalism, Christian ecumenism and Neo-Buddhist syncretism, is due to globalization or, more precisely, to media and communication globalization.

⁵ For Serbian Roma Adventists see Kuburić, 2003, 2003a. A far-and-wide famous example of entirely Romany Pentecostal community is in Leskovac, a town in the south of Serbia (Kurtić, 2003).

⁶ More about it in: Đorđević, 2003b.

⁷ More about it in: Đorđević, 2001; Đorđević and Todorović, 2001, 2002; Filipović and Đorđević, 2003.

⁸ More about it in: Đorđević, 2004g.

Missionaring

There is no dilemma concerning the fact that the foreign main offices of those Protestant religious communities that are active in Serbia and their domestic officials understand their work among Romas as a pure *missionaring* coupled with numerous difficulties: "Ministries among and by Romany are increasing throughout Central and Eastern Europe, some initiated by Western mission groups, others by individual missionaries, and others by local churches. The difficulties arising from variations in dialects, extreme poverty, widespread illiteracy, and racial prejudice against Romany make facilitating a church movement a slow process. In spite of the difficulties, people of God are answering the call and are finding ways to overcome obstacles. In particular, many successful ministries among Romany have multiplied their resources and gifts by developing international, interdenominational, and intercultural ministry partnerships (Dawson, 2002)".⁹

Of course, it can be legitimately spoken about so-called external missionaring¹⁰ only when it comes to the Romas who are not "baptized" into Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism and brought to the "law" in Islam. Those among them who, traditionally and by their family genealogy, belong to Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism and Islam, are numerous. These are the Romas who, in addition to their religious-confessional background that they cannot, most often, recognize in any articulate way, have not any single contact with the traditional religions and the religious organization on the territory of Serbia. In that sense, and filling in the gaps left by the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church and the Islam Community, various Protestant groups are more than justified in their missions among the Romas. They are using their chance and they are successful. One cannot object to that.

Conversion

There is no doubt that the Protestant communities owe part of their success among Romas to *conversion*. Many a Roma, "baptized" into Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism and brought to the "law" in Islam, since lacking closer and more active relations with respective religious institutions and being only left with the traditional means of expressing their religious adherence, becomes "an easy prey" to the activities of the Protestant churches; thus, he converts and turns into their ardent believer.

Though "religiously gifted" and "spiritually starving", the Roma is reduced to the status of a marginal believer of the custom and ritual type. He is not deeply-rooted religiously and is liable to conversion due to the lack of interest of the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church and the Islam Community: they ignore him, push him to the margins and - or at least that is the impression they make - they want to get rid of him. That is why the question posed by Mirko Mlakar (2003:106)¹¹ can be answered, without hesitation, positively, namely, the churches have not done any work with their Roma members. Neither have they "developed" them as believers and people. They have never treated Romas as a specific constitu-

⁹ Frank Dawson, Moscow, Russia, is strategic coordinator of the European Romany Team of the Cooperative Baptist Fellowship.

¹⁰ **Missionaring** (from Lat. *missio*) is a movement or actions for conversion of unfaithful, usually non-Christian and underdeveloped nations to Christianity. This is its wider meaning or so-called external missionaring. The missionaring is carried out by many large churches of Europe and America among some nations of Asia, Africa and Oceania. However, missionaring in a narrow sense of the word or so-called internal missionaring implies the church activities among its own believers for the sake of sustaining and improving their religious and moral life (Drašković, 1982:19-20)

¹¹ "How much has the Church worked with its Roma members in the last decades, how much has it developed them as believers and people? Could not it do more, as it were, because it was under the communist dictatorship; or did it fail to see Romas as a specific constituent part of its flock? Or was it just because it did not want to waste any time on Romas?"

ent part of their flock. To put it simply, they have had no wish to waste their time on Romas.

Yet, unlike them, there are religious organizations – and it is most fortunate there are – that, by converting Romas and accepting them as their equals, take care of them, elevate them spiritually and culturally, emancipate and integrate them. In that sense, and by compensating for the omissions made by the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church and the Islam Community, different Protestant groups rightfully convert Romas. They use their chance and they are successful. Neither is there anything to object to them in this case, either.

Proselytism

There is no doubt that any single Protestant religious community active among the Romas in Serbia would claim its *taking over* Roma believers from the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church and the Islam Community. Besides, though there is a thin layer of active Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim Romas, it does not mean that among them there are no so-called classical church-going believers, namely those who are theologically trained, who possess a highly developed religious consciousness and who are regular religious practitioners (Đorđević, 2001; Đorđević and Todorović, 2002). Whatever the majority believers think about this, namely, Orthodox Serbs, Croatian and Hungarian Catholics, Bosnian and Albanian Muslims (Đorđević and Todorović, 2001; Filipović and Đorđević, 2003), the Romas are good believers and they are on the way to achieve the same religious “quality” as their religious fellow-believers.

As such, Romas are of especial interest for the Protestant churches. They are the ones that try, with special propaganda and additional efforts, to take over as many believers as possible, that is, to snatch good Roma believers. By sheer proselytism they acquire proselytes¹² who then become “hammers” in further religious propagation, namely the key and passionate members of missionaring and conversion of Roma population. In that sense, different Protestant groups are absolutely unjustified in their taking over Roma believers from the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church and the Islam Community. They are successful in this; they use their weaknesses and abuse religious freedoms. And, in this case, they can be objected to.

Conclusion

The sociologists of religion agree that *globalization* is among the key desecularization factors. It is in itself inevitable and thus, it inevitably leads to *de-territorization of religion* (Mardešić, 2004:5) and this, among many meanings, is nothing more than the fact that some religions and religious communities inevitably penetrate into new territories, to those they have never been present before and where they have no tradition on their own, thus, at least in the beginning, appearing as “foreign.”

New Protestantism is a typical example of de-territorization of religion and in that sense it is a very successful movement of expansion, of spreading that also meets with a strong resistance.¹³ Moreover, if it happens to be directed to a vulner-

¹² “**PROSELYTISM** or propaganda for the sake of converting to one’s own religion the members of other religious teachings (Cvitković, 1991:228)”. “**PROSELYTE** (Greek), person who has passed from one religious community into another and who tries to win as many new followers as possible (Cvitković, 1991:228).”

¹³ Exhaustive, timely and reliable news about difficult living problems and works of the Christian, mostly New Protestant communities at the Balkans, in Central and Eastern Europe and the countries of the for-

able ethnic group such as the Roma one - attacked by stigmata, prejudice and stereotypes, and, in any case, poorly received within the majority religious environment (Đorđević and Todorović, 2001; Filipović and Đorđević, 2003) – then it can easily be seen to what kind of animosity any minority Protestant community and its believers will be exposed to.¹⁴ *In the case of the Serbian Romas, the above-mentioned resis-*

mer Soviet Union can be found on the Internet (FORUM 18 NEWS SERVICE, Oslo, Norway; <http://www.forum18.org/>).

¹⁴ Animosity sometimes leads to prosecution. For example, I am quoting from the letter that I received, as President of the Yugoslav Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, at the time when I wrote the paper. It was sent to me by the Protestant Evangelical Church “Roma Community”. It says:

**Leskovac Gypsy Church
Tent Removal and Land Purchase
April 23, 2004**

Background:

The Romany Gypsy Church has been meeting in a tent since Easter 2001! Until then believers were attending one of three consecutive meetings in a small church hall in the center of Leskovac. Besides cramped space, this place was distant from the 3 camps where Leskovac Gypsies live. So we purchased a plot of land on the outskirts of our city, but near the 2 largest Gypsy camps. That's where the Tent was erected.

Adults have been coming to the Tent Meetings in very cold winter months and extremely hot summers for over 3 years. Despite the conditions, the number of believers has already outgrown its Tent capacities – our last Christmas and Easter celebrations were held in the Leskovac Sports Arena, where about 2,500 gathered! Since the celebration was televised, many more participated.

Besides the Main meetings for adults, there are Sunday School for Children, the “small group” ages 6 to 9 years numbers over 250 children; “tall group”, ages 10 to 13 years has about 150 children, the teenagers group numbers about 60, and the youth group, ages 16 and over numbers about 80. There are also the choir with 60 singers and 15 musicians, 12 intercessory prayer groups. The young couples group, and the ladies group meets once a month, and so does the group of leaders and assistants, which numbers 58 people.

With a local Gypsy doctor and with dentists from NorthWest Medical Teams and Ichthus Remedium we've been also organizing medical prevention classes; together with Child Evangelism Fellowship we've been having regional training for childrens workers and sunday school teachers, and with Next Level International various leadership training courses.

However, we've been facing the opposition of neighboring Serbs in Leskovac, who have been expressing their racial prejudice and nationalism: as soon as the Tent was erect they have started complaining and filed a report against us. Rumors were the Gypsies were taking over the whole neighborhood, which was orchestrated by a religious sect! Over half a dozen hostile reports appeared in regional and national papers! The neighbors formal accusation was that our church property is near the city wells and the water supply lines and that we could pollute the drinking water!

By explanation and presentation of our papers of land ownership and church registration papers we tried to correct the neighbours fears. To the City Officials we offered instalments of special filters and secure sewage lines to the main waste line – which the City refused to consider. There are 463 houses in this neighborhood, even a leading chemical and pharmaceutical factory along the same waterline, but none have received orders for demolition.

We've had a 3 year long battle with the City Planning Commission, Building Inspection, and Regional Building Authority and have taken the mater to the Supreme Court! However, mostly due to the fact that some of our neighbors are leaders in local political parties and hold key positions in the City Administration, it was a no-win battle. Three weeks ago we received the Executive Decision of the Supreme Court of Serbia, which states the Tent must be dismateded and removed by April 30, 2004.

Current Situation:

Finally a favorable solution is offered: to relocate: the Leskovac City Council is giving us a plot of land (owned by the City) which is 2879 square meters /or 28 ares, whereby 1 are = 100 sq. meters/, about 18 meters wide and 160 meters long. Due to its long and narrow shape, slightly tilted at an angle, the Council requires we purchase the adjoining plots, owned privately.

If we purchase the plot of land by the end of this month, the City Assembly would pass the decision to grant us their piece of land free of charge. They are offering to level the ‘combined plots’, install sewage and pave a road from the main street to our property, hook us up to the electricity line, and help us with the planning and permits for the multi purpose Gypsy Church Center. During all this time the Tent would stand erect at this new property, until the new building is finished.

We have 7 more days, as the Executive Decision of the Supreme Court of Serbia states the Tent must be dismateded and removed by April 30, 2004! So far the City nor the Inspection has had no understanding

tance and animosity to their protestantization do not even depend on the fact whether it is done by missionaring, conversion or proselytism. We have also seen that protestantization of the Romas is done exactly in this way and that it is inevitable.

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for our need to keep the Tent for meetings etc until the new plot is purchased and developed. Today the Police came to tell us that unless the Executive Decision is revoked, they will protect the demolition squad who will dismantle our Tent! We are now collecting signatures which we plan to present as an appeal to Mr. Gojko Velicković, the Mayor of Leskovac, and also send to the Prime Minister of Serbia, Dr. Vojislav Kostunica, and to the head of OSCE Mission in Serbia, Mr. Mauricio Massari.

Your help:

Hereby we invite you to join us in our efforts to keep the Tent standing until we are able to relocate and move into a permanent structure which will serve as the Gypsy Spiritual, Cultural, Educational, Medical Advisory and Humanitarian Center.

We need your help in finances, firstly for the adjoining plots of land, then for the building project. Mostly, we need your encouragement and prayer support!

Pastor Selim Alijević
Romany Coordinator of the Protestant Evangelical Church in Serbia

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Ružica Cacanaska

CHANCES FOR CHANGES IN ROMA CONFESSIONAL MATRIX IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

The process of the religion-revitalization especially “actualizes” the question about redefinition or recomposition of the essential determined notes of the confessional map of the R. of Macedonia. In that context, in the majority religious communities, a big motions occur among the believers, that refers to their return to their religious roots by the gradual strengthening and reanimation of the same one. The rate of the atheists gradually decreases and turns into the religious structure with different intensity.

In the minority religious communities, those motions are pointed to the general strengthening of their position in the global community, of course, seen through the development of the globalization process. Since the ninety's, the number of the minority Christian religious communities grows, defining their places more “precisely” within the Macedonian religious map.

The minority religious communities in the R. of Macedonia, their own prove to the global community starts and continue with acting among the groups in the margins of the society as well as among membership in the margins of the majority religious communities, that haven't found and defined their religious affiliation.

The work among the Roma population, as a margin society group, is a great challenge for the minority religious communities. Since the ninety's to the present days, the following religious communities have established their presence in the Roma settlements: Evangelical Church, Methodist church, Seven-Day Adventist Church in Macedonia, Jehovah witnesses, New-Apostolic Church in Macedonia, Congregational Church in Macedonia, Christian Center in Macedonia.

The leading stuff of the religious communities that act in Roma settlements point out the fact that Roma behave far tolerant to the new religions then non-roma populations. Namely, they establish contacts with Roma groups very fast and easy but the processes of the profiliation and filtration as well as the retaining on the religious base go more difficulty¹.

Part of Roma feels satisfaction very soon and leave the religious communities or sometimes they go to another, also minority communities. The preaching stuff, that work in Roma settlements, underlines that there are some Roma categories that migrate from community to community, depending on the humanitarian support.

Roma in Macedonia² are most of Muslim religious affiliation, but there are also Orthodox and very small number of Catholics. In Šuto Orizari, the Muslim Roma population prevails that usually, in their own religious practice has something of the Orthodox. Roma believers, with the transfer to the minority religious community, leave completely behind their former way of life.

Jehovah witnesses act among Romas almost for two decades. This religious minority counts over 1200 believers in the R. of Macedonia, among them

¹According to the leading stuffs (of evangelical churches) through the large evangelizations, that they practice, a hundreds of Roma pass through, but only a few retain on. The large evangelizations are followed by humanitarian support, that they emphasized as a crucial moments in their participation on the evangelization activities.

² A lot of Roma groups that recruit in minority religious communities, declare themselves as Macedonian

about 25% of Romas. They have their own building in Šuto Orizari where they gather a lot of followers and sympathizers of Jehovah that are not “baptized”³.

Jehovah witnesses practices individual evangelisation. The process of the evangelisation is realized by plan, in regions that are running by local religious seniors. Every believer has his own “space” in the region for evangelisation.

The Seven-Day Adventist Church in the R. of Macedonia has a small number of Romas. In 2000-Th. year, a church structure was built in Šuto Orizari, in which about one hundred church members are gathering. In Kumanovo Adventist church there are about fifthly church members of Roma population.

New-Apostle Church in Macedonia, according to its etiology, is typical Romas church. This one exists in Romas settlements since 1987 and today counts about 50 members. Entire families have approached. This church has its own preacher that is Roma and preaches in Roma language.

Evangelical Church has a long tradition in Romas settlements. Today, more than 10% of its religious base are Roma believers. They practice global evangelizations, in certain period, in tents, followed by humanitarian activity, medical help. A lot of Romas pass through this evangelization.

This religious community, 5 years ago, cut its cooperation with the Evangelical Roma church (God temple-Devleskoro hrami). Since then, this religious community acts separately of this church and those Roma believers, that left Roma church in Šuto Orizari, practice to work in home-communities, to come on serving in the central religious structure. This church develops its activity in home and church communities almost throughout the whole Republic of Macedonia. In its evangelisation action, the Evangelical Church gradually recruits preaching-stuff among Romas.

God Temple – Devleskoro Chrami works separately and don't participate in the Evangelical Alliance. It is running by the first Roma-missioner in the R. of Macedonia⁴. The conflict with the Evangelical Church resulted with their complete separation although there are no differences in their doctrine. This church counts about 50 members, expecting the church structure that is under construction.

The Methodist Church in the R. of Macedonia has its own Roma church communities in Prilep and Kočani, with approximately 50 members, including their families.

Congregational Church, with its resume, begins to work intensively with the Roma population. Soon, own communities was established, that turns latter into church communities. Although the Roma-believers have a range of church communities, they gather in home groups or they practice do come on servings in church structure in the center of Skopje. In Congregational Church Nevigili (Šuto Orizari), a lot of believers were “baptized”, that left this church latter.

The Christian Center in the R. of Macedonia⁵ begins its evangelisation among Roma population about 3.5 years ago. The rate of Roma-believers is about 20% of the total of the believers. Its activity is mostly among Romas from Skopje and in the settlements Šuto Orizari they have their own religious community that counts

³ For official approaching to the community of Jehovah witnesses, beside the personal agreement, an agreement of the leading stuff is necessary, that judge the spiritual mature of the Jehovah follower, who expressed the wish to be baptized.

⁴Severdjan S., approached to the Evangelical Church in 1991 year. He is followed by his wife that works with the kids group.

⁵The Christian Center is a church communities, that belongs to the group of the Pentecostal church. The Pentecostal communities achieves success when Roma people come to Roma population in other countries, but that success is relatively modes among Roma in Macedonia. The Pentecostal mark have almost all formed evangelistic communities and church among Roma population, that is not case with the same communities, for example among Macedonian population. For instance, Congregational Church that belongs in the row of the conservative protestant church, but Congregational Church Nevigili has charismatic elements, especially in the religious-service.

about 70 believers.. On the religious-services always come couple tens their sympathizers and admirers that are not yet officially "baptized".

At this moment, in the Christian Center in Šuto Orizari are working 3 trained assistants of the pastor, and in time about 10 guides of home groups will be recruited with intention to become latter pastor's assistants in his service. Their spiritual improvement will be firstly result of their faith and, of course, that will leave a trace in this religious community.

Evangelical Church, Congregational church, The First Baptist Church and also the Church of God create the union of Evangelical Alliance. The Christian Center and the Second Baptist Church are about to join this alliance, as well.

At a level of the alliance, the listed churches are about for common evangelization. The relatively modest results are due, as they used to say, to the spiritual emptiness the over flown the Macedonian spaces. Of course, a common action would be a great contribution to broadening the legitimacy of this, predominantly, Evangelical churches on this spaces.

The Evangelical churches practice large evangelizations. In the beginning of June, they organize large evangelization, supported by the Argentinean missionary center of Luis Palao⁶. Evangelization will be conducted through more target groups, made according to the professional engagement of the persons included in it⁷.

The large evangelizations continue with activities that are based on individual contact. The individual acting of the preachers, especially of the believers that are in close relations with the potential believers, results with gradual recruiting new believers from Roma population. If the man approached first, then the other members of the family followed him.

The Jehovah witnesses don't use the large missionary activities but they choose the planed end intruding missionary-acting of their believers.

As usual, in talks, especially the preachers, point out that they had no conflicts with the Muslim Community, that the most Roma come from. Relatively poor knowledge of the doctrine teaching, as well as their "weak integration" in the Muslim Community, placed Roma on the margins of this religion. The obvious indolence expressed by the Islamic Community on the leavings of Roma, the preacher of the Christian Center explains with the feeling that Roma are realized, to a certain point, as a "burden".

The creation as well as the further activities, especially of the minority communities in Roma settlements, are strongly supported by the same or very close international religious structures.

These Christian religious communities became recognized for the Roma population especially after the conflict in Kosovo (1998), through the often realized humanitarian activity. The preachers point out that this "impression" to the Roma people is very difficult to be changed, due to the fact that their primary aim is to evangelize them.

As conclusion, I would point out the following:

In Roma settlements, good prospects were existed and also there were created conditions, the basic Roma confessional matrix to undergo bigger changes in the way of approaching to the minority Christian religious communities. But, so far, this process goes slowly, although there was good beginning result.

Roma people, as a target missionary group, show relatively higher level of tolerance to the other religions. A large evangelization is realized on a very easy way, an individual contact is established, but the "filtration" of the stable religious issues goes very hard.

⁶These evangelization was practiced through more countries, in the neighborhood that occurred in the surrounding Balkan countries. This evangelization, the missionary center of Luis Pakao, will support financially (90%) and personally.

⁷ In this evangelization, a target group of Roma-intellectual will be created.

The evangelization of the Roma settlements is followed very often by humanitarian support, education work and health education. That is, for Roma population, very often the crucial moment for recognizing these minority Christian communities.

Roma people, with this transfer to minority Christian communities, completely change their "former life". They become new persons, with new value system and new religious matrix.

The new minority religious communities in Roma settlements work with Roma-preachers as well as preacher's assistants, but there is still no Roma with high-theological education.

The relatively low rate of recruited Roma-believers in the Evangelical churches was an incentive for their unification in order to take over common evangelization activities. In that context is the opening of the children garden where primarily the kids of the believers are settled.

The minority Christian religious communities in Roma settlements have family character, in fact the believers approach together with their families.

The patrijahat family, that revealing in this regions, is very appropriate for successful work of the home religious communities.

The charismatic formal element is dominating in the Roma Evangelical Churches.

Globally, the low rate of recruited Roma-believers is due partially to unplanned, elemental action, that is taken over separately by certain religious communities, and also, no so rare case, even certain foreign missionaries to go and to act directly in the field.

The development of the religious conciseness of the Roma settlements is specific and requires specifically trained staff, particularly Roma staff with high-theological education.

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Magdalena Slavkova

THE “TURKISH GYPSIES” IN BULGARIA AND THEIR NEW RELIGIOUS IDENTITY

There lives a Gypsy community in Bulgaria, called “Turkish Gypsies” by the surrounding population. This name has existed ever since the times of the Ottoman Empire when it was used to mean “Muslims” and it used to reflect the mixing and interchangeability of religion and ethnicity. *Turkish Gypsies* have a differentiated self-consciousness varying between Gypsy and Turkish identity. At times they would define themselves as *Xoraxane Roma* (e.g. “Turkish Gypsies”); at other times as the Gypsy group to which they belong; and very often they would define themselves as “Turks”; not rarely would they use the name “Millet” (e.g. “a people” as ethnically neutral category or as a separate community). Their language is different too; a part of them use *Romanes* (Gypsy language); others are Turkish-speaking; the third use *Romanes* with a lot of Turkish borrowings and influences. Very often both languages are used but the Gypsy language was the more actively used one in the past.

Today most of the representatives of this community live in the East of Bulgaria but they can be found in the Western part of the country as well. This is probably the most numerous Gypsy community in Bulgaria, numbering about 300-400 thousand people (Marushiakova and Popov). This data is approximate and we cannot be certain about the number of the *Turkish Gypsies*, due to the fact that parts of them declare themselves “Turks” when census is taken.

Turkish Gypsies live in the other countries of the South-East Europe as Greece, Romania, the countries of former Yugoslavia. They call themselves and are known by the surrounding population by names meaning “Turkish Gypsies” – *Korane Roma* (Macedonia) (Petrovski, 2000-2002); *Turko – Gifty* (Greece) etc. Some of them are with Turkish identity and are listed as “Turks” when census is taken (for example part of the Gypsies in Macedonia, Romania etc.) or as “Muslims” (in Greece, Bosnia and Herzegovina etc.). Others, since the formation of the independent Balkan states have developed Gypsy self-identity and define themselves today as *Arlia* (Serbia), *Chergari* (Bosnia and Herzegovina) etc. (Guy, 2001). To take a broader view, representatives of the *Turkish Gypsies* community live in Turkey, the countries of Western Europe or inhabit as distant places as Australia etc.

The Gypsy groups started accepting the Islamic religion at the times of the Ottoman Empire, and parallel, the use of the Turkish language for official purposes or in everyday life (Stojanovski, 1989: 127-144; Marushiakova and Popov, 2000). This led to changes in their self-identification as the Turkish identity was replacing the Gypsy. Others, however, retained their Gypsy self-consciousness. After the formation of the independent Bulgarian state the official religion was Christian Orthodox and Bulgarian was the official language. The existing community of Gypsy Muslims found itself into entirely different political and social conditions, which influenced their ethnic self-awareness. The Bulgarian state made several intended attempts to change the Muslim identity of the *Turkish Gypsies*, for example at the end of the XIX c. in the North-West of Bulgaria (Eldarov, 2001: 597), in the 40s of the XX c. in the Faculteta neighbourhood in Sofia (Marushiakova and Popov, 1993: 87), in the 60s of the XX c. (Protocol “A”101 of PB, 1962: 7-10) etc. Thus in the progress of time and at different circumstances parts of the Muslim Gypsies

accepted the Christian Orthodox baptism but remained *Turkish Gypsies* only by their kinship ties and origin. With Turkish ethnic identity are those who continued to be Muslims and stuck to the Turkish festivity-ritual system. The process of “sticking to the Turkish identity” among the *Turkish Gypsies* grew even stronger after the Liberation. In some villages, for example, in Turnovo region (Central Bulgaria) (Dobri dol, Kutsina, Stambolovo etc.) when census was taken in 1893 there were Gypsies registered speaking *Romanes*, while several years later (1910 census) in the same villages there were only “Turks” registered or Gypsies speaking Turkish language (Kolev, 2003: 19-39). The last stage in the development of the community in question started with the successful missions of the Protestant churches among the Muslim Gypsies (former and present) as they fell under the influence of the Evangelical movement (social, cultural and religious).

Turkish Gypsies are a heterogeneous community and have a rather complex, determined at different levels (due to the process of diluting the bounds between the separate groups) and at different directions (towards the Gypsy or Turkish ethnic community, respectively) identity. In the past they used to be divided into separate groups according to the different crafts they practiced, or way of life (settled or nomads) and so on (Petulengro, 1915-1916: 1-109). Today these differences have almost disappeared and there are other differentiation marks as spoken language (Gypsy, Turkish or both), ethnic self-identification (Gypsy identity, *Xoraxane Roma*, e.g. “Turkish Gypsies” or *Turkish Gypsies* with group belonging and identity of “Turks” or [*Millet*]) and religious belonging (former and present Muslims). The latest change in the religious belonging of the *Turkish Gypsies* happened when they accepted Evangelical baptism. Then both religious groups (former and present Muslims) became former Muslims, but what is more important for us is the fact that one of the groups was for a longer period of time in a transitional state before (from Islamic to Christian religion, although the initial direction could be the Orthodox Christianity) accepting the Protestant religion.

To make the picture clearer, let us introduce the main subdivisions of the *Turkish Gypsies* and their characteristic features in groups according to some major criteria – language, community identity and religion (in the past and today), presented in a schematic order:

Type I

A - Spoken language - *Romanes*;

B - They have Roma self-awareness, with preserved group divisions to a certain extent;

C - Former Muslims;

D - A great part of them are Evangelists at the present moment;

Examples – *Kalaidžii* (North-Western Bulgaria), *Katkadžii* [or musicians] (Eastern Bulgaria), *Zagundžii* (Eastern Bulgaria), *Aidii* (South-Eastern Bulgaria) etc.

Type II

A - They speak Gypsy or Turkish; or speak only *Romanes*;

B - They have *Turkish Gypsies* self-awareness (*Xoraxane Roma*); or Roma self-consciousness with preserved group divisions;

C - Some of them have preserved the Islamic religion as the preferred religion; others are Muslims because of their family origin;

D - Only individual representatives of them accept Evangelism;

Examples – *Kamchiboilii* (Eastern Bulgaria), *Futadžii*, *Fichiri* (Southern Bulgaria), *Koshnichari* (district of Shoumen, Eastern Bulgaria) etc.

Type III

A - They speak *Romanes* or Turkish and Gypsy;

B - They have the self-awareness of *Turkish Gypsies* (*Xoraxane Roma*), without preserved group divisions;

C - Muslims by family origin; or follow part of the Islamic cultural tradition;

D - A great part of them are Evangelists at present;

Examples – all over the country.

Type IV

A - They speak Turkish language;

B - They have Turkish self-awareness, especially demonstrated in front of strangers or define themselves as *Millet*;

C - Muslims;

D - Often there are cases when their representatives have accepted Evangelism;

Examples – “sticking to the Turkish identity” and *Millet*.

This classification is relative because we cannot determine with great precision at what time a certain subdivision has stopped keeping the Islamic tradition. Besides, there is a rather long transitional period of religious syncretism. Apart from that, when we speak of former Muslims we mean to what extent a certain Gypsy group “sticks to the Turkish identity”. The classification is not valid in all cases and some of the elements can vary because the cultural (and religious) processes with the Gypsies are not static.

In the presented classification there are groups with Gypsy self-identity and a sense of belonging to the respective group community. They had been following the Islamic tradition long before they became Evangelists and meanwhile some of them accept the Christian Orthodox baptism. The present generations have almost no memory of their Muslim ancestors, although they have the partly preserved Turk-Arab name systems. At the beginning of this century the English vice-consul in Varna – B. Gilliat-Smith (Petulengro) wrote that the *Zagundžii* and *Aidii* were nomadic Muslims (Petulengro, 1915-1916: 1-109). Today the majority of the representatives of these groups is Christians and distinguish themselves from the *Turkish Gypsies* (Type I) to some extent.

Among the *Turkish Gypsies* community there are the more or less preserved groups of *Kamchiboilii* (Eastern Bulgaria), *Futadžii*, *Fichiri* (Southern Bulgaria), *Koshnichari* (the district of Shoumen) etc. They have a self-consciousness of *Turkish Gypsies*, but always point out their group belonging (defined as origin-name or nick-name) (Type II).

Another part of the *Turkish Gypsies* have lost part of their group characteristics and are self-defined within the frames of a larger community, that of the *Turkish Gypsies* (or *Xoraxane Roma*) (all over the country). Sometimes when *Xoraxane Roma* live among representatives of the *Millet* they can accept the name “*Milliet*”, using it as an explanatory notion. In case the group does not live among Turks and it is impossible for it to follow this way of life it gradually leaves the Muslim cultural system behind, and they remain *Turkish Gypsies* by family origin (South-Western Bulgaria). In many cases they are bilingual, they speak *Romanes* and Turkish, as the Turkish is sometimes the language they use to communicate in the family and with the Turkish community. In the district of Silistra (North-Eastern Bulgaria) the *Turkish Gypsies* are called “*Alaidžaci*” by the representatives of the *Millet*. The name is considered offensive and is not used by them. Sometimes *Xoraxane Roma* are called “*Laxori*” by the other groups, for example the *Katkadžii* in the town of Kableschkovo

(South-Eastern Bulgaria) use this name when they refer to *Xoraxane Roma* in a neighbourhood in the vicinity. This name has a negative connotation and is not always acceptable (Type III).

There is a big group of Turkish-speaking Gypsies where only the oldest generation speaks *Romanes*, influenced by the Turkish language (Eastern, South-Western Bulgaria). They have strongly manifested Turkish self-awareness, particularly so in front of strangers and identify themselves as “Turks”, *Millet/ Milliet* or simply as “Muslims”. There is no strict differentiation among the “Turks”, *Millet* or Muslim identification and very often the group of the *Millet*, for instance, may use the three of them. In very rare cases are they inclined to accept a possible Gypsy origin, but then they point out that they had among their ancestors a female great-grandparent “H/asal kadanka” (“a real Turk”). A great part of them retain their Turkish self-awareness after they have accepted the Protestant religion. They stick to the Islamic cultural system before they accept the Evangelical baptism.

With the *Millet* the group boundaries are preserved to some extent and they are differentiated as *Mehter-Millet* (e.g. musicians) and *Usta-Millet* (e.g. craftsman or blacksmiths). There is also the name “Charale” (which is also used in the sense of craftsmen or blacksmiths). *Usta-Millet* is not always differentiated from *Mehter* and often get married become relatives. *Xoraxane Roma* call the representatives of the *Millet Charale*, meaning craftsmen. *Usta-Millet* consider this name offensive and do not use it because of its probable Gypsy origin. The Turks do not accept *Usta* and *Mehter* as part of their ethnic group and call them “Chingene”, e.g. “Gypsies” (Type IV).

* * *

The influence of the **Evangelical movement** among the **Turkish Gypsies** in Bulgaria as tendency is part of the worldwide Gypsy Evangelical movement (Gay y Blasco, 1999; Zanellato; Williams, 2002; Lange, 2003 and many others). This religious movement of the Gypsy groups is called Evangelical, because of the inadequacy of the term Protestant in those countries where Protestantism is the official religion and therefore cannot be differentiated from the religion of the majority. Most authors prefer this term as well (Lazell, 1997; Liègeois, 1999: 85-88; Acton; Gay y Blasco, 2000: 1-22 etc.). In Bulgaria, however, this movement can be called Protestant too, because the Protestant religion has never had strong positions among the Bulgarian society and has always been in the position of an “alien religion”. Parts of the Adventists in Bulgaria define themselves not as Evangelists but only as Protestants. In some cases the Adventist Gypsies also stick to the differentiation between Protestants and Evangelists. Both names are used in the text.

In Bulgaria there exists and functions the Protestant Alliance, uniting part of the existing Protestant churches. It includes - the Methodist (MCh), the Congregationalist (CCh), the Baptist (BCh), the Pentecostal (PCh) and Bulgarian God’s Church (BGCh). Outside the Protestant Alliance remain the following churches: United God’s Church (UGCh) and the Adventist church (ACh). They are included in organizations of their own churches. The Gypsy churches are registered in all officially recognized Protestant denominations.

The purposeful work of the Protestant missionaries among the Gypsy Muslims began in the first years of the XXc. A famous missionary among the Gypsies in the country was the Bulgarian preacher Petar Minkov. In Evangelist magazine¹

¹ Evangelist magazine was issued by the Alliance of Evangelical Baptist Churches in Bulgaria. It was published in period 1920-1938 and in 1939 was transferred to Christian Friend magazine, which was published only a year.

The ‘Turkish Gypsies’ in Bulgaria and Their New Religious Identity

(Evangelist, 1927, No. 7: 2) dated 1927, it says: “... In March three women of the *Kaldžii* tribe were baptized in the town of Ferdinand. These are the first baptized women of this tribe which confesses the Islamic religion. On the day preceding the baptizing the husband of one of the sisters, who is an infidel, forbade her to be baptized. He threatened to expel her. In order to keep the peace in the family we were inclined to postpone the baptizing, but she was determined in her decision to be baptized with the others and we could not refuse. Her belief and stamina were so big that it made her husband stand back. Now they live a normal life...”. The article was signed by Petar Minkov. A night school was opened in the 20s in the town of Ferdinand (present town of Montana, North-Western Bulgaria), which was a school for the illiterate and where a great part of the attendees were former Gypsy Muslims (Evangelist, 1932, No. 7: 12).

In the beginning of the 30s of the XXc. was established a Committee of Gypsy Evangelical Mission with missionary among the Gypsies, pastor Minkov. The Evangelical Mission tried to establish a sermon hall in the town of Vidin (North-Western Bulgaria) especially for the purposes of the Gypsy Muslims. The Committee had to face the strong opposition of the Holy Synod and the Metropolitan Bishop of Vidin, rvd. Neophyte (CGEM, 1932-1933). When the Protestant pastors began their missionary activity among the Gypsies they had to take into consideration the religious affiliations of the laity. Thus at the very start it was of prior importance to work among the two groups – Orthodox Gypsies and Gypsy Muslims. The religious activity of the Protestant missionaries consisted in conducting several evangelizations and sermons with a certain community of people, and the establishment of a central church, after which the preachers (foreign or Bulgarian) ceased their activity among that community. The central church itself continued developing and working for the opening of new church bodies, which initially became its branches and later on separated as independent ones. The same procedure is followed by all Gypsy churches, including those among the *Turkish Gypsies*.

Presently the prayer homes of the *Turkish Gypsies* in Bulgaria are not centrally unified because they do not have the awareness of belonging to a community. Attempts have been made to unify religious communities with Turkish identity and churches with Gypsy identity. With both groups the processes develop in different ways. *Turkish Gypsies* with Gypsy identification are a comparatively open community because they have the self-awareness of belonging to the Gypsy ethnic group. Their pastors take part in the Protestant congregations of other Gypsy groups in Bulgaria and abroad. The group of the *Millet* however are an exceptionally closed community because of the lack of “ethnic confidence” and enough respect on the side of the surrounding population towards the chosen by them identity. Its representatives communicate only in the group of the believers, and the pastors have established connections with religious leaders within the frames of the Turkish-speaking community in the country or with Evangelists from the Muslim countries – Turkey, Iran etc. On the other side the connections of the respective Evangelical community with other religious groups depend to a great extent on the mobility of the pastor. The more mobile the religious leader is the more due confidence he possesses to take part in the congregations of other Gypsy groups, although his very presence is justified by his high esteem, not by the fact that he and his church are part of the Gypsy Evangelical movement. Of course, with some of the pastors from the *Millet* group certain actions do remind an identity game. In certain cases they demonstrate distinctively expressed Turkish ethnic belonging, but when contacts with Gypsy sponsors are concerned, they do not hesitate to take advantage.

In the beginning of the 90s of the XXc. the “Roma-Turk” mission was organized with the cooperation of American pastors. One of the leaders of the mission is a Bulgarian pastor from Bourgas (South-Eastern Bulgaria) with assistants – a Roma pastor from the town of Jambol (South-Eastern Bulgaria), from the *Aidia* group (for “Roma” mission) and a religious leader from the *Millet* group (for “Turk” mission) from the town of Bourgas. The mission functioned only a couple of years, because in February 1994 there were changes in the People and Family Act and article 133-A was introduced. According to it, corporate bodies with non-business activity (foundations and associations) carrying out religious or religious-educational activity should attain a permit to continue their functions by the Department of Ecclesiastical Matters (Official Gazette, No. 18 from 18.II. 1994). After the 90s there have been several periodical meetings of pastors from the Turkish-speaking community held in Eastern Bulgaria under the initiative of the Turkish-speaking German preacher Stephan Pilz. A great part of the pastors of the *Millet* group were invited. Similar in kind was the conference held in Rousse (North-Eastern Bulgaria) in 2002 as well as many others. Sometimes unofficial meetings are held of Turkish-speaking pastors and their Turkish colleagues by regions - for example, a meeting of the preachers from the district of Silistra, Rousse or Razgrad (North-Eastern Bulgaria) etc.

After the 90s the function of the Bulgarian Protestant churches has continued, at times in cooperation with foreign missionaries, with the purpose of disseminating the belief among the *Turkish Gypsies* in Bulgaria. The sermons and evangelizations of the churches are organized in such a way as to reach everyone, notwithstanding their language and ethnic belonging. Their special missions among the *Turkish Gypsy* community are organized according to this principle. Among the *Millet* the preachers are usually of Turkish origin or come from the same group, because that makes their admission in the community easier. For example the GCh of Providence in the town of Rousse, after several years of hard work among the Gypsy Muslims in the region there appeared the churches in Selemetia neighbourhood, among the *Millet* group (called also “blacksmiths”); a religious community in the village of Slivo pole (the district of Rousse), among the *Xoraxane Roma* etc. In the district of Silistra the Bulgarian UGCh has strong holds. There is a sermon in Turkish every Thursday there. A great part of the visitors come from the *Millet* group. The UGCh has managed to organize prayer homes in some neighbouring regions in the district – the towns of Dulovo and Glavnitza, the villages of Poroino, Pravda etc. At the end of the 90s in the village of Golesh, where lives *Usta-Millet*, American missionaries gave away the New Testament to the residents. In 2002 the UGCh-Silistra carried out evangelization in the community cultural centre and the film “Jesus” was shown, books written by the head pastor were handed away to the people. In the village of Bogdanci (Glavinitsa municipality, the district of Silistra) there has existed a church of the *Turkish Gypsies (Millet)* ever since the 90s. Its pastor holds connections with UGCh and reads sermons in Turkish in the central building. The church in Bogdanci has its own branches in the town of Tutrakan (the district of Silistra), the village of Nova Cherna (Tutrakan region), the Gypsy neighbourhood in Silistra and the people to visit it are mainly from the *Xoraxane Roma* and the *Millet*. There are organized churches among the *Turkish Gypsies* in the town of Bourgas and the region – in the neighbourhoods of the town (Pobeda, Meden Rudnik, Dolno and Gorno Ezerovo), and in the region in (the villages of Zidarovo, Troianovo and Kableshkovo etc.). The visitors are mainly from the group of the *Millet*, *Katkadžii*, *Zagundžii*, *Xoraxane Roma*, fewer from the *Kamchiboilii* etc. One of the most recent evangelizations in the region is the one in 2003 in the housing complex of Sarafovo, Bourgas. The service was conducted by American pastors. *Turkish Gypsies* were present as well and

members of the churches in the town of Kableskovo (the district of Bourgas). For the sake of comparison we will point out that there are prayer homes in South-Western Bulgaria, too, which appeared among *Turkish Gypsies* – in the town of Sandanski, the nearby villages but Protestantism has not penetrated among “the Gypsies with Turkish affiliations” there.

Our purpose here was not to offer a chronological and geographical outline of the appearance of all the religious communities and prayer homes among the *Turkish Gypsies* but to point out a few examples which prove the fact that the missionary work among the *Turkish Gypsies* in Bulgaria has had a long tradition. It would be of greater interest to show how the Evangelical model (social, cultural and religious) penetrates the life of that Gypsy community.

In purely religious sense, being a follower of one of the Protestant trends would mean accepting Jesus Christ for a personal savior and abiding by the regulations and norms in the prayer home and outside it. We can provisionally differentiate two main trends in the Protestant movement in Bulgaria; the first comprises the MCh, CCh, BCh and ACh; to the second we can include the PCh and its branches God's Churches – BGCh, UGCh and their subbranches – New Generation, GCh of Providence, Christian Church of “Sion” etc. The services at the MCh, CCh, BCh and ACh include a silent prayer, without the practice of ritual dances. Being part of the Pentecostal trend (called also “charismatic”) would mean having a gift (charisma), which is expressed by the presence of the Holy Spirit and the ability to speak “divine” languages (glossolalia). The presence of the Holy Spirit could even lead to falling into trance. The services at the churches of that trend include a lot of dance movements. The consecration and participation in the divine dances means giving up any worldly rhythms (traditional folk dances as “horó”, modern dances etc.). As we have pointed out this division is provisional, because every denomination has to a certain extent its own structure and religious rules which determine its specific features. For the Gypsy Evangelists, themselves, it is not of such great importance which church their denomination belongs to, but rather the fact that they are “believers”, “believers in Christ” etc. And last but not least the fact that there are cases of rejecting the new faith and returning to the Islamic religion and a resumed second acceptance of Evangelism (the second acceptance of Protestantism is not always obligatory). One of our informers from the Silistra region, in the mid-90s, got married for the second time for a Muslim from the town of Svishtov (Northern Bulgaria). When she entered the home of her new husband “the worldly man” (as she called him), she had already become a believer. They lived together about three years. On the second year of their mutual life, her husband would not let her visit the church and she gave it up, although she had water and spiritual baptism in the Holy Spirit. After she left her husband because he had forbidden her to attend Evangelical services, B. returned to her home town and resumed her visits to the church there. At the present moment there is a church in her house. When in 2002 the UGCh conducted evangelization in the village of Golesh (the district of Silistra) a great part of the *Usta-Millet* gathered in the local cultural centre. At this service in the cultural centre was another informer of the same village, hoping to cure her sick legs. Having met the strong opposition of the local imam, the Evangelists had to cease activity for awhile in this village. Our informer now complains, saying that not only could not she cure her legs but the others still mocked at her for attending Christian meetings. The family of Ž. from the *Zagundžii* group used to attend the Evangelical services at one of the home churches in the neighbourhood. After the family church stopped functioning the family of Ž. stopped attending Protestant services altogether.

Every Protestant, having accepted the Evangelical baptizing, is acknowledged as part of the world of the Christians and believers, part of the sacred world. They rank highest God (*Edevles* [a case form], *Dell*, *Devel* with the Gypsy-speaking and Allah with the Turkish speaking) and Jesus Christ (Issa with the Turkish-speaking). The Holy Spirit (Kutsal Ruh for the Turkish-speaking) is especially revered among the believers of the Pentecostal Church. In some cases God and Jesus Christ are differentiated (in the *Millet* group), while in other cases God and Jesus Christ are perceived as one and the same (with most of the groups, which is actually closer to the idea of the Evangelism, the foremost belief in Jesus Christ). Outside stays the worldly life which only leads to disappointment and disasters caused by the Devil (*Beng* or Sheitan). The less the Gypsy believers are in touch with the outside world, the less contacts they have with the worldly people, the less defiled they would be.

Similar conceptually are the Gypsy prohibitions *ma(h)rime* (e.g. “defilement”). Traditionally the Gypsy groups divide the world into two groups, the world of the Gypsies and the world of the *gadje* (“the others”, “the strangers”), e.g. *romania/ mahrime* (Sutherland, 1986; Steward, 1997). What is meant is the contact with *gadje*, which is limited to a certain degree and refers to a set of rules of behaviour of the Gypsies (for different parts of the body considered dirty, prohibition to eat together with inferior Gypsy groups, contacts with dirty people – people who ignore the prohibitions etc.). The prohibitions (*mahrime*) are not as strict for all Gypsy groups and have different versions (Marushiakova and Popov, 1997). After accepting the belief the Gypsies tend to separate the world of the believers and the world of the unbelievers/ the infidel. The first model implies limiting the social and contacts with the non-Gypsies (*gadje*), while the second model avoids contacts with the worldly way of life and the unbelievers (notwithstanding their ethnic identity). The degree of perception of the world in this way depends on how long the family or the group have been Evangelists, whether they have the self-conscience of believers, the authority of the pastor of the church etc.

One of the main ideas of the Evangelical churches led by the pastors is to change (to a certain extent) the life the Gypsies have had so far, concerning their everyday life, social life and festivity rituals and practices and the family cycle. The depletion of the coincidence between the biblical commandments and the traditional customs, a coincidence often proclaimed as superstition, must be overcome. This change, on its own, affects the self-awareness of the Gypsy communities. With the different sub-divisions of the *Turkish Gypsies*, which we defined in the first part of the text, the processes do not proceed equally because they stop being Muslims at different stages. It would be adequate to point out here that the Evangelical model, which the church tries to establish, cannot be found in its ultimate variant in terrain research. The closest to it only get the pastors and their closest officials and their families. On the other side great importance plays the duration of influence of the Evangelical model among a particular group.

The everyday life of the *Turkish Gypsies* is constructed in close dependence on the Evangelical religion. The Bible (no matter whether it is in Bulgarian or Turkish) is one of the main objects to be found in every house. It is placed in a visible position as a sign that it is a home of Evangelists, so that it can be used by everyone who needs it. In case not all family members are believers it is placed somewhere hidden, so as not to cause conflicts in the relationships especially in families of active Muslims. The interior of the home does not change considerably because of the financial constraints of the believers. It is interesting to note the appearances of different pictures, crucifixes, wall rugs, magazine cuttings or calendars with biblical

character – for example Communion, Christ’s Crucifix, different scenes of his life etc. Sometimes Orthodox icons can be seen too. In this case the icons are not placed as an Orthodox sign but the believers need to feel the constant presence of Jesus Christ. Although the church forbids icons in the prayer homes, they are present in some of the Evangelists’ homes. The believers juxtapose their home to other homes – it is clean, silent (there are neither rows nor loud worldly music), there is always a Bible, enough food for the family, they have more material belongings, because they are blessed etc. The everyday clothes of the *Turkish Gypsies* do not change considerably. The women (especially the elderly) from the *Usta-Millet*, *Xoraxane Roma* etc. even after accepting Evangelism continue wearing the traditional shalwars. When in the church the older women necessarily wear scarves on their heads. The young do not obey this rule but yet they have to be neatly dressed and the girls are not allowed to wear make-up. For most of the believers (except some of the Adventists) there are no food prohibitions. Before each meal the family members say a prayer and thank God for bestowing food on them. In their everyday life smoking and drinking (“do not drink on wine but on the Holy Spirit” - part of a sermon among of the *Millet* group in the district of Rousse) are seen as vices, which have to be overcome. Sometimes some of the pastors do not obey these rules (the prohibition to smoke). Very often there are cases when men after they had taken the baptism, refuse to take part in fights and rows. In connection with the good attitude towards one’s fellowmen, the believers give up swearing (“a believer has no right to swear” – an informer from the town of Sandanski) and cursing. The believers’ vocabulary changes after accepting Evangelism. There are no obscene words but God and Jesus Christ are often present.

After the Evangelical baptism of some member of the family the relationships in the family change, especially when the others are still Muslims. This could lead to conflicting situations and misunderstandings between the spouses and parents. One informer from the Bourgas region started visiting the local church, but after the numerous problems she started having with her husband, she gave up. The family of X. from the *Millet* group, the region of Silistra went through many trials until they live together again. At the end of the 80s X’s mother-in-law fell ill with epilepsy. After the unsuccessful attempts of the local doctors, she asks the children to take her to the imam. He did not help the ill woman either. Then they heard of Evangelical churches which cured the suffering. When his mother-in-law recovered from the illness, he and his wife went to work in the town of Razgrad. There he started visiting the local Evangelical house. The accusations of his wife were that becoming a Christian he was becoming a Bulgarian. His wife decided to divorce him because he was denying the family traditions. One night she had a dream and saw her husband standing on a road, asking her to go with her but she refused. That is how she decided to accept Jesus Christ as her personal savior. Influenced by a member of the family, the others started visiting the Evangelical church too. In this case there is a conflicting situation between the family and the rest of the clan. The family either restricts its contacts with the relatives or cuts them short. For example, the family of pastor X. from the Bourgas region does not have any contacts with the relatives who live in a neighbouring housing complex, because of their accusations against them for denying their Turkish origin and accepting Christian religion.

Being a comparatively open community the *Turkish Gypsies* with Gypsy self-consciousness maintain connections with Evangelists from other Gypsy groups. In Dolno Ezerovo neighbourhood in the town of Bourgas and in a next-door village of Ravnetz both members of the *Turkish Gypsies* and the *Rudari (Kopanari)* go to the same church. In the village of Troianovo, district of Bourgas, after a period of

common services the groups of *Rudari* and *Turkish Gypsies* were separated in their own prayer homes, because both groups expressed their desire to pray and preach in their own languages (Romanian and Gypsy). In the town of Kableskovo all *Turkish Gypsies* visit the PCh in the centre of town, run by a Bulgarian pastor, but the different groups (*Katkadžii* and *Xoraxane Roma*) have separate home churches. The group of the *Millet* is comparatively closed to the other *Turkish Gypsies*, because they have a preferred Turkish identity and when they refuse to praise God, together with the other Gypsy communities, they demonstrate this difference. There are exceptions of course, but in these cases the differentiation between the groups are kept. For example, in neighbourhoods of Meden Rudnik and Gorno Ezerovo in Bourgas, the *Millet* and the *Zagundžii* go to the same church with a pastor from the group of the *Millet*. The *Turkish Gypsies* who have accepted the Evangelical baptism do not form a unified religious community, because with the separate subdivisions (as defined in the first part of the text) the processes connected with their identity go along different ways. On the other hand there are cases of accepting and rejecting Evangelism and that is why we cannot state with certainty that *Turkish Gypsies* do necessarily refuse their Muslim tradition (especially with groups with preserved characteristics). The believers are not totally isolated from their Muslim relatives and keep family contacts on the basis of tolerance, although a considerable part of the contacts has been limited. *Turkish Gypsies* with Gypsy self-consciousness are not accepted wholeheartedly by the other Gypsy groups; for them they are still the *Turkish Gypsies*. In Sredna Kula neighbourhood in the town of Rousse both Bulgarian Gypsies (*Kardarashi*) and *Turkish Gypsies* go the same church building for divine services. However the *Kardarashi* will always refer to the *Turkish Gypsies* as Tsutsumani (by this name they show their negative and derogatory attitude to all the other Gypsies), although they are believers. The Turks believers express considerable tolerance to the *Millet* for the chosen by them identity, which allows their common services, although they would still remain “Chingene” (“Gypsies”).

The common custom system and the family cycle of rituals of the *Turkish Gypsies* is one of the spheres where the church is trying to establish the Evangelical model, which means that the previous superstitions and traditions have to be overcome. The contemporary condition of the festivity and family cycle of the different subdivisions of the *Turkish Gypsy* groups is not fixed and stable because they stop keeping the Islamic traditions at different times.

At childbirth, if the parents are believers, they take the child to the local church to the pastor to read a prayer (to bless it) and to introduce it to the community of believers, who pray for the child to be guarded until it receives the Holy Baptism. The Baptism (this is not a spiritual baptism, as most of Evangelical churches insist on having it at one’s conscious years) is organized as a family gathering at home, if most of them are believers, and the pastor is invited too. The traditional “sjunet” (circumcision), “kidnapping” or “haircut” are claimed as incorrect and their practice is not recommended.

When young people become of marriageable age they choose partners among the *Turkish Gypsy* believers. One of the sons of a pastor in the village of Bogdanci (district of Silistra) liked a girl from the *Millet* group in Razgrad. When he went to ask for her hand, he says that God helped him in his choice. In other cases the girl can go and ask from the parents a respected person, for instance the pastor. The wedding is sometimes preceded by an engagement but not always. And yet if there is an engagement, a pastor of authority is invited to bless the young couple. Today’s wedding is not like the “old” wedding, says an informer (when they were Muslims – M.S.) – in terms of duration and rituals. In the day of the wedding there

is first the civil wedding in the local Town Hall Registry Office and then the young are blessed in the Evangelical church. The ceremony in the church is seen as presenting the young to God and is not associated with the traditional wedding ritual. No smoking or alcohol is allowed at the party table, there are no traditional dances (with the Pentecostal division), but this is not kept strictly at all weddings. When the young couple does not have the financial means to organize the ceremony and have to wait until some money is collected, they go to the preacher in the church and he reads a prayer. After this blessing the marriage can be consummated.

At funerals the pastor is called for at home where he reads a prayer. God's word is preached to those present (Meden Rudnik neighbourhood, Bourgas). When the body is buried it is wrapped in a "kefin" (burial cloth) and is put to the grave (the district of Silistra), or is placed in a coffin (Sandanski, the district of Sofia). There are men and women present at the funeral. After that no memorial services are held, no food is given away for the dead, black is not worn and it is advisable to avoid all the other traditional rituals. This comes from the idea that the real life of a righteous Christian begins after death. According to the Gypsy Evangelists the body remains in the earth but the spirit of the Evangelical Christian joins God in heaven: "...and now we live with the hope that one day our bodies will be resurrected..." (Sandanski region), or "...God will descend in full glory and will raise first the dead and then they will come to life..." (Sandanski region). Usually the Evangelists are buried in the common graveyards if there are no separate places there or anywhere else in the village. For instance with the *Xoraxane Roma* Evangelists in the village of Slivo Pole, the district of Rousse, the dead are buried in the Muslim graveyard, because there are no other ones. A wooden pile is put on the grave and a gravestone for the richer (Meden Rudnik, Bourgas) or a cross (the village of Ravnetz, Bourgas district).

When talking about the burial ritual every informer tries to explain how the very funeral should be conducted, as the pastor has taught them, but always mention a traditional moment and then say that is how things used to be done. Sometimes they tell of cases when a family of believers sent for an imam at a funeral (village of Ravnets, Bourgas region; Pobeda neighbourhood, Bourgas etc.) or the wife who was a believer was buried in the same burial space with her husband who was a Muslim etc., but always specify that this happened in another village or town or that they have heard about this practice from other people. In this case it is important to know how long the informers have been Evangelists, if they had ever been active Muslims before they accepted the Evangelical baptism and whether at the time of the research they had not rejected the new faith. A great part of the *Turkish Gypsies* have not been Evangelists for long and when talking about burial practices very few of them mean a personal experience. It is with the other family practices – birth, weddings, that the Evangelical model enters more quickly, due to the fact that compared to the burial ones they are not as conservative. At funerals, even if the informers have been Evangelists for long, they have not been believers for so long as to choose the Evangelical funeral. Also, it is not necessary for all the family members and relatives to be Evangelists, or in cases when the young are Evangelists but the older have remained Muslims, usually when the old are buried it is according to their choice.

The biggest Protestant holidays are Easter and Christmas, and from the services – Communion. At Easter and Christmas there are holy services devoted to the Son of God with a lot of songs. At some churches there are performances where children play biblical plays, recite poems, learnt at the Sunday school etc. God's Supper is not fixed in the calendar (could be held at the beginning of each month, when "God informs the pastor about it or some of the brothers and sisters" etc.). The God's Supper is "memory of Christ's sacrifice at the cross" (Sandanski region) and it

includes wine and unleavened bread. They are administered by the pastor to the believers who want to receive the Holy Communion. Sometimes there is also the ritual “washing of the feet” of the brothers and sisters. After accepting the Evangelical baptism the traditional Muslim feasts Ramazan Bairam, Kurban Bairam, Hederlez etc. should not be practiced, nor the respective rituals. We should again point out that part of the *Turkish Gypsies* in Bulgaria are such only by origin and they very rarely celebrate the Muslim holidays (for instance a pastor in Sandanski mentions – “our Gypsies call an imam only in cases of death, and perform Orthodox rituals at other times”). Others are followers of the Islam just before accepting Evangelism. There are elderly *Xoraxane Roma* (about 50-60 years of age), in the Bourgas district (Dolno Ezerovo neighbourhood; the village of Ravnets), who do not remember keeping the Ramazan or Bairam, but still do the Ederlezi. Unlike them, the *Millet* and part of the *Xoraxane Roma* in the districts of Rouse and Silistra celebrate Muslim holidays which are practiced by the Turkish population. These differences in the keeping of the Muslim tradition have influenced the festivity customs in the families after the acceptance of Evangelism. The family of the female pastor in the village of Ravnets, Bourgas district, still celebrates 6, May and prepare boiled mutton as an offering, but does not offer it to God (*Dell*), but uses the holiday as a good reason to meet with relatives. The *Millet* in the village of Golesh (district of Silistra) who have visited several Evangelical meetings, organized by the UGCh in Silistra, still celebrate the Ederlezi, but do not always offer a lamb because of financial constraints. A *Xoraxane Roma* family in Tutrakan region celebrate the Muslim holidays at present and still visit the Softa baba in Tutrakan at Ederlezi and during the month of Ramazan, although they have been gathering for Evangelical services at home for two years now, and their daughter has had a water baptism.

The change in the everyday, religious and cultural life of the *Turkish Gypsies* makes it possible for the different groups to identify themselves in a certain way. The processes in the groups go along diverse ways and the self-awareness is on a different level. *Turkish Gypsies* with preserved group characteristics, where the processes of evangelization have been running for the last few years, still identify themselves as *Turkish Gypsies* and the group (or origin) to which they belong is specified. In conversation with them they might explain that they have been visiting the local Evangelical church. Part of these *Turkish Gypsies* (for example the *Katkadzii* in the town of Kableschkovo) have a rather complex identity and therefore can define themselves as *Dassikane Roma*, “Roma Gypsies”, or Gypsies, specifying that they are Evangelists etc. The group of the *Turkish Gypsies* without any specified community characteristics define themselves as *Xoraxane Roma*, but also believers (districts of Bourgas, Rouse and Silistra). Others who have a longer Muslim family history compared to them, can identify themselves in quite an interesting way, for instance – “I used to be a Gypsy before, now I am Christian” (Evangelical Christian - M.S.) or “I am a Gypsy but my father was a Turk” etc. (Sandanski region). The community of the *Millet* in its greater part preserves its Turkish identity, which is based on the spoken Turkish language (Turkish is also the language used at religious services, which is a very important fact in this case) and the preserved Turk-Arab names, although the representatives of other groups might also have returned their Muslim names. There are cases when they have a Muslim self-awareness although they have been visiting Evangelical meetings for some time. In this case by “Muslim” they mean different from the Gypsies and Bulgarians, e.g. the Turks.

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In conclusion we must point out that we are talking about two main tendencies – the keeping and development of Gypsy identity in different varieties (*Xoraxane Roma*, to be identified only by the group they belong to, only Gypsies etc.) and keeping the Turkish ethnic self-awareness (*Mehter* and *Usta-Millet* etc.). In many of the cases the ethnic or group self-identification turns out to be as important as the new religious self-awareness for belonging to the religion of Evangelism.

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